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True statements

Banno
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Posted 04/17/09 - 04:13 PM:	#171
Banno wrote: I have a pain in my toe Are you saying that this is equivalent to: J. Random Hacker wrote: I feel pain when I stub my toe. While it is true that I have a pain in my toe, I can't see how this "corresponds" to any state of affairs in the world. In particular, to turn Schlitz' question back on itself, what would you do to check that I have a pain in my toe? To be sure, I think you can answer these questions; but only by stretching. See how you go. And to be sure, I think the problem I am pointing to applies as much to coherence as to correspondence theories. To be more controversial, I am certain that I have a pain in my toe. Are you?
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

J. Random Hacker
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Posted 04/17/09 - 04:22 PM:	#172
Banno wrote: To be more controversial, I am certain that I have a pain in my toe. Are you? Really? Then how do you distinguish pain from non-pain?

Schlitz
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Posted 04/17/09 - 04:40 PM:	#173
Banno wrote: I hope this quote captures the focus of your argument, which I think is quite a good one. I am a realist, in the sense that I hold that there are things in the world that are independent of our representations of them. I thought I ought mention that, since realism is often wrapped up with the correspondence theory of truth. I think the wrapping up is an error which complicates the story needlessly. The issue for me is that I don't know what sort of a relationship correspondence might be; but I do know what reference is; or at least, I have a better understanding of reference than correspondence. I am also reticent to use the same theory of truth for all statements. I think correspondence becomes a bit strained when we talk about certain statements. Consider: I have a pain in my toe (I stubbed it on the table). I love my wife I like chocolate I eat too much chocolate I ought eat less chocolate. I promise to eat less chocolate (chocolate is an issue at the moment...) Doubtless correspondence could be stretched to render each true or false, but stretched it would be. The same goes for coherence, and even more so for the other theories (How does a consensus theory deal with the truth of "I have a pain in my toe"?) For each of the above, you could give an adequate accounting of it just as long as possibly infinite classes of sentences count as objects of reference just as well as physical objects. Or you could just define a semantic value that works just like truth for assertions about the world (and reserving the term for just such cases), but instead applies to the conditions under which a promise (for example) or command or praise or scolding or whatever is understood. The problem with coherence theories is also a classic problem for naive verificationism: Truth, on any coherence theory, just like for naive verificationism, is not trans-theoretic. There is True-in-L, True-in-L₁, True-in-L₂, ..., True-in-L_n, but, for example, no method to compare any number of theories to test for consistency. That's because there is no truth-functional relation from any fragment of one theory to any like fragment of another theory. For example, identities of terms in different theories but with the same extension fail, because the truth-conditions of sentences including these terms are given in terms of other sentences of the theory, but they don't fail to be true. They fail to be meaningful. The same goes for material equivalences of sentences that are true in L_n and true in L_m. This unhappy result leaves scientists completely unable to determine which scientific theory to choose, which is completely at odds with elementary scientific practice. For example, the phlogiston theory of combustion isn't false according to current physics + a coherence theory of truth; it's meaningless. This is a problem because the phlogiston theory of combustion is surely meaningful, and very likely false. And correspondence theories should be agreeable to deflationary-type intutions, because correspondence theories contain weak deflationary theories. In a correspondence theory , "p" is deducible from " 'p' is true " since it will have a disquotation schema. But I say weak deflationary theories, because a disquotation schema is a means to prove " ('p' is true) <==> (p) ", and not the stronger assertion of full-blooded deflationary theories, " ('p' is true) = (p) ". Has anyone ever seriously argued for a consensus theory (and Sokal's article in Social Text doesn't count)? I'm curious to know, because these things are wrong on their face. But I don't think reasoning by cases to determine which theory of truth is right can decide that problem, because there are an infinite number of theories of truth, even if there is only one right one. Edited by Schlitz on 04/17/09 - 08:25 PM. Reason: Super Duper Kameamea Double Secret Clarity

