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What questions cannot be dissolved by wittgenstein's games?
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Postmodern Beatnik
Castigat ridendo mores  Usergroup: Administrators Joined: Nov 18, 2005 Total Topics: 19 Total Posts: 3137 |
 #31
Morosoph wrote: I'm all for critical theory and literary analysis, but I don't see what bearing it has on the issues here being discussed. Again, all you seem to be saying is that to attempt communication is to assume (or presuppose) that there is someone else to communicate with. Strictly speaking, I think this is false. But that's irrelevant: we're not concerned with assumptions and presuppositions, but rather ontological and epistemological issues.I am rather arguing something slightly different: that the text is burst out of such a world view by its very meaning as communication (without communication, it is not a text as such, but rather simply 'symbols' upon 'paper'). Morosoph wrote: Great, but now the solipsist just becomes a text-skeptic, as well. That is, if something only counts as a text when there is another conscious being to receive it, then the solipsist denies there are any texts. To prove that there are (and not just that we assume there are), you have to deal with the ontological and epistemological issues that are at the root of the problem.This is not just a matter of defining the word 'text'; the only meaning that a text can have is one where there is another to receive the communication, thus, since the thesis cannot be contradicted, so all meaningful (communicative) texts occur in worlds with self, other, and a channel of communication. Morosoph wrote: Which is the problem we're (temporarily) discussing...Certainly it doesn't solve the problem of solipsism... Morosoph wrote: No, it doesn't. It only calls into question whether or not there are any "genuinely" communicated works (presuming your definition of text is a good one).
...but it does surely address the problem for the subset of one's self-expression that involves communicated works. "All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. I say ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." --Bertrand Russell |
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Morosoph
Initiate  Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 16, 2009 Total Topics: 1 Total Posts: 7 |
#32
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: I'm all for critical theory and literary analysis, but I don't see what bearing it has on the issues here being discussed. Again, all you seem to be saying is that to attempt communication is to assume (or presuppose) that there is someone else to communicate with. Strictly speaking, I think this is false. But that's irrelevant: we're not concerned with assumptions and presuppositions, but rather ontological and epistemological issues. Not at all. I am saying that any meaning that writing has occurs in non-solopsitic worlds, and that the audience is given in precisely those worlds where the writing has meaning. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Great, but now the solipsist just becomes a text-skeptic, as well. That is, if something only counts as a text when there is another conscious being to receive it, then the solipsist denies there are any texts. To prove that there are (and not just that we assume there are), you have to deal with the ontological and epistemological issues that are at the root of the problem. You're missing my point. I conceed that the issue isn't resolved for either party. What I am saying is that it is essentially pointless writing texts that presume solipsism, since any world where the text has meaning makes a nonsense of that presumption. If, however, the text presumes the reverse, the text is never made a nonsense of. The text, if you like, 'demonstrates' to the system {author, channel, reader} that the reader exists. It doesn't do this for either party; rather, the assumption is simply never contradicted where the text is meaningful. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Morosoph wrote: Certainly it doesn't solve the problem of solipsism... Which is the problem we're (temporarily) discussing... I wasn't intending to suggest that the problem was resolved for either party. Rather, I am simply putting forward that and text can safely presuppose 'other', since there is no world where the text both has meaning, and there is no other to read it. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: No, it doesn't. It only calls into question whether or not there are any "genuinely" communicated works (presuming your definition of text is a good one). I get this. Perhaps I should have made clear that I am not attempting to address the problem of solipsism, but rather a much smaller problem that is the problem of writing for a would-be solipsist. The author does not need to be careful that her writing does not presume the existence of other. If her text is read, the 'other' is granted. My motivation in this is to show that language and communication can themselves resolves philosophical problems. I am not attempting to address to larger problem of solipsism; I am attempting to address a much smaller (and slightly different) problem in order to (attempt to) demonstrate my contention that analysis of language can yield non-trivial results. |
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Postmodern Beatnik
