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The Binding Problem

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The Binding Problem

reincarnated
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Posted 04/06/09 - 04:27 AM: Subject: The Binding Problem	#1
The binding problem in cognitive psychology/philosophy of mind is usually described as the problem of the how the brain integrates various information on the shape, colour, texture, motion, etc of a perceived object so that all of these properties of the object can be experienced together as a single “scene” by the mind. In other words, how do individual conscious percepts become unified into single perceptual units? How do we explain the way that information processed by different sensory systems is apparently brought together by the brain to produce a unified perception? How is it that we seem to experience a single, integrated world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality? Is this a real problem, or has it already been explained away by the likes of Dennett et al? If we still think of this as a problem, is this simply because we insist on clinging to the Cartesian Theatre view of the mind, with its resident homunculus? http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model If Dennett’s dissolution of the binding problem does not work for you – why not?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

wuliheron
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Posted 04/06/09 - 12:45 PM:	#2
I think Dennett's arguments are good, but leave out some of the more subtle aspects of consciousness. In particular, altered states of consciousness. For example, under life and death situations people often experience time as passing slowly (ie their consciousness speeds up) and their minds put aside all extraneous matters as they focus exclusively on survival. Another good example is the fact that our senses and even muscles and joints have "minds" of their own. The right ear, for example, is designed to process music better than the left, and the left is designed to process language better than the right. Likewise, our joints learn distinctive routines such as how to run and jump without hurting ourselves. This is why when athletes are injured they immediately treated first with ice, but as soon as possible they excercize the joint. If this is not done, the joint forgets how to do what it needs to do and the odds increase that the athlete will injure themselves even worse. In other words, where do we draw the line between the mind and body? Traditionally this has been done in the sciences somewhere around the top of the central neurvous system and brain, but increasely evidence points to the simple fact that we are a unified organic whole. A person who is blind from birth must think somewhat differently from others and vice versa and the same might also be said about the binding problem in cognitive psychology. That it is merely another useful way of describing the mind, whether or not it reflects the whole story. It is a bit like asking whether or not reductionist viewpoints are less valid than holistic ones. Such arguments are specious imo, both are useful points of view depending upon the context in which you choose to use them.

reincarnated
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Posted 04/06/09 - 07:55 PM:	#3
wuliheron wrote: I think Dennett's arguments are good, but leave out some of the more subtle aspects of consciousness. In particular, altered states of consciousness. For example, under life and death situations people often experience time as passing slowly (ie their consciousness speeds up) and their minds put aside all extraneous matters as they focus exclusively on survival. I guess Dennett would argue that the apparent experience of time passing slowly is simply a trick being played by our consciousness, and that conscious focus on survival is quite explicable. “Altered states of consciousness” is suggestive of states with which we are not routinely familiar, thus it is hardly surprising that such states would have unusual subjectively perceived properties. wuliheron wrote: Another good example is the fact that our senses and even muscles and joints have "minds" of their own. The right ear, for example, is designed to process music better than the left, and the left is designed to process language better than the right. Likewise, our joints learn distinctive routines such as how to run and jump without hurting ourselves. This is why when athletes are injured they immediately treated first with ice, but as soon as possible they excercize the joint. If this is not done, the joint forgets how to do what it needs to do and the odds increase that the athlete will injure themselves even worse. Agreed – to an extent. Again this is explicable on the basis that it makes sense to distribute routine or learned processes to the bodily regions where those processes are implemented if possible. I don’t agree with your interpretation of the efficaciousness of ice and exercise treatment on injuries, however. It seems to me that the objective here is to both reduce swelling and maintain blood circulation around the joint– a mainly mechanical issue and not necessarily anything to do with the joint “forgetting” anything. wuliheron wrote: In other words, where do we draw the line between the mind and body? Traditionally this has been done in the sciences somewhere around the top of the central neurvous system and brain, but increasely evidence points to the simple fact that we are a unified organic whole. A person who is blind from birth must think somewhat differently from others and vice versa and the same might also be said about the binding problem in cognitive psychology. That it is merely another useful way of describing the mind, whether or not it reflects the whole story. I think Dennett’s response would be that this makes no difference to his argument. We can posit a consciousness which is distributed around the body, or we can posit a consciousness which is mostly localised in the brain, the distinction is not one that makes a difference to his suggested multiple drafts model of consciousness (indeed, he argues that there is no unique centre of consciousness where it “all comes together” ). wuliheron wrote: It is a bit like asking whether or not reductionist viewpoints are less valid than holistic ones. Such arguments are specious imo, both are useful points of view depending upon the context in which you choose to use them. Many supporters of reductionistic or holistic arguments would disagree, arguing either that everything can be explained reductionistically (reductionists) or that some things cannot be explained reductionistically (holists). One of these extreme viewpoints must be false.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

