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The Relationship between Language and Culture
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God of Enyart
Initiate Usergroup: Members Joined: Apr 09, 2007 Total Topics: 2 Total Posts: 4 |
 #1
Subject: The Relationship between Language and Culture Last winter, I read the book THE ALCHEMIST by Paulo Coelho (I recommend it; although some think it's too simple, I found some very profound ideas in the text) which discusses the idea of "The Soul of the World" or "The Language of the World." The Soul and Language were part of every single object on earth, and they connected every rock, tree, animal, and person together (like the blanket in I Heart Huckabees.) This got me thinking on the idea of language. From my musings about this book and other aspects of language itself, I came to the following conclusions: 1. Language is flawed in the respect that it was designed to communicate more temporal things, such as objects like rocks, money, or computers. Words are unable to capture true ideas without diluting their meaning. When you put a thought into words, it is like a photograph of the real idea itself. The metaphor that comes to my mind on this subject is Plato's Theory of Forms, in which Plato states that everything in the physical realm is simply a shallow manifestation of a much deeper Form, or philosophical ideal. The physical "photos" are ephemeral and short-lived, while the Forms are constant and unchanging. When we use words, we are creating photos of the Forms so that we can share them between other human beings. It is fine for most things, but not for Forms. An example: when I say the word "Family," two definitions spring to mind. The first is a network of people related by blood. The second, which is the Form, is that of a deep sense of connectedness and community. That second meaning is clouded over by the first, because the practical uses of words create connotations that tarnish the Form. 2. The nuances of different languages affect the cultures of the societies that speak said language, and vice versa. English speaking societies are different from Spanish speaking societies because of the different meanings and connotations of words. The simplest example I can give is that of the word DHARMA. In Tibetan life, dharma represents the natural order of things. There is no substitute for it in English. The Tibetan societies live according to this peaceful idea and structure their lives around it because they have a word which they can use to grasp the idea. English speakers have no such handle, and therefore cannot truly understand dharma. The process also works in reverse. Take, for example, the nature of Americans to make everything into a soundbyte. Speed and efficiency is the name of the game. So, Americans have created words like BLOG, PODCAST, and BLOGOSPHERE only recently. This change in language represents the ability of culture to influence language. This is what makes language so powerful: its is the window from which we view the world. The written word is indispensible to civilization today. Just look at what you're doing: reading my post. And at this date, the primary world language is English. But what will the world be like when a new language like Chinese becomes the dominant force? Words will be translated to their best fit in the new language. I think the person who can master an array of languages will have the best understanding of the new, globalized world. It is interesting to note that these essays are prefered to be written in English. Maybe allowing some other languages would create a nice new perspective not yet seen on this English-dominant Internet. Just a thought! Please post your comments. |
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Nebula
Aspirant  Usergroup: Members Joined: Jul 07, 2007 Total Topics: 7 Total Posts: 41 |
#2
Your post is very insightful, very eye-opening. I recently compiled a list of my "favorite English words" and found that all of them required a network of related words to help explain them. Most actually involved one another to create definitions. Language is completely dependent on more language to function and thrive-- an interminable circle. Now if we could all somehow become pantomimes, we'd have less of an issue. Lately, I've been contemplating the nature of language more and more, and I can't help but be spell-binded by the realization that we are both bounded and unbounded, limited and limitless, when it comes to what we are capable of communicating through spoken/written language. I have relatives visiting from Egypt, and have become more captivated by the culture I so apathetically ignored. Hearing them speak, understanding what they're saying, and having a void when trying to translate it to English purely puts me in the position that you were describing: having a lack of thought, of understanding, because my language has no connection to a Form seen in another. Thank you so much for sharing your thoughts. "Metaphor for a missing moment. Pull me into your perfect circle." |
