Very well, how exactly can we understand a dictionary, as I thought you already admitted, without having "firm opinions or convictions", or beliefs about the meaning of most of the words in the dictionary?

Now I am perfectly open to the possibility that dictionaries are useful things, without the view that all issues of meaning can be settled by dictionaries.

Do you think all Platonic dialoges are silly for their long debates on the meaning of terms like knowledge or justice, because they could simply have consulted a dictionary?

Do you think all useful distinctions in the use of a word can be found in dictionaries? Given the significant differences in dictionaries, which dictionary is definitive in this sense?

In spite of the incredible importance you attach to dictionaries, I wonder how much time you have actually spent carefully reading and comparing different dictionaries.

Added on edit: Do I really need to list all of the vareity of dictionary definitions of belief to show that almost none are "a firm opinion or conviction"? In fact, given the uncommonness of this definition as the primary definition of belief, I am sort of curious where you got it from. For that matter, in looking up belief, did you not notice that, as for most words, there are multiple defintions?

Jehu wrote:
I can see little value in comparing different dictionaries, unless the dictionaries in question are all current, and all developed for the use of the same linguistic group. Oxford, for example, produces many different English dictionaries, because there are many different kinds of English now spoken in the world, an while they are sufficiently alike to be called ‘English’, there are also considerable differences. Now, if I wish to understand a document that was written in a different era, I would be wise to consult a dictionary of the same period, so as to avoid misunderstanding. For, example, if I wish to read Ecclesiastic in the James I addition of the Bible, it would be helpful to know that the term ‘vanity’ meant ‘ empty or without substance’, rather than interpreting it in accordance with modern usage.

Yes, I am quite aware of the multiple definitions, and I understand their order of precedence as well, and according to my current Oxford Dictionary, the first entry under belief is “1. a firm opinion or conviction”; or according my Webster’s “1. a state or habit of mind in which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing.”; which I think say pretty much the same thing. Perhaps you could tell what sort of dictionary your referring to?

This is just plain silly. A belief can only be justified by other beliefs. One cannot "demonstrate" a belief without reference to other beliefs. "That is Mars that shines near the sun" is "demonstrated" by looking into a telescope and looking at astronomy books, but only justified by the beliefs that "That is a telescope" and "That is an astronomy book" (and thousands of other interlocking beliefs).

Consider the statement "I believe in God."

Under the first defintion, this would seem to mean that I have a firm conviction that an entity like God exists.

Under the sceond, this statement would mean I have chosen to trust what I understand to be God--a very, very different thing.

Under the third defintion I proposed, this would mean I hold it as true God exists--a potentially different statement than I have a firm conviction that God exists (since I know my firm convictions are occasionally, or even frequnently wrong).

In addition, let me expand on your rather odd view that the truth of a statement negates the need for belief. If we both believe the same thing, even if both of us are wrong, we may well understand each other. If one of us believes something that is true, and the other views that something to flase--we will have a serious communication problem. Only if we both believe that certain true statements are true can we both communicate and communicate on a basis that may lead somewhere interesting.

Jehu wrote:

You have completely misconstrued my statement! What I said was that the conventional meanings of words are demonstrable facts, for they are codified in dictionaries and lexicons, and so they cannot correctly be called beliefs;

Jehu wrote:

Look, this is nonsense, if I ask every one in a room their opinion as to the average age of the people in that room, then what I have is a number of opinions; and even if there is an average age that is generally agreed upon, this is still an opinion. However, I take pole of everyone’s actual age, and calculate the mean age; then this is not an option, but a fact.