treysuttle
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Posted 04/17/09 - 04:42 PM:	#174
Thanks for the questions Schlitz, First, I think there is a sense in which we are field linguists. It's not that we are speaking radically different languages, but communication is in large part behavioral. What I mean by that is that most of the time (in low stake situations) we assume that we mean the same thing by sentences. And most of the time we probably do...but it's not a given...as you probably know when sometimes you have ask someone what they mean by some sentence even though you know the 'definition' of the words involved. The higher the stakes, the less likely we are to make such assumptions. This is a matter of practical fact; we are all aware that to a great extent, as language speakers -- language is highly behavioral. So, what I am saying is basically....yes it is different when one is talking to someone of their own language...but it's not fundamentally different..only different as a matter of degree...and relative to the stakes. Of course, that we use the same word and that this word shares the same reference is not analytic or a priori...it's a matter of investigation. This is what Quine was all about (and I agree with him on this)...you don't establish the criteria or set the parameters and then see what follows...you look at what's going on and then see what the criteria may be. I only know that our word shares the same reference if we engage in a little empirical investigation...and even then, it's still indeterminate (although perhaps more determinate than it was before -- we can at least get to the point where we can get on with business). When I am checking to see if the cat is on the mat...I'm not checking to see if there is a relation holding between the sounds that you make and that cat sitting over on the mat. I'm checking to see if I would say the same while presumably having a similar experience. If all you mean by 'correspondence' is that when I see a cat on the mat I will say 'There is a cat on the mat' or when you say 'There is a cat on the mat' and I see a cat on the mat and I will say 'yep'..then we are in agreement. If you go further and say there is some kind of relationship holding between our sentences and that cat on the mat...then perhaps it is just my lack of imagination to see what this could be. The restricting of phenomenon, as I see it, is a psychological activity. I take it as a brute fact that humans categorize things...but this categorization is grounded in our evolutionary history, our physiology, psychology, and even socio-historical context...it's not necessarily the way it must be. Right. When I (or we) 'restrict phenomenon' we are basically assigning references. But again, this doesn't mean that there is some relationship between language and the world...the relationship is between language and psychology (and it works both ways). The communication is that we are simular creatures in the same world affected by simular stimuli...not because our language is latching onto reality in any meaningful sense of the idea (if there is such). I don't have to take correspondence for semantics because reference is not a relation between a word and thing.

Schlitz
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Posted 04/17/09 - 04:43 PM:	#175
J. Random Hacker wrote: The only propositions that correspondence doesn't cover are propositions that are true by definition. Actually, correspondence theories cover these too (as long as a proposition that is true by definition is one that is a logical truth), since logical truths are true regardless of the interpretation of atomic sentences. Edited by Schlitz on 04/17/09 - 10:21 PM

Schlitz
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Posted 04/17/09 - 05:19 PM:	#176
treysuttle wrote: Thanks for the questions Schlitz, First, I think there is a sense in which we are field linguists. It's not that we are speaking radically different languages, but communication is in large part behavioral. What I mean by that is that most of the time (in low stake situations) we assume that we mean the same thing by sentences. And most of the time we probably do...but it's not a given...as you probably know when sometimes you have ask someone what they mean by some sentence even though you know the 'definition' of the words involved. The higher the stakes, the less likely we are to make such assumptions. All this is undoubtedly true, and these are good operational principles to hold when you're talking to someone, but the truth of these does not vindicate the idea that I engage in any kind of non-trivial translation from English_treysuttle to English_Schlitz to understand you. Note that these principles hold if you and I share references but each of us has false beliefs about the meanings of some terms, and that they stay useful if neither of us knows which beliefs about the meanings of terms the other has are false, and which are true. treysuttle wrote: So, what I am saying is basically....yes it is different when one is talking to someone of their own language...but it's not fundamentally different..only different as a matter of degree...and relative to the stakes. Of course, that we use the same word and that this word shares the same reference is not analytic or a priori...it's a matter of investigation. This is what Quine was all about (and I agree with him on this)...you don't establish the criteria or set the parameters and then see what follows...you look at what's going on and then see what the criteria may be. I only know that our word shares the same reference if we engage in a little empirical investigation...and even then, it's still indeterminate (although perhaps more determinate than it was before -- we can at least get to the point where we can get on with business). Can you refer to elm trees? Can you pick an elm tree out the forest? I can't, but I can still talk about elms, and my statements about elms can be true or false. The problem with the field-linguist view of communication is that makes a person's ability to make assertions about things a matter of his beliefs, and this just isn't so. To adopt the field-linguist view- if I am trapped in my own idiolect, and you yours, and him his, and her hers, and so on for everybody, and we all speak the same language (which puts everyone in the position of the field linguist), because I can't pick an elm tree out of a line of trees that contains elms, I can never truly say "That's an elm!" because the truth of what I say is indexed to my theory of trees, (for example), and my theory of trees just doesn't have the expressive power to make that assertion. But I can truly or falsely say of any tree, "That's an elm!". I can do this because I share the references of experts in the theory of trees. So do you.

