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What IS the argument for motivational cognitivism?

What IS the argument for motivational cognitivism?

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 04/30/08 - 08:04 PM: Subject: What IS the argument for motivational cognitivism?	#1
I’m a moral expressivist. There. I’ve said it. I know its implications, and I know what it commits me to: amongst other things, the denial of the existence of moral truths (and moral falsehoods for that matter), a seemingly eminent slope towards relativism, and the stark realization that the objectivity and authority of morality may be nothing more than smoke and mirrors. But I do think I have good reasons to hold this view; I have been convinced by what I consider to be sound arguments, and I believe I have effectively argued for a certain kind of non-cognitivism elsewhere. As for those irksome consequences of holding such a view, I can accept that sometimes, we need to simply bite the bullet. For all it’s worth, I think we all should be moral expressivists. But that’s just my opinion. I’ve been spending some time lately thinking about various forms of non-cognitivism, of which moral expressivism is but one kind. Another sort is what is sometimes referred to as motivational non-cognitivism. In the effort to prepare a short manuscript about its relationship with moral motivation, I figured it would be a good idea to familiarize myself with some common arguments against motivational non-cognitivism. While the literature certainly contains its fair share, none of them I found extremely effective. In fact, most of them seem to beg the question against the motivational non-cognitivist. But more surprisingly, nowhere could I find a solid argument for its rival view; i.e. motivational cognitivism. In the following, I attempt to present what I conjecture to be the most charitable argument for motivational cognitivism and demonstrate that, even in its most charitable form, the position for motivational cognitivism is rather shaky. I would be very interested to hear what you have to say, both about the argument for motivational cognitivism and my argument against it. For those that are not familiar with the distinction mentioned above, let me broadly set the stage. The debate between motivational cognitivism and non-cognitivism should not be confused with the debate between moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The latter is a debate concerning the ontological status of moral claims. The moral cognitivist claims that moral judgments are a certain kind of belief which can either be true of false. Since a true moral belief must be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, this is often understood to lend support to moral realism. Moral non-cognitivism, on the other hand, holds that moral claims are, in their very nature, not cognitive (they are merely conative) and hence not the right sort of things to be true or false. One form of moral non-cognitivism is moral expressivism; the view holding that a moral claim, like any other evaluative claim, is nothing more that an expression of one’s sentiment. The debate between motivational cognitivists and non-cognitivists centers on the relation between evaluative claims (of which moral claims are but one kind) and motivation. The motivational cognitivist claims that certain sorts of beliefs (e.g. moral beliefs) can motivate an agent to act. For example, it is often believed that the belief that it would be wrong to cheat on your taxes can motivate an agent to refrain from doing so. Of course, motivational cognitivists are not committed to the view that moral or other evaluative beliefs always motivate; indeed, they must allow for the possibility of some form of irrationality. All they are committed to is the view that certain evaluative beliefs can potentially motivate; i.e. they are of the right sort of things to motivate agents to act. The argument for motivational non-cognitivism consists primarily in making a distinction between two different sorts of psychological states. On the one hand, we have what are called conative states; states like desires, wants, values, and other pro-attitudes. These can be distinguished from cognitive states by identifying their particular direction of fit. Desires and other pro-attitudes are psychological states in which the world must fit. As Michael Smith writes, one does not stop desiring P upon the realization that ~P. On the other hand, cognitive states like beliefs must fit the world. If rational, one stops believing P upon the realization of ~P. Because of this difference in direction of fit between beliefs and desires, it is argued that the only sort of psychological state that can motivate an agent to act is a conative state, i.e. a desire or some other pro-attitude. According to the motivational non-cognitivist, simply believing that P is what one should do is not enough to motivate an agent to act. There are plenty of facts out there that play no role in motivating an agent to act. So what makes certain putative facts and not others have motivational force? By virtue of what is it true that some putative facts can motivate an agent to act while some cannot? According to the motivational non-cognitivist, it is because the agent must also, e.g., care about the fact that it is what she ought to do. The argument for motivational cognitivism usually appeals to one simple but arguably shaky premise. According to the motivational cognitivist, there are certain beliefs – for example moral beliefs – that can motivate an agent to act. Support for this claim usually appeals to the apparent paradox of an agent holding the belief (or even knowledge) that e.g. it would be wrong to torture children for fun but does not care about that. Indeed, holding such a pair of psychological states is sometimes understood to be equivalent to Moorean paradoxes in which an agent e.g. claims that it is raining outside but does not believe it. Now, I agree that there is something quite odd about an agent holding the belief that it would be wrong to torture children for fun while not caring about that. But the reason that makes it odd need not in any particular way lend support to motivational cognitivism. In fact, I believe it does the exact opposite; it rather lends support to its rival view. In order to come to see how this is so, one first has to accept some form of reasons-internalism, which, although still controversial, is nevertheless understood to be the default position in the domain of practical reasons. According to this thesis, a reason for action is determined in part by an agent’s subjective motivational set (or more generally, by an agent’s desires). Combining this thesis with moral expressivism, one can come to understand that the belief that it would be wrong to torture children for fun can only mean that the agent (perhaps everybody else as well) has conclusive reason to refrain from torturing children for fun. But for the reasons-internalist, if it is true that the agent truly has conclusive reason to refrain from torturing children for fun, then it must be the case that the agent has a desire or something else in his subjective motivational set that would be furthered or promoted by refraining from torturing children for fun. And if that is true, then the agent already has the desire present in his psychology; a conative state that has motivational force that can also explain why it is the case that the agent has the reason for action in the first place. What is odd about an agent holding the belief that it would be wrong to torture children for fun while not actually caring about that is that the moral judgment is already loaded with the implicit commitment to the welfare of children and so cannot also fail to care about it at the same time. The agent here would be desire P and ~P at the same time, and this is, if not a mark of irrationality, a definite mark of oddity. So it seems that moral judgments, when understood as a claim about what one has reason to do (or refrain from doing) are already conatively loaded, so to speak, and it would be inaccurate for the moral cognitivist to claim that certain cognitive states of an agent can motivate them to act. Moral judgments can motivate, yes. But that is because there is already a relevant pro-attitude in place that explains the presence of a motivational force. Any thoughts? Edited by jdrw on 05/11/08 - 04:21 AM. Reason: paragraph spacing for readability