Castigat ridendo mores Usergroup: Administrators Joined: Nov 18, 2005 Total Topics: 19 Total Posts: 3137 |
#33
Morosoph wrote: Okay, well I disagree with this as well. When I write myself a grocery list on Tuesday and go grocery shopping on Friday, the list has meaning to me regardless of whether or not anyone else ever sees it.Not at all. I am saying that any meaning that writing has occurs in non-solopsitic worlds, and that the audience is given in precisely those worlds where the writing has meaning. Morosoph wrote: One of the primary functions of philosophy -- though by no means the only function -- is to clean up one's own thinking. That is, it helps one to order his beliefs and make them consistent with one another. This can be done without any other conscious beings, but might require writing things down.You're missing my point. I conceed that the issue isn't resolved for either party. What I am saying is that it is essentially pointless writing texts that presume solipsism, since any world where the text has meaning makes a nonsense of that presumption. Morosoph wrote: I don't see how this follows. According to you, a text that presumes the truth of solipsism is made into nonsense in a world where solipsism does not obtain, but a text that presumes the falsity of solipsism is not made into nonsense in a world where solipsism does obtain (since it is "never made a nonsense of"). Since you must not think (on pain of contradiction) that it is the truth or falsity of the presumption that makes a text into nonsense, why the asymmetry? The only possibility I can find in what you have written so far is your definition of "text," but that would make your argument impotent (since your use of the word "text" in the above quote would then be premature/equivocal and we could never know -- without solving the solipsism problem -- whether or not we have a text).If, however, the text presumes the reverse, the text is never made a nonsense of. Morosoph wrote: The system is not the sort of thing to which one can demonstrate something.The text, if you like, 'demonstrates' to the system {author, channel, reader} that the reader exists. Morosoph wrote: Surely it can be contradicted (by a solipsist, for example, who would say "I disagree!). So what I take it you mean is that, given your special definitions of text and meaningfulness, any world in which a genuine (i.e. meaningful) text exists the assumption is true. But so what? Your special definitions of text and meaningfulness themselves presuppose this. So what you are arguing is this: in any world where the presupposition is true, the presupposition is true. Not very enlightening.It doesn't do this for either party; rather, the assumption is simply never contradicted where the text is meaningful. Morosoph wrote: What does "safely" mean? It can't mean "without fear of falsity," which is usually what philosophers are worried about when it comes to their assumptions. (Also, texts don't assume anything -- authors do.)I am simply putting forward that a text can safely presuppose 'other', since there is no world where the text both has meaning, and there is no other to read it. Morosoph wrote: For a solipsist to be consistent, he'd better not presume the existence of other conscious beings. Indeed, all of his writings would specifically need to be for the purpose of convincing himself or finding out what reaction the non-conscious universe/his own subconsciousness has.I get this. Perhaps I should have made clear that I am not attempting to address the problem of solipsism, but rather a much smaller problem that is the problem of writing for a would-be solipsist. The author does not need to be careful that her writing does not presume the existence of other. If her text is read, the 'other' is granted. Morosoph wrote: Well, I already believe that. But I don't see how your example has proven anything substantive, useful, or non-trivial.
My motivation in this is to show that language and communication can themselves resolve philosophical problems. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on Feb 8, 2009 - 12:09 PM. Reason: quote tag error. "All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. I say ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." --Bertrand Russell |
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Makarismos
Tenured Poster  Usergroup: Members Joined: Mar 06, 2007 Location: Uk, Midlands Total Topics: 27 Total Posts: 1465 Last Blog: "No right to force PR"? |
#34
Morosoph, are you talking about private language? It seems like you are arguing that a text (which I would take to mean any artefact of communication) by its very existence, is proof that some others exist. If no others existed, then why bother with the text. Your argument would follow this pattern:- Skeptic: no others exist, I can prove that I am the only being. Morosoph: then who are you talking to? your talking proves that you don't believe you are correct? I think the problem that PB has, is that the Skeptic isn't saying that he can prove that no others exist: he is just saying that he cannot prove that they do. He is unsure that they exist. I do think that such Skepticism is a language trap, a fly bottle. Yes we can say the words "I am unsure that others exist, as I cannot prove that they do", but surely this is something which simply does not occur to one, unless he is currently engaged in philosophical debate. The reasoning - a la Descartes - goes along the lines of: I cannot trust my senses some of the time, therefore I cannot trust that any particular piece of sense data is correct, theretofore I find myself doubtful at any particular moment that the world around me is as it appears. The trap for me begins with the idea that we must be able to prove that which we can trust. Since I have worked out for myself that their are many things which cannot be proven, things which are none the less necessary for human existence as it stands, I am open to this possibility. The Sceptical premise ("I doubt all which I cannot prove") has undoubtedly been a great shaper of the disciplines of science, and yet I feel it discriminates to harshly between the real/unreal, when viewed in the cold light of day. To eliminate all which cannot be proven would ultimately rob us of that which makes us human. |
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DeReel
Student Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 31, 2009 Total Topics: 2 Total Posts: 87 |
#35
3) Humanist principles, even if I hold them true, don't allow me to shrug : "Look, Mr Skeptic, you must have made a mistake, the result doesn't suit my views at all". 1) The 'grocery list' was a bit gross but in fact one can write or talk for and to oneself. CQFD. We could argue, that "self (while) reading" is different from "self (while) writing", but I don't think a solipsist would take this stance without becoming... something else : multiple personality in one's own very self doesn't seem to fit in the (young and speculative) solipsist picture. 2) There are such persons as brillant skeptics, it seems. (Does anyone doubt it ?  ) Descartes adresses them in the proper way : paranoiac carefully laid logic tiles leading outside the bottle. The fact that it doesn't convince fake skeptics does not seem pertinent. A question that seems difficult to dissolve for me : "Does free will exist ?" I don't think psychology can ever answer that. The feeling of free will does exist, sure, but I think it is just an artifact. Maybe the question is just a language puzzle, but I don't see how. |
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Language Games
Initiate Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 08, 2009 Total Topics: 0 Total Posts: 3 |
#36
A question that seems difficult to dissolve for me : "Does free will exist ?" I don't think psychology can ever answer that. The feeling of free will does exist, sure, but I think it is just an artifact. Maybe the question is just a language puzzle, but I don't see how. It is a language puzzle in many senses. To begin with, proponents and exponents of free will may use similar signs (words) in their arguments, but the senses and meanings of their language might not align up. A Wittgenstein-style philosopher can examine the contexts of the argument carefully and determine if the two sides might not be arguing at cross-purposes, if not in every way at least in some ways. But more importantly, the experiences that reside in a person's use of language during a free will argument are mysterious -- choice for example is a mysterious experiences that might not be verifiable as free or unfree, and in spite of putting on an appearance of certainty and closure, both sides are actually way out of the depth of what knowledge is accessible to human beings. |
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Postmodern Beatnik
Castigat ridendo mores Usergroup: Administrators Joined: Nov 18, 2005 Total Topics: 19 Total Posts: 3137 |
#37
Makarismos wrote: It is true that the skeptic should say no more than this. A solipsist, however, might go so far as to assert that he is the only conscious being. I emphasize "might" because there are different degrees (skeptical/assertive) and types (epistemological/metaphysical) of solipsism. Regardless of what we think of this claim, asking "who are you talking to?" would not deter such a solipsist one bit. For if his view is that everything is a manifestation of his imagination, he is talking to himself. Indeed, he might believe that "communication" is really a matter of plumbing his own psychological depths. And if his view is just that other beings are not conscious, but rather "zombies," he might still value the "responses" they give -- even if only because they help him maintain his sanity.Skeptic: no others exist, I can prove that I am the only being. Morosoph: then who are you talking to? your talking proves that you don't believe you are correct? I think the problem that PB has, is that the Skeptic isn't saying that he can prove that no others exist: he is just saying that he cannot prove that they do. He is unsure that they exist. But yes, the skeptic (and skeptical solipsist) is merely concerned with whether or not we can prove other minds exist. Makarismos wrote: Interestingly enough, solipsism is one of the forms of skepticism that is more common outside of philosophy than within philosophy. It is a not uncommon reaction to ongoing depression, the use of certain drugs, and various psychological traumas. (Possible worlds realism is another seemingly abstruse metaphysical view that more often occurs, and appears plausible, to non-philosophers than to philosophers -- usually as a technique for rationalization or consolation.)I do think that such Skepticism is a language trap, a fly bottle. Yes we can say the words "I am unsure that others exist, as I cannot prove that they do", but