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The Binding Problem
reincarnated
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Posted 10/30/09 - 09:24 AM:
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#31
bert1 wrote:
Does memory play a role here, then? Can you access one dataset, then forget about it, and then access the next dataset, and still construct a phenomenal experience from these two? Or does the first one have to be 'held' in memory while you look up the next one, so that they can be logically related at the same time in order to get the phenomenal experience?

Yes, memory (of some kind) plays a role. If there was absolutely no memory of the first dataset then there would be no possibility of comparison with the second.
bert1 wrote:
OK, but the 'neural processes taking place in the brain' have a spatio-temporal location, at least roughly. They are within the boundary of your skin and take, say, a few seconds (to be generous) or whatever to do their stuff. Don't forget we're talking about what does the logical binding necessary for phenomenal experience which you have previously said does not have a spatio-temporal location. Could you clarify this please?

I believe I have said there is no well-defined spatio-temporal location (the neural processes which process this information can be delocalized within the brain), but this does not mean that the processes exist somehow outside of space and time. So yes, the processes take place within the boundary of one’s skin and within a few seconds.
bert1 wrote:
Just to be super-clear: Have there been any phenomenal experiences within the boundary of your skin surface within the last five minutes?

There have indeed been phenomenal experiences detected by my consciousness, which my consciousness interprets as taking place on or within the boundary of my skin, within the last five minutes.
bert1 wrote:
OK, I'm getting confused again now. We have two things in this sentence, the neural processes and our conscious attention. It's the conscious attention bit which, by definition, the phenomenal experience happens in. It has to be the conscious bit in which the logical binding takes place doesn't it? Otherwise we can't achieve a phenomenal experience?

Agreed that phenomenal experience “happens” within conscious experience, but (imho) conscious attention is directed (controlled) by subconscious neural processes. Logical binding is a subconscious process (in the sense that we have no conscious awareness that binding is taking place, our consciousness is simply presented with the result of that binding process).
bert1 wrote:
Does our 'conscious attention' have a spatio-temporal location? I'm not asking for a place in the brain, just a rough location in, say, a room with a person in it, will do.

It has a spatio-temporal location only by virtue of the phenomena which define it – if we are conscious of a visually perceived image, we are conscious of that image in specific spatial coordinates. Temporal coordinates are simply stamped onto phenomenal events (roughly) according to an interpreted logical sequence. In absence of phenomenal experience, we have nothing on which to ground our spatio-temporal coordinates, hence time and space lose significance (witness sensory deprivation).
bert1 wrote:
OK, I've let your use of all the bolded words slide for now, just so we don't get bogged down. I'm also aware that if I prohibit the use of these words without definition it will become difficult for you to say anything. Also, you may be using these words metaphorically without the intention of implying a subjective entity to which they refer. .
So, by 'we' do you mean whatever-it-is-which-binds-the-logical-elements-to-form-a-phenomenal-experi ence?

By “our” or “us” (in this context) I mean elements or entities that we assume reside (spatio-temporally) within the physical entity that we refer to as our body. By “we” (in this context) I mean “the processes that are used by us”.
bert1 wrote:
I'm sorry if it seems like I'm asking the same questions over and over! I do appreciate the time you are taking to answer them. I think I have a better chance of understanding you than I do of getting through one of Dennett's books - at least I can ask you questions!

That’s ok. I actually appreciate your probing questions, they force me to think more deeply about my own assumptions. I just wish more posters on here were more critical (in a positive sense).
bert1 wrote:
I completely agree that we must have a final perceiver, although I imagine there are probably philosophers who don't actually believe in a unified self at all. Quite what they think holds their own beliefs, I don't know.

Of course there is a “final perceiver”, but this perceiver is created as part and parcel of the conscious process, it ceases to exist when consciousness ceases.
bert1 wrote:
For me, there must be some kind of unified subjective consciousness, which I take to be the same concept as your 'final perceiver'.
So far I think we agree. Your final perceiver is a process in the nervous system which you take to be a unity which binds its parts, if I understand you correctly. You might be right. I think there are plenty of philosophers who think that such things as processes, (or brains, of bits of brains, or whole bodies, or whatever the particular theory is) are natural unities.

Pardon me, but you seem to be hung up on this “unity” thing. Simply remove “unity” from your description and I agree:
“Your final perceiver is a process in the nervous system which you take to bind its parts, if I understand you correctly. You might be right. I think there are plenty of philosophers who think that such things as processes, (or brains, of bits of brains, or whole bodies, or whatever the particular theory is) are natural.”
bert1 wrote:
If we are to avoid problematic substance dualism, we have to look at our list of physical unities (singularity, space), then look at our list of mental unities (consciousness), and we have to say something from each list is identical with something on the other list.

