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The basic premise of existentialism is false

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The basic premise of existentialism is false

Berkeley's Ghost
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Posted 07/30/08 - 08:45 AM:	#21
crow wrote: This may be true, but it is not what Sartre says. Perhaps, but perhaps there is sense in which all mankind’s essence is born from our personal essence. It has been a long time since I read Being and Nothingness, and when I did I was still learning the ropes of philosophy so I missed more of what he said then I would like. So I will not try to speak for Sartre here, only speak for myself and maybe run parallel to him if our roads run similar. But if ones own essence is created by stream of ones choices and existence, then so too is ones view of all mankind’s essence effected by this tapestry of choices. Because we can not know others without first passing through the essence of the self, the self being the only human consciousness which is laid open before us. The self’s consciousness and the self’s essence is the only subject out of the throng of individual which we can know. So if we wish to say anything of the essences of others then we have only our own essence to use as a foundation for that proclamation and thus the essence of the other is tainted or formed from the essence of the self. crow wrote: We cannot transcend our human condition and become free spirits or pure being, so our freedom can never be infinite. I don't think the question ever comes to physical freedom. The fact that we are limited as consciousness embodied is not a problem for existentialism because I don't believe any would deny the reality of such limitations. What is important is internal freedom, the freedom of thought and consciousness. When we speak of choices we are not casting the light on the physical action which those choices entail, rather we are looking at the internal confrontation of a crossroads within the consciousness. And in this realm it is not the practical freedom that matters, as enkidu said, it is the potential freedom, the possibility which is important. The heart of the matter is that in spite of any limitations, in the face of any determining factors, we still, in the confines of our consciousness we still will (determinaly willed or not) to choose. Also I asked what Sartre mean by "man is condemned to be free" more as a rhetorical question, since I somewhat try to answer it after. I have a bad habit of adding pointless rhetorical flair to whatever I say, just try to ignore it.
Faith which does not doubt is dead faith.-Miguel de Unamuno Ceiling Cat is watching you post.

Crow
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Posted 07/30/08 - 03:30 PM:	#22
enkidu wrote: First, let's precise that we are talking about the freedom of choice here, not the freedom of action, our acts are certainly limited by our embodiement, but I don't see how our choices are. Our choices may be limited by our history, but this history can be critically assessed and transcended in an infinity of ways (however this is not a phenomenological approach and is of no immediate relevance with regard to existentialism). Secondly something embedded can perfectly be infinite, there is an infinity of numbers between 0 and 1, all however are embedded in [0,1]. Our freedom of choice comes from our ability to reflect recurrently about the world and our self. If you think my choices are finite, you agree that this finite set of choices can be explicited, enumerated, provide me with such an enumeration, and I'll still be able to make another choice, proving that the set of choices was not all that there was to my freedom. My freedom of choice is infinite in the sense that there is no such enumeration and that there can't be one. A choice which you know cannot be acted upon is not truely a choice. It is just a wishful thought. If you know in advance that 'X' is impossible, you also know that it is not one of your available choices. It may be true that you can come up with a large number of fantasy "choices", but if you know they cannot be actualized, how could you ever use them to create yourself or all mankind as Sartre would have it? I think that Sartre would want to equate freedom with action in the world.
The only thing I know for sure is that I don't know.

Crow
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Posted 07/30/08 - 04:06 PM:	#23
Berkeley's Ghost wrote: When we speak of choices we are not casting the light on the physical action which those choices entail, rather we are looking at the internal confrontation of a crossroads within the consciousness. And in this realm it is not the practical freedom that matters, as enkidu said, it is the potential freedom, the possibility which is important. The heart of the matter is that in spite of any limitations, in the face of any determining factors, we still, in the confines of our consciousness we still will (determinaly willed or not) to choose. . You may be getting tired of me only replying with Sartre quotes. But if you don't agree with Sartre's quotes, you don't agree with Sartre's philosophy (as I do not). But anyway, here's another (again from the book I previously mentioned): "The doctrine I am presenting is the very opposite of quietism, since it declares, "There is no reality except in action." Moreover, it goes further, since it adds, "Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfils himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life." " And here's another: "You see that it cannot be taken for a philosophy of quietism, since it defines man in terms of action; nor for a pessimistic description of man-- there is no doctrine more optimistic, since man's destiny is within himself; nor for an attempt to discourage man from acting, since it tells him that the only hope is in his acting and that action is the only thing that enables a man to live. Consequently, we are dealing here with an ethics of action and involvement."
The only thing I know for sure is that I don't know.

