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Uneducated definite descriptions
What if I don't know about the person I'm naming?

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Uneducated definite descriptions

Incision
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Posted 06/12/09 - 09:59 AM: Subject: Uneducated definite descriptions	#1
Suppose I'm a new member of PF, and all I know about Paul is that he's the webmaster (and whatever that entails). Then according to Russell's analysis of names, when I say "Paul," I just mean "the x such that x is the webmaster of PF." But if that's true, then Paul is necessarily the webmaster of PF, which is false. (He could have started Economics Forums.) Isn't this a knockdown objection to Russell's analysis of names?

keda
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Posted 06/12/09 - 10:14 AM:	#2
Knockdown objection if you ask me.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

unenlightened
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Posted 06/12/09 - 11:03 AM:	#3
But that's not all you know. You know he is a (probably male) human being and that he is interested in computers and philosophy. Definitely not a potato or a cat. Edit: Well possibly a particularly intelligent and benevolent cat. Edited by unenlightened on 06/12/09 - 01:00 PM
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Incision
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Posted 06/12/09 - 02:38 PM:	#4
keda wrote: Knockdown objection if you ask me. That's what I'm thinking, yeah. unenlightened wrote: Definitely not a potato or a cat. Well, between this and the Santa threads, all my illusions are being destroyed. * * * I think that's a standard reply. Typically, we know several features about the people we're naming; with a modest alteration, the theory can have the replacement definite description be the disjunction of the features, or the majority, or a weighted combination, etc. But my post was trying to get around all that by a thought experiment: what if I knew less than I know -- if I knew only that Paul was the webmaster? In that hypothetical case, it would be self-contradictory to say that Paul might not have been the webmaster, but it seems that it shouldn't be.

Incision
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Posted 06/12/09 - 02:42 PM:	#5
Crap, I just realized there's another topic basically on this subject. Thanks for humoring me.

Fenchurch
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Posted 06/13/09 - 10:12 AM:	#6
Incision wrote: Suppose I'm a new member of PF, and all I know about Paul is that he's the webmaster (and whatever that entails). Then according to Russell's analysis of names, when I say "Paul," I just mean "the x such that x is the webmaster of PF." But if that's true, then Paul is necessarily the webmaster of PF, which is false. (He could have started Economics Forums.) Isn't this a knockdown objection to Russell's analysis of names? How are you dragging necessity into this? On Russell's view, a proper name such as "Paul" is not a genuine name, but rather a linguistic shorthand that we employ for the purpose of referring to a person who (we believe) fits some number of definite descriptions. So if all you believe about Paul is that he is the webmaster of PF (you don't have to know it), then when you say "Paul," you mean "the webmaster of PF." Perhaps you are very strange and believe that Paul is the webmaster of PF and nothing else (that is, he fits no other definite descriptions), but I bet you actually believe (or are disposed to believe) that Paul has other qualities. So Paul really refers to "the x such that x is, among other things, the webmaster of PF." The multitude of definite descriptions associated with a given proper name becomes relevant when we consider the possibility of false associations. Take, for example, Sandra. Sandra is really famous. A great deal of her life is known, but some of the most interesting parts are merely rumored. All of those rumors are associated with Sandra, but we're not going to say that Sandra fails to be Sandra simply because one or two of those rumors are false. It is only if a large number of those rumors -- or perhaps a small number of rumors central to our total conception of her -- turn out to be false that we will say that she is not the person we thought she was. And it would take even further dispersing of her definite descriptions for us to say that no one matching the description of Sandra existed. To take a parallel case, consider Moses. We might think that Moses was a real person who led the Jews out of Egypt and died before reaching Israel, but we might not believe in any of the miracles. That's probably not enough to make us say that Moses never existed, however. But if it turns out that there was no single person who led the Jews out of Egypt, that "Moses" is just the name of one of the guys who was walking in front of the group one day, and that all the stories about him are an amalgam of many different people, then we'll probably say that no such person as our Moses existed (cf. Robin Hood). Necessity never enters the picture, though. In fact, Russell didn't believe in anything but epistemic necessity. So if you have a direct sensory experience and name it, then the name must refer (to that experience). But all other senses of necessity (and possibility) were dropped in favor of expression in terms of universal and existential quantifiers. At least, that's what I recall of Russell from Philosophy of Language. I never was one for the early 20th century analytic philosophers.
...and she, laughing softly, "Why should I lift a shield in contest? If I conquer when naked, how will it be when I take arms?" "Cautious, careful people always casting about to preserve their reputation or social standards never can bring about reform. Those who are really in earnest are willing to be anything or nothing in the world's estimation, and publicly and privately, in season and out, avow their sympathies with despised ideas and their advocates, and bear the consequences." -Susan B. Anthony