klorius
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Posted 05/01/08 - 06:12 AM:	#2
The terms seem confusing. When you talk about motivational (non-)cognitivism, are you referring to the internalist/externalist debate? It seems like this is so, given your description; if this is the case, it would probably be much better to refer to internalism and externalism, to avoid possible confusion (as you recognise) with the distinction between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism. To wit: Hume, for example, would be a moral externalist: his basic view is that belief and desire are distinct, and that while rationality produces beliefs (e.g. "I should do X"), the motivation to do so (e.g. "I want to do X") arises from desire. An internalist holds that the motivation for the action is sufficiently derived from the rationality the action itself; generally, they either disagree with the above Humean distinction made between desire and belief (e.g. Dancy), or hold that the belief can in some way contain or generate the desire (e.g. Nagel). As an aside, just for the sake of clarity, I think it should be made fairly clear that this issue is one of metaethics rather than normative ethics, since often "ethics" is taken to refer to the latter.
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/01/08 - 06:31 AM:	#3
Thanks for your reply, but the distiction between motivational cognitivism and non-cognitivism is not the distinction between moral internalism and externalism. So I don't want to equivocate the two and I think I have made that suffuciently clear. Furthermore, when I refer to internalism, I am talking about reasons-internalism, or what Stephen Darwall calls reasons/motives internalism. It is clear that Hume is a paradigmatic case of an internalist. As for moral internalism, the only thing I can imagine that being is the view that for moral internalism, the fact that X is wrong necessarily givs you are reason to not do it, while moral externalism would deny that. But the characterization you give for the two seems off the mark. Maybe Hume is a moral externalist in this sense, but I highly doubt it.

