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Transcendent Facts
ontological & epistemological implications ... especially for sound reasoning

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Transcendent Facts

180 Proof
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Posted 10/24/09 - 02:55 PM: Subject: Transcendent Facts	#1
definitions: (i) Transcendent denotes beyond conditions & limits (i.e. unconditional & unlimited). (ii) Fact denotes a conditional state-of-affairs or actual possibility in logical-space. (iii) Set denotes a collection of elements formed by membership rules (e.g. predicate identity) axiom: (A) There is a set of 'transcendent facts'. proposition: (1) The set of 'transcendent facts' is empty. question: Is proposition (1) true? (Please explain.)
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

brainpharte
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Posted 10/24/09 - 04:37 PM:	#2
Isn't "transcendent fact" a contradiction? If so, isn't "set of transcendent facts" meaningless rather than empty? (This strikes me perhaps as analogous to the difference between non-cognitivism and error theory in ethics?)
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

jsidelko
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Posted 10/24/09 - 04:50 PM:	#3
Although proposition (1) is empty of logical facts, it is not empty of illogical fictions. Therefore, proposition (1), though empty of logical facts, is filled with illogical fictions. The unanswered question is this: Can fictions be a kind of fact?
thanatos

180 Proof
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Posted 10/24/09 - 05:47 PM:	#4
brainpharte wrote: Isn't "transcendent fact" a contradiction? Is it? If so, isn't "set of transcendent facts" meaningless rather than empty? The phrase "transcendent facts" might be meaningless but the set itself is either empty or not. (This strikes me perhaps as analogous to the difference between non-cognitivism and error theory in ethics?) jsidelko wrote: Although proposition (1) is empty of logical facts, it is not empty of illogical fictions. Therefore, proposition (1), though empty of logical facts, is filled with illogical fictions. The unanswered question is this: Can fictions be a kind of fact? If so, then my definition (ii) would be inadequate. Would you say that a "fiction" is either a conditional state-of-affairs or actual possibility in logical-space? I'd go as far as defining it as an "nonactual possibility" ... but then again if we're talking about an "illogical fiction" then its not even a possibility in (some) logical-space.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

brainpharte
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Posted 10/24/09 - 06:29 PM:	#5
I really know very little about set theory, so it may take a large dose of charity to understand my point here: If the membership rules of a set are incoherent (conditional states-of-affairs that are beyond conditions and limits), then in what sense is it intelligible to say there is such a set, empty or not? It seems to me that there is a difference between saying on the one hand that a set with coherent membership rules has no members, and on the other hand saying that a set with incoherent membership rules has no members. How would we be able to ascertain whether or not a set with incoherent membership rules had members or not?
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

swstephe
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Posted 10/24/09 - 06:29 PM:	#6
I think I need some examples. A "circle" is a geometric shape where all the points are equal distance from a central point, by definition. A "transcendent circle" would not be limited by such trivial conditions or limits (i), allowing it to defy its definition. Any geometric shape -- or anything at all, (even a goat), could be considered a "transcendent circle". Maybe this is an issue of symbols and signifiers. We signify something with specific definition, a set of conditions, attributes and relationships and describe these concepts as "facts". Saying something is "transcendent" is breaking away from definitions, so "transcendent fact" is an oxymoron. If it is a fact, it isn't beyond our definitions. If it is transcendent, it means it actually belongs to another category which hasn't been identified yet. As a contradiction, the set of possible entities would always be empty. Something can't fit within a definition and exceed it, (some of the time)? So I guess the conclusion is that suggesting something is "transcendent" simply means they dispute a definition and aren't able to present a corrected definition yet.
Ethics is the measuring of morality. Morality is the measuring of good. Good is the measuring of benefit. Benefit is the measure of values.