Why this insistence on “unities”? Why does the insistence on unities seem so essential to you?


Edited by reincarnated on 10/30/09 - 09:24 PM

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treemanshope
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Posted 10/30/09 - 11:19 AM:
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#32
reincarnated wrote:

Logical binding is simply : I have a set of data A, and I have a set of data B. These two sets of data are logically related, even though they may be separated in space and time. For example, I may have data (1) on the particular shape of a portion at coordinates X,Y of a (perceived) tomato in one folder on my computer, and I may have data (2) on the colour of a portion at coordinates X,Y of a (perceived) tomato in another folder on my computer. If I want to know both the colour of the tomato and the shape of the portion of tomato at coordinates X,Y I do not have to physically bring both sets of data together into the same spatio-temporal location (ie the Cartesian Theatre), instead I can simply do a lookup on the outputs of (1) and (2) (which outputs may be at different times and physical locations) to get my answer.

This works perfect for machines like computers and washing machines and I think you are at a lose for comparing them to a self aware perceiving system that is coherent and cognitive and a representative of its environment. I think you are still trying to compartmentalize and reduce the process to a Cartesian Theater.

What relates them is simply the information that both sets of data come from the same X,Y coordinate at the same time in the field of view. If I have a set of shape data from coordinate X,Y and a set of colour data from coordinate X,Y, and both have the same “timestamp” on them, then I can logically associate them (even though the exact times that I access the two sets of data within my conscious mind may be different – I don’t need to access both datasets simultaneously). The relationship is created by the neural processes taking place in the brain – the equivalent of the processes taking place in a computer which relates two sets of data from a database.

The question that comes to mind is what is the proposed design, how does an end seeking process complete a program without a programmer? Who is the programmer?
How could this program allow for newness and the unexpected? No I don't think so.

The subconscious neural processes that direct our conscious attention. Our subconscious tells our consciousness that when we access dataset 1 (the shape of the tomato at coordinate X,Y) we should associate the output of that dataset with the output of dataset 2 (the colour of the tomato at coordinate X,Y). We do not actually have to make that association in realtime, and we do not have to physically bring the two sets of data together – we simply fool ourselves into thinking that we are making the data association in realtime – and this gives rise to the Cartesian Theatre illusion.

[/quote]

You can't have a correspondence to a program because you are a representative of it. Because, cognition is participating with consciousness and because cognition and evolution are really flip sides of the same conceptual coin. A logic of coherence.

The words of peace are just words, it is man that gives them flesh. Bring peace into the material world. Or, bring something else.
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Posted 10/30/09 - 09:35 PM:
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#33
treemanshope wrote:
This works perfect for machines like computers and washing machines and I think you are at a lose for comparing them to a self aware perceiving system that is coherent and cognitive and a representative of its environment.

I'm not trying to compare existing computers or washing machines to a self aware perceiving system, so I'm not sure what your point is here?

treemanshope wrote:
I think you are still trying to compartmentalize and reduce the process to a Cartesian Theater.

What makes you say this? There is no Cartesian Theatre (or anything like it) within my model. Perhgaps you could point out where you think it appears?

treemanshope wrote:
The question that comes to mind is what is the proposed design, how does an end seeking process complete a program without a programmer? Who is the programmer?

Why need there be a programmer? Why do you think a programmer (an external designer) is necessary in order for a process to take place?

treemanshope wrote:
How could this program allow for newness and the unexpected?

Present-day learning algorithms allow for, adapt to, and learn from newness and the unexpected. This is a trivial issue.

treemanshope wrote:
You can't have a correspondence to a program because you are a representative of it.

A program can in principle contain a representation of itself within itself, no problem there.

treemanshope wrote:
Because, cognition is participating with consciousness and because cognition and evolution are really flip sides of the same conceptual coin. A logic of coherence.

I'm not sure what point you are trying to make here. Are you saying that consciousness can emerge only through evolution? If yes, can you defend your asssertion? If no, then what are you saying?


