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the question to the dasein? heidegger

the question to the dasein? heidegger

fede
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Posted 06/22/07 - 07:23 PM: Subject: the question to the dasein? heidegger	#1
the being is presented hidden in the entity, according to heidegger, and the man possesses the being's anticipated comprehension, for the same fact that the being hides in the entity, but the being is a (jecto), that is to say, a heady one in the time... so, when we formulate the question for the being, is the dasein in the being? pardon for my english, but I'm from argentina, and I try to practice his lenguage

Goaswerfraiejen
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Posted 06/24/07 - 08:50 AM:	#2
Hmm. If I understand you correctly, you're asking if Dasein is in a/the particular being (and, more broadly, you're asking about the relationship between subject, world, Dasein, and the question of metaphysics)? If so, then the answer is more or less no--Dasein isn't and doesn't name a characteristic or attribute, but rather a way of being: in German, Da-sein means something like Being-toward; to be in a state of Dasein is to consider one's existence in the face of the first (and only, really) question of metaphysics (why is there something rather than nothing?). Accordingly, to be in a state of Dasein is to consider one's current being (existence) against the knowledge that there was a time when it did not exist, and there will be a time when it no longer exists (it dies) (note that Heidegger takes care to distinguish Being-in as it is usually understood [a spatio-temporal position] from the Being-in of Dasein, which is an existential). When you are in a state of Dasein, then, Heidegger believes that you've entered into an authentic relationship with and to the world. You no longer divorce yourself from it, but consider yourself in relation to it: you are en-worlded. Human existence, says Heidegger, is grounded in our always already finding ourselves grounded in the world: we are Dasein precisely because of the way in which we are-in-the-world; that is to say, the mode of our existence is related to the way in which we exist, which is grounded in the (objective) world. The subject-object distinction, then, eclipses some of the most basic elements of existence (notably being-in-the-world, relevance, being-with, etc.). As Heidegger puts it, there can be no world without Dasein and, conversely, no Dasein without world: Dasein can only be read from the world in the mode of its being-in-the-world, and it is thus never free from this mode of being. To help you with the bit about anticipation, here's an excerpt from an exegesis I wrote on this section when we were studying Being and Time. Page references are to the German pagination of Being and Time. I think it'll be more helpful to you than an even briefer summary, like I did above. For Heidegger, knowledge itself is grounded beforehand in an already-being-in-the-world that is the essential constitution of Dasein (60): “in knowing, Da-sein gains a new perspective of being toward the world always already discovered in Da-sein” (62). As a fundamental constitution, being-in-the-world requires a prior interpretation (62). This is because the world is always already present in things which are at hand (83), and thus things at hand have the character of being referred: that is, they are always already presented to us in their respective contexts, in-the-world (84). The character of things being-at-hand, Heidegger calls things’ relevance, that for the sake of which the thing is (84). Ultimately, however, a thing’s relevance points to Dasein, to a human being (84). Dasein, then, is like a light in the sense that it allows things to show themselves as-they-are-in-the-world. Where there is no Dasein, things are not free to be even ontically relevant: Dasein illuminates them such that they are free to reveal themselves in-the-world, in their respective contexts (85). We do not give things their ontological relevance (as in a metaphysics that privileges the subject-object distinction, such as Kant’s or Hume’s); rather, we passively allow things to reveal themselves to us as-they-are-in-the-world, and this worldly character of things always lies pre-discovered: Beings are always already things-at-hand, and are not merely some kind of objective “world-stuff” (85). **Note, of course, that in The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger will expand upon his notion of "revealing" and "showing itself"--while something is unconcealed to us, so too is something else concealed: either it is re-concealed, or it remains concealed. In this way, revealing is always a double-concealing. This makes the explanation above a little more complex, but I just included it so that you know what's coming in the later Heidegger.

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