This is a hand: Philosophy Forums

Forums Articles Gallery Links

Register Login Members Calendar New Posts Search Chat Help

Philosophy Forums » Introduction to Philosophy / Factual Issues / Books » This is a hand » This is a hand

This is a hand
This is an x, & this x is a hand

Print

Print

This is a hand

quickly
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Oct 29, 2007

Total Topics: 31
Total Posts: 234

Posted 10/22/09 - 04:53 AM: Subject: This is a hand	#1
Moore writes: "I think it certain, therefore, that the analysis of the proposition "This is a human hand" is, roughly at least, of the form "There is a thing, and only one thing, of which it is true both that it is a human hand and that this surface is a part of its surface." In other words, to put my view in terms of the phrase "theory of representative perception," I hold it to be quite certain that I do not directly perceive my hand; and that when I am said (as I may be correctly said) to "perceive" it, that I "perceive" it means that I perceive (in a different and more fundamental sense) something which is (in a suitable sense) representative of it, namely, a certain part of the surface." Therefore the proposition "This is a part of the surface of a human hand" becomes a proposition "about the sense-datum, which I am seeing, which is a sense-datum of my hand." If I can paraphrase Moore, I think what he is saying is the following: "There is an x, and this y is an x, such that there is a relation between x and y, such that if this is y, then this y is a thing which is x." This seems consistent with his analysis, and it raises an interesting question, which I don't think he has sufficiently addressed. Namely, a possible objection about the nature of "y" or that "this sense datum is of a thing, which is a human hand." and the objection would be, that knowledge of the thing of which the sense-datum is of, must be previously given. Or, there must be a type or class which I recognize and which is a constituent of the relation. So: when I say "and this sense-datum is of a human hand," I have done little to solve the problem of how I know this is a human hand, besides knowing that my sense-datum is of some thing, whose nature is unknown to me. But this is interesting in light of his views on propositions: namely, that both "this is an x" and "x is a y" are both propositions each of which are about some specific fact. This view seems to entail that "y's" or "types" or "things of which several things are about or of" must be exist. And the view seems to be able to be taken to either of two extremes, viz., (a) sociological reduction (this is a hand, because it is called a hand, because Science calls this "of object" a "hand"); (b) "rigid designation" (used informally to mean: this is an object, and this object is of only one possible type, and that type is that which I see). Discussion? Am I wrong? What does this "object talk" entail? What I am trying to get at is the following: what does the proposition, then, "This is a hand," when by "hand" he means "object" imply? Edited by quickly on 10/22/09 - 05:50 AM
Sunt bona, sunt quaedam mediocria, sunt mala plura quae legis hic; aliter non fit philosophyforums.com (cf., Martial, Epigrammata I.XVI)

Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.