Philosophy Forums
Forums Articles Gallery Links


Register Login Members Calendar New Posts Search Chat Help
Philosophy Forums » Philosophy of Science » Will AI robots ever be conscious? » Will AI robots ever be conscious?

Will AI robots ever be conscious?

PrintPrint


Page: First 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Will AI robots ever be conscious?
Slipstick Libby
Aspirant

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 28, 2009

Total Topics: 0
Total Posts: 28
Posted 11/02/09 - 09:33 AM:
quote post
#131
Kamerynn wrote:

They are certainly acting in a way that is consistent with them being conscious. However, there is an assumption implicit in the idea that their behavior then demonstrates their consciousness. The very same assumption would lead us from seeing someone pretend to be in pain to the belief that they actually are in pain.

I'm not saying that amoeba aren't conscious; I'm saying that I'm not sure if they are. They could be acting as if.


I simply know that a rock will not roll away from a hammer simply because the hammer is near it. It is my impression that any entity which internally responds to external stimuli is conscious. That may be because I have an open opinion of the matter, and no reason to separate the sorts of behaviors of cells from the sorts of behaviors of more complex organisms.


It depends on what you mean. Molecules can be arranged in particular fashions, resulting in solidity, liquidity, or gaseousness. However, the emergent properties of those solids, liquids, or gases will depend on the element (the material) and not just the organization. Of course, in the end, all elements are just different arrangements of electrons, protons, and neutrons. I can see someone objecting to the thought that "it isn't the materials that matter" based on the former reasoning (and thus perhaps missing your point?) and I can also see one agreeing based on the latter.

This is important to draw out; if, by "materials," one is referring to elements (or, on any higher level, things composed by elements), then the material certainly does matter. Only the combination of the right material (say, carbon) as well as its organization (resulting in, say, diamond) amounts to something with a particular "hardness." In this sense, higher level properties depend on both matter and organization. It seems reasonable that only certain materials, in a particular organization, would produce consciousness.


Are not different elements composed of the same materials differing only in organization and quantity? Consider the difference between helium and hydrogen.

Elements aren't the smallest form of matter. There are materials that the elements are made of. There are also materials that those materials are made of.

If the elements which make up compounds are not distinguished by the materials which make them up and only the arrangement/quantity of certain materials, then it isn't the "matter" that matters but the structure. Maybe I'm taking a bit too holistic of an approach.

We can certainly understand the brain by understanding brain events, i.e., interactions that occur within the brain. That we can pair brain event x with pain, and brain event y with one acting as if she's in pain, still depends on reports about pain. Even if we measure different kinds of stress in the body, we still only know that those body events are pain events because we have already correlated them with pain itself. That is, reports of pain must play a role at some point in our scientific explanation of pain events, be they in the brain or in the body.


http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs...902160318#STS=g1jibzto.pw2

As you can see, it does not rely upon reports anymore. Through observation and comparison of neural activity, MRI technicians can now see who is and who is not experiencing chronic pain.
Slipstick Libby
Aspirant

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 28, 2009

Total Topics: 0
Total Posts: 28
Posted 11/02/09 - 09:39 AM:
quote post
#132
ssu wrote:
It's obvious that your understanding of what is consciousness differs from mine a lot. To me your example is a very good example of something that hasn't have to do anything with consciousness. It is more likely that an amoeba has built in detectors to do just that: to move away when noticed harmful substances rather than it makes itself a conscious decision: "UH oh...that's a harmful substance there, perhaps I should swim away from it". The human body performs a lot of vital tasks that we as humans do not control consciously: just think about the immune system. Would in your view the immune system would be somehow "conscious" of viruses etc? Futher thinking about it: it is easy to build machines that can follow this kind of basic "if...then" program: if you want to program a robot to do something when in contact with water, just put a detector on the robot to notice H2O. As Kamerynn already said, behaviour that is consistent with conscious acting doesn't have to be conscious acting. And here I'd advise to follow the next quote: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.


Tell me, please, how your understanding of consciousness is different from my apparent understanding of consciousness. Does your understanding of consciousness encompass more than response to stimuli?

Now a far more interesting debate would be, if one could somehow teach amoebas to do something that they do not usually do in nature (and here altering the amoebas organs isn't teaching). But first it would be good to an agreement on what conscious means. In my view we learn to be conscious, it is not something we own inherently from birth or at the moment of fertilation (even if inherently have the ability to become conscious).


How does teaching a single cell organism new tricks have anything to do with presence of consciousness?

I disagree with this view. My view is that we are conscious at conception but don't have the organs to retain memories of experience.

Yes, but think what about you dream about. Dreams do have a connection what you have experienced awake. One can fantasize awake, but still there's a connection to what we have learned, experienced with the outside world, even if think about something we haven't seen. Still you need some, if minimal, interaction with the outside world.


