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Uneducated definite descriptions
What if I don't know about the person I'm naming?

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Uneducated definite descriptions

Incision
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Posted 06/14/09 - 04:17 PM:	#11
Schlitz wrote: I don't understand the difference between "Paul is essentially the webmaster" and "Paul is the webmaster." Would you care to explain it? Hm, that sounds like linguistic shorthand for "I've got something up my sleeve." But okay, I'll call you. "Paul is the webmaster" is true if Paul is the webmaster at the actual world; "Paul is essentially the webmaster" is true if Paul is the webmaster at each possible world at which Paul exists; "Paul is necessarily the webmaster" is true if at all possible worlds Paul is the webmaster. Since if at all possible worlds Paul is the webmaster, then Paul necessarily exists, by saying "if that's true, then Paul is necessarily the webmaster" I inadvertently conditionally upgraded Paul's usergroup status. This leaves me wondering, is there an articulation of the description theory of names that makes the reference of names constant across speakers, and across time? I'm under the impression that description theorists have generally admitted that what I mean by "Schlitz" probably has little in common with what you do, and have guessed, I imagine with fingers crossed, that the referent of both would likely be the same. Any theory that doesn't have the definite descriptions vary by beliefs will imply that we sometimes don't know what we mean. Fenchurch wrote: [Y]ou do believe that Wernicke fits other definite descriptions that "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Werkicke's aphasia,'" right? I think I understand what you're getting at now, and yes, I clearly do. Wernicke must have done all sorts of things unbeknownst to me, some combinations of which form uniquely satisfied descriptions. Perhaps Wernicke was the only person taking a smoke on Sepulveda Boulevard on 18 August, 1950. So maybe the definite description that "Wernicke" means is unknown to me. But that's just to say that I don't know what "Wernicke" means. And this of course will be a general problem: if everyone's definite descriptions include a combination of all the things they actually do satisfy instead of those I believe they do, then I won't know what anyone's names mean. So it seems there's a dilemma. If "Wernicke" means the definite description that I know that Wernicke satisfies, then Wernicke necessarily is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." If "Wernicke" means some definite description the content of which I'm unaware, then I don't even know what the previous sentence means. I don't think either of these is plausible.
The only leaf it drops goes wide, Your name not written on either side. — Robert Frost, "On Going Unnoticed"

Fenchurch
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Posted 06/18/09 - 08:46 AM:	#12
Incision wrote: "Paul is essentially the webmaster" is true if Paul is the webmaster at each possible world at which Paul exists; In which case, Paul is not essentially the webmaster. It is merely the case that he is actually the webmaster, which is all the definite description requires. Incision wrote: I'm under the impression that description theorists have generally admitted that what I mean by "Schlitz" probably has little in common with what you do, and have guessed, I imagine with fingers crossed, that the referent of both would likely be the same. Any theory that doesn't have the definite descriptions vary by beliefs will imply that we sometimes don't know what we mean. This requires a bit of caution, I think. An object X fits set Y of definite descriptions. We, not knowing the full extension of Y, identify X by proper names which stand in for a variety of sets (call them Z_1...n) that we take to be subsets of Y. So while we may need to cross our fingers with regard to successful co-reference, it is not so much a matter of luck whether or not we are trying to refer to the same thing. To some, this may seem a problem. But then again, our theories of names, or reference, or whatever should not imply knowledge that we demonstrably do not have. It is a common occurrence that two people wind up talking past one another, and it is one function of analytic philosophy to help us identify when we are doing so. Therefore, it's really more of a strength of the theory of descriptions (assuming we're getting it right) that it reflects the situation we actually find ourselves. Incision wrote: So maybe the definite description that "Wernicke" means is unknown to me. But that's just to say that I don't know what "Wernicke" means. No, it means you don't know the full extension of the set you take "the eponym of Wernicke's aphasia" to be a member of. You know what "Wernicke" means to you, and part of that meaning entails that you recognize there are things you don't know about Wernicke. But it doesn't mean that you don't know anything about Wernicke or the meaning of the word "Wernicke." All you lack is perfect, complete knowledge. And that, I trust, is not counterintuitive at all. Incision wrote: So it seems there's a dilemma. If "Wernicke" means the definite description that I know that Wernicke satisfies, then Wernicke necessarily is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." If "Wernicke" means some definite description the content of which I'm unaware, then I don't even know what the previous sentence means. I don't think either of these is plausible. But the problem is that "Wernicke" doesn't have a singular meaning. It means Z₁ to you, Z₂ to me, and Z_3...n to others. We all use that name in an attempt to refer to X (i.e. Wernicke), with the assumption that Y contains that which our Zs are committed to.
"Cautious, careful people always casting about to preserve their reputation or social standards never can bring about reform. Those who are really in earnest are willing to be anything or nothing in the world's estimation, and publicly and privately, in season and out, avow their sympathies with despised ideas and their advocates, and bear the consequences." -Susan B. Anthony "I want women to be liberated and still be able to have a nice ass and shake it." -Shirley MacLaine

Incision
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Posted 06/18/09 - 11:49 AM:	#13
Fenchurch wrote: It is a common occurrence that two people wind up talking past one another [. . .]. I can't help but wonder if that's going on here, so I'll take a minute to see if I'm understanding you. Fenchurch wrote: An object X fits set Y of definite descriptions. We, not knowing the full extension of Y, identify X by proper names which stand in for a variety of sets (call them Z_1...n) that we take to be subsets of Y. [. . .] "Wernicke" [. . .] means Z₁ to you, Z₂ to me, and Z_3...n to others. So Wernicke fits a set Y, which, although it must be much larger, I'll for convenience identify as {aphasia eponym, Sepulveda smoker, closet ninja}. Even though Y = {aphasia eponym, Sepulveda smoker, closet ninja}, I don't know that. I know only that there is a set Y = {d₁, d₂, d₃, . . ., d_n}, that aphasia eponym is a member of Y, and that it is not the unique member. I could say that there's a subset of Y, Z₁ = {aphasia eponym}. So when I say "Wernicke," I mean Z₁, that is, the x such that x is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." I did misunderstand you before, then. I was taking you to mean that the meaning of "Wernicke" was Y, or a cluster of Y. But if I've got it now, the meaning for each person is their respective Z_i (or perhaps a cluster of that?). However, doesn't my argument still go through? Given that, when I use it, "Wernicke" means "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia,' " we can go through a series of transformations like this: Wernicke is essentially the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." Necessarily, if Wernicke exists, then Wernicke is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." Necessarily, if there is a unique x such that x is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia," then the x such that x is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia" is the x such that x is the eponym of "Wernicke's aphasia." I think the important thing is that there is no way for me to hold that "Wernicke" means "the x such that x is the eponym of 'Wernicke's aphasia' " and hold that Wernicke might not have been the x such that x is the eponym of Wernicke's aphasia. The validity of this argument should not be affected by others' assigning it different meanings.
The only leaf it drops goes wide, Your name not written on either side. — Robert Frost, "On Going Unnoticed"

Aetixintro
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Posted 06/18/09 - 03:33 PM:	#14
Bertrand Russell is aiming for the things like "king of France (who is living now) is bald" and "Pegasus" with his paper "On Denoting" (1905). By making an existential quantification of definite descriptions, he is making it more clear what kind of status regarding reality the definite descriptions should have. Contentious stuff isn't really entailed by his proposal the way I see it. I don't know if I understand you properly, Incision. At one point, you make the assumption: I know about Paul is that he's the webmaster (and whatever that entails) Then you continue with: I say "Paul," I just mean "the x such that x is the webmaster of PF." This seems to me to be correct. I'm not going to enter the modal logic debate of the kind Kripke is so obsessed with. The conclusion you draw puzzles me: Then Paul is necessarily the webmaster of PF, which is false. It appears correct to me to still assume the correctness of "Paul is the webmaster of the PF-forum" as you have already made that assumption by what you have stated first that is "I know about Paul is that he's the webmaster (and whatever that entails)"! That Paul is also the webmaster of some Economics-forum doesn't change the fact that he is the webmaster of the PF-forum. I don't think you are obliged to add every fact to the quantification as long as you stay within the boundary of your understanding. So when you state "Uneducated definite descriptions", you are already outside that boundary of known declarations and I think that is not what Bertrand Russell aims for with his theory. Cheers! Edited by Aetixintro on 06/18/09 - 03:46 PM
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Incision
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Posted 06/19/09 - 11:49 PM:	#15
aetixintro wrote: I'm not going to enter the modal logic debate of the kind Kripke is so obsessed with. Actually, that's just what the discussion is about, and my argument is similar to ones in Naming and Necessity. My claim is that if names mean definite descriptions, then there are cases in which sentences of the form "(name) is F" would be true, even though they're false. Here's the argument. Suppose "Paul" means for me "the webmaster of PF." Then "Paul is the webmaster of PF" means for me "the webmaster of PF is the webmaster of PF." That's a necessary truth, so "Paul is the webmaster of PF" would be for me a necessary truth. But surely it still wouldn't be a necessary truth. So "Paul" doesn't mean "the webmaster of PF." Without meaning any disrespect to the arguments to the contrary, it still seems to me that if names mean definite descriptions, then either we have situations like that above, or we don't always know what our names mean. Suppose again that names mean definite descriptions. If we always know what those names mean, then "Paul" would mean "the webmaster of PF." Or if "Paul" means "the webmaster of PF and the most recent person to resign as administrator, etc.," then I don't know what "Paul" means.
The only leaf it drops goes wide, Your name not written on either side. — Robert Frost, "On Going Unnoticed"

Schlitz
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Posted 07/10/09 - 10:53 AM:	#16
Fenchurch wrote: Schlitz wrote: So, given the idea that the reference of a name depends on who is using the name and what that person's beliefs are, you can come up with examples where a true sentence, i.e. "Paul is the webmaster," comes out false. The sentence, yes. But not the proposition. But that's why the distinction is made, right. I don't understand the significance of this. Could you explain? Here's where I'm coming from: I don't know what a proposition is, except for perhaps a partially uninterpreted sentence- one that lacks force in Fregean terms; in other terms, it's a sentence evaluated separately from pragmatics- no speaker, no context; it just belongs to a language and is capable of being true or false. I suppose this construction could be accounted for as an equivalence class of utterances over time, from which rules of syntax could be divined, then perhaps a semantics given (but is it the right scheme?), but to do this would be to deprive us of a concept of language, which we undoubtedly have. However, sentence or proposition, however you slice it, both still have truth-conditions in common. Both still have in common the methods to determine their truth, and, both the sentence under consideration and its propositional form, whatever that is, are both capable of truth and falsehood, and both are either true or false. The disagreement between description and causal theories of naming is a disagreement between how, in general, to determine the truth of sentences that feature proper names in truth-functional roles. I just don't see the utility here in making the sentence / proposition distinction, since the dispute over theories of names already grants a distinction between semantics and force, or pragmatics.

Pete
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Posted 07/20/09 - 01:32 PM:	#17
Incision wrote: Here's the argument. Suppose "Paul" means for me "the webmaster of PF." Then "Paul is the webmaster of PF" means for me "the webmaster of PF is the webmaster of PF." That's a necessary truth, so "Paul is the webmaster of PF" would be for me a necessary truth. But surely it still wouldn't be a necessary truth. So "Paul" doesn't mean "the webmaster of PF." Without meaning any disrespect to the arguments to the contrary, it still seems to me that if names mean definite descriptions, then either we have situations like that above, or we don't always know what our names mean. Suppose again that names mean definite descriptions. If we always know what those names mean, then "Paul" would mean "the webmaster of PF." Or if "Paul" means "the webmaster of PF and the most recent person to resign as administrator, etc.," then I don't know what "Paul" means. There is a way for a Russellian to avoid this particular objection. He can pack the indexical concept of "actual" into the description that is supposed to be synonymous with "Paul." It does not follow from the fact that "Paul" means the same as "the actual webmaster of PF" that the modal sentence "Paul could not have failed to be the webmaster of PF" is true. But there are other good objection against Russell's theory that you seem to be gesturing at, e.g. if "Paul" means "the actual webmaster of PF" then it ought to be a priori knowable that Paul is the actual webmaster of PF. But this is something we can learn only a posteriori. And it seems like I can know the meaning of "Paul" and manage to refer to him by using his name without knowing much of anything about him, certainly without knowing anything that uniquely identifies him. Still, Russell's theory was invented to solve some really tough puzzles--how can sentences containing empty names be meaningful? how can "Scott is the author of Waverley" be informative? It may be a flawed solution, but I don't know if there are better ones out there.

jsidelko
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Posted 07/20/09 - 02:16 PM:	#18
All the new member can know is this: There is an x such that x is the name assigned to the present webmaster and x may have been the name of the webmaster in the past and may be the name of the webmaster in the future.
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Incision
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Posted 07/22/09 - 02:22 PM:	#19
A deft response, Pete. It's disappointing to see the whole argument succumb to a modal flourish, but I suppose that's how these things go. While my argument may be sound, it's irrelevant: a Russellian need not believe that "Paul" means "the webmaster of PF," just "the actual webmaster of PF." And that's not a problem.
The only leaf it drops goes wide, Your name not written on either side. — Robert Frost, "On Going Unnoticed"

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