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ying
I ? Scepticism  Usergroup: Missing Mods Joined: Feb 20, 2004 Location: Lichtenvoorde, Netherlands Total Topics: 18 Total Posts: 1482 |
#3
God of Enyart wrote: 1. Language is flawed in the respect that it was designed to communicate more temporal things, such as objects like rocks, money, or computers. Words are unable to capture true ideas without diluting their meaning. When you put a thought into words, it is like a photograph of the real idea itself. The metaphor that comes to my mind on this subject is Plato's Theory of Forms, in which Plato states that everything in the physical realm is simply a shallow manifestation of a much deeper Form, or philosophical ideal. The physical "photos" are ephemeral and short-lived, while the Forms are constant and unchanging. When we use words, we are creating photos of the Forms so that we can share them between other human beings. It is fine for most things, but not for Forms. An example: when I say the word "Family," two definitions spring to mind. The first is a network of people related by blood. The second, which is the Form, is that of a deep sense of connectedness and community. That second meaning is clouded over by the first, because the practical uses of words create connotations that tarnish the Form. Words are lexically designated symbolic representations wich represent abstracted mental phenomena. Because of their lexical nature, they don't incorporate subjective judgements, like your second example would have... And because of their abstracted nature, they don't specfically point to any 'real' object: I don't go and point to my chair and just utter the word 'chair' when referring to it. I either call it 'this chair' or 'that chair in my room etc etc" thus providing properties of recognition for the listener. Taking this into account, it's not actually the words themselves wich muddle the idea they represent, it's the speaker. One could always be more clear by adding in more properties (read: information). 2. The nuances of different languages affect the cultures of the societies that speak said language, and vice versa. English speaking societies are different from Spanish speaking societies because of the different meanings and connotations of words. The simplest example I can give is that of the word DHARMA. In Tibetan life, dharma represents the natural order of things. There is no substitute for it in English. The Tibetan societies live according to this peaceful idea and structure their lives around it because they have a word which they can use to grasp the idea. English speakers have no such handle, and therefore cannot truly understand dharma. Uhm, yes they do. It's called "dharma". They borrowed the word, wich is a common occurance in linguistical development. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_change The word 'dharma' started out as a Sanskrit word, btw, and buddhism itself was introduced into Tibet (it originiated in India), so the word is also borrowed by the Tibetans. Also note that it's used in different religions and has a long history so the meaning of it has also been modified or developed accordingly. This points to a more social cause of languagechange than a linguistical cause of social change. The process also works in reverse. Take, for example, the nature of Americans to make everything into a soundbyte. Speed and efficiency is the name of the game. So, Americans have created words like BLOG, PODCAST, and BLOGOSPHERE only recently. This change in language represents the ability of culture to influence language. Check the link on language change. People are lazy speakers, and the words develop accordingly. Edited by ying on Jul 16, 2007 - 10:53 AM "I determined nothing." -Sceptical expression |
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Cyberflaneur
banned Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 05, 2005 Total Topics: 8 Total Posts: 171 |
#4
ying wrote: Words are lexically designated symbolic representations wich represent abstracted mental phenomena. Words can represent real phenomenon, not just mental ones. WHen I say that there is a chair in my room, I don't mean that there a phenomenon of "chair in my room" in my mind. I mean that there is a chair in my room. Taking this into account, it's not actually the words themselves wich muddle the idea they represent, it's the speaker. One could always be more clear by adding in more properties (read: information). True. We can usually glean the meaning and translate words in another culture and get very accurate definitions. It seems to me that the OP is mainly focusing on the innability to communicate connotation cross culturally as opposed to communicating meaning and denotation. Connotation is what Frege called "coloring" while the meaning supplies a basic structure for identifying the truth conditions of a statement. Yes, it is sometimes difficult to communicate connotation but meaning is usually very easily translated accross languages. The sentence "there is a chair in my room" is easily translatable to just about any language and even many abstruse philosophical ideas can be translated accross languages if there is a good enough translator available. Of course, that is not to say that that job is easy. In fact it is very very difficult but definitely not impossible. I think the OP is really talking about the limitations of translation (esp. translation of connotation) rather than the basic descriptive or other roles of language. I don't think he was very clear in stating this and this could cause some confusion. |
