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The atom and the I
longfun
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Posted 11/03/09 - 07:46 AM:
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#11
Tobias wrote:
I'd like to think about the idea of the atom and where it came from. I am not suggesting to delve into the atom from the persepctive of natural science. The natural sciences have greatly advanced our understanding of the elemental particles that make up the physical universe, yet I am sure many more discoveries will follow. What I like to do is examine the idea of an elemental particle, a particle that is itself individable (atomos) and fulfills the role of the building block of the universe.


If you can do math and start dividing numbers, you'll soon meet the biggest common divider...if you look at common dividers you will notice that it has the ability to divide 1 by a commonality without really calculating it
From that point the concept becomes a logical observation supported by math

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exel+two
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Posted 11/03/09 - 02:15 PM:
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Quick question: Why are you so convinced of the existence of atoms? I mean is not this just empty speculation once you consider the other half of this sub-category of forums (epistemology) and the fact that science (meaning evidentialism and foundationalism) as the only way to really understand this universe doesn't stand up to thirty seconds of intellectual scrutiny?
To Mega Therion
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Posted 11/03/09 - 03:41 PM:
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Well, I don't know how we can time postings on the forum, but if you could reproduce those thrity seconds' worth of scrutiny?
Tobias
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Posted 11/04/09 - 12:38 AM:
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Ahh thanks for the reactions. Hmm, I know the concept of atom was a reaction to the Eleans. But that just replaces the question. The Eleans posited reality as a unity, indivisible, unchangeable, always the same. all change was mere illusion. What can have triggered such an idea? I know they never talked about the self, let alone the self as underpinning their idea of the cosmos. I wonder though if the self is not the implicit model on which they based