Philosophy Forums


Utilitarianism is Objectively Valid

PrintPrint


Page: 1 2 3 4

Utilitarianism is Objectively Valid
Odin
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 09, 2009

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 208
Posted 10/18/09 - 10:21 AM:
quote post
#11
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Note: this thread is for the purpose of Advocatus Diaboli. If you are unfamiliar with our local holiday, click here.
Question: A devious sprite grants you one wish. You know that the sprite is bound by unbreakable laws to grant your wish, but that he will do everything possible to avoid the result being what you expected. What can you wish for that the sprite cannot ruin?
Answer: Happiness.
lol - that's not utilitarianism because you haven't asked for happiness for everyone. I can achieve happiness by pursuing my vanity and skirking every obligation that I have it life, but that is not right.


To secure an objectively valid moral theory requires an intrinsic good. Not only is happiness just such a good, it is the only such good. While there may be other possible answers to the question posed in this post's epigraph--we could, for example, be so specific that the sprite cannot but grant our request as expected--only happiness qualifies as an answer that can be given by every person. After all, so long as one is displeased, the wish has not been granted; and once the wish has been granted, one can no longer be displeased.


No it doesn't and no it isn't. Happiness is the state of mind that is achieved by accomplishing one's virtues or the purpose of life. Happiness is just a human intuition that helps to tell you whether or not you are on the right track, not whether what you are doing is right or wrong.

Moral actions, then, are those that maximize this intrinsic good. Regardless of whether or not the hedonic calculus is practically feasible for any given individual, that which it would recommend is morally right. And we must take note that "right" in this case means obligatory, for it would be morally wrong to do anything that did not maximize the intrinsic good of happiness. Thus we can do away with the oft-used, but ultimately misleading, terms "permissible" and "supererogatory." Actions are right or wrong, plain and simple. This is precisely the kind of black and white clarity that morality requires, and only Utilitarianism can grant it. All forms of moral nonobjectivism--including that subjectivist theory known as Divine Command Theory--are morally vague for quite obvious reasons. Deontology, however, also admits of an amoral class of actions and of instances where more than one action may be considered "good," with one action being "more good" than another, and yet decrees that either action is permissible (the latter, of course, being supererogatory).


Even if happiness was intrinsically good, it's not true that moral actions have to maximize it as much as possible. Why should I care about intrinsic happiness of others? Happiness is a trait too that applies to most species of animal, so do they fall under the umbrella of 'maximizing intrinsic good?' Utilitarianism is similar to observing that a car runs on fuel, and concluding that therefore what is good for the car is the consumption of as much fuel as possible. It's rubbish. What matters is where the fuel takes you. Just because happiness is one of many traits that tends to lead me in the right direction toward accomplishing my goals and purposes in life (there is an objective purpose of life), it does not mean that we base every action off its tendency to create happiness in the world. And there's no reason that I have to care at all about whether my actions maximize other's happiness. Even if I said "happiness is intrinsically good," nothing about that statement obligates me to perform actions that create greater happiness on a universal scale. It is actually more logical to conclude that I should do everything to maximize my own happiness, and let others worry about maximizing their's.
voyaging
Graduate
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 27, 2008
Location: United States

Total Topics: 51
Total Posts: 165
Posted 10/18/09 - 01:13 PM:
quote post
#12
Odin wrote:
lol - that's not utilitarianism because you haven't asked for happiness for everyone. I can achieve happiness by pursuing my vanity and skirking every obligation that I have it life, but that is not right.



That was only an example he used to show that happiness is the greatest good. In this case it would be egoism.

A witty saying proves nothing.
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006

Total Topics: 28
Total Posts: 617
Posted 10/18/09 - 05:55 PM:
quote post
#13
Odin wrote:

What matters is where the fuel takes you. Just because happiness is one of many traits that tends to lead me in the right direction toward accomplishing my goals and purposes in life (there is an objective purpose of life), it does not mean that we base every action off its tendency to create happiness in the world. And there's no reason that I have to care at all about whether my actions maximize other's happiness. Even if I said "happiness is intrinsically good," nothing about that statement obligates me to perform actions that create greater happiness on a universal scale. It is actually more logical to conclude that I should do everything to maximize my own happiness, and let others worry about maximizing their's.