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Posted 10/31/09 - 12:21 AM:
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reincarnated wrote:
I use “illusion” to illustrate the fact that your subconscious mind somehow makes your conscious mind believe that when you look at a red tomato, the information derived from the stimulus corresponding to the “red” of the tomato somehow spatio-temporally "coincides" with the information derived from the stimulus corresponding to the “shape” of the tomato somewhere within your brain – that there is a unique place in your brain (the Cartesian Theatre) where the information about “redness” and the “shape” come together at the same time to form an integrated “perceptual unit”. But such a theatre is redundant, it is not necessary. All your subconscious brain needs do is to form a logical relationship between the spatio-temporally separated information corresponding to “redness” and “shape”, and to pass this relational information up to your consciousness – your conscious mind then simply (logically) associates those two sets of information together as one perceptual unit – but no physical theatre is necessary to bring these things together - because there is no homunculus to watch the show.

It doesn't seem as if these percepts are indissolubly bound in the "bringing together". For instance, we can "bind" together a person's visage and their name, but it is possible to be able later to recall their face without recalling their name. (Not that this in any way undermines your point: I'm just making an observation.)

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Posted 11/01/09 - 10:40 PM:
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#35
reincarnated wrote:
I believe I have said there is no well-defined spatio-temporal location (the neural processes which process this information can be delocalized within the brain), but this does not mean that the processes exist somehow outside of space and time. So yes, the processes take place within the boundary of one’s skin and within a few seconds.


OK, thanks for clearing that up.

Agreed that phenomenal experience “happens” within conscious experience, but (imho) conscious attention is directed (controlled) by subconscious neural processes. Logical binding is a subconscious process (in the sense that we have no conscious awareness that binding is taking place, our consciousness is simply presented with the result of that binding process).


Ah, OK. That's probably another place where we differ. I tend to think that the binding and the experience are one and the same thing. Of course, we are not aware of any process, because binding is not a process at all. It is the opposite of a process, it is a simultaneous unification of differences. If it is a process, in what sense is it bound?

reincarnated wrote:
By “our” or “us” (in this context) I mean elements or entities that we assume reside (spatio-temporally) within the physical entity that we refer to as our body.


You've used the words you are defining in your definition! (At least, 'we' is sufficiently close in meaning to 'us' to fall foul of circular definition).

By “we” (in this context) I mean “the processes that are used by us”.


Again, now I just want to know what you mean by 'us'. Is this just a language problem such that you really do have an explanatory theory, but our language prevents (or makes it difficult for) you from putting it in a non-question-begging way? Or does the fact that you have to use the language of subjective agents suggest that your theory does not explain subjective agency? (I am assuming here that question of subjectivity, the self, and consciousness all overlap at least to a degree, such that you can't talk say 'our' or 'we' without referring to consciousness.)

Perhaps, instead of 'us', for example, you could use 'the body at co-ordinate A,B,C and the body at co-ordinate E,F,G' or some such cumbersome formulation? If we agree that you can I won't insist you use it all the time. I'm not sure if I will agree to it though, as even these expressions depend on a relative frame of reference. Can we have such a frame without subjectivity? Oh, blimey, I don't know if I want to get into that. (I went over some of this ground in Aetixintro's "An Attack on Indexicality" thread. The issue is a bit different here, but there are similarities, I think.)

Pardon me, but you seem to be hung up on this “unity” thing.


I certainly am hung up on the unity thing. I do regard it as indispensable. And I think you are committed to it too. You are committed to binding as an essential aspect of phenomenal experience (as I understand you so far). To my mind binding implies unity. A bound thing is one thing with several elements related together at once.

The reason I was so insistent for you to clarify that binding takes place in space and time was to show that the unity implied in binding was a real spatio-temporal something. Do you agree that logical binding, if it takes place in space and time implies spatio-temporal binding? It's this idea that leads me pretty directly to the view that consciousness is space or some aspect of space (a field perhaps).

Simply remove “unity” from your description and I agree:
“Your final perceiver is a process in the nervous system which you take to bind its parts, if I understand you correctly. You might be right. I think there are plenty of philosophers who think that such things as processes, (or brains, of bits of brains, or whole bodies, or whatever the particular theory is) are natural.”


The problem is that there is nothing 'final' about a process, unless we say the final bit is last element of a process, but then the final perceiver is not the process itself, but only the last bit of it.

Why this insistence on “unities”? Why does the insistence on unities seem so essential to you?


Simply because unity seems like an essential feature of consciousness. It's a pretty mainstream view, by the way, so I'm not being weird, or at least I'm being no weirder than a lot of other people.