klorius
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Posted 05/01/08 - 07:20 AM:	#4
Leaving aside the issue of internalism/externalism then, would it be accurate to say that as long as one holds that some beliefs exist that are capable of motivating one to action without a reliance on the relevant desire, then one is a motivational cognitivist?
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/01/08 - 02:16 PM:	#5
yep, that's exactly right. The problem for the motivational cognitivist then is to give an account of how this is possible. I mean, it seems to be pretty clear to me that the belief that it is raining outside can only motivate you to put on a rain coat if you desire to stay dry. If you lack this desire, then in no way can the belief that it is raining outside motivate the agent to put on a rain coat. It is, so to speak, motivationally impotent. So, going back to my orginal question: What IS the argument for motivational cognitivism?

klorius
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Posted 05/01/08 - 04:06 PM:	#6
Not too clear exactly what you're asking for here. Are you asking: 1) Why do we want to support motivational cognitivism? Or, at the risk of a pun, what is the motivation for motivational cognitivism? 2) Or are you asking how motivational cognitivism could be possible? That is, you want a more detailed description of the way in which it could work, beyond the bare claim that a belief can motivate by itself?
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/01/08 - 05:10 PM:	#7
I think these are important questions: 1. I've been meaning to write a paper on this topic for a while now, and I realize that in order to argue for a certain sort of non-cognitivism, it would be wise to try and understand the opposing view. Of course, I don't want to support motivational cognitivism; nor do I think what I want really matters. I simply don't buy their view. And so in order to argue against it, one better get clear on what one's opponent is claiming. This is the notion of philosophical charity. And so I am trying to figure out what in the world the cognitivist is trying to say here. 2. The claim that some beliefs are motivating is ubiquitous in the literature. One of the biggest proponent of this view is Thomas Nagel. There are many others. But it is, after all, just a claim. I don't think it is too much to ask for an argument for that claim. And I would surely hope that, along with an argument, the proponents of motivational cognitivism could always conjecture at the very least a sketch of how such a phenomenon can actually be possible. What would we need to accomodate in order to make that claim true? Of course I realize that our domain of inquiry is somewhat folky, and I am happy to accept a folky account; one need not invoke some irrelevant eliminative materialistic explanation, but something that one can wrap their head around that does not beg the question against the motivational non-cognitivist.

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/01/08 - 06:35 PM:	#8
And I just remembered that we can construe motivational cognitivism as a sort of judgment internalism the way defined by Darwall. So in some sense, you were right to think of the distinction as one between (judgment) internalism and externalism.

klorius
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Posted 05/01/08 - 06:57 PM:	#9
Well, since you know that Nagel is one of the biggest proponents of motivational beliefs, then you shouldn't be too unfamiliar with his argument(s) for that position, which is mainly elucidated in The Possibility of Altruism. Crudely speaking, one of those is basically the idea that some desires are generated by beliefs; since the existence of those desires are dependent on the beliefs, they are intrinsic to the belief rather an external motivating factor, and as such the beliefs can be said to be motivating. If I recall, McDowell also supports this idea with some refinements, while Dancy tries to take it further (but also wants to argue for moral particularism, which may confuse the issue).
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/02/08 - 07:08 PM:	#10
Yes, I understand that Nagel posits the idea that a belief can motivate in The Possibility of Altruism. But what you stated from Nagel in your past post is not an argument but a mere claim. What I want to know is what is the argument that leads to this conclusion? Nagel speaks of what he calls motivated desires; desires that are had for the sake of another end. These are compared to our rather raw, unmotivated desire; I never liked that distinction. The idea is that the belief that by doing Y, you would X, combined with the desire to X can motivate an agent to desire, and eventually do Y. But why think that this is something above and beyond the normative force of an instance of good practical reasoning? In any case, how is this an argument for motivational cognitivism?