surely this is something which simply does not occur to one, unless he is currently engaged in philosophical debate. But even were it the case that solipsism were a strictly philosophical problem, that in no way demonstrates (nor should it suggest) that the problem is therefore a fly-bottle. Makarismos wrote: No. Descartes' reasoning is this: I know that my senses deceive me on occasion; therefore, it is conceivable that they are always deceiving me and that I have only discovered this fact in a handful of cases (i.e. I cannot be certain they are accurate in any given case). Therefore, I cannot simply assume that they are accurate.The reasoning - a la Descartes - goes along the lines of: I cannot trust my senses some of the time, therefore I cannot trust that any particular piece of sense data is correct, theretofore I find myself doubtful at any particular moment that the world around me is as it appears. The trap for me begins with the idea that we must be able to prove that which we can trust. He does not say we must prove something in order to trust it, only that we must prove it in order to assert it as certain. Only if you make "trust" equivalent to "know with certainty" would you need the one for the other (thereby making an absurdity out of any claim to the contrary). Makarismos wrote: The later works of Nietzsche go so far as to say that human existence may require falsehoods (making the will to truth one of the most dangerous ways to live). Regardless, there are degrees of skepticism: some skeptics deny what they can't prove, others simply refuse to believe or suspend judgment. So it is not the case that a skeptic must reject as unreal that which cannot be proven. His main purpose is to refrain from asserting as certain that for which there is not a proof.
Since I have worked out for myself that their are many things which cannot be proven, things which are none the less necessary for human existence as it stands, I am open to this possibility. The Sceptical premise ("I doubt all which I cannot prove") has undoubtedly been a great shaper of the disciplines of science, and yet I feel it discriminates too harshly between the real/unreal, when viewed in the cold light of day. To eliminate all which cannot be proven would ultimately rob us of that which makes us human. "All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. I say ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." --Bertrand Russell |
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Postmodern Beatnik
Castigat ridendo mores Usergroup: Administrators Joined: Nov 18, 2005 Total Topics: 19 Total Posts: 3137 |
#38
DeReel wrote: Humanist principles, even if I hold them true, don't allow me to shrug : "Look, Mr Skeptic, you must have made a mistake, the result doesn't suit my views at all".  DeReel wrote: Gross? It strikes me as a perfect counterexample as it is the kind of quotidian "text" encountered by philosophers and non-philosophers alike (reminders such as lists being probably the most common form of self-communication).The 'grocery list' was a bit gross but in fact one can write or talk for and to oneself. CQFD. But so long as it serves the purpose, I don't care if it is gross.  "All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. I say ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." --Bertrand Russell |
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Postmodern Beatnik
Castigat ridendo mores Usergroup: Administrators Joined: Nov 18, 2005 Total Topics: 19 Total Posts: 3137 |
#39
Language Games wrote: No need. The compatibilism/incompatibilism debate (which recognizes, differentiates, and tries to adjudicate between different senses of "freedom") has been going on since at least the 18th century. Regardless, the question is whether or not the problem of free will is essentially a language problem -- not whether or not there are linguistic difficulties among the other issues involved.To begin with, proponents and exponents of free will may use similar signs (words) in their arguments, but the senses and meanings of their language might not align up. A Wittgenstein-style philosopher can examine the contexts of the argument carefully and determine if the two sides might not be arguing at cross-purposes, if not in every way at least in some ways. Language Games wrote: Which makes it not an issue of language, but rather one of unwarranted (and often admittedly provisional) assertions in the fields of metaphysics and epistemology. But more importantly, the experiences that reside in a person's use of language during a free will argument are mysterious -- choice for example is a mysterious experience that might not be verifiable as free or unfree, and in spite of putting on an appearance of certainty and closure, both sides are actually way out of the depth of what knowledge is accessible to human beings. 
"All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. I say ends that we desire, not ends that we ought to desire. What we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire." --Bertrand Russell |
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DeReel
Student Usergroup: Members Joined: Jan 31, 2009 Total Topics: 2 Total Posts: 87 |
#40
OK but, look : I simply forgot "free will Vs Determinism" WAS in the first list given and I just sort of found the obvious...  I keep looking for other 'substantive' questions.
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