The visual experience of a tomato has several elements. One patch of red next to another very similar patch of red up until a roughly circular line defines the point at which the green of the background takes over. In order to identify this patch of red as a tomato memories need to be accessed and related to the image. This all has to happen at once to get the single experience/item of knowledge "There's a tomato over there". It all has to come together, not just logically, but also in time and space.

The SEP discusses it at length here There's a lot of disagreement about to what extent consciousness is unified, and in exactly what ways, but most agree that it is unified in some ways. Searle (in Consciousness, 1999) goes on about the unified 'field' of consciousness, and I think it is his greatest insight. Indeed, I think he has all but solved the problem of consciousness. All he has to do is mean 'field' in a non-metaphorical sense and he's there.

Of course, just because lots of philosophers think consciousness is unified doesn't make it true.



Edited by bert1 on 11/02/09 - 03:24 AM

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Posted 11/05/09 - 06:11 AM:
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#36
Arkady wrote:
It doesn't seem as if these percepts are indissolubly bound in the "bringing together". For instance, we can "bind" together a person's visage and their name, but it is possible to be able later to recall their face without recalling their name. (Not that this in any way undermines your point: I'm just making an observation.)

I agree they are not necessarily indissolubly bound together. Indeed it may be the case that the logical binding takes place “on the fly” each time the various sets of data are accessed – a bit like the sound track of a film being stored in a different location to the image track, and the two being brought into synchrony only if and when the movie is played.
bert1 wrote:
If it is a process, in what sense is it bound?

A process is simply a sequence of related events. The binding that takes place can be viewed as a sequence of events (the events that lead to binding), but I am not suggesting that the binding process is itself somehow “bound”, so I’m not sure where your question comes from?
reincarnated wrote:
By “our” or “us” (in this context) I mean elements or entities that we assume reside (spatio-temporally) within the physical entity that we refer to as our body.
bert1 wrote:
You've used the words you are defining in your definition! (At least, 'we' is sufficiently close in meaning to 'us' to fall foul of circular definition).

reincarnated wrote:
By “we” (in this context) I mean “the processes that are used by us”.
bert1 wrote:
Again, now I just want to know what you mean by 'us'.

You have a good point. Let me reword to remove the apparent circularity:
By “our” or “us” (in this context) I mean the elements or entities that reside (spatio-temporally) within the physical entity that is referred to as the body.
By “we” (in this context) I mean “the processes that are used by us”. (see above for meaning of “us”).
bert1 wrote:
I certainly am hung up on the unity thing. I do regard it as indispensable. And I think you are committed to it too. You are committed to binding as an essential aspect of phenomenal experience (as I understand you so far). To my mind binding implies unity. A bound thing is one thing with several elements related together at once.

Something that is created by binding together a set of disparate elements is not a genuine unity in the strong sense in which I believe you mean it – it only has the appearance of unity. It’s an abstraction of unity, constructed from components which are quite separate. If this is what you mean by unity (something created by binding together disparate components) then I have no problem with your concept of unity, but I personally wouldn’t call that a unity (only an appearance of unity).
bert1 wrote:
The reason I was so insistent for you to clarify that binding takes place in space and time was to show that the unity implied in binding was a real spatio-temporal something. Do you agree that logical binding, if it takes place in space and time implies spatio-temporal binding? It's this idea that leads me pretty directly to the view that consciousness is space or some aspect of space (a field perhaps).

Yes, I agree that binding which takes place in space and time implies spatio-temporal binding (I don’t see how one could deny such a thing). But why does this imply that consciousness “is space”? One could equally argue (on this basis) that consciousness “is time”…
bert1 wrote:
The problem is that there is nothing 'final' about a process, unless we say the final bit is last element of a process, but then the final perceiver is not the process itself, but only the last bit of it.

To me, final perceiver here refers to “final” in a logical or hierarchical sense, not in a temporal sense, and does not refer to a final process or a final part of a process, but rather to the centre of narrative gravity (the self) which is created by the set of reflexive processes, hence I do not see your objection applies. And yes, the perceiver is not the process itself, it is an artifact of the process (the centre of narrative gravity).
bert1 wrote:
Simply because unity seems like an essential feature of consciousness. It's a pretty mainstream view, by the way, so I'm not being weird, or at least I'm being no weirder than a lot of other people.

I agree that the appearance of unity is a contingent feature of human consciousness, but we all know that appearances can be deceptive, and my model explains how this deception is achieved. (By the way - arguing that some belief is justified because it is a mainstream view is a logical fallacy of the type “appeal to authority” or “appeal to popularity” – that the earth is flat was also a mainstream view at one time).
bert1 wrote:
This all has to happen at once to get the single experience/item of knowledge "There's a tomato over there". It all has to come together, not just logically, but also in time and space.