A very eloquent defense of hedonism, but somewhat missing the point. When the OP says that "Happiness is intrinsically good", then he is saying that the only thing that everyone could wish for with a [/i]guarantee[/i] of being moral would be happiness. In this way, one could not wish for one's own happiness at the cost of everyone else's happiness (according to a Utilitarian ethic) for that would defy the Greatest Happiness principle, allowing for a deficit of happiness for the world as opposed to the surplus we are looking for.

The only reason any of this would be obligatory is simply due to morality. Morality is by definition what is right, and if it is intrinsically right to do good things, and the only universally good thing that exists is happiness, then the only obligation that exists for EVERYONE is to wish for happiness.

I sort of expect PMB to respond to the desire for sadness as being a sort of joy in itself. Just as if pain causes happiness, then pain would be good; if sadness causes happiness, then sadness is good. Still, to say that sadness is an intrinsic good seems a little ridiculous, for there are many people the world over who consider sadness to be a bad thing, however productive it may be. Not everyone is a depressed egomaniac looking for solace within the wounds of their own heart.

I did so hope that I could have not made the comment above, for I did so want to engage the conversation that touches on a metaphysical level: what if there is no true human happiness, and it is merely a fleeting hope that we all strive for but never obtain? Would the sprite then reveal this truth to us and thereby dash our hopes for happiness that feed into our being human? Sadly (the bad kind of sad), I do not feel that I can maintain this argument after just admitting that I see the sense in promoting happiness to even those who are morbidly sad, for even those who are depressed do not wish to be depressed as their condition is nearly defined by wishing they were happy. Also, it would not be fair to the thought problem to wantonly say that we could wish everyone in the world were sad and have this be intrinsically good, when we clearly know that even those who are sad wish to be happy, for sadness is almost defined by happiness and the desire for it.
Odin
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 09, 2009

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 208
Posted 10/18/09 - 07:04 PM:
quote post
#14
voyaging wrote:


That was only an example he used to show that happiness is the greatest good. In this case it would be egoism.


And so? My point was that his example proves egoism more than utilitarianism.
Odin
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 09, 2009

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 208
Posted 10/18/09 - 07:43 PM:
quote post
#15
Buddahchuck wrote:


A very eloquent defense of hedonism, but somewhat missing the point. When the OP says that "Happiness is intrinsically good", then he is saying that the only thing that everyone could wish for with a [/i]guarantee[/i] of being moral would be happiness. In this way, one could not wish for one's own happiness at the cost of everyone else's happiness (according to a Utilitarian ethic) for that would defy the Greatest Happiness principle, allowing for a deficit of happiness for the world as opposed to the surplus we are looking for.


But I'm not defending hedonism - you must have missed something in what I said. There is no world where everyone gets to be happy and utilitarianism recognizes that. So the solution is that in a conflict of interest one's happiness must be sacrificed for the greater happiness. Never mind justice or obligation. Never mind rights and freedom or good and evil. I would wish for my own happiness at the expense of everyone else's when my happiness is earned by accomplishing the virtues and obligations that define human life and morality while all others choose to deny that those obligations

The only reason any of this would be obligatory is simply due to morality. Morality is by definition what is right, and if it is intrinsically right to do good things, and the only universally good thing that exists is happiness, then the only obligation that exists for EVERYONE is to wish for happiness.


You are changing the definition of 'good' in your argument. Good can refer to the subjective notion that equates with happiness, or good for me (happiness can only relate to an individual, and cannot be a universal way to act), or it can refer to the goodness that is the opposite of evil, or morality. Happiness is usually achieved by doing good things, although there are many psychopathic people who get happiness by ways we find disgusting. But happiness is a derivative of morality at best, and the good feeling we get from doing good things cannot be used to define what actions are good and what are not.

I sort of expect PMB to respond to the desire for sadness as being a sort of joy in itself. Just as if pain causes happiness, then pain would be good; if sadness causes happiness, then sadness is good. Still, to say that sadness is an intrinsic good seems a little ridiculous, for there are many people the world over who consider sadness to be a bad thing, however productive it may be. Not everyone is a depressed egomaniac looking for solace within the wounds of their own heart.