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Cyberflaneur
banned Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 05, 2005 Total Topics: 8 Total Posts: 171 |
#5
God of Enyart wrote: 1. Language is flawed in the respect that it was designed to communicate more temporal things, such as objects like rocks, money, or computers. Words are unable to capture true ideas without diluting their meaning. Well, language is a skill and the more we express ourselves in it, the better we get at expressing ourselves using language. There are some difficult ideas that are hard to put in words but I definitely wouldn't say that langauge is in any form inherently limited in trying to represent and express our ideas. We can come very very close even the most abstract ideas in communicating them. This is how deeply philosophical, spiritual and scientific ideas are transmitted throughout time. Somethings might be lost, certain inessential connotations might be lost sometimes but the main structures are communicated. An example: when I say the word "Family," two definitions spring to mind. The first is a network of people related by blood. The second, which is the Form, is that of a deep sense of connectedness and community. For words that have different meanings, we can use the context or explicit definition to disambiguate the different meanings. By distinguishing the two meanings explicitly yourself, you have communicated what you had wanted to say when you used the word 'family' to us. Most words have multiple meanings. There are also words that always change meaning and denotation whenever there is a new context. These words are the so called "indexicals". Words like 'now,' 'me,' 'you,' 'there,' 'here,' 'he,' 'it' etc all depend on context to express there meaning and what they are suppossed to denote. But we use these words effectively to communicate because we can tell by the context what they mean. Edited by Cyberflaneur on Jul 16, 2007 - 7:51 PM |
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ying
I ? Scepticism Usergroup: Missing Mods Joined: Feb 20, 2004 Location: Lichtenvoorde, Netherlands Total Topics: 18 Total Posts: 1482 |
#6
Cyberflaneur wrote: Words can represent real phenomenon, not just mental ones. WHen I say that there is a chair in my room, I don't mean that there a phenomenon of "chair in my room" in my mind. I mean that there is a chair in my room. Even physical phenomena are contents of the mind since sensory information is first neurologically processed and then presented to consciousness in a phenomenal form. But, because most humans experience a collectively similar apprehension of reality, we tend to equate physical phenomena with reality in-itself. It's all good in normal conversations, but on a technical level, we actually are talking about the contents of our minds. Besides, I was talking about abstracted words in themselves, wich do represent exclusively mental phenomena due to their abstracted nature; an abstracted idea doesn't have physical properties, making it, by definition a mental as oposed to physical phenomenon. Edited by ying on Jul 16, 2007 - 7:04 PM "I determined nothing." -Sceptical expression |
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Cyberflaneur
banned Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 05, 2005 Total Topics: 8 Total Posts: 171 |
#7
ying wrote: When one is talking about a chair, the word 'chair' doesn't point to a physical phenomenon, but to an abstracted, non-specified generalisation of what a chair is. And a chair without any properties at all isn't a physical chair, but an intentional one; and because it doesn't exist in the physical world but can be thought of, one is speaking about an exclusively mental phenomenon imho. Yes, but my point is that there are words that "point to" individual objective objects. In some contexts the word 'chair' is used as a universal and some it is not (such as my example). And even physical phenomena are contents of the mind since sensory information is first neurologically processed and then presented to consciousness in a phenomenal form. No, physical phenomenon are just physical phenomenon, not mental. There are the physical phenomena, then there are representations of these phenomena within consciousness. The actual phenomenon and its representation are not the same. When we speak of things like chairs being in rooms, we are not talking about the representations within our minds (or perhaps brains). We are talking about a phsyical object being in a