It only has to APPEAR to come together “all at once” in time and space. So long as your subconscious can bring the elements together LOGICALLY, and then FOOL your consciousness into thinking they have come together “all at once” in time and space, then the objective (the appearance of unity) has been achieved. In what sense does this not explain your appearance of unity?
bert1 wrote:
Of course, just because lots of philosophers think consciousness is unified doesn't make it true.

I suspect that many philosophers may not mean “strong” unification in the literal sense that you seem to – but once again, justifying one’s arguments on the basis of the beliefs of others (authority or no authority) is a logical fallacy.

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Posted 11/13/09 - 12:02 AM:
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reincarnated wrote:
bert1 wrote:
If it is a process, in what sense is it bound?


A process is simply a sequence of related events. The binding that takes place can be viewed as a sequence of events (the events that lead to binding), but I am not suggesting that the binding process is itself somehow “bound”, so I’m not sure where your question comes from?


I think your use of the word 'related' implies binding. For me, anything which is related is bound together by the relations. So if you say the process is a sequence of related events which are not bound, I take this as problematic.

Something that is created by binding together a set of disparate elements is not a genuine unity in the strong sense in which I believe you mean it – it only has the appearance of unity. It’s an abstraction of unity, constructed from components which are quite separate. If this is what you mean by unity (something created by binding together disparate components) then I have no problem with your concept of unity, but I personally wouldn’t call that a unity (only an appearance of unity).


OK, I think we can agree on that. That kind of unity is what I refer to as 'weak' unity. However, you say it is an appearance of unity. I agree, but to my mind that implies that there is something it is an appearance of unity to, and that thing must be a strong unity, because it confers its unity on the original disparate elements. So we have a strong unity creating a weak unity. I know you don't make that step, but to me it is a necessary step, because otherwise even the weak unity has no basis if all we have to start with is completely separate components.

Yes, I agree that binding which takes place in space and time implies spatio-temporal binding (I don’t see how one could deny such a thing). But why does this imply that consciousness “is space”? One could equally argue (on this basis) that consciousness “is time”…


My reasoning is this: Conscious relates (binds) its contents without destroying them. Dualism is false, so consciousness must be some physical thing. Space is the only physical thing which binds and relates its contents without destroying them. Therefore consciousness is space.

Time cannot perform this function, because binding is simultaneous binding. Simultaneity is the opposite of time, time being generated when one thing happens after another. So if we have awareness of one bit of the the tomato's skin, then forget that, then have the concept of juicyness, then forget that, then have the concept of 'fruit', then forget that, and so on for any conceivable elements of an experience of a tomato, then we will never get the experience of a tomato. Memory clearly plays an important role here. Not all elements of a tomato-experience present themselves simultaneously. So we need the memory to be able to access all the elements simultaneously to get an experience of a tomato.

It only has to APPEAR to come together “all at once” in time and space. So long as your subconscious can bring the elements together LOGICALLY, and then FOOL your consciousness into thinking they have come together “all at once” in time and space, then the objective (the appearance of unity) has been achieved. In what sense does this not explain your appearance of unity?


Because they all come together in consciousness, which is spatio-temporal. They must all come together in consciousness, because consciousness is what they all appear to. As far as brute experience is concerned, the appearance-reality distinction is not applicable.

...justifying one’s arguments on the basis of the beliefs of others (authority or no authority) is a logical fallacy.


Absolutely. I didn't mean it as a justification of my views. I just got the impression that you thought my views on unity were eccentric and that you might be tempted to dismiss them on those grounds, which would be just as unreasonable as an argument from authority. I sought to counter this possibility with an appeal to authority.

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Posted 11/14/09 - 01:38 AM:
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#38
bert1 wrote:
If it is a process, in what sense is it bound?
reincarnated wrote:
A process is simply a sequence of related events. The binding that takes place can be viewed as a sequence of events (the events that lead to binding), but I am not suggesting that the binding process is itself somehow “bound”, so I’m not sure where your question comes from?
bert1 wrote:
I think your use of the word 'related' implies binding. For me, anything which is related is bound together by the relations. So if you say the process is a sequence of related events which are not bound, I take this as problematic.

