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The Truth Paradox

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The Truth Paradox

Banno
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Posted 03/14/07 - 02:41 AM:	#41
Vat-brain theory does not keep me awake at night. It must be the epitome of the pointless philosophical debate. I can't see the point of your introduction of induction. By your own admission, it doesn't providing the peculiar certainty you crave.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing...

Dunamis
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Posted 03/14/07 - 08:15 AM:	#42
GDA wrote: True, as defined by the Oxford English dictionary is: In accordance with fact or reality, real or actual. Rightly or strictly so-called; genuine. Consider the problem that you wrestle over to be an issue of (by analogy) the entropy of meaning. Communication is based on the assumption that the proponderance of beliefs that you, and others hold, are true. Communication simply cannot exist without this. Which beliefs are true, and which false, is of course the difficulty. The assumption though that there is a set of true beliefs that can be parsed from the set of false beliefs, leaving potentially a pure set of true beliefs, mis-understands how meaning functions. A set of "true beliefs" is exposed to the contingency of the world, and its communications. There is no such thing as a ahistorical set of true beliefs. The meaning systems of a given person, or a given speech community, suffers a kind of entropy. The beliefs that "work" (that is functionally operates as if true), will inherently fail to work, as a system, at some point in time. Just as communication cannot function without the preponderance of one's beliefs being true, so too it cannot function with the entirety of one's beliefs being true. In short, even though correspondence is a primary means of justification of a great variety of individual beliefs, it is not how beliefs function. They function through coherence, in a necessarily entropic scenerio.
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Jehu
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Posted 03/14/07 - 12:29 PM:	#43
Communication is based upon a tacit assumption that both the speaker and the listener will employ each of their words, either in accordance with its conventionally prescribed meaning, as is found in a dictionary, or by some other specified meaning which has been previously agreed upon between them. Only in this way, can one be certain that the idea which the speaker intends to communicate will be perceived correctly by the listener. However, when people utilize words according to what they personally believe the word to mean, then there is the potential for a degradation of meaning, and their ability to communicate is impaired. Consequently, there is no place for beliefs in communication; not if it is to be effective.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

Nonblack Raven
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Posted 03/14/07 - 01:35 PM:	#44
Jehu wrote: Communication is based upon a tacit assumption that both the speaker and the listener will employ each of their words, either in accordance with its conventionally prescribed meaning, as is found in a dictionary, or by some other specified meaning which has been previously agreed upon between them. But we shall not understand a dictionary unless we already know most of the words in that dictionary—try reading a dictionary written in a foreign language, or even a technical dictionary fro a discipline you are unfamiliar with. A dictionary assumes a preponderance of common beliefs as to the meanings of words. How do we agree on a specified meaning? Frequently by saying things like “That (points) and that (points) and that (points) and things like them.” We can only make sense of such directions if our beliefs are sufficiently similar that we can both see what common features the things pointed to might have. Further, I cannot learn from such instructions unless I assume you are making what you believe is a true statement about the items pointed to, and in turn, have sufficiently similar beliefs that I can find something that I believe to be true about all of the items pointed to. This is the sense in which I interpret Dunamis’ statement that “Communication is based on the assumption that the preponderance of beliefs that you, and others hold, are true.”
NBR

GDA
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Posted 03/14/07 - 02:05 PM:	#45
Banno wrote: Vat-brain theory does not keep me awake at night. It must be the epitome of the pointless philosophical debate. I can't see the point of your introduction of induction. By your own admission, it doesn't providing the peculiar certainty you crave. Oh I do not crave certainty, I don't believe we can be completely certain of most things. (For example, I can be certain that whatever I am, I know meanings of words I use, although they may not be correct or conventional meanings, I know meanings nonetheless, this is an example of something I can be certain of, I have alreadt demonstrated things that we cannot be certain of). We may exist as we think we do, or we may not. We can't really have conclusive proof either way, as I have tried to demonstrate.

Nonblack Raven
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Posted 03/14/07 - 04:30 PM:	#46
GDA wrote: Oh I do not crave certainty, I don't believe we can be completely certain of most things. (For example, I can be certain that whatever I am, I know meanings of words I use, although they may not be correct or conventional meanings, I know meanings nonetheless, this is an example of something I can be certain of, I have alreadt demonstrated things that we cannot be certain of). What an incredible thing to be certain of!!!! But what on earth can you mean by it? When you say you know the meanings of the words you use, do you mean that you could write a dictionary that would include meanining for each word you use such that one of the meanings could be substituted into every sentence in which you have ever used the word and the sentence would have the same meaning? This strikes me as an almost absurd claim? It seems to me anyone who has ever read the early Socratic dialogs should have noticed the very considerable difficulties in defining words, as you alone or anyone else means them. What, by the way, does it mean to you to say that two sentences have the same meaning (even for you alone)? That their truth conditions are the same, or what exactly? Are you aware of the number of arguments as to whether it even makes sense to talk of meanings that are valid for you and you alone? How would you know that your meanings are consistent, for example? So explain to us what this thing you are certain of is exactly, and why on earth you can be certain of it. Personally, I think you are vastly overly impresed with the brain in a vat argument, and perhaps too blissfully unaware of other sceptical arguments, which may explain your over fascination with the brain in a vat argument, and willingness to ignore packs of other epistemological problems.
NBR