room. But, because most humans experience a collectively similar apprehension of reality, we tend to equate physical phenomena with reality in-itself. It's all good in normal conversations, but on a technical level, we actually are talking about the contents of our minds. ACtually, the common sense way of talking is not only the "technically correct" way, but the only way that makes any sense. You're basically espousing a Lockean conception of meaning. There are very good counter arguments against this. The fact that we can distinguish between objective and subjective phenomenon is one such argument that is completely satisfying to me. If all phenomenon were simply "mental" then statements about mental and physical phenomenon would have the same meaning and the same truth value. But they clearly don't. We can distinguish sentences like "There is a chair in my room" from "I am having an acid flashback and am imagining that there's a chair in my room when there really isn't." We can talk about your or mine or anyone else's mental representations without talking about a physical phenomenon. We can also talk about physical phenomenon without talking about mental representations. Scientists talk about things that no human has ever seen or experienced (such as the first few moments of the beginning of the universe) without refering to anyone's mental states (because no one was around then). Also, if mental phenomenon were all we ever refer to in using language, statements like "I am imagining a unicorn" would have the same truth value as "I am seeing a unicorn" which would be nonsense. Anyone, at anytime, can imagine a unicorn but no one has ever seen one. But certainly, both are mental phenonmenon in the occiptial region corrosponding to neuronal activity in a certain neural structrure. If all mental phenomon were what is being referred to, then whatever we imagine would be as real as whatever we see, which is nonsense. If I were to show you that there is a chair in my room, I wouldn't point to my head, I'd take you there and show you the chair! Also, mental images can be distorted and are ephemeral. Things like chairs are not. I can imagine a chair one second, imagine a bottle of beer next moment and I would never say that a chair magically appeared out of nowhere then disappeared to be replaced by a bottle of beer, then reappeared again. Also, the Lockean argument is self-defeating. When you said that But, because most humans experience a collectively similar apprehension of reality, we tend to equate physical phenomena with reality in-itself. you make reference to a "[thing] in-itself". In order for you to make your theory, you would need to refer to a thing-in-itself just to say that language does not refer to it! That is a self-contradicting statement. Edited by Cyberflaneur on Jul 18, 2007 - 5:56 PM |
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ying
I ? Scepticism Usergroup: Missing Mods Joined: Feb 20, 2004 Location: Lichtenvoorde, Netherlands Total Topics: 18 Total Posts: 1482 |
#8
Cyberflaneur wrote: No, physical phenomenon are just physical phenomenon, not mental. There are the physical phenomena, then there are representations of these phenomena within consciousness. The actual phenomenon and its representation are not the same. When we speak of things like chairs being in rooms, we are not talking about the representations within our minds (or perhaps brains). We are talking about a phsyical object being in a room. Really? Not according to particle physics. When I look at an object, I don't see different layers of particles, but the phenomenal object presented to my consciousness. That's why I'm talking about mental and physical phenomena. I'm employing a Brentanian definition of those terms here, btw. ACtually, the common sense way of talking is not only the "technically correct" way, but the only way that makes any sense. You're basically espousing a Lockean conception of meaning. There are very good counter arguments against this. The fact that we can distinguish between objective and subjective phenomenon is one such argument that is completely satisfying to me. If all phenomenon were simply "mental" then statements about mental and physical phenomenon would have the same meaning and the same truth value. But they clearly don't. We can distinguish sentences like "There is a chair in my room" from "I am having an acid flashback and am imagining that there's a chair in my room when there really isn't." Hmpf. Ever had an acid flashback? I had mushroom ones, and those don't create non-tangible physical phenomena. A few of my friends had those though, but because of other drugs. You only notice the non-physicality of such hallucinations once you actually interact with them. We can talk about your or mine or anyone else's mental representations without talking about a physical phenomenon. We can also talk about physical phenomenon without talking about mental representations. Scientists talk about the physical structures of electrons all the time. Yet no one has ever seen an electron. Scientists