Then you have just answered your original question. If you wish to designate all processes “bound” simply because they relate events I have no problem with you doing that. Where is the problem?
bert1 wrote:
OK, I think we can agree on that. That kind of unity is what I refer to as 'weak' unity. However, you say it is an appearance of unity. I agree, but to my mind that implies that there is something it is an appearance of unity to, and that thing must be a strong unity, because it confers its unity on the original disparate elements. So we have a strong unity creating a weak unity. I know you don't make that step, but to me it is a necessary step, because otherwise even the weak unity has no basis if all we have to start with is completely separate components.

How does this follow? Just because some X looks like some Y, does not entail that some Y exists. You will need to explain why you think it is a necessary step (because to me this seems like your subjective opinion rather than something which is logically necessary).
bert1 wrote:
My reasoning is this: Conscious relates (binds) its contents without destroying them.

Consciousness does not relate (bind) its contents (this would be circular – the binding problem of consciousness is solved by conscious binding???) – rather consciousness is a reflexive process which binds together certain events.
bert1 wrote:
Dualism is false, so consciousness must be some physical thing.

Physicalism does not entail that all things are physical – only that all things supervene on the physical. Hence your argument fails. If all things are physical, where actually is the physical embodiment of the fictional character Sherlock Holmes in the story The Hound of the Baskervilles?
bert1 wrote:
Space is the only physical thing which binds and relates its contents without destroying them. Therefore consciousness is space.

How does space bind and relate its contents? Could you explain the mechanism?

How do you conclude that space is the ONLY physical thing which binds together and relates its contents without destroying them, when you have already concluded that consciousness ALSO does the same thing? (This is like arguing: A exists, B exists, therefore A = B)

A process also binds and relates its contents without destroying them – therefore consciousness could be a process.

(Alternatively, using your argument – we conclude that all processes are space. Why? Because a process relates its contents without destroying them, a process must be a physical thing, the only physical thing that binds and relates contents without destroying them is space, hence all processes are space) shaking head
bert1 wrote:
Time cannot perform this function, because binding is simultaneous binding.

How does this follow? On what basis do you claim binding is simultaneous binding?
bert1 wrote:
So we need the memory to be able to access all the elements simultaneously to get an experience of a tomato.

Why must it be simultaneous? The subconscious merely needs to tell the conscious that these elements have been accessed simultaneously for the conscious to believe in the simultaneous existence of elements – it does not actually need to be simultaneous.
bert1 wrote:
Because they all come together in consciousness, which is spatio-temporal. They must all come together in consciousness, because consciousness is what they all appear to. As far as brute experience is concerned, the appearance-reality distinction is not applicable.

It does not follow that all elements must come together “all at once” within consciousness in a spatio-temporal sense - any more than they need to come together "all in one place" (the pineal gland perhaps?). It only requires that the conscious mind merely believes they have come together “all at once, and all in one place”.


Edited by reincarnated on 11/14/09 - 07:01 AM

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bert1
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Posted 11/16/09 - 12:43 AM:
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#39
reincarnated wrote:
Then you have just answered your original question. If you wish to designate all processes “bound” simply because they relate events I have no problem with you doing that. Where is the problem?


But you won't tell me what it is about a process that justifies calling it a (i.e. singular) process. What do all the elements in the process have in common which justifies calling that collection of elements one thing, namely, the process? Whatever it is which binds together the elements of the process is, I suggest, the same thing that binds together what you think is bound together by the process.

reincarnated wrote:
bert1 wrote:

OK, I think we can agree on that. That kind of unity is what I refer to as 'weak' unity. However, you say it is an appearance of unity. I agree, but to my mind that implies that there is something it is an appearance of unity to, and that thing must be a strong unity, because it confers its unity on the original disparate elements. So we have a strong unity creating a weak unity. I know you don't make that step, but to me it is a necessary step, because otherwise even the weak unity has no basis if all we have to start with is completely separate components.


How does this follow? Just because some X looks like some Y, does not entail that some Y exists.


If someone looks at some separate events and calls them a process, I think it does follow that the looker is a strong unity. The weak unity must come from somewhere, even if it is only an appearance. And it cannot come from something that isn't a unity, because something that has no unity of its own cannot unify anything else.

Consciousness does not relate (bind) its contents (this would be circular – the binding problem of consciousness is solved by conscious binding???) – rather consciousness is a reflexive process which binds together certain events.


The binding problem of consciousness is solved, in my view, if consciousness is a spatially extended continuum. Then there is one place where it all comes together. See below my answer to your question about mechanism.

Physicalism does not entail that all things are physical – only that all things supervene on the physical. Hence your argument fails.