bert1
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Posted 04/06/09 - 11:01 PM:	#4
reincarnated wrote: indeed, he argues that there is no unique centre of consciousness where it “all comes together” Doesn't the most cursory piece of introspection simply disprove this? Take any mental act you like: perception, inferring, understanding, whatever. They all involve relating many things together as one. We simply have to account for where the unity of subjective experience comes from. (I went into a bit more detail in the substance theory thread before I saw you'd made this one). We are talking about phenomenal consciousness here, aren't we, (just by way of clarification)?
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Posted 04/06/09 - 11:42 PM:	#5
wuliheron wrote: In other words, where do we draw the line between the mind and body? One possible description of the line is that "mind contains representations of outer world - body included - and process only them, communicating input and output from/to outer world thru sensorimotor system". It's a metaphysical definition, no physical line may never be possible to define (meaning non-reductivity). Wilder Penfield's homunculus describes the representation of the body in mind: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/p...id=1014945&pageindex=2
"In the life, there are no solutions. There are forces in motion. Those need to be created, and solutions follow." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Night Flight

reincarnated
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Posted 04/07/09 - 01:08 AM:	#6
bert1 wrote: Doesn't the most cursory piece of introspection simply disprove this? No - this is Dennett's point. From naive introspection we have the illusion that it "all comes together" in one central place (the so-called Cartesian Theatre), but studies of consciousness have shown that there is no such place in the brain, that different phenomenal properties are in fact processed in different parts of the brain. bert1 wrote: Take any mental act you like: perception, inferring, understanding, whatever. They all involve relating many things together as one. We simply have to account for where the unity of subjective experience comes from. Yes , they do - but this is a logical "relating things together as one" which does not necessarily mean there is also a physical place in the brain where all things come together as one. bert1 wrote: (I went into a bit more detail in the substance theory thread before I saw you'd made this one). I'll check it out. bert1 wrote: We are talking about phenomenal consciousness here, aren't we, (just by way of clarification)? Yes.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Cuthbert
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Posted 04/07/09 - 01:20 AM:	#7
So it's not like this?

reincarnated
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Posted 04/07/09 - 02:25 AM:	#8
I love the numskulls! Was that the Beezer or the Beano? Did they have a Binding Dept?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

bert1
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Posted 04/07/09 - 03:16 AM:	#9
reincarnated wrote: From naive introspection we have the illusion that it "all comes together" in one central place (the so-called Cartesian Theatre) But it cannot be an illusion, unless you are willing to say that phenomenal experience doesn't exist. An illusion is a genuine mental phenomenon, and as such involves a many-in-one experience. Saying that the many-in-one aspect of an illusion is an illusion seems absurd to me. reincarnated wrote: Yes , they do - but this is a logical "relating things together as one" which does not necessarily mean there is also a physical place in the brain where all things come together as one. I'm not sure I understand you here. Consciousness is a real physical phenomenon (isn't it?). If it's logically true that it must be a certain way, then it is also empirically, physically, true that it must be that way, a fortiori.
"Like a ungroomed dog in which the desired look is it’s long hair but it has been so unattended to, that combing is impractical, and it might be better if the hair was cut and attended to as it grows back." d_martin

wuliheron
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Posted 04/07/09 - 03:43 AM:	#10
reincarnated wrote: I guess Dennett would argue that the apparent experience of time passing slowly is simply a trick being played by our consciousness, and that conscious focus on survival is quite explicable. “Altered states of consciousness” is suggestive of states with which we are not routinely familiar, thus it is hardly surprising that such states would have unusual subjectively perceived properties. Agreed – to an extent. Again this is explicable on the basis that it makes sense to distribute routine or learned processes to the bodily regions where those processes are implemented if possible. I don’t agree with your interpretation of the efficaciousness of ice and exercise treatment on injuries, however. It seems to me that the objective here is to both reduce swelling and maintain blood circulation around the joint– a mainly mechanical issue and not necessarily anything to do with the joint “forgetting” anything. The theory is that reducing swelling prevents damage to the joint that can cause it to forget its routines. There is no evidence that the swelling alone causes any significant damage to the joint itself, otherwise the joint could simply heal on its own given enough time and the athlete would not be prone to further injury. reincarnated wrote: I think Dennett’s response would be that this makes no difference to his argument. We can posit a consciousness which is distributed around the body, or we can posit a consciousness which is mostly localised in the brain, the distinction is not one that makes a difference to his suggested multiple drafts model of consciousness (indeed, he argues that there is no unique centre of consciousness where it “all comes together” ). That was my argument all along, I was not refuting Dennett but merely confirming and expanding upon his arguments. From my point of view, too many philosophers rely too heavily on reasoned arguments without incorporating enough emperical evidence. reincarnated wrote: Many supporters of reductionistic or holistic arguments would disagree, arguing either that everything can be explained reductionistically (reductionists) or that some things cannot be explained reductionistically (holists). One of these extreme viewpoints must be false. I'm not interested in what is true and false, just what fits the facts and is useful.

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