 The Harm Principle | |
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Ratheius Netheros
Resident  Usergroup: Members Joined: Mar 15, 2005 Total Topics: 49 Total Posts: 309 |
 #1
Subject: The Harm Principle So I'm writing an essay on legal paternalism, and I am explaining the Harm Principle as based on power relations as opposed to natural law. Consider the following dilemma: In the state of nature, ten people exist. Of these ten people, nine want to enact a principle where murder is punished. A single individual prefers murder. He has a psychological propensity to murder, and he would prefer murdering at the risk of his own safety than enacting such a law. He generally finds ways to get away with murder and escape predators. He has found individualist mechanisms to survive in the state of nature that work with his psychological nature. Because his interests are outside the majority, he is deemed psychologically ill or abnormal. If his kind had been the majority, the state of nature may have remained. The Harm Principle assumes all people in the state of nature prefer cooperation. We can conceive this to be false. Therefore, it sets itself up as a "self-evident" truth, but it has no basis for this claim outside majority opinion. Had individuals primarily preferred harming others to their safety, which is conceivable, this principle would never have emerged. Therefore, the Harm Principle should be advocated as advantageous rather than intrinsically valuable. Libertarians, then, have to follow Mill and provide more justification for their idealization of liberty. Here is another explanation to illustrate my point: 1. They want to ban murder, but a tenth individual rejects the idea. 2. They rationalize the Harm Principle as a way to justify their actions. 3. The tenth individual has his freedom limited because it is "harming others" 4. The rational justification for the Harm Principle, then, is that it is in the interests of the majority. If the foundations of the Harm Principle, "to be in the interests of the majority," are violated by the Harm Principle, you have to reject the Harm Principle. The Harm Principle violates the interests of the majority, in some cases, where paternalist intervention is disallowed. The Harm Principle is the equivalent of an moral principle that says, "you can eat food, except when I want to eat it." Society qualifies the situation to circularly justify its advantage over "abnormal" individuals we imprison for failure to adopt the principle. |
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philthemn
Newbie Usergroup: Members Joined: Aug 15, 2008 Total Topics: 0 Total Posts: 5 |
#2
I think your conclusions are based upon some mistaken assumptions about the Harm Principle. You say that 'The Harm Principle assumes all people in the state of nature prefer cooperation.' but this is not true at all. The Harm Principle assumes that all people will be better off in the long term if they cooperate and allow each other self-government, irrelevant of whether or not each individual realises this fact. 'Had individuals primarily preferred harming others to their safety, which is conceivable, this principle would never have emerged. ' While the individuals themselves may never have thought up the principle, the principle itself would still be a veritable solution which would most likely cause the group to survive much longer than if it was not enacted. So the Harm Principle itself remains a strong philosophical solution for society. 'Therefore, the Harm Principle should be advocated as advantageous rather than intrinsically valuable.' You say this as if it defeats the original basis upon which the Harm Principle was founded, but Mill was a utilitarian. The Harm Principle is intended as a utilitarian principle, and to benefit the majority over the long term 'Libertarians, then, have to follow Mill and provide more justification for their idealization of liberty.' The libertarian may justify their beliefs upon utility as Mill did. This means that the Harm Principle is seen as the most beneficial to the most people over the long term. You argue that, had the majority of society been made up of very different characters (namely those who wish to murder), the Harm Principle would not be utilitarian, I doubt this to be true, since those who wish to be murder would probably be more happy being prevented from murdering others and alive, than allowed to murder and dead. 'If the foundations of the Harm Principle, "to be in the interests of the majority," are violated by the Harm Principle, you have to reject the Harm Principle. The Harm Principle violates the interests of the majority, in some cases, where paternalist intervention is disallowed.' From what I understand, your main point is this one. If the Harm Principle, which is based upon utilitarianism, is not itself utilitarian, it is a broken principle and must be disregarded. In 'On Liberty', Mill spends a lot of time rebutting this point. For example, the Harm Principle defends free speech. But if the 99.9% of the population are offended by the free speech of the remaining 0.1%, it would seem un-utilitarian to allow it. Since the Harm Principle is based upon the utilitarian benefits, this would seem to be problematic. In actual fact Mill explains that the Harm Principle, although not completely Utilitarian in the short term, will always produce the best outcome for the whole of society in the long term. It is this long-sighted vision which makes the Harm Principle effective at promoting the most overall happiness. Also, you say that Libertarians have to provide more justification for their idealisation of liberty. Well, in truth, they already have. Libertarianism is more likely to be defended using Natural Rights as a justification rather than Utilitarianism or the Harm Principle. |
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Ratheius Netheros
Resident Usergroup: Members Joined: Mar 15, 2005 Total Topics: 49 Total Posts: 309 |
#3
Mill's long-sighted vision of the harm principle is poorly defended. When he makes the harm principle say you can't commit suicide or engage in voluntary slavery, he places the liberty not as advantageous to utility but above it. He also claims liberty is a higher good implying it is some sort of "actual" thing. Natural rights have little basis as Bentham pointed out. Most people argue that a right is natural if it is advantageous for everyone, but to assume there are such rights is a vast overgeneralization. For instance, consider liberty. If you are forced to do X, which you wanted to do anyway, you get the same benefit as you would had you chosen it yourself. Negative liberty seems to imply that infringing on liberty is what is bad. So you infringe on liberty X and the individual is forced to go against their inclinations. To go against your inclinations is painful because of how the body works. Negative liberty is equivalent to the claim, "pain is painful." If you have a term and examine what it means, such as liberty, you often find it isn't something distinct. It is just a definition encompassing other ideas. If we accept that negative liberty is freedom from pain we have the following issue: 1. Acting on liberty is the equivalent of seeking pleasure. 2. Acting against liberty is the equivalent of causing pain. 3. If acting on or against liberty would cause more pleasure or pain, the basis on which liberty is founded, utilitarianism, implies restriction. You might save negative liberty by claiming individuals forced to go against their inclinations for their own good, even if they don't realize it, are harmed more than if they realize it. However, this is still a harm consideration and if the benefit was significant, you could justify intervention. Mill claims negative liberty should be defended. If you deconstruct his claim, it is the claim that we should avoid causing pain. If avoiding that pain does not maximize utility, you disregard it. The concept of negative liberty serves to making considering utilitarian questions easier. However, it doesn't contribute anything additional to the analysis. Acting on inclinations and pursuing interests is important, but it isn't always the most important thing. I tried to side with Mill on this issue, and I couldn't. He suggests we should be careful about going against liberty, but he doesn't show how we should never do that (which he doesn't even claim). Mill and his followers typically argue against paternalism in cases like seat belt laws, compulsory vaccinations, et cetera, but there arguments are significant enough to justify overturning utility maximizing laws. |
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