Haribol Pd
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Posted 07/30/08 - 06:06 PM:	#24
In fact no premises can be complete, and all of them are time bound and beyond time line they can not go. Once it was a very great literary theories had indeed great impacts, but no impacts can endure the course of time. We have several schools of literautre down the strait of history but see all of them have evaporated. Now no longer romanticism have strong grips on us, nor neoclassicism. Now we all are obsessed with magic realism and it too suffers limitations and cannot go prolongation.

Berkeley's Ghost
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Posted 07/30/08 - 09:37 PM:	#25
Again I don't see why this physical determinalism can not be reconciled with the heart of existentialism for the reasons I have stated earlier. Realizing in this case as well that existentialism is a abstract label we have constructed to encompass a wide range of philosophical views, espoused by a equally wide range of individuals. Sartre was certainly one of the more well known philosophers of those who have the dubious honor of being label existentialist but one can no more claim that he is the absolute representative of all existentialists then one could claim that Lord Byron is an absolute representative of all romantic poets. After all, much of the early portions of the Myth of Sisyphus are taken up by Camus criticisms of other philosophers we also label as existentialists. Philosophy itself is struck to its core with a inherit subjectivity to each philosopher, with each unique individual birthing from the dialog of his consciousness a philosophy which is stamped with his own essence. But if this is primarily a criticism of Sartre then I will do my best to defend him despite my manifold disagreements with him (as I mentioned previously). I realize the point you are making but I still think Sartre claim holds within the premises he lays out. The heart of his thesis rests on choices, to say man is condemned to be free is also to say that man is condemned to choose, these choices may be limited by the pressing barriers of the physical, but all times there is still a choice being made and as long as a choice is made then man is free within the limits of his own world. If I may be a hypocrite and use an example from another philosopher for a second. The view of freedom taken by Sartre can be found somewhat in Camus short story that I'm sure all of you read in high school, The Guest. If you look at the short story with out thinking of Camus concepts of the Absurd, then it presents well the story of a man being condemned to be free. Throughout the story Daru is attempting to shun the responsibility of choosing, of acting. His final delegation of responsibility however is shown to be as much an choice as any of the other options he was presented with. Daru choose to act by giving prisoner the option to go to prison or to escape. He was never able to avoid making a choice on the matter. I believe Sartre would have seen Daru as a man utterly condemned to freedom, condemned to choose as he willed. The last determinalistic problem which has to be confronted is that of the determined choice. That one is presented with choices but the option you will choose already decided by a multiplicity of determinalistic pressures. I don't think Sartre would have given much thought to this problem given his penchant for giving greater weight to mans perceptions of reality, rather then a more abstract scientific perspective of unperceived pressures. It only matters to Sartre that there is something which is presenting itself to man as a choice, whether or not such a presentation is illusionary or not most likely does not matter to him. Abstract concept do not matter if they do not, or can not, be absorbed into the way man experiences reality. One only has to look at Being and Nothingness to see that Sartre is not approaching reality from the same path as the throngs of scientific materialists who dominate philosophy today. For example, his use of anguish as mans the perception of his own freedom of choice. It is telling that rather then look outward to find some kind of external support for mans freedom (which other philosophers have shown can be done at least somewhat successfully) he points inward towards a feeling within man to be his support. He chooses to forgo any material proof of his statement at first, and instead he uses the emotions that most modern philosophers try to suppress in order to make purely logical theories. Yet I am not the best man to be the devils advocate for Sartre here, because as I already mentioned I have not read him in years. So sorry if I make no sense, though on further reflection, if I make no sense it is most likely just because of me and has nothing to do with my knowledge of Sartre or lack there of.
Faith which does not doubt is dead faith.-Miguel de Unamuno Ceiling Cat is watching you post.