Supervenient 'entities' always consists of relations between and behaviours of differentiated bits of physical stuff, e.g. games of chess, digestion, Sherlock Holmes. Therefore supervenient entities exist as properties of that-which-relates the differentiated stuff, namely space. Which bits of stuff get considered as related together depends on the intentions of consciousness-space.

To say that supervenient 'entities' or properties are not physical seems very dualistic to me. And supervenience by itself does not explain what these entities are, it only states that they are totally dependent on the physical. We need an extra theory to explain the ontology of supervenient entities, it seems to me.

If all things are physical, where actually is the physical embodiment of the fictional character Sherlock Holmes in the story The Hound of the Baskervilles?


That's a good question, and I'm not sure exactly of the answer. Perhaps the answer is that Sherlock Holmes is no more than an amalgam of memories (image of deerstalker hat, concept of detective, etc) in the reader which are related together by the conscious intention of the reader. The instructions for which images and concepts to access and bind are in the pages of the book. Sherlock Holmes is whatever the physical basis of these memories are, combined with the space that relates them simultaneously according to its intention.

How does space bind and relate its contents? Could you explain the mechanism?


The point is that there is no mechanism. If there were a mechanism, it would have to consist of different parts which then execute a process which takes time to complete. Consciousness is exactly that which has no parts, is not a process, and takes zero time to relate its contents, which is how binding/relation/unification is possible. EDIT: Sorry, I haven't quite given you the answer you want. Although there is no mechanism, space is nevertheless connected to, and capable of, relating its contents because it is substantially identical with them, just as the substance of plasticine is substantially identical with the model of the man it is made into.

How do you conclude that space is the ONLY physical thing which binds together and relates its contents without destroying them, when you have already concluded that consciousness ALSO does the same thing? (This is like arguing: A exists, B exists, therefore A = B)


Space is exhaustive. There cannot be any continuous relating medium other than space, because there is no room for it. Therefore if there is, apparently, another continuous relating medium, then it must be identical with space, assuming that dualism is false. At some level or another, we have to bridge the gap between the mental and the physical, and say one is the other. Otherwise we have dualism. The level of reality at which we can do this is at the level of space, the continuum.

A process also binds and relates its contents without destroying them – therefore consciousness could be a process.


A process can only relate things by appeal to that which also relates the process, namely consciousness-space. Without appeal to the continuum, a process is incapable of relating anything, and therefore cannot be consciousness.

(Alternatively, using your argument – we conclude that all processes are space. Why? Because a process relates its contents without destroying them, a process must be a physical thing, the only physical thing that binds and relates contents without destroying them is space, hence all processes are space) shaking head


We've got to the head-shaking stage! We can stop if you like. I've found the dialogue instructive so far, but it has gone on for a while. Maybe a break is in order. smiling face

How does this follow? On what basis do you claim binding is simultaneous binding?


It just seems a necessary part of the concept of binding. The only way for temporally separated events to be bound is through memory, but then its the memories that are simultaneously bound, not the events themselves.

Why must it be simultaneous? The subconscious merely needs to tell the conscious that these elements have been accessed simultaneously for the conscious to believe in the simultaneous existence of elements – it does not actually need to be simultaneous.


But if that's what the subconscious does, hasn't it gathered up all the elements and presented them to consciousness all in one go? If not, how does consciousness get the experience of a tomato, which necessarily involves all these things? Merely believing they have all come together at once is insufficient for an experience of a tomato, if indeed the belief that they have all come together at once is possible without them all coming together at once. Even the formation of the belief might involve the binding of all the elements of that belief. If the subconscious tells the conscious they have all arrived at once, but it doesn't give them to consciousness all at once, consciousness will never experience a tomato, no matter how convincingly the subconscious argues that it has.



Edited by bert1 on 11/16/09 - 01:11 AM

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Posted 11/16/09 - 04:17 AM:
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#40
bert1 wrote:
But you won't tell me what it is about a process that justifies calling it a (i.e. singular) process. What do all the elements in the process have in common which justifies calling that collection of elements one thing, namely, the process? Whatever it is which binds together the elements of the process is, I suggest, the same thing that binds together what you think is bound together by the process.

What makes you think I won’t tell you? Did you ask me to explain this before now?

