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Transcendent Facts
ontological & epistemological implications ... especially for sound reasoning

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Transcendent Facts
Waterearth
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Posted 10/25/09 - 10:28 AM:
Subject: Transcendent facts
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#11
How could what is transcendent be put into a set?
It is after all not a part of logic. Am i wrong or just plain naïve?
180 Proof
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Posted 10/25/09 - 12:33 PM:
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#12
brainpharte wrote:
But I still think there's something amiss in not distinguishing logically impossible sets from logically possible but contingently empty sets.

Well, that's just it. Is a "set of transcendental facts" logically impossible? The set itself isn't logically impossible, it's just consists in rules. I don't think so, bpharte. Explain it to me.

Thus we can infer nothing about the world ... So what's the point of such a construction?

I didn't know that sets provide information about the world. The point of constructing sets, I think, is for organizing concepts.

reincarnated wrote:
I like this thread.
On a literal reading of 180 Proof’s definitions, “transcendent fact” would be a simple oxymoron (since “fact” is defined as denoting something conditional, whereas “transecendent” is defined as denoting something beyond conditions).
Hence these two sets (the set of things which are “transcendant”, and the set of things which are “facts” ) are mutually exclusive, and the union of these two sets is thus by definition a null set.

cool

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

[What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]
brainpharte
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Posted 10/25/09 - 01:22 PM:
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#13
I just don't understand what the point could be for constructing a set whose membership rules logically prohibit the possibility of there being any members.

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
Mako
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Posted 10/25/09 - 04:46 PM:
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#14
Isn't the proposition (1) merely the same as saying "There are no transcendental facts," except it's phrased here as a set-theoretic proposition? Again, I'm tentatively agreeing with the proposition.

If we add a fourth definition and state for our purposes that "All definitions of 'god(s)' include properties of transcendence." ...

...can we not claim then that, according to our definitions, "There are no gods?," (i.e. The set of gods is empty?)

Going by our set of definitions in the op, claiming that there are no transcendental facts (or that there are no gods) is not the same as claiming "There are no red emeralds." The qualities of redness and emerald-ness are contingent/conditional qualities and do not imply a formal contradiction. But 180's set of definitions includes the way we define all facts and that we necessarily define them as being conditional states of affairs.. It's thus a categorical, limiting condition for facts, period. However it would seem (to my non-logician self) that the proposition should actually be an axiom and therefore that it is axiomatic that "there are no transcendental facts" or "the set of transcendental facts is empty."

.

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180 Proof
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Posted 10/25/09 - 04:52 PM:
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#15
Mako wrote:
Isn't the proposition (1) merely the same as saying "There are no transcendental facts," except it's phrased here as a set-theoretic proposition? Again, I'm tentatively agreeing with the proposition.

If we add a fourth definition and state for our purposes that "All definitions of 'god(s)' include properties of transcendence." ...

...can we not claim then that, according to our definitions, "There are no gods?," (i.e. The set of gods is empty?)

Going by our set of definitions in the op, claiming that there are no transcendental facts (or that there are no gods) is not the same as claiming "There are no red emeralds." The qualities of redness and emerald-ness are contingent/conditional qualities and do not imply a formal contradiction. But 180's set of definitions includes the way we define all facts and that we necessarily define them as being conditional states of affairs.. It's thus a categorical, limiting condition for facts, period. However it would seem (to my non-logician self) that the proposition should actually be an axiom and therefore that it is axiomatic that "there are no transcendental facts" or "the set of transcendental facts is empty."

Yeah, but I don't think another definition is needed in order to form this specific set which can be applied as is to the question of the ontological status of that to which any concept (e.g. god, mind, soul, number, etc) might refer.

Edited by 180 Proof on 10/28/09 - 03:02 PM. Reason: So far, so good ...

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

[What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]
brainpharte
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Posted 10/25/09 - 07:21 PM:
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#16
180 Proof wrote:

Yeah, but I don't think another definition is needed in order to form this specific set which can be applied as is to the question of the ontological status of that to which any concept (e.g. god, mind, soul, number, etc) might refer.

So God etc. do not exist because such existence would instantiate a "transcendental fact", (which is to say such existence would simultaneously have to be both contingent and non-contingent--a logical impossibility)?