Crow
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Posted 08/01/08 - 06:42 AM:	#26
Please excuse me for not just responding with Sartre quotes. I think the main problem with the brand of philosophy held by Sartre, Heidegger, and others of their ilk is that they start from an artifically abstract notion of the concept of Being. They see Being as being prior to its context and environment and, therefore, can properly be conceived abstractly as an independent purity... as a nothingness, a revealedness, as a primal emptiness, etc . I think that this existentialist premise is false. I hold that 'being' is a brain construction for the experience of its consciousness just as surely as "red" is a brain construction for the experience of its consciousness. Our experience of 'being' and 'red' is not prior to conscious, and consciousness is not prior to brain. Only a naive realist would take his mind-created experience of 'red' as a primal element of reality; only a naive realist would take his mind-generated experience of 'being' as a primal element of reality. A philosophy which has such an error as its basic premise is metaphysically false.
The only thing I know for sure is that I don't know.

yffer
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Posted 08/02/08 - 04:39 AM:	#27
Crow wrote: Our experience of 'being' and 'red' is not prior to conscious, and consciousness is not prior to brain. Only a naive realist would take his mind-created experience of 'red' as a primal element of reality; only a naive realist would take his mind-generated experience of 'being' as a primal element of reality. I hold that 'being' is a brain construction for the experience of its consciousness just as surely as "red" is a brain construction for the experience of its consciousness. Only a naïve realist would hold that her/his (mind/consciousness created experience of) brain (or the idea of brain) is a primal element of reality. (whatever that means). Edited by yffer on 08/02/08 - 04:55 AM

unenlightened
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Posted 08/02/08 - 09:03 AM:	#28
Crow wrote: I hold that 'being' is a brain construction for the experience of its consciousness ... ' Brain construction' - is that a metaphor for thought? It seems from this that you must agree that 'being' is unconstrained, since it is a constructed idea. Is that not exactly what the existentialists are getting at? We invent/construct ourselves as identities and as 'human nature' and assign meaning to our lives. What is a brain construction if it is not an abstraction, an emptiness, a pattern?
The observer is the observed. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Crow
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Posted 08/03/08 - 07:30 AM:	#29
Well, if it is true that the existentialists are limiting their claims to the subjective, then my objections may not be entirely justified. My orientation to philosophy is that it is the Socratic search for truth. For me, this means attempting to go beyond the limited representations of our biologically determined senses and our conditioned thoughts, to go beyond the limitations of our subjectivity. Perhaps when I am reading the existentialists. I am assuming that they share this same orientation, and I project it upon my reading of them. To be fair, I have not had the interest or patience to give _Being and Time_ or _Being and Nothingness_ more than a cursory review. I find their vague, ambiguous style to be somewhat impenetrable. I still have an objection to using the term "unlimited freedom" in reference to the human condition (if the existentialists actually do that). I see the human being as phenotype which has its specific characteristics as a result of its success in facilitating the reproduction of the genotype. Sensations are imposed upon us which motivate specific behavioral tendencies. Such motivations steming from our physiology and social conditioning are imposed and not objectively free. However, people can still experience this imposed motivation as being self-chosen, if they identify with the motivation and experience it as a freely-chosen aspect of the self. The subjective feeling of freedom that results from identification is a form of unconscious self-deception. Perhaps an appropriate metaphor for the human condition is found in Camus's "Myth of Sisyphus". He is condemned to the meaningless suffering of rolling a heavy rock up a hill. Camus describes him as choosing to bear this suffering with nobility, and as enjoying what pleasures he can see while heading back down the hill to start the rock up again. He could have chosen to bear his burden with constant complaining, or with self -deception such as believing his reward in heaven will be the greater for each roll of the rock up the hill. He has great choice in how he will choose to bear his burden, perhaps even an unlimited number of choices. But his total situation can hardly be taken as a condition of unlimited freedom. Taken as a totality, his sphere for the exercise of freedom is quite small. And so it is with the human condition which, taken as a whole, cannot be characterized as a domain of unlimited freedom. Edited by Crow on 08/03/08 - 07:34 AM
The only thing I know for sure is that I don't know.

yffer
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Posted 08/03/08 - 08:45 AM:	#30
Crow wrote: The subjective feeling of freedom that results from identification is a form of unconscious self-deception. If the sense of being somebody is a mind construct, an idea, freedom is in the recognition of that. That you are rolling a heavy rock up a hill is not self deception if there is no self to deceive. You can’t deceive an idea. If the sense of self is a mental construct so is the dichotomy of freedom and non-freedom applied to it. The either-or is neither-nor if there is no self.

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