talk about things that no human has ever seen or experienced (such as the first few moments of the beginning of the universe) without refering to anyone's mental states (because no one was around then). They employ an intellectual understanding; strictly speaking, a theoretical object is a mental phenomenon (again, Brentanian definition). Also, if mental phenomenon were all we ever refer to in using language, statements like "I am imagining a unicorn" would have the same truth value as "I am seeing a unicorn" which would be nonsense. Anyone, at anytime, can imagine a unicorn but no one has ever seen one. But certainly, both are mental phenonmenon in the occiptial region corrosponding to neuronal activity in a certain neural structrure. If all mental phenomon were what is being referred to, then whatever we imagine would be as real as whatever we see, which is nonsense. If I were to show you that there is a chair in my room, I wouldn't point to my head, I'd take you there and show you the chair! I already dealt with this... To call phenomenal reality 'physical' just because human beings have corresponding mental faculties just begs the question. And the highlighted part just is a bunch of strawmanning nonsense. Thought and perception are two different categories, and I'm certainly not mucking those up, here. Also, mental images can be distorted and are ephemeral. Things like chairs are not. I can imagine a chair one second, imagine a bottle of beer next moment and I would never say that a chair magically appeared out of nowhere then disappeared to be replaced by a bottle of beer, then reappeared again. Indeed, we can't alter physical reality. We can, however, alter phenomenal reality, wich is the apprehension of that physical one. Just take hallucinogens. Also, the Lockean argument is self-defeating. When you said that you make reference to a "[thing] in-itself". In order for you to make your theory, you would need to refer to a thing-in-itself just to say that language does not refer to it! That is a self-contradicting statement. Do you really think that my thoughts are that inconsistent? Really...  BTW, you're not accusing me of a self-contradicting statement, but what you (immagine) to point out is that I'm employing a circular argument. Well, I'm not. I'm hypostasising an undelying layer of phenomenal reality, wich consists of particles. On a final note, I don't think that a naive realism is tennable in this day and age. There's a lot of evidence pointing in an other direction, as provided by particle physics and neurology, just to name a few. Oh, and I never read Locke. I'm tackleing this from a strictly phenomenological perspective. Edited by ying on Jul 16, 2007 - 9:15 PM "I determined nothing." -Sceptical expression |
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Cyberflaneur
banned Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 05, 2005 Total Topics: 8 Total Posts: 171 |
#9
ying wrote: Really? Not according to particle physics. When I look at an object, I don't see different layers of particles, but the phenomenal object presented to my consciousness. That's why I'm talking about mental and physical phenomena. I'm employing a Brentanian definition of those terms here, btw. Can you elaborate on what particle physics has to do with this? BTW, if you are saying that mental phenomenon are "just phsyical phenonmenon" that still wouldn't refute my objections. My objection is not that there are some fundamental ontological difference between the mental and the physical phenomenon, but that there is a difference. Neurological processes occur in the brain, physical ones (in the sense I am using, the common sense one) do not. They are not even the same kinds of phenomenon. Hmpf. Ever had an acid flashback? I had mushroom ones, and those don't create non-tangible physical phenomena. A few of my friends had those though, but because of other drugs. You only notice the non-physicality of such hallucinations once you actually interact with them. But it still makes sense to distinguish the two types of phenomenon. To not make the distinction is to delve into a incoherent world of madness. All I am saying is that it is nonsensical to not distinguish them because then we'd be committed to all sorts of nonsense. Schizophrenics and people who are dreaming "see" and "feel" a phenonmenal environment but do not experience these phenonmena qua physical processes. Their experiences are quite tangible. We would never say that dreamers are experiencing physical reality even though they possibly do have very very similar phenomenological experiences and neurological processes as awake persons in their sensory cortices. I already dealt with this... To call phenomenal reality 'physical' just because human beings have corresponding mental faculties just begs the question. I am not calling phenomenal "reality" physical. I am calling physical reality physical and mental processes mental. I don't see how it "begs the question". In fact, it seems to me that your phenomenology in this begs the question. And