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
AmidaTobosaku
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Posted 10/25/09 - 10:36 PM:
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#17
A quick few comments about the definitions provided for a fact. 180 Proof writes "(ii) Fact denotes a conditional state-of-affairs or actual possibility in logical-space." I am not sure what is meant by "conditional." If conditional means contingent, then there are examples of non-conditional items of knowledge. Mathematical knowledge and logic would be two good examples. However, the definition seems to refer to counterfactuals or possible worlds. That is, a fact would denote some actualize or nonactualized possible world. But, its hard to make sense what a transcendental counterfactual or possible world would be.

For this particular question, it might be easier to refer to facts as true propositions. We could then ask whether it is possible to a) ask meaningful questions about propositions that refer to the transcendental and b) even if the propositions are meaningful, could we say that they are true propositions.

Going back to 180 proof's question, he writes:

(1) The set of 'transcendent facts' is empty.

question:

Is proposition (1) true? (Please explain.)

Proposition (1) states that there are no properties that could be assigned to transcendent objects. Thus, there would be no transcendent facts.

We could simply say that there is an object that does not have the property of being non-transcendent. Or, in other words, if the transcendent set is a set of all properties, not included in any non-transcendent set, then as long as an object has a property that is not included in all non-transcendent sets, there would be a transcendent fact. However, note that this does not mean that there actually are transcendent facts, just that it is possible for there to be a transcendent fact.

In summary, transcendent objects have the property of being transcendent. This would be a fact about them, if they existed. At this point, it would seem that much of the discussion would depend on the nature of the object in question.
rigelrover
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Posted 11/02/09 - 12:15 PM:
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#18
brainpharte wrote:

(BTW, I thought sets were indeed mathematical objects. What kind of object is it logically impossible to conceive of? This strikes me as voodoo

reification.)


This, I think, is what 180 Proof was trying to get at with this thread. It promotes two ontological questions. But first a brief discussion of what was stated above:

Well, for one, the set described is not the union of, but rather the intersection of the transcendent and the fact-able. I say fact-able because the definition of fact used does not describe actual facts but rather potential facts. Consider that transcendent (by 180's definition) entails un-fact-ability by definition; i.e. a formal definition implies a limit or conditional constraint. So it is trivially true, given these definitions that the intersection of these two 'sets' is non-empty. Does un-fact-able imply transcendent though? Well one way to put it, as AmidaTobosaku pointed out, is that its own definition is self-defeating (there cannot be a limit like un-fact-ability placed on a transcendent object). Furthermore a transcendent object, by this definition, could not be limited by any statement in any language. So it would be un-speakable, non-categorical; and thereby not containable (as in sets). If this is the definition of 'un-fact-able' (as if it were a word), then we are already defeated in any consideration of such things; there are no un-fact-ables, because if there were, they would have the property (condition) of being un-fact-able.

Do I believe that this sort of ontology is useful? Yes and NO. It appears that this is just another clever discussion of the nature of epistemology. It is certainly useful to only concern ourselves with fact-able things. But there are at least some apparently un-fact-able considerations that creep into human consciousness (180 named a few of the 'big' ones above). And the real question is the same one asked time and time again: are there things that do not appear to have empirical meaning but a meaning that transcends empirical limitation. One would be truly disingenuous to suggest that these things were not at the heart of philosophy. If not for them, what is all this about anyway? As it is, an important question is always 'is philosophical thought getting us anywhere in regard to these things?'. Most people (but not all) are willing to suggest that it is. If anything it seems to be doing so by gradually pointing to all the things that un-fact-ables can't be (that is fact-able things), and performing a limit operation of sorts. Well-defined questions are the best product of a good philosophy, I think, rather than any 'concrete' definitions or knowledge/truth claims; because, as we have come to learn, many of these claims are self-defeating in the end.

To the questions produced above, then:
(1) What is the categorical nature of a logically impossible object (i.e. is it fact-able or transcendent).

It seems me that this is the very nature of what 180's definition of transcendent is getting at. But
then we must realize that the categorical nature of the logically impossible forbids membership
among the 'transcendent'. So we must either forgo the definition as useful, or admit to an inconsistency
(which open up the gates of universal possibility, logically).

I am not sure how to answer this question though.

(2) Are there, conceivably, objects that are beyond conception?