A process is simply a series of actions, changes, or functions which bring about a particular result. Depending on how one defines “the result”, one can usually logically break down any given process into a set of sub-processes. “Process” in this particular context is simply a shorthand way of referring to a specialized group of physical (neuronal) interactions in the brain which bring about the result of self-consciousness. Now, I am not insisting that we call all of these neuronal interactions a single “process” as opposed to a “set of processes”, so your question (as to why its singular rather than plural) doesn’t seem relevant. To me, its not important whether we refer to one process or a set of processes – the principle is the same. The particular property which “binds together” all of the elements into this process (or set of processes) is simply the fact that these elements are (by definition) the ones required for the emergence of self-consciousness – in other words the process-elements are bound together definitionally – IF the elements contribute to the emergence of self-consciousness THEN they are deemed part of the process (or set of processes) which lead to the emergence of self-consciousness. BUT this “logical/definitional binding of elements into a process(es)” is NOT the same concept of binding as the binding (or integration) of multiple perceptual inputs to produce an apparently (more or less) unified sensation of phenomenal experience (which is the end result of the process(es) referred to above).
bert1 wrote:
If someone looks at some separate events and calls them a process, I think it does follow that the looker is a strong unity.

Sorry, but I don’t see this at all. The mere fact that an observer draws a circle around a set of events and calls the set a process means nothing other than the observer has drawn a circle around a set of events and called them a process. The concept “unity” seems to add nothing here.
bert1 wrote:
something that has no unity of its own cannot unify anything else.

Which law of logic or physics is this? I’ve never seen it before. Perhaps this is Bert’s Law of Unification?
bert1 wrote:
To say that supervenient 'entities' or properties are not physical seems very dualistic to me.

Only because you define physicalism as “everything is physical”. But I don’t. Check the SEP:
SEP wrote:
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
bert1 wrote:
We need an extra theory to explain the ontology of supervenient entities, it seems to me.

Indeed we do – but this in itself does not contradict physicalism. The thesis of physicalism only says that everything is supervenient on the physical, it doesn’t say HOW this supervenience arises.
bert1 wrote:
The point is that there is no mechanism. If there were a mechanism, it would have to consist of different parts which then execute a process which takes time to complete. Consciousness is exactly that which has no parts, is not a process, and takes zero time to relate its contents, which is how binding/relation/unification is possible.

What makes you think the binding takes “zero time” to do its job, or that “zero time” is necessary?
bert1 wrote:
Although there is no mechanism, space is nevertheless connected to, and capable of, relating its contents because it is substantially identical with them, just as the substance of plasticine is substantially identical with the model of the man it is made into. Space is exhaustive. There cannot be any continuous relating medium other than space, because there is no room for it. Therefore if there is, apparently, another continuous relating medium, then it must be identical with space, assuming that dualism is false. At some level or another, we have to bridge the gap between the mental and the physical, and say one is the other. Otherwise we have dualism. The level of reality at which we can do this is at the level of space, the continuum.

Sorry, this is mumbo jumbo to me.
bert1 wrote:
A process can only relate things by appeal to that which also relates the process, namely consciousness-space. Without appeal to the continuum, a process is incapable of relating anything, and therefore cannot be consciousness.

The elements of a process are related by definition (otherwise they wouldn’t be part of the process) – no “consciousness-space” or “continuum” is needed to achieve this relationship.
bert1 wrote:
But if that's what the subconscious does, hasn't it gathered up all the elements and presented them to consciousness all in one go?

Not necessarily – you seem to want to keep returning to this idea of simultaneity. Why?
bert1 wrote:
If not, how does consciousness get the experience of a tomato, which necessarily involves all these things? Merely believing they have all come together at once is insufficient for an experience of a tomato

How do you know this? What you THINK that you experience is what your brain tells you that you are experiencing – one only needs to study a few optical illusions to know that the brain is very good at “telling itself” that it is seeing something very different to what is actually out there in the real world. I see no problem at all in believing that the brain can tell itself that it is experiencing a tomato when the individual percepts that go together to make up this experience are presented and processed at (slightly) different times and places in the brain.
bert1 wrote:
If the subconscious tells the conscious they have all arrived at once, but it doesn't give them to consciousness all at once, consciousness will never experience a tomato, no matter how convincingly the subconscious argues that it has.

Again, I suggest you study some optical illusions. They may give you some insight into how easily the brain plays tricks on consciousness. Your intuition of simultaneity comes from, I suggest, the fact that you are still clinging to the Cartesian Theatre model of consciousness – that there is “some unique time and place” where it all comes together (for the benefit of the “observer”). Most contemporary theories of consciousness reject this requirement as being unnecessary.

crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
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