I did so hope that I could have not made the comment above, for I did so want to engage the conversation that touches on a metaphysical level: what if there is no true human happiness, and it is merely a fleeting hope that we all strive for but never obtain? Would the sprite then reveal this truth to us and thereby dash our hopes for happiness that feed into our being human? Sadly (the bad kind of sad), I do not feel that I can maintain this argument after just admitting that I see the sense in promoting happiness to even those who are morbidly sad, for even those who are depressed do not wish to be depressed as their condition is nearly defined by wishing they were happy. Also, it would not be fair to the thought problem to wantonly say that we could wish everyone in the world were sad and have this be intrinsically good, when we clearly know that even those who are sad wish to be happy, for sadness is almost defined by happiness and the desire for it.

Here are some wise words from Philo:

"For, after each of the senses has been subjected to the charms of pleasure, and has learnt to delight in what is offered to it, the sight being fascinated by varieties of colors and shapes, the hearing by harmonious sounds, the taste by the sweetness of flowers, and the smell by the delicious fragrance of the odors which are brought before it, these all having received these offerings, like handmaids, bring them to the mind as their master, leading with them persuasion as an advocate, to warn it against rejecting any of them whatever. And the mind being immediately caught by the bait, becomes a subject instead of a rules, and a slave instead of a master, and an exile instead of a citizen and a mortal instead of an immortal. For we must altogether not be ignorant that pleasure, being like a courtesan or mistress, is eager to meet with a lover, and seeks for panders in order by their means to catch a lover. And the sensations are her panders, and conciliate love to her, and she employing them as baits, easily brings the mind into the sensations conveying within the mind the things which have been seen externally, explain and display the forms of each of them setting their seal upon a similar affection. For the mind is like wax, and receives the impressions of appearances through the sensations, by means of which it makes itself master of the body, which of itself it would not be able to do, as I have already said. And those who have previously become the slaves of pleasure immediately receive the wages of this miserable and incurable passion."
Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006

Total Topics: 28
Total Posts: 617
Posted 10/19/09 - 04:29 AM:
quote post
#16
Odin wrote:

I would wish for my own happiness at the expense of everyone else's when my happiness is earned by accomplishing the virtues and obligations that define human life and morality while all others choose to deny that those obligations


And you don't find this hedonistic? Do you not see the argument as being either choose happiness for yourself (hedonism) or happiness for the world (utilitarianism)?

Odin wrote:

You are changing the definition of 'good' in your argument. Good can refer to the subjective notion that equates with happiness, or good for me (happiness can only relate to an individual, and cannot be a universal way to act), or it can refer to the goodness that is the opposite of evil, or morality. Happiness is usually achieved by doing good things, although there are many psychopathic people who get happiness by ways we find disgusting. But happiness is a derivative of morality at best, and the good feeling we get from doing good things cannot be used to define what actions are good and what are not.


Perhaps you are changing the definition of good in my argument. Let's use your definitions and say that the former is a description of "the good" and the latter is a description of "the greater good". Is it not possible to mean both "the good" and "the greater good" at the same time in the statement you quoted? My understanding, with regard to PMB's argument, is that morality is a dynamic entity that changes with each person. In spite of these laws changing, the one thing that remains constant is happiness. So I think it an unnecessary confusion to enter into a conversation of morality being derivative of happiness or happiness being derivative of morality, for when we are talking about the greatest happiness principle, it is quite clear that the maximization of happiness defines morality rather than the notion that morality makes people happy. So rather than confuse the argument being presented, let's say that for this argument, Happiness is necessarily the "greater good".

Of course all of this is contingent upon clarification by PMB, IMO.


Odin
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Sep 09, 2009

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 208
Posted 10/19/09 - 05:55 AM:
quote post
#17
Buddahchuck wrote:

And you don't find this hedonistic? Do you not see the argument as being either choose happiness for yourself (hedonism) or happiness for the world (utilitarianism)?


Not really, because my own pleasure is not my motivation to act morally and it is also not how I derive morality. I use science and reasoning to determine an objective morality. But its true that there's really no reason that I should surrender my own happiness when it is earned by my good deeds and my virtues. I'll also point out, though it sounds kinda corny, that your happiness can not be achieved by anyone but yourself. Happiness is the result, not the motive of your actions, that means that there is a separate moral standard. Happiness cannot tell us how to act, it can only evaluate how we have acted.