Jehu
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Posted 03/14/07 - 05:56 PM:	#47
Nonblack Raven wrote: But we shall not understand a dictionary unless we already know most of the words in that dictionary—try reading a dictionary written in a foreign language, or even a technical dictionary fro a discipline you are unfamiliar with. A dictionary assumes a preponderance of common beliefs as to the meanings of words. How do we agree on a specified meaning? Frequently by saying things like “That (points) and that (points) and that (points) and things like them.” We can only make sense of such directions if our beliefs are sufficiently similar that we can both see what common features the things pointed to might have. Further, I cannot learn from such instructions unless I assume you are making what you believe is a true statement about the items pointed to, and in turn, have sufficiently similar beliefs that I can find something that I believe to be true about all of the items pointed to. This is the sense in which I interpret Dunamis’ statement that “Communication is based on the assumption that the preponderance of beliefs that you, and others hold, are true.” Clearly, one does not learn a language by reading the dictionary, however, one will certainly learn to use it more effectively with the aid of a dictionary. Nevertheless, I must disagree with the contention that a dictionary definition represents merely a ‘common belief’ with respect to the meaning of a word, for this implies that the users of the language, as a linguistic group, are not certain as to what they mean when they use a word; and this is simply not the case. The reason that this cannot be so, is simply that it is the users of a language themselves, by convention, that determine what a word means; and therefore, although it is entirely possible that a individual user of a language may be uncertain as to the meaning of a word, the linguistic group as a whole cannot. Now, I will agree that in order to communicate, we must ‘believe’ that we are, all of us, employing our words in the conventionally prescribed manner, and adhering to the same set of grammatical rules, but this is hardly a preponderance of common beliefs.
It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.

Nonblack Raven
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Posted 03/14/07 - 06:01 PM:	#48
Jehu wrote: Now, I will agree that in order to communicate, we must ‘believe’ that we are, all of us, employing our words in the conventionally prescribed manner, and adhering to the same set of grammatical rules, but this is hardly a preponderance of common beliefs. Ahhmmm, exactly why not? How exactly does assuming we are all of us, making common assumptions, differ from assuming a preponderence of common beliefs, at least about what you call common assumptions? Plus you have completely failed to address the issue of how we learn a new term or ostensively define a term (and in any possible system, some terms must be ostensively defined) without having common beliefs?
NBR

Dunamis
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Posted 03/14/07 - 09:07 PM:	#49
Jehu wrote: Now, I will agree that in order to communicate, we must ‘believe’ that we are, all of us, employing our words in the conventionally prescribed manner, and adhering to the same set of grammatical rules, but this is hardly a preponderance of common beliefs. Actually, the point put forwards is Davidson's point, and it has nothing at to do with "employing words conventionally" because he exacts a theory of meaning not reduced to use. What he intends is that the reason why the preponderance of beliefs between communicators are true, is that it is this that facilitates interpretation. The reason why I am able to interpret the sounds and scratchings of another (and here he borrows from Quine), is because such sounds and scratchings are conditioned by a preponderance of his/her beliefs being true--in other words, when speaking about the shared world, one can discern their relevance. For Davidson, this has absolutely nothing to do with conventionality, in fact, he denies that conventiality of use is the basis of interpretation at all. The reason why I can interpret what you mean is because the host of coherent beliefs that govern your speech are predominantly true. That is, they are about the world in a coherent fashion. Belief, for Davidson, is inherently verdical. In the end, this is Davidson's final reply to the skeptic: the skeptic must already understand what belief is (that is that it is inherently verdical), in order to doubt it in the first place.
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Dunamis
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Posted 03/14/07 - 09:16 PM:	#50
Jehu wrote: Communication is based upon a tacit assumption that both the speaker and the listener will employ each of their words, either in accordance with its conventionally prescribed meaning, as is found in a dictionary, or by some other specified meaning which has been previously agreed upon between them. Actually, Davidson denies this as well, taking up the Quinian thought experiment of the field linguist, who would be able to make up a (multiply variable) "translation manual" of the speech of a being whose speech he has not access to the "convention" of. Instead of appeal to a "convention" (mutually shared), what is necessary is the regularity of reference to a shared world, and the assumption of a preponderance of true beliefs (that is, that the being is "rational"), such that the triangulation of speech reference and events in the world would produce communication. Conventiality most certainly would aid in communication, but it is not the basis of communication. Rather, it is the assumption of verdicality (a preponderance of true beliefs), and the coherence of those beliefs as desciptions in a shared world forms the basis of communication. Edited by Dunamis on 03/14/07 - 09:21 PM
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

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