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Posted 05/04/08 - 04:02 AM:	#11
The claim there is just that some beliefs are able to generate desires. The rest of it is derivative from that claim. Leaving aside the argument that follows, would you allow just that initial claim?
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/04/08 - 10:09 AM:	#12
Well, that claim needs support, and in what you've cited, there is no argument for it. But I do agree with Davidson that if one desires to X and believes that by Y-ing, one will X, then in some sense, if one is at the very least instrumentally rational, one will desire to Y. But that desire (what Nagel calls a motivated desire)nevertheless needs an antecedent belief and desire pair. Take away the desire to Y, and it becomes a mystery why one would desire to Y simply by believing that by Y-ing, one will X. The belief that by putting on my raincoat today I will stay dry cannot motivate me to act if I do not already desire to stay dry. So I may agree with Nagel that there are some things as motivated desires, but how is that an argument for motivational cogntivism?

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Posted 05/11/08 - 03:16 AM:	#13
Well, if you accept the existence of motivated desires, then one possible line of argument works thus: Some desires are generated by beliefs, to the extent that they exist because of the respective belief(s). The desire cannot be taken away without taking away the belief since it is generated by the belief. The explanation for the desire becomes, simply, the explanation for the belief. As such, the belief is able to motivate without an extrinsic desire. The obvious problem with this view is that it still makes the existence of the relevant desire necessary. The difference here is the claim that the desire is effectively built into the belief.
_____________________ To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. - Jose Ortega y Gasset Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power. - Lao Zi

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Posted 05/13/08 - 12:00 AM:	#14
klorius: But the notion of a desire 'built into' a belief seems rather mysterious. It seems to suggest that there is something that I cannot believe without ipso facto desiring something. I can think of plenty of contingent examples of that, but the contingency is always an associated desire, which leaves us back where we started. deus: I think in the O P you assume that motivation or the 'motivational set' roughly equates to the agent's desires. But it may not. E.g. I may prefer A to B without desiring either A or B. I may be a moral cognitivist and judge both that I ought to care for my children and also that it's true that I ought to. I may further have no desire to care for them, being an uncaring sort of person. Nevertheless, my belief that I ought to care for them, combined with my belief that it's true that I ought to do so, motivates me to care for them, despite my absence of desire. What an emotionally barren parent I make, I say to myself, but at least I do what I claim to know to be my duty, regardless of my desires. I may have a negative attitude to what I say is my duty. I may find it irksome in the extreme and wish for nothing more than for it not to be my duty. (If that's a pro-attitude, what is an anti-attitude...?) Now my ethical cognitivist theory may happen be wrong. Nevertheless I may be utterly sincere in saying that I don't desire X and also that I'm motivated to do X purely by my belief that p. To contradict me you'd have to invoke 'subconscious desire' to care for my children - or you would have to unearth a pro-attitude from my constant complaining about my duty of care - then I'd say 'smoke and mirrors'... But perhaps that's the line that you refer to as 'question-begging'? *********** Perhaps it's odd to desire p and ~p, but I think it's common enough. I used to love shop lifting when I was a child but it came as no revelation to me that it's wrong, in the sense that I did not have to learn that it was wrong subsequent to doing it. I knew it was wrong and didn't care. That was shameless, but not I'd say logically suspect...? A reply a la Hare might be that I merely knew that it was 'wrong' and didn't care - but I'm not sure why we must have those scare quotes.. Edited by Cuthbert on 05/13/08 - 12:31 AM

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/13/08 - 09:29 AM:	#15
Cuthbert, I tried to make it clear in my OP that the term desire should be understood as a term of art thay stands in for any pro-attitude such as (cares for, likes, wants, values, prefers, etc). So while I don't think that motivation is always grounded in strict desires, I do think they are always grounded in some sort of pro-attitude. And while I think you're right to claim that it is possible for an agent to judge that she ought to X and it being true that she ought to X (this just amounts to the claim that we can be right in judging what we ought to do), I do not think that it is possible to judge that you ought to X without being motivated to X, if it is the case that you do not already desire (or care for, or value, or prefer, or whatever) to X. This is partly due to my committment to reasons-internalism; the view that what we have reason to do (i.e. what we ought to do) is grounded in our subjective motivational set (i.e. our pro-attitudes when we are fully informed and rational). So the idea is that I do not think that the belief that you ought to care for your children can motivate you to act if you do not already have a pro-attitude towards the welfare of your children. WIthout this existing pro- attitude, the belief that you ought to care for the welfare of your children is motivationally barren. But more importantly, I think that the person who claims something like "I know that I should not beat my children, but I simply don't care about that" is either being dishonest or unsincere, or she is confused about what she means by that claim. But as I've mentioned, this is not because I am committed to something like motivational or ethical cognitivism (or judgment internalism) but because I think that reasons-internalism is a sound position about reasons for action.

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Posted 05/14/08 - 01:00 AM:	#16
deus ex machina wrote: So the idea is that I do not think that the belief that you ought to care for your children can motivate you to act if you do not already have a pro-attitude towards the welfare of your children. WIthout this existing pro- attitude, the belief that you ought to care for the welfare of your children is motivationally barren. That's plausible, and I'd say that contingently it's often true. My question is: must it be true? Could it be false in particular cases? That is, someone might hold: a. I ought to care for my children, because it's my absolute moral duty. b. I'm a weak person who positively desires not to do what I ought to do and to do what I ought not to do. c. I'm a bad parent who cares nothing for my children. d. I'm going to care for my children anyhow, because of a. And she still might care for her children, simply because she ought. Perhaps someone who held that would be dishonest or insincere, as you say. E.g. she doesn't really believe c., because otherwise she would not be motivated by a. But let's suppose she isn't being insincere. Perhaps she sincerely believes all a - d. And she's not confused, because they a - d are logically consistent (I think?). Then the problem comes down to a test of sincerity. I wonder whether you're saying she must be insincere, because of the principle quoted above. But then that begs the question. AGainst my objection, isn't this perhaps a place to invoke meta-desires? She doesn't want to look after her children. But she wants to want to look after them because she judges that she ought. Then you include meta-desires in the motivational set. That probably answers my objection, not sure.

deus_ex_machina
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Posted 05/14/08 - 06:19 AM:	#17
Well, I was working under the assumption of the CETERIS PARIBUS clause, so if you are to change the story, my response would be somewhat different. While I don't think that A-D are inconsistent, we are now talking about reasons for action, i.e. reasons (not) to take care of your children. We all know that reasons can be over-determined in many ways. Even if you do not care for X, there may nevertheless be a reason for you to X, given that there is another desire that can be served or furthered by X-ing. This is the case in your example. If you do decide to take care of your children because of the consideration illusteated in A (i.e. that it is your moral duty to do so), then your action can nevertheless be explained, in part, by a desire to do what you consider to be morally right, and the belief that by taking care of your children, you would be doing what is morally right. IF you do not desire to do what you morally ought to do, it is unclear how knowledge of what you should do can motivate you to act. Think, for example, about someone who on top of not caring for his children, also does not care about morality. So the knowledge that it is what he morally ought to do will in no way motivate him to act; he will be left unmoved. So here, your reason for action may not include the desire for your children; ex hypothesi, this desire doesn't exist. But if you do decide to take care of your children, there will be a reason for you to do so, and in your example, this reason is grounded in the desire to do what you believe you morally ought to do. And I don't think this is a contigent truth, I that that it is a necessary conceptual truth; I think that the only sort of psychological state that can motivate an agent is a conative one (i.e. pro-attitudes) while cognitive states like beliefs are motivationally barren. Edited by deus_ex_machina on 05/14/08 - 06:24 AM

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