Incision
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Posted 06/13/09 - 11:48 AM:	#7
Nice to speak to you, Fenchurch. I admit to making a gaff in saying that "if that's true, then Paul is necessarily the webmaster of PF": I should have said, "Paul is essentially the webmaster." But that's still dragging necessity into this. Aside from that clarification, I'm just going to drop the Paul thought experiment, since it seems to be causing too many problems. Let me try Wernicke. I'm vaguely aware that there's a condition called "Wernicke's aphasia," so I can tell that there's someone called "Wernicke." But that's all I know. The only definite description I can associate with Wernicke is "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " Of course I could guess that Wernicke is a medical researcher (though possibly a patient), and male (though possibly female). But I don't believe either of those because they're just guesses. And I also know that Wernicke is the eponym of something, and a human. But I can't construct a true definite description from those because there are many human eponyms. So the "cluster" of properties in my definite description has a single member (and its entailments, I guess). In this case, I'm trying to preempt any maneuvers involving clusters of properties. Thus, there's this argument: Suppose "Wernicke" is short for "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " Then "possibly Wernicke is not the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia' " is short for "possibly the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia' is not the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " But that's false. (I don't know whether Russell believed that, but I do, and I think most people would.) Wernicke might not have had a condition named after Wernicke, but Russell doesn't seem to allow this.

keda
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Posted 06/13/09 - 12:46 PM:	#8
I think the problem is that "the web master of PF is the webmaster of PF" doesn't say anything but "Paul is the webmaster of PF" says something. The former cannot logically be false, while the latter can. So it is a necessity but a logical one. Assuming "Paul is the webmaster of PF" has been interpreted correctly, the name Paul refers to the same person, no matter what is known about him, and to anyone who has never heard of Paul, is not going to be able to interpret it correctly without first figuring out who is being refered to by "Paul".
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

Schlitz
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Posted 06/13/09 - 02:04 PM:

Incision wrote:
Nice to speak to you, Fenchurch. I admit to making a gaff in saying that "if that's true, then Paul is necessarily the webmaster of PF": I should have said, "Paul is essentially the webmaster." But that's still dragging necessity into this. wink

Incision- I don't understand the difference between "Paul is essentially the webmaster" and "Paul is the webmaster." Would you care to explain it?

Incision wrote:

Thus, there's this argument: Suppose "Wernicke" is short for "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " Then "possibly Wernicke is not the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia' " is short for "possibly the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia' is not the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " But that's false. (I don't know whether Russell believed that, but I do, and I think most people would.) Wernicke might not have had a condition named after Wernicke, but Russell doesn't seem to allow this.

Yeah. There's definitely some hanky-panky going on with the account of naming you're using in your example, and I think it's here: your example makes the meanings of the sentences you speak a matter of your beliefs. This is really clear in another example of yours:

Incision wrote:

what if I knew less than I know -- if I knew only that Paul was the webmaster? In that hypothetical case, it would be self-contradictory to say that Paul might not have been the webmaster, but it seems that it shouldn't be.

If the meaning of the sentence "Paul is the webmaster," said by you, varied as your beliefs about Paul varied, then so do the truth-conditions for "Paul is the webmaster." Both of these sentences are indexed to you, so they're more properly written "Paul is the webmaster_Incision". And we can index these sentences to snapshots of your beliefs, so to speak, that is, all the beliefs you believe at one time. These are written "Paul is the webmaster_Incision(T1)," "Paul is the webmaster_Incision(T2)," where (T1) and (T2) indicate different times that are correlated with sets of your beliefs. Sure, many of your beliefs will be constant across time; others won't have much bearing on your beliefs about Paul; some will bear on your beliefs about Paul, such as which genders use which names, for example; but for the sake of simplicity, and in order to dodge the whole cluster concept thing along with you, let's just say that anybody who has anything to say about Paul has just one belief about him, and this belief fixes the reference of sentences making allegations about Paul, for each speaker.

So now, imagine you, Yakko, Wakko, and Dot each have something to say about Paul. You believe Paul is the webmaster. Yakko believes Paul is a kind cat with computer skills. Wakko believes Paul is the sandwich he made last tuesday. Dot believes Paul is the guy who lives in a trash can on the Warner Bros. lot, just down from the water tower.

You say, "Paul is the webmaster."

Yakko says, "Paul is the webmaster."

Wakko says, "Paul is the webmaster."

Dot says, "Paul is the webmaster."

Your sentence means, "The man who's the webmaster is the webmaster." That's true.

Yakko's sentence means, "The unique kitty that is a kind cat with computer skills is the webmaster." That's false.

Wakko's sentence means, "The sandwich I (Yakko) made last tuesday is the webmaster." That's false.