Perhaps a more useful definition (that is close) is that transcendent is that which
exceeds empirical/physical prescription
. In this sense we can see that it is not trivially true
that the set of transcendent facts is empty (it is still contingently open as in brainpharte's
suggested meaning of contingent). The question then leads us to that which is definable, but not suited
for empirical description. There are questions about these 'type' of things that are interesting: are
there possibly any of them? how many are possible, and why are they? are they suited for categorizing
(are there different types or modes of them)? If not teaching us about the nature of the object in
question, these further questions minimally teach us about the nature of knowing about how to ask about
these type of objects.

Before I explore any answers/possible answers to these questions I will wait a bit for a reaction (in case I am wrong in assuming what 180 is trying to get at). I don't want to waste more space on this thread if I am.


Edited by rigelrover on 11/02/09 - 01:37 PM

I am more interested in questions than answers; dialog than dictation.
If we can reasonably believe that there is not just a breach, but a fundamentally unclosable gap
between the individual mind and the ultimate nature of the reality; the primordial thing in itself,
then 'true' mystery does exist.
stax
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Posted 11/03/09 - 04:54 AM:
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#19
reincarnated wrote:
I like this thread.
On a literal reading of 180 Proof’s definitions, “transcendent fact” would be a simple oxymoron (since “fact” is defined as denoting something conditional, whereas “transecendent” is defined as denoting something beyond conditions).
Hence these two sets (the set of things which are “transcendant”, and the set of things which are “facts”) are mutually exclusive, and the union of these two sets is thus by definition a null set.

There is a set of “bachelors”, and there is a set of “married people”. The set of “married people who are also bachelors” is defined as the union of these two sets – and the union of these two sets is empty. Now a “married bachelor” is just as non-existent as a “transcendent fact” (according to 180 Proof’s definitions), but nevertheless we can (logically) talk about the set of “married bachelors” even though it seems nonsensical in English.
But I doubt that the word “transcendent” is always used in the English language in exactly the way 180 Proof has defined it here.

What is a “correct definition”? In theology, transcendent simply means outside of the mortal world (in the sense that God’s existence is said to transcend our material world). In Mediaeval philosophy, transcendent simply meant outside of the Aristotelian categories of reality. Kant and Sartre also use the term “transcendent” (or transcendental) in their works, but I doubt whether their intended meanings are identical to the one suggested by 180 Proof. In colloquial usage, “transcendent” simple means “going beyond….” – which begs the question “going beyond what?”

I agree with you on your first two points, we can talk about anything, even though it contradicts itself, because that contradiction in itself is still a concept and can be comprehended by the mind.

On the third point you made, I just wanted to state, what I (hope) is 180 Proof's position too, on transcendence. Even the religious use of the word must conform to 180 Proof's definition, as anything that could exist outside the universe (as god is purported to be) cannot be conditional on rules found inside the universe, as the universe has rules, limits, etc. What is outside the universe cannot be conditional, and this is where 'god' supposedly exists. This then means that god's existence is not conditioned on any rules that we can apply, from which facts are derived from.

Anything that transcends the material world then must be in line with 180's definition, as all things in the material word are bound by certain rules, anything which is outside the universe, is not.

"Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." Arthur Schopenhauer

"To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth." Ludwig Wittgenstein

"Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open." Ludwig Wittgenstein
rigelrover
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Posted 11/03/09 - 08:56 AM:
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#20
I can think of a case for the existence of transcendental facts (in the sense of non-empirical).

Consider the state of the universe now. As it is we are able to determine that there was a beginning, it is flat (spatially), and accelerating, etc. Now consider that there are conscious beings who are empirical scientists that exist billions of years ahead of our time (if this is possible). At this point, our same universe would have expanded such that each galaxy (let's say our own) could not transmit or receive information (EM radiation, etc.) from other galaxies beyond its light cone. Because of this it would be empirically impossible to determine the information that we currently know about previous states of the universe. Because they could no longer see the cosmic background microwave radiation, they would have no context for understanding a beginning, or other galaxies past their horizon. They would not be able to empirically determine these 'facts', so they would be transcendental (not conditional or limited by their state of being or knowing).

These folks could none the less posit that there are transcendent conditions for their existing as such. And they would be right, but would not be able to know empirically that they were right.

I am more interested in questions than answers; dialog than dictation.
If we can reasonably believe that there is not just a breach, but a fundamentally unclosable gap
between the individual mind and the ultimate nature of the reality; the primordial thing in itself,
then 'true' mystery does exist.
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