180 Proof
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Posted 10/24/09 - 09:33 PM:	#7
swstephe wrote: Saying something is "transcendent" is breaking away from definitions, so "transcendent fact" is an oxymoron. If it is a fact, it isn't beyond our definitions. If it is transcendent, it means it actually belongs to another category which hasn't been identified yet. Hmmm ... Outside of (all) frames of reference. Completely unrecognizable or unintelligible to us. Void. So I guess the conclusion is that suggesting something is "transcendent" simply means they dispute a definition and aren't able to present a corrected definition yet. Would it remain transcendent after it is correctly defined? I think transcendence is asymptotic and therefore cannot be a predicate of that which can ever be definite (or actual). brainpharte wrote: If the membership rules of a set are incoherent (conditional states-of-affairs that are beyond conditions and limits), then in what sense is it intelligible to say there is such a set, empty or not? I don't think the rules for the set are incoherent. If X is transcendent AND if X is a fact, then X belongs to TF-set. The set's fine, there are just no members (so far) that (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously. How would we be able to ascertain whether or not a set with incoherent membership rules had members or not? Again, I don't believe the membership rules are incoherent because each rule makes sense individually. The rules are not predicates defining the set itself as an object but rather independent extensions (i.e. filters, or functions) of it. As far as discering whether or not the set has any members, all we'd have to do is look, so to speak, that is to say, find an object that can satisfy all membership rules at the same time. For instance, we can see that the set of "50 Foot Women" is empty without confusing the predicates of an object needed to satisfy the membership rules with any predicates of the set itself.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Mako
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Posted 10/25/09 - 12:08 AM:	#8
180 Proof wrote: definitions: (i) Transcendent denotes beyond conditions & limits (i.e. unconditional & unlimited). (ii) Fact denotes a conditional state-of-affairs or actual possibility in logical-space. (iii) Set denotes a collection of elements formed by membership rules (e.g. predicate identity) axiom: (A) There is a set of 'transcendent facts'. proposition: (1) The set of 'transcendent facts' is empty. question: Is proposition (1) true? (Please explain.) I agree with the proposition (1) that the set is empty. The boundary of the set defines (and thus limits) all logical and/or substantive possiblities. All possibilites are manifested within the set. The logical/formal boundary is therefore a 'summation' of all possibilites framed by the logical form of the set. Any hypothetical 'fact which is not defined by the terms of the set in question would be a member of a different set (a non-transcendent set) and I agree that once such a condition/state-of-affairs is correctly defined, it could not (by necessity) be transcendent. Edited by Mako on 10/25/09 - 12:28 AM
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reincarnated
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Posted 10/25/09 - 01:15 AM:	#9
I like this thread. On a literal reading of 180 Proof’s definitions, “transcendent fact” would be a simple oxymoron (since “fact” is defined as denoting something conditional, whereas “transecendent” is defined as denoting something beyond conditions). Hence these two sets (the set of things which are “transcendant”, and the set of things which are “facts”) are mutually exclusive, and the union of these two sets is thus by definition a null set. brainpharte wrote: If the membership rules of a set are incoherent (conditional states-of-affairs that are beyond conditions and limits), then in what sense is it intelligible to say there is such a set, empty or not? There is a set of “bachelors”, and there is a set of “married people”. The set of “married people who are also bachelors” is defined as the union of these two sets – and the union of these two sets is empty. Now a “married bachelor” is just as non-existent as a “transcendent fact” (according to 180 Proof’s definitions), but nevertheless we can (logically) talk about the set of “married bachelors” even though it seems nonsensical in English. But I doubt that the word “transcendent” is always used in the English language in exactly the way 180 Proof has defined it here. 180 Proof wrote: Would it remain transcendent after it is correctly defined? I think transcendence is asymptotic and therefore cannot be a predicate of that which can ever be definite (or actual). What is a “correct definition”? In theology, transcendent simply means outside of the mortal world (in the sense that God’s existence is said to transcend our material world). In Mediaeval philosophy, transcendent simply meant outside of the Aristotelian categories of reality. Kant and Sartre also use the term “transcendent” (or transcendental) in their works, but I doubt whether their intended meanings are identical to the one suggested by 180 Proof. In colloquial usage, “transcendent” simple means “going beyond….” – which begs the question “going beyond what?”
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

brainpharte
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Posted 10/25/09 - 08:12 AM:	#10
Thanks to both 180 and reincarnated for your forbearance. But I still think there's something amiss in not distinguishing logically impossible sets from logically possible but contingently empty sets. 180 Proof wrote: I don't think the rules for the set are incoherent. If X is transcendent AND if X is a fact, then X belongs to TF-set. The set's fine, there are just no members (so far) that (can) satisfy both rules simultaneously. I don’t really know, but treating the logically impossible set as of the same status (ontological? mathematical object?) as a logically possible set strikes me as potentially problematic when we go to draw inferences based on these sets. That any logically possible set is empty is contingent, but that a logically impossible set is empty is analytic. Thus we can infer nothing about the world from a logically impossible set that we didn't already know when we constructed the rules for membership in that set. So what's the point of such a construction? (BTW, I thought sets were indeed mathematical objects. What kind of object is it logically impossible to conceive of? This strikes me as voodoo reification.)
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

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