Dot's sentence means, "The guy who lives in a trash can on the WB lot (and so on) is the webmaster." That's false.

Next, consider that your beliefs about Paul change. At T1, you believe Paul is the webmaster. At T2, you believe Paul is the founder of the Freemasons. At T3, you believe Paul is Luke Skywalker's father. Then, as above-

"Paul is the webmaster_Incision(T1)" is true.

"Paul is the webmaster_Incision(T2)" is false.

"Paul is the webmaster_Incision(T3)" is false.

So, given the idea that the reference of a name depends on who is using the name and what that person's beliefs are, you can come up with examples where a true sentence, i.e. "Paul is the webmaster," comes out false. This leads me to conclude that the truth of a sentence that someone says doesn't depend on what she believes. So, the meanings of sentences spoken by Dot cannot be determined by the Dot's beliefs- and this holds for everyone.

This leaves me wondering, is there an articulation of the description theory of names that makes the reference of names constant across speakers, and across time? If so, it'll avoid any trouble I've tried to articulate in this post.

Fenchurch
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Posted 06/14/09 - 09:18 AM:	#10
Incision wrote: I should have said, "Paul is essentially the webmaster." But that's still dragging necessity into this. I don't think that does it. The point is that "Paul" simply means "the x such that x is the webmaster of PF" to you. That is, the webmaster of PF is who you are trying to refer to when you say "Paul." There's nothing essential or necessary about it. It's really more of a stipulation than anything else, I guess. Incision wrote: Let me try Wernicke. I'm vaguely aware that there's a condition called "Wernicke's aphasia," so I can tell that there's someone called "Wernicke." But that's all I know. The only definite description I can associate with Wernicke is "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia.' " Of course I could guess that Wernicke is a medical researcher (though possibly a patient), and male (though possibly female). But I don't believe either of those because they're just guesses. No, but you do believe that Wernicke fits other definite descriptions that "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Werkicke's aphasia,'" right? Because that makes it relevantly the same as the case involving Paul as the webmaster of PF. Wernicke isn't necessarily or essentially the eponym of Wernicke's aphasia, he just happens to be so in fact and you happen to believe it. Incision wrote: In this case, I'm trying to preempt any maneuvers involving clusters of properties. Okay, but the clusters aren't essential ( ) to the reply. The point is that proper names are shorthands that are associated with definite descriptions as a matter of historical fact, not necessity. "Paul is the webmaster of PF" is only necessary insofar as it says "the name I use for the webmaster of PF is the name I use for the webmaster of PF." And more accurately, it is merely a definition in the context you present it, meaning that it is contingently true so long as "Paul" is really the name you use for the webmaster of PF. It's a matter of keeping track of just what you are asserting. Saying "Paul is what I call the webmaster of PF" is different than saying "the webmaster of PF is named Paul." The first depends on whether or not you call the webmaster of PF Paul, whereas the latter depends on whether or not the webmaster of PF is actually named Paul. Eponyms may also be an odd example, since it is an analytic truth on any theory of naming (that recognizes analytic truths) that the x such that x is the eponym of y is the eponym of y. But that has to do with the meaning of "eponym," not the theory of naming. The necessity of Wernicke being the eponym of Wernicke's aphasia depends only on "Wernicke's aphasia" being eponymous (it's not necessary in the sense that the condition couldn't have been named differently), and your belief that Wernicke is the x such that x is the eponym of Wernicke's aphasia rests only on your belief that "Wernicke's aphasia" is eponymous. Schlitz wrote: So, given the idea that the reference of a name depends on who is using the name and what that person's beliefs are, you can come up with examples where a true sentence, i.e. "Paul is the webmaster," comes out false. The sentence, yes. But not the proposition. But that's why the distinction is made, right. Schlitz wrote: This leaves me wondering, is there an articulation of the description theory of names that makes the reference of names constant across speakers, and across time? If so, it'll avoid any trouble I've tried to articulate in this post. Again, this is based on limited knowledge of Russell. However, it seems that anytime we are using a name such that we believe others are using it the same way we are, we are at least dispositionally committed to the proper name being shorthand for, among other things, "the x such that x is what other people are talking about when they use the proper name I use for it." Discovering when this assumption is incorrect is one of the functions of linguistic philosophy. This function causes a lot of people to think that philosophy is just arguing over words, but in fact it is quite important to know that we're talking about the same things before we argue about what those things are!
...and she, laughing softly, "Why should I lift a shield in contest? If I conquer when naked, how will it be when I take arms?" "Cautious, careful people always casting about to preserve their reputation or social standards never can bring about reform. Those who are really in earnest are willing to be anything or nothing in the world's estimation, and publicly and privately, in season and out, avow their sympathies with despised ideas and their advocates, and bear the consequences." -Susan B. Anthony

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