I have had dreams about earth breaking apart and huge chunks floating into space. I have had dreams about man sized bi-pedal lizards with unbelievably long tongues lopping off the heads of loved ones. I've had dreams of impossible geometrical shapes floating in my grasp spinning and changing shapes in varying ways unrelated to my will for them to stay one shape. Tell me, were those things caused by some external entity at the time that I experienced them?
Mijin
Registered Offender
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Nov 05, 2003
Location: Birmingham, England

Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 390
Posted 11/02/09 - 10:32 AM:
quote post
#133
Slipstick Libby wrote:

It is my impression that any entity which internally responds to external stimuli is conscious. That may be because I have an open opinion of the matter, and no reason to separate the sorts of behaviors of cells from the sorts of behaviors of more complex organisms.


Your "open opinion" is what leads you to decree that any behaviour consistent with consciousness is proof of consciousness, and to not even consider the possibility that they may simply be behaving in a knee-jerk way with no subjective awareness.

In fact, Kamerynn hasn't made an assertion on the matter. You're the one making a claim about amoeba.


Does your understanding of consciousness encompass more than response to stimuli?


Of course. Neither the philosophical nor simple dictionary definition of consciousness is "responding to stimuli".

At best, you're confusing intelligence with consciousness. But even here just "responding to stimuli" is a very weak definition of intelligence, since an intelligent entity may not respond to stimuli, and vice versa.

Edited by Mijin on 11/02/09 - 10:52 AM
ssu
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 02, 2007

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 217
Posted 11/02/09 - 12:58 PM:
quote post
#134
Slipstick Libby wrote:
Tell me, please, how your understanding of consciousness is different from my apparent understanding of consciousness. Does your understanding of consciousness encompass more than response to stimuli?
Yes.

Your understanding is closer to the medical term being conscious/unconscious. In philosophy consciousness is a far more complex question. Note that this thread was about AI, robots or computers, and the possibility if they would have consciousness. In other words, if they could think. Here then the term should be so broad that we can think about this question. In my view then consciousness is more about subjectivity, subjective experience or self-consciousness, not just that an entity responds to outside stimuli (like the traction control in my car).

And everything you described there does relate to what you have seen or learned. "Earth", "space","lizards" and "geometrical shapes" (even impossible ones floating) relate quite well to what people learn usually in school, for example. Now I do not say one cannot have an imagination, but all imagination, however crazy, is based on something.
Slipstick Libby
Aspirant

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 28, 2009

Total Topics: 0
Total Posts: 28
Posted 11/02/09 - 09:59 PM:
quote post
#135
Mijin wrote:


Your "open opinion" is what leads you to decree that any behaviour consistent with consciousness is proof of consciousness, and to not even consider the possibility that they may simply be behaving in a knee-jerk way with no subjective awareness.


Is it not your opinion that response to stimulus, however less developed than ours, is not consciousness at all?


Of course. Neither the philosophical nor simple dictionary definition of consciousness is "responding to stimuli".


Are you calling my interpretation of observations non-philosophical? If so, may I ask with what authority you can make such claims?

At best, you're confusing intelligence with consciousness. But even here just "responding to stimuli" is a very weak definition of intelligence, since an intelligent entity may not respond to stimuli, and vice versa.


I beg to differ. http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/intelligence?view=uk According to the oxford dictionary, intelligence requires the ability to acquire knowledge (I would venture to say through memory). Response to stimuli does not necessitate acquisition of knowledge.
Slipstick Libby
Aspirant

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 28, 2009

Total Topics: 0
Total Posts: 28
Posted 11/02/09 - 10:05 PM:
quote post
#136
ssu wrote:
In philosophy consciousness is a far more complex question.


Please, tell me what you fell consciousness represents in the axiomatic and deductive method of philosophy.

In my view then consciousness is more about subjectivity, subjective experience or self-consciousness, not just that an entity responds to outside stimuli (like the traction control in my car).


So you believe consciousness of self is a necessary condition for consciousness?

And everything you described there does relate to what you have seen or learned. "Earth", "space","lizards" and "geometrical shapes" (even impossible ones floating) relate quite well to what people learn usually in school, for example. Now I do not say one cannot have an imagination, but all imagination, however crazy, is based on something.


And so when I am dreaming I am directly experiencing lizards, earth, space, geometrical shapes? Or am I experiencing abstracted versions of those things which are related ONLY in the fact that they are abstractions by me?

My interpretations are not based on those things but my experiences of those things, which believe it or not, are internal creations.
Kamerynn
Vetran Lurker
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: May 31, 2005

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 159
Posted 11/03/09 - 05:45 AM:
quote post
#137
Slipstick Libby wrote:
I simply know that a rock will not roll away from a hammer simply because the hammer is near it.


Not only are rocks not conscious (at least, we have no real reason to believe they are, in my opinion), but they don't even act as if they are. If they did behave as if they were conscious, there would still be a question of whether they are actually conscious or only acting as if.

Slipstick Libby wrote:
It is my impression that any entity which internally responds to external stimuli is conscious. That may be because I have an open opinion of the matter, and no reason to separate the sorts of behaviors of cells from the sorts of behaviors of more complex organisms.


The above supposes that, for example, a game of pong is conscious because it "internally responds to external stimuli." I see no necessary connection between responses to stimuli and subjective, qualitative experience.

