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Two Mistakes and Scepticism

Brad
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Posted 04/24/03 - 05:59 PM:	#1
Originally, I wanted to call this three mistakes, but Kant is a tougher nut to crack than that (I can say that it's his emphasis on inner representation that's the problem but it takes a while to see that.). I am not saying that Descartes and Locke aren't worthy of reading, I think it is absolutely necessary to read them (if you're interested in this stuff, that is), but pointing out what's wrong can just as easily be seen as a sign of respect, even love, as it can be seen as a sign of disrespect. First mistake: Descartes argued that since we can doubt any one belief, it follows that all of our beliefs are doubtable. The problem is that it doesn't follow at all. In order to doubt a belief, we have to accept a large part, even most, of our other beliefs to be true. Otherwise, we wouldn't be able to make since of that doubt in the first place. If we aren't willing to consider that some of our beliefs our false or can be false, then we can't at the same time believe they are true. 1+1=2 is true but only if we accept that 1+1=3 or 1+1=0 are false. The true and the false are intricately linked. Second mistake: Locke confuses explanation with justification. It simply doesn't matter how we come to see the world when it comes to our accuracy with respect to the world. You can explain to me how photons turn into electric signals which my brain interprets for as long as you want, it simply doesn't follow that you can therefore put the fact that I'm looking at a computer monitor at this moment into question. I may or may not be actually seeing a computer monitor right now (it is possible that I'm wrong), but no amount of explaining how I see a monitor justifies the doubt. If I'm travelling down the Pacific Coast Highway, you can't explain away the Pacific ocean by explaining to me the intricacies of the internal combustion engine.

Paul
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Posted 04/24/03 - 08:37 PM:	#2
Though that's one way of putting Descartes' mistake, I'd put it this way: his mistake was to argue that if we can doubt something then that thing is meaningless and that if we can't doubt it then it's the container of all meaning. He was entirely backwards in that he thought things which cannot be doubted are more important than things which can... it's quite the opposite. In reality, tautological truths are of no particular significance and most certainly don't deserve the attention which real truths (and by real I mean doubtable) deserve. If something cannot be questioned, then it cannot be genuinely answered. To say it answers itself is to say it asked a pointless reflexive question.
"We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about 'and'." - Arthur Eddington

Brad
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Posted 04/24/03 - 08:54 PM:	#3
That's an excellent point. Can I quote this sometime? One question lingers however. In Descartes' solution (roughly speaking, doubt is not doubtable), is it that he was wrong to ascribe indubtability to thoughts or that having thoughts isn't a particularly philosophically interesting question. Of course, I choose the former, but I wonder if something might be made of the latter course?

Gassendi1
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Posted 04/24/03 - 09:18 PM:	#4
Originally posted by Paul Though that's one way of putting Descartes' mistake, I'd put it this way: his mistake was to argue that if we can doubt something then that thing is meaningless and that if we can't doubt it then it's the container of all meaning. He was entirely backwards in that he thought things which cannot be doubted are more important than things which can... it's quite the opposite. In reality, tautological truths are of no particular significance and most certainly don't deserve the attention which real truths (and by real I mean doubtable) deserve. If something cannot be questioned, then it cannot be genuinely answered. To say it answers itself is to say it asked a pointless reflexive question. ______________________________________ The term "meaningless" is, of course, foreign to Descartes, so I am a little baffled about whether what you are saying is true or false. What Descartes did hold, I think, was that what was was dubitable was not knowledge, and, of course, what was indubitable was knowledge. I take "meaningless" in philosophy to mean "has no truth value." But I don't think that Descartes thought that what was dubitable had no truth value. He thought it was probably true that there is monitor in front of me, but that I could not know it. From what you write I gather that you mean by meaningful, "important" and "meaningless" unimportant. But how does that fit into Descartes? I think it is true that Hume held that "relations of ideas" were not about "real existence" and that is why they were certain, and "matters of fact" were about "real existence" and that was why they were not certain. Is that the sort of thing you had in mind?

Paul
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Posted 04/24/03 - 09:32 PM:	#5
Brad - Quote anything you like. The no question = no answer bit is kind of a paraphrase of Wittgenstein anyway. Perhaps I can doubt that I've had a particular thought (such as a complex action of doubting), because I have to judge that my short term memory is reliable. Since I have to make that assumption or judgment before I can know that I thought something in particular, even if it's just the beginning of a long thought (maybe I should say proposition) which refers to itself, it's possible to doubt it. To know that there is thought in general, without referring to a specific thought, I would call meaningless. The only way to define a general idea of thought that doesn't refer to any specific one, it seems to me, is to define it as simply that which you're aware of. (If you narrow it down to any subset of what you're aware of then you're picking particular things and it becomes doubtable.) With this definition in place you can continue on like Descartes did to note that you're aware of what you've just defined as being whatever you're aware of, and poof, an indubitable truth which tells us nothing at all. It only pulls out what we just wrote into the definition. The error wasn't quite as obvious as it may look, since under dualist metaphysics there would be some meaning to Descartes' conclusion. Dualists have the metaphysical picture of the two separate boxes labeled 'physical' and 'mental', and think that these boxes are clearly different looking. Because of this, Descartes would assume that even when not considering a particular thought he's still looking at that box instead of the other box... and so he'd presume there's meaningful content there about the box even if not about any items. (But to me, that's just another reason to reject dualism.) Originally posted by Jon1667 I take "meaningless" in philosophy to mean "has no truth value." Tautologies and contradictions are more like definitions of truth values, rather than instances, and so and unpopular as this makes me I'm hesitent to say that they 'have' truth values. At least, I say that what it means for a contingent thing to be true Hume's point looks reasonable to me as well. Tautologies and contradictions are structural guideposts... a contradiction is a sign saying "whatever method you used to get here was a mistake" and a tautology is a sign saying "whatever method you used to get here leads nowhere." Either way, it means "go back where you came from and remember to close off this path when you leave." In each case, they're useful in that when we reach a tautology of contradiction it tells us we made some mistakes in either the process or about our starting assumptions. (In math, of course, this lets them be used to show relationships among those assumptions.)
"We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about 'and'." - Arthur Eddington

Gassendi1
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Posted 04/25/03 - 04:14 AM:	#6
Tautologies and contradictions are more like definitions of truth values, rather than instances, and so and unpopular as this makes me I'm hesitent to say that they 'have' truth values. At least, I say that what it means for a contingent thing to be true Hume's point looks reasonable to me as well. Tautologies and contradictions are structural guideposts... a contradiction is a sign saying "whatever method you used to get here was a mistake" and a tautology is a sign saying "whatever method you used to get here leads nowhere." Either way, it means "go back where you came from and remember to close off this path when you leave." In each case, they're useful in that when we reach a tautology of contradiction it tells us we made some mistakes in either the process or about our starting assumptions. (In math, of course, this lets them be used to show relationships among those assumptions.) _____________________________________ If contradictions do not have a truth value (false) then why should we avoid contradicting ourselves? And it would be unclear (to say the least) why the a reductio ad absurdum proof in logic would show anything. And why would an argument with inconsistent premises be counted as valid? I could cite more examples which force us to count contradictions as false: and therefore, tautologies, which are the denials of contradictions as true. In the "Tractatus" Wittgenstein talks of of "sinnloss" and "unsinn." These may be translated as "senseless" and "nonsense" respectively. Wittgenstein says that tautologies are "unsinn." And maybe that is what you had in mind.

Gassendi1
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Posted 04/25/03 - 04:19 AM:	#7
Oh yes, forgot: "At least, I say that what it means for a contingent thing to be true." What about tautologies are true in all possible worlds; contradictions in no possible world; and contingent statements is some possible worlds?

Fire drill
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Posted 04/25/03 - 04:53 AM:	#8
Originally posted by Paul Tautologies and contradictions are more like definitions of truth values, rather than instances, and so and unpopular as this makes me I'm hesitent to say that they 'have' truth values Even if I partly agree with your standpoint, here's a cute quote I like a lot: "People say that tautologies have no practical value at all; but trust me, it's very hazardous to take a walk into the woods when you saw three sets of four tigers entering the woods and you see eleven tigers exiting. F.d.

darkcrow
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Posted 04/25/03 - 02:12 PM:	#9
Paul: Tautologies and contradictions are more like definitions of truth values, rather than instances, I am quite certain tautology and contradiction are definitions of truth values. But what else could they be, surly it can’t be denied they describe something. What does it mean to say, “that is a contradiction”, except to say conflicting ideas When we have two conflicting ideas aren’t we saying one is true and the other false, or some combination of one or another of those words. First mistake: Descartes tried to establish a universal, or as some might say, “a principle”. Second mistake: Locke None
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Gassendi1
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Posted 04/25/03 - 07:00 PM:	#10
Originally posted by darkcrow I am quite certain tautology and contradiction are definitions of truth values. But what else could they be, surly it can’t be denied they describe something. What does it mean to say, “that is a contradiction”, except to say conflicting ideas When we have two conflicting ideas aren’t we saying one is true and the other false, or some combination of one or another of those words. First mistake: Descartes tried to establish a universal, or as some might say, “a principle”. Second mistake: Locke None _______________________________________ Liberalism and Conservatism are "conflicting ideas" but both could be false. All dogs are brown and All dogs are red are conflicting ideas. But both happen to be false. Therefore: Conflicting ideas are not contradictions.

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