the highlighted part just is a bunch of strawmanning nonsense. Thought and perception are two different categories, and I'm certainly not mucking those up, here. Can you elaborate on this? Where have I made a strawman? I am fully aware that thought and perception are different processes. But that would just refute your own argument! I don't thin kyou understood my argument there so it is you who have made a strawman. You had said that whenever we talk about something, we are just talking about mental processes or phenomenal objects. But phenomenal objects are ephemeral and maleable to our every whim. Physical ones are not. Indeed, we can't alter physical reality. We can, however, alter phenomenal reality, wich is the apprehension of that physical one. Just take hallucinogens. Of course we can alter phsyical reality. We do this all the time. I never said we couldn't. I don't think you are being very clear. They employ an intellectual understanding; strictly speaking, a theoretical object is a mental phenomenon (again, Brentanian definition). Yes, but all I said was that it is false to say that they refer to their own mental theoretical objects when they talk about these external and ancient physical phenomena. They may employ them as you say but they don't refer to them, they refer to the actual phsyical phenomena. Again, I am not desputing that people need to employ mental objects to think but I am saying that it is logically nonsense to say that what is meant by 'reference' when we talk about words refering to physical objects and phenomena. To employ something is not the same as refering to it. I may use a mental image of a Robin or ostrich to talk about birds in general but if I am talking about birds in general, I am not talking about a specific Robin or ostrich! I employ these images due to phychological tendencies in the act of referring to birds as a group but surely the particular image in my mind is not what I mean when I make a statement about birds. If I said that "birds have a 4 chambered heart" I don't mean that the particular robin I am currently thinking has a 4 chambered heart. I mean that all birds have a 4 chambered heart. BTW, you're not accusing me of a self-contradicting statement, but what you (immagine) to point out is that I'm employing a circular argument. No. I am accussing you of a self-contradictory statement. Well, I'm not. I'm hypostasising an undelying layer of phenomenal reality, wich consists of particles. I am not sure what you are espousing here. This is way too vague for a rigorous philosophical discusion. What underlying layer are you talking about? Is this some kind of panpsychism? This is a very strange theory.  On a final note, I don't think that a naive realism is tennable in this day and age. There's a lot of evidence pointing in an other direction, as provided by particle physics and neurology, just to name a few. Such as? What other direction are you talking about? BTW, I am not espousing a "naive realism". Though I do agree with Wittgenstein's Tractatus that a phenomenological view collapses into a naive realism (Tractatus 7s). Oh, and I never read Locke. I'm tackleing this from a strictly phenomenological perspective. You don't have to read locke to have a lockean perspective on meaning. Edited by Cyberflaneur on Jul 16, 2007 - 10:27 PM |
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Cyberflaneur
banned Usergroup: Members Joined: Feb 05, 2005 Total Topics: 8 Total Posts: 171 |
#10
ying wrote: Even physical phenomena are contents of the mind since sensory information is first neurologically processed and then presented to consciousness in a phenomenal form. But, because most humans experience a collectively similar apprehension of reality, we tend to equate physical phenomena with reality in-itself. It's all good in normal conversations, but on a technical level, we actually are talking about the contents of our minds. Besides, I was talking about abstracted words in themselves, wich do represent exclusively mental phenomena due to their abstracted nature; an abstracted idea doesn't have physical properties, making it, by definition a mental as oposed to physical phenomenon. Then you should have qualified your original statement by saying that some words represent abstract phenomenon (which is a trivial truth) in certain contexts. Obviously, there are other contexts in which they don't. And the some words in some contexts don't point to specific real object (again, trivially true). Even if you had qualified your statements, this statement would still be technically false. "Even physical phenomena are contents of the mind since sensory information is first neurologically processed and then presented to consciousness in a phenomenal form." Also, not everyone is aware of Brentano's phenomenology. So when you talk about physical phenomenon, how is everyone to know that you are talkning about phenomenal objects? People assume you are using common everyday or common philosophical diction, not esotera. |
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