Slipstick Libby wrote:
Are not different elements composed of the same materials differing only in organization and quantity? Consider the difference between helium and hydrogen.

Elements aren't the smallest form of matter. There are materials that the elements are made of. There are also materials that those materials are made of.


This was a part of what I addressed. I don't disagree with you, here. I merely stated that, under a certain construal of "matter", higher level properties depend on both matter and organization. I'll say more on this, below.

Slipstick Libby wrote:
If the elements which make up compounds are not distinguished by the materials which make them up and only the arrangement/quantity of certain materials, then it isn't the "matter" that matters but the structure. Maybe I'm taking a bit too holistic of an approach.


Under your (above) construal of "matter," only organization seems to be of importance. However, my point was that particular elements give rise to certain properties on a higher level while others don't. It is reasonable to extend this point; perhaps only certain elements that are interacting in a certain way produce consciousness. That all elements are just different arrangements of protons, neutrons, and electrons is academic to this point.

Slipstick Libby wrote:
As you can see, it does not rely upon reports anymore. Through observation and comparison of neural activity, MRI technicians can now see who is and who is not experiencing chronic pain.


You're right, in a sense; reports are no longer necessary. However, that's only because the correlation between brain events and chronic pain has already been made. No event in the brain itself entails, a priori, that it is a chronic pain event. Just think: there are no labels in the brain that make it obvious that brain event X is an event of consciousness type Y. We have already paired brain events with events of consciousness, and we can now, therefore, simply refer to brain events instead of reports; this doesn't refute the necessity of those reports in the initial establishment of what those brain events represent.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong.
-- R. Buckminster Fuller
Mijin
Registered Offender
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Nov 05, 2003
Location: Birmingham, England

Total Topics: 11
Total Posts: 390
Posted 11/03/09 - 12:27 PM:
quote post
#138
Slipstick Libby wrote:

Is it not your opinion that response to stimulus, however less developed than ours, is not consciousness at all?


Correct.
Hell, a response to stimulus more developed than ours is not consciousness, since "response to stimulus" is not part of the philosophical definition of consciousness.


Are you calling my interpretation of observations non-philosophical? If so, may I ask with what authority you can make such claims?


I don't need authority to tell someone a clock is something which is used to tell the time, and I don't need authority to tell you that consciousness, to the philosopher, primarily means subjective, qualitative mental states.
Hence "The Hard Problem of Consciousness".

For example, if I am in REM sleep, by some medical definitions I am not conscious, but most philosophers would consider me conscious, especially if I am lucid dreaming.

If we define consciousness to mean "responding to stimuli" then consciousness doesn't really mean a lot, and a vast number of entities both biological and artificial are trivially conscious. If though we mean subjective, qualitative experience then answering what is consciousness and how can we know what possesses it is arguably the most difficult and fascinating question there is.


I beg to differ. http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/intelligence?view=uk According to the oxford dictionary, intelligence requires the ability to acquire knowledge (I would venture to say through memory). Response to stimuli does not necessitate acquisition of knowledge.


Perhaps you've misread my post?
I said that your definition wouldn't work, even as a definition of intelligence.
You then "beg to differ", and post a cite that shows your definition is not the same as the definition of intelligence.
What you've posted supports what I said.
ssu
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 02, 2007

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 217
Posted 11/03/09 - 04:18 PM:
quote post
#139
Slipstick Libby wrote:
Please, tell me what you fell consciousness represents in the axiomatic and deductive method of philosophy.
You think that for philosophy there is an axiomatic and deductive method? Hell, if something as obviously logical as mathematics cannot to be explained by the axiomatic method, how on earth do you think there is an axiomatic and deductive method of philosophy? Now if you meant to ask me what comes close to my thinking of consciousness or what explanations of consciousness in the vast philosophic heritage make sense to me I would start with Locke's Tabula rasa, for example. It's good to start from Locke's views in order to discuss the question of this thread.

Slipstick Libby wrote:
So you believe consciousness of self is a necessary condition for consciousness?
I believe that if we stick to what this thread was about in the first place (Will AI robots ever be conscious?) then yes, self consciousness is a very important part of the problem. As Mijin wrote, your definition makes the whole matter of consciousness trivial. Too trivial definitions (or lax standards) are not good. Using them you can hide underlying problems and easily proclaim some robot to be already conscious. (Why the fuzz while my car is already conscious because it has traction control!)
spock
Aspirant

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 17, 2009
Location: Somewhere over the rainbow

Total Topics: 2
Total Posts: 23
Posted 11/03/09 - 05:51 PM:
quote post
#140
I think that to become concious you must be able to feel guilt. Guilt means that you know that an action was wrong. To know what is wrong you must know what you believe is the correct course of action, and by extension you have morals. If you know something is right why would you not do it? Machines will always take the correct course of action(Not to be confused with just action) as dictated by their program(Morals). Concious beings can disobey their internal programming and the correct course of action. (You make a choice against the pull of fate/what is set out for you that you must do) Would a robot designed to hunt for food not hunt because it would kill the prey?
Download thread as

Page: First 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17



Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.

Powered by WSN Forum

The time is now 11/22/09 - 03:29 PM.