True premises/Conclusion: Philosophy Forums

Philosophy Forums » Metaphysics and Epistemology » True premises/Conclusion » True premises/Conclusion

True premises/Conclusion

Firebrand
Demagogic orator

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 22, 2006
Total Topics: 8
Total Posts: 129

Posted 02/16/07 - 06:40 AM: Subject: True premises/Conclusion	#1
Sup guys, i'm currently working on an anti-skeptical argument. It relies on the principle (let us call it principle P) that premises cannot feature as truthful in one argument but act as false conclusions in others. Namely, that a given thing must be true/false. What do people think of this? If we apply the principle of bivalence, then a thing asserted is either T/F, with the exception of 'This sentence is false' types. The exception to this rule would be things posited within a definite context, such as 'If the lights are on, then it's night-time'. The skeptic's argument runs thus: 1) I know that I have hands 2) I do not know that [insert skeptical argument denying existence of external world, and thus composite bodies] 3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands Following from this, the argument would run: 1) If the external world does not exist, then neither does my rational body [as I understand it to be]. 2) The external world does not exist. 3) Therefore, my rational body [as I understand it to be] does not exist. It seems that if we take the skeptic's argument a step further, then it falls apart. It is possible to accept the above, but with the above principle, a thing such as this cannot be true in one argument but false in another. How can I weaken my argument? I think that the only way is to deny principle P, but to do this we'd need a counter-example, and i'm not sure how. Thanks, -Firebrand

Morrandir
Ich habe mich aufgehoben

Usergroup: Members
Joined: May 19, 2004
Location: The Finnest Land
Total Topics: 53
Total Posts: 2968

Posted 02/17/07 - 03:55 AM:	#2
Hi, The first argument argues that you do not know something. The second one argues that you know something. The second one cannot be an extension of the sceptical argument as you portray it. A sceptic denies knowledge and cannot coherently therefore argue for knowledge. In other words, there is nothing sceptical about the latter argument: it is simply (a bad) argument for non-existence of your body. ~M~
Philosophy is disciplined bewilderment. A mathematician is a person who thinks that if there are supposed to be three people in a room, but five come out, then two more must enter the room in order for it to be empty. http://www.beyondappearances.com

Jehu
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Nov 30, 2006
Total Topics: 1
Total Posts: 702

Posted 02/18/07 - 06:25 PM:	#3
There are two problems with the argument, as I see it. First, a true sceptic would never put forward the premise “I know that I have hands.” Rather, they might assert that “I know that I appear to have hands.”, for if they deny the absolute existence of an external objective world, this would necessarily include their apparent bodies, including their hands. Second, a true sceptic would never categorically deny the existence of the world, but rather would only deny that it exists in the manner that we generally believe it to, that is to say, as a collection of real, independent and lasting entities. There is a fundamental misconception in modern metaphysics, and it is the notion that if a thing is not real, then it does not exist. This is a completely erroneous view, and one that leads to all sorts of illogical conclusions. To be real, a thing must possess an absolute and not merely contingent existence, that is to say, it must be possessed of its own constitutive and operative principles, and therefore, completely unrelated to any other thing. So you see, the sceptic is not denying the existence of the universe categorically, but simply saying that its existence is contingent upon something else, that is to say, upon some hidden reality. Why is this reality hidden? Simply because the subject (cognizant awareness) cannot observe itself directly, it having no discernible qualities or characteristics. Just as a mirror can reflect every object that comes into its field, but cannot reflect itself, so it is with the cognizant subject. Ask yourself, what is it about yourself that remains always the same, while everything about you is in a state of constant flux. Certainly it is not you body, nor is it your thoughts, and even your preferences are always changing, so what is it about you that is ‘real’.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

dimka
banned

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Aug 14, 2006
Location: Toronto, Canada
Total Topics: 52
Total Posts: 1016

Posted 02/18/07 - 08:10 PM:	#4
Certainly it is not you body, nor is it your thoughts, and even your preferences are always changing, so what is it about you that is ‘real’ It is your sense of "psychological continuity". That's the only thing that remains constant no matter what happens to your body or mind whist you're still alive of course

ying
Stoned ape theorist

Usergroup: Moderators
Joined: Feb 20, 2004
Location: Lichtenvoorde, Netherlands
Total Topics: 9
Total Posts: 1155

Posted 02/18/07 - 11:19 PM:	#5
True sceptics don't hold anything of that sort. True scepticism is expounded and catalogued by Sextus Empiricus, and he clearly states that the endgoal of any scepticism is to attain ataraxia, or quittude. Next to that, sceptics don't hold that we can't know anything, they hold that we can't know the ultimate nature of things, so they postpone judgement. CHAPTER IX. -- DOES THE SCEPTIC DEAL WITH PHYSICS? We make a similar reply also to the question "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making, firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so-called "philosophy." CHAPTER X. – DO THE SCEPTICS ABOLISH APPEARANCES? Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appearances," or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School. For, as we said above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily; and these impressions are "the appearances." And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance, -- and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the appearance. And even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness by following it. CHAPTER XI. -- OF THE CRITERION OF SCEPTICISM That we adhere to appearances is plain from what we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality," (and this we shall discuss in our refutation); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that we are now speaking. The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be. Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, Another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically. http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Parthenon/8607/ Now quit strawmanning.
*"I determined nothing."* -Sceptical expression

You don't have permission to post.

Please login or register.