True statements: Philosophy Forums

Forums Articles Gallery Links

Register Login Members Calendar New Posts Search Chat Help

Philosophy Forums » Metaphysics and Epistemology » True statements » True statements

True statements

Print

Print

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Last

True statements

J. Random Hacker
banned

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Apr 11, 2009

Total Topics: 12
Total Posts: 479

Posted 04/14/09 - 10:18 PM:	#31
Banno wrote: then something that is true by definition is not a timeless truth, since once the convention folds, the truth ceases. That's changing conventions. That doesn't change the truth value under the old convention. If the convention doesn't exist then the truth doesn't exist, it doesn't become false.

Schlitz
Hulkamaniac

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Feb 09, 2009
Location: Home of the Cougar, Illinois

Total Topics: 3
Total Posts: 232

Posted 04/14/09 - 10:22 PM:	#32
I think Putnam gave the best explanation of analyticity out there- that there is a class of analytic truths and "All bachelors are unmarried men," "A bachelor is an unmarried man," and "If John's a bachelor, then John's unmarried and John's a man," are all examples of analytic truths, but analyticity is trivial. An analytic truth is one that is true in virtue of some semantical rule, of the same form as ' "John is a bachelor" is true whenever "John is unmarried and John is a man" is true. For every analytic statement, there is some such rule that the analytic statement is true in virtue of, and not every identity or statement that asserts synonomy between terms is analytic. Some might have turned out otherwise. But still, analyticity isn't a big deal since it doesn't inform epistemology like some philosophers had hoped it would. But what is truth? To address the poll, I don't think that asserting a statement is the same as asserting its truth. I don't even think that an assertion of a statement's truth is deducible from an assertion of that statement; however, it does follow that a person who asserts some statement in earnest has reasons to believe the statement is true. Making an assertion is a linguistic performance, and it is in virtue of our being able to distinguish the linguistic performance at hand- the question, the command, the statement, the playful joke - that we can interpret the sentence at hand.

Banno
Old goat

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 15, 2004
Location: Oz

Total Topics: 111
Total Posts: 6293

Posted 04/14/09 - 10:46 PM:	#33
Some detail on my own vote. First, T-sentences. The sentence "the cat is on the mat" will be true just in those cases in which the cat is on the mat. Nothing too profound here, I hope. Putting this more general, "P" is true if and only if P Note that the "P" on the left is mentioned, and the one on the right is used. Notice that the "is true" does not change the truth value of the original statement. Curious, that. As if it had no significance whatsoever. as if "it is true that the cat is on the mat" were exactly the same as "the cat is on the mat". When one asserts that it is true that the cat is on the mat, one does no more than in asserting that the cat is on the mat. The "is true" is redundant. Except that "it is true that the cat is on the mat" is somewhat more adamant. Hence, my vote.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

Banno
Old goat

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 15, 2004
Location: Oz

Total Topics: 111
Total Posts: 6293

Posted 04/14/09 - 10:47 PM:	#34
J. Random Hacker wrote: That's changing conventions. That doesn't change the truth value under the old convention. If the convention doesn't exist then the truth doesn't exist, it doesn't become false. If, at some point, it ceases to exist, it is not timeless.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

J. Random Hacker
banned

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Apr 11, 2009

Total Topics: 12
Total Posts: 479

Posted 04/14/09 - 11:05 PM:	#35
Banno wrote: If, at some point, it ceases to exist, it is not timeless. That's one meaning of the word. However, when we say something is a "timeless classic" or a "timeless beauty" we don't mean that the subject has always existed or will always exist. We mean that it has no reference to a specific time. I've already agreed with you that conventions come and go and have conceded your point. So there's no need, as far as I can tell, to keep disagreeing simply over the language we're using.

Banno
Old goat

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 15, 2004
Location: Oz

Total Topics: 111
Total Posts: 6293

Posted 04/14/09 - 11:11 PM:	#36
The question, I'd suppose, is whether analytic statements are distinct from synthetic. Seems they are both dependent on convention; so I don't think that the distinction holds up. That is, it would be wrong to suppose two types of truth, analytic and synthetic...
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

J. Random Hacker
banned

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Apr 11, 2009

Total Topics: 12
Total Posts: 479

Posted 04/14/09 - 11:18 PM:	#37
Banno wrote: The question, I'd suppose, is whether analytic statements are distinct from synthetic. Seems they are both dependent on convention; so I don't think that the distinction holds up. That is, it would be wrong to suppose two types of truth, analytic and synthetic... How is the proposition "there are more than three planets" true by convention? I understand that the syntax and the words themselves are conventions but the semantic content of the proposition is true not by convention but by a correspondence with the facts, with the current state of the universe, being that there are more than three planets in existence.

Banno
Old goat

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 15, 2004
Location: Oz

Total Topics: 111
Total Posts: 6293

Posted 04/14/09 - 11:26 PM:	#38
J. Random Hacker wrote: How is the proposition "there are more than three planets" true by convention? I understand that the syntax and the words themselves are conventions but the semantic content of the proposition is true not by convention but by a correspondence with the facts, with the current state of the universe, being that there are more than three planets in existence. Bloody good question. Depends what a proposition is. If it is a representation of the state of affairs, then it is true in virtue of that representation - which of course is a convention. If the proposition is itself a state of affairs, then it is perhaps arguably not a convention - but them propositions would be the same thing as facts. For these sorts of reasons, I avoid using the term "proposition".
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

Cuthbert
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2005

Total Topics: 26
Total Posts: 2138

Posted 04/14/09 - 11:58 PM:	#39
A proposition is that which an indicative sentence means. So 'snow is white' expresses the same proposition as 'white is the snow' and 'la neige est blanc', because those sentences all mean the same thing. If we cannot reliably distinguish or identify meanings, then we cannot communicate, because we might just as well mean one thing as another; and so we mean nothing. But we can communicate. So there is identity / distinction of meaning between sentences. So there are propositions. If we cannot identify and distinguish meaning, then we cannot evaluate the above argument or a rebuttal of it. **** A proposition may be both a representation of a state of affairs and a state of affairs itself, just as a picture may be both a representation of an object and also itself an object. But it may be neither a representation (like a picture) nor a state of affairs (like a fact). I tend to think that these are misleading analogies beyond a certain point. ***** To make an assertion is to present a statement as being true. So to say that truth is just what we present statements as having, when we assert them, is to define 'assertion', but it does not establish the redundancy of the concept of truth.

Banno
Old goat

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Aug 15, 2004
Location: Oz

Total Topics: 111
Total Posts: 6293

Posted 04/15/09 - 12:44 AM:	#40
Cuthbert wrote: A proposition is that which an indicative sentence means. So 'snow is white' expresses the same proposition as 'white is the snow' and 'la neige est blanc', because those sentences all mean the same thing. More good stuff. But the statement "snow is white" presumably means the same as 'white is the snow' and 'la neige est blanc', so I still don't see why we need to invoke propositions. Why not just stick to statements? The meaning of 'la neige est blanc' is "snow is white" not the proposition "snow is white". Cuthbert wrote: A proposition may be both a representation of a state of affairs and a state of affairs itself, All the more reason to avoid them, since they are ambiguous. The statement "snow is white" represents the state of affairs in which snow is indeed white. But the statement is not the state of affairs.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Last

Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.