Perhaps you are changing the definition of good in my argument. Let's use your definitions and say that the former is a description of "the good" and the latter is a description of "the greater good". Is it not possible to mean both "the good" and "the greater good" at the same time in the statement you quoted? My understanding, with regard to PMB's argument, is that morality is a dynamic entity that changes with each person. In spite of these laws changing, the one thing that remains constant is happiness. So I think it an unnecessary confusion to enter into a conversation of morality being derivative of happiness or happiness being derivative of morality, for when we are talking about the greatest happiness principle, it is quite clear that the maximization of happiness defines morality rather than the notion that morality makes people happy. So rather than confuse the argument being presented, let's say that for this argument, Happiness is necessarily the "greater good".

Of course all of this is contingent upon clarification by PMB, IMO.





Good 1: "intrinsically right [thing] to do" or morality.

Good 2: the universal good feeling of happiness.

They are just not the same and the first is not derived from the second. In the second you are talking about an arbitrary, subjective feeling, while in the first you are talking about an instrintic good and evil. And I won't just assume a 'greatest happiness' principle. Science says otherwise. Why would humans evolve to have these feelings of happiness and painfulness? To make us moral people? Would certain actions still be wrong if humans were not a species that could feel happiness? Humans evolved to have a desire for happiness in the same way we evolved with a desire to drink. We have a desire to do what is morally right because it is best for the survival of the species. Now that's not to equate 'survival of the species' and morality, simply to say that morality is what tends to result in survival. Happiness is only an incentive for us to do what is right, but it can also lead us to do things that are morally repugnant, and that is where humans, being a rational animal, are meant to use their reason to temper their instints in order to be moral.
ethicist
Initiate
Avatar

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 10, 2009
Location: London

Total Topics: 1
Total Posts: 14
Posted 10/19/09 - 07:57 AM:
quote post
#18
The reason why the OP has claimed that happiness is the only intrinsic good is that, from a humanistic viewpoint, 'intrinsic good' here must be one and the same thing as that which is valued. Since happiness is construable as the feeling or state that results from the fulfilment of our wishes (inherent in our values), our wish to the sprite must be for happiness. This I find a short but very dense argument, and a strong one at that.

The question of whether the OP's utilitarianism is objectively valid is more tricky. I think Odin's point about not wanting to sacrifice his own happiness poses a real problem because utilitarianism would require this of him given that a compromise of an individual's happiness might be necessary in order to maximize utility. That everyone must wish for happiness does not entail a utilitarian state of affairs. The objective (intersubjective) validity of the OP's utilitarianism requires that everyone should wish for the world's happiness over their own which, although agreeable personally, is by no means without need of justification.

Edited by ethicist on 10/20/09 - 03:34 AM
xzJoel
Bio-clump

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 30, 2005
Location: New Jersey

Total Topics: 32
Total Posts: 842
Posted 10/19/09 - 08:32 AM:
quote post
#19
PMB wrote:

Question: A devious sprite grants you one wish. You know that the sprite is bound by unbreakable laws to grant your wish, but that he will do everything possible to avoid the result being what you expected. What can you wish for that the sprite cannot ruin?
Answer: Happiness.

To secure an objectively valid moral theory requires an intrinsic good. Not only is happiness just such a good, it is the only such good. While there may be other possible answers to the question posed in this post's epigraph--we could, for example, be so specific that the sprite cannot but grant our request as expected--only happiness qualifies as an answer that can be given by every person. After all, so long as one is displeased, the wish has not been granted; and once the wish has been granted, one can no longer be displeased.



What about

A) Bliss
B) Perfection
C) Never ending euphoria
D) "A second wish that you will have to grant exactly as I inteded"
E) "For you to read my mind and grant me precisely the best wish I could wish."
F) The best wish ever
G) Etc.

Doesn't the original answer to the question seem a little limiting and non-imaginative?

Make a joyous noise onto the lord... Not a good one, just a joyous one.
Mako
Assistant Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Feb 15, 2006
Location: In transit, somewhere in Nanjing

Total Topics: 14
Total Posts: 314
Posted 10/19/09 - 08:55 AM:
quote post
#20
Re the fundamentals: It's a clash of fundamentals, PMB. Firstly, utilitarianism as a theory, is not reduced to the broadest ontological ground. One must first ask "Why value happiness?" or more specifically, "Why value happiness above all else?" Those questions must first be answered.

' My own response to that speaks to the ever-present problem-of-the-hidden-premise' within utilitarianism. My claim is that one values happiness because one first values the agent from which such states as happiness etc. are derived. From a moral perspective, why should one value a mere derivative of agency, when one can/should value agency itself in its broadest, most comprehensive scope (i.e. rational agency)?

It seems that utilitarianism's claim is that it is not only rational to value happiness, but also obligatory to do so and this duty is imposed without proper justification. Indeed, in the absence of a more fundamental premise than the principle of ' the greatest happiness to the greatest number," one could make any number of claims as to what constittues moral behaviour.

Further, is happiness, sans freedom really an intrinsic good? If it is, then utlitarianism opens itself up to such objections as the 'happiness-drug-machine" example.

And why should one consent to an ethical theory which is not 'practically feasible?" Imposing unreasonable, excessively burdensome obligations is obviously inconsistent with the 'ought implies can' principle, which makes me wonder if it's perhaps not more suitable for hypothetical super-beings who can more readily comply with its stringent rational/moral requirements. But why should real people consent to such a moral theory? It would seem to be quite irrational from the outset despite of all the claims as to how rational it is to pursue happiness. But I think I get it now: It's all about pursuing supposedly and apparently rational ends through highly irrational, unrealistic means. Makes sense! confused

Who's imposing this universal obligation that one must always (try to) perform the utilitarian calculus? My own impression is that it's merely imposed by fiat, that is, by power and dominance? If that's so (and it would appear it is), then symmetrical relationships are obviously not a feature of utilitarianism, and as I've just t mentioned, it would appear that some use of 'dominance strategies' would be a permanent and necessary feature of utilitarianism. It seems to be more a form of totalitarianism (i.e. Hapinessism). Be happy or else!

Re the problem of authority: Firstly, there's the ever-present problem of which definition of happiness or well-being one accepts and how can one reasonably foist the same model universally, on all individuals. Secondly, in a supposed political formulation of utilitarianism, who's watching out for one's happiness/well-being? Upon whom do the obligations fall? This is a serious question. Are we to do that ourselves, as individuals, or is there some authority performing the calculus for us? Or is it both? If it is indeed both, then there are bound to arise cross-purposes/contradictions between the calculations (and resulting policies) of authority on the one hand, and the calculations and decisions of individual agents. Can/Should the authority impose punishments for not performing the calculus? Then the burdens of justice would indeed be overwhelming since that would require knowing people's thoughts. It would also constitute 'double jeopardy' since firstly, a recalcitrant citizen would (theoretically) naturally suffer anyway by not maximizing her own happiness. Hence she punishes herself and the punishment occurs as a natural consequence of her lack of willingness and diligence to perform the calculus and performatively follow-up on it. So why punish her again through a formal system of justice, at least if that's what utilitarians have in mind when they consider utilitarianism as a political theory?


Re the reflexive nature of theories in general, both scientific and moral:
My own sense of moral theories is informed in part by how we construct scientific theories. Scientific theories, as formal constructs, attempt to explain the broadest scope of data in a reflexively consistent manner. By that I mean that through theory construction, scientists attempt to account for and explain in formal terms, the broadest range of observed/measurable data/behaviours in a consistent manner. Predictions should match testable/measurable observations and vice versa.

It is (imo) similar with moral theories. As factors for consideration, happiness and well-being only reflect the 'outcome' side of the 'moral agency' balance-sheet and not the means or conditions under which those outcomes arose. Moral theories as formal constructs, should in my view, reflect the broadest scope of human agency and in doing so, attempt to define the nature and scope of 'justification,' as well as regulate behaviours between agents. In order to do that, a moral theory must present the broadest, average definition as to what constitutes a 'rational agent,' and not merely consider slices of agency, in the form of derivative or symptomatic elements (e.g. 'happiness' or 'well-being') which are (in utilitarianism's case) offered up as the teleological, and it would appear according to the op, the deontological ground of all moral agency.

Edited by Mako on 10/19/09 - 11:11 AM

"To alcohol. The cause of, and solution to, all of life's problems." ~ Homer Simpson
Download thread as

Page: 1 2 3 4



Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.