J. Random Hacker
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Posted 04/17/09 - 05:24 PM:	#177
Schlitz wrote: J. Random Hacker wrote: The only propositions that correspondence doesn't cover are propositions that are true by definition. Actually, correspondence theories cover these to (as long as a proposition that is true by definition is one that is a logical truth), since logical truths are true regardless of the interpretation of atomic sentences. Logical truths are based on axioms. In traditional logic, an axiom or postulate is a proposition that is not proved or demonstrated but considered to be either self-evident, or subject to necessary decision. Therefore, its truth is taken for granted, and serves as a starting point for deducing and inferring other (theory dependent) truths. Logical truths are true by convention only. There are some logical systems that reject various axioms that we consider self-evidently true such as paraconsistent logic.

treysuttle
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Posted 04/17/09 - 05:50 PM:	#178
Concerning the first reply...sure and I agree...as I said...often we probably do understand each other and in ordinary conversation there is often little trouble..and while there is translation taking place...the degree to which differences may be present are so minimal as to not be salient at all. For example, we tend to take it for granted that the semantical content of much of the metaphorical language that we use in ordinary conversation is universal among those speakers of our language -- and this is a LOT of our language. But again, whether translation is trivial or not will depend to a great extent on the stakes. "I can still talk about elms, and my statements about elms can be true or false." Me too. But this doesn't require correspondence in the sense of a relation between a word and elms...does it? I mean after all...there are no 'elms' right...only individual elm trees...but then there are not even trees are there..but only individual... When you say a sentence even as basic as 'Elms are trees' is there literally a relation holding between the word 'elms' and some things? Does it correspond to just the elms that exist...all elms that have existed, do, and will exist...how does a word correspond to something that doesn't exist? Does the correspondence relation of the word 'elms' change when I am referring to a set of elms in my backyard and when I am referring to the set of elms that exist on the planet Earth? If not...that's kinda weird (its a pretty shadowy relation) if so...well that's kinda weird also. Perhaps there is no correspondence at all. Perhaps it says that some things (of which we have particular experiences of) are restricted to some class (by our convention) such that in the presence of the applicable experience I will assent to that thing is correctly contained within a certain class (with the containment being psychological...we do in fact categorize the world). I don't see why I need a relation between a word and a thing in order to say something about something or for my statements 'about' things be true or false.

J. Random Hacker
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Posted 04/17/09 - 05:58 PM:	#179
treysuttle wrote: I don't see why I need a relation between a word and a thing in order to say something about something or for my statements 'about' things be true or false. What makes the proposition "there is an elm tree in my backyard" true or false? What gives the proposition its truth value? Isn't the truth value of the proposition determined by the state of my backyard? Meaning, if the proposition corresponds to the state of my backyard then it's true, if it's not then it's false. That's how I've been using these words all my life at least. Edited by J. Random Hacker on 04/17/09 - 06:03 PM

treysuttle
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Posted 04/17/09 - 06:13 PM:	#180
We also say things like 'I have an idea'...do we mean that there is something..an 'idea' that is possessed by me? Perhaps. Perhaps not. Surely the statement can be true or false. But I wouldn't presuppose that our ordinary way of thinking about language is actually what is going on...but I wouldn't presuppose that it's not either. I would also say that if you break down language in such a way that it makes sense to you that your words have some kind of relation with things...then that's cool. I honestly don't think that there is one and only one correct way of thinking about the world. Honestly, much comes down to preference. Now, onto a lighter note...I'm not going to accept propositions unless you mean by that nothing more than a sentence token. What makes it true is if in experiencing the state of your backyard, fellow speakers of our language would agree to the sentence being spoken correctly (in the midst of the experience). When it is analyzed into what it means (spoken correctly) it means that ultimately we agree on how we classify phenomena. If someone doesn't agree...you can try and convince them that they are not using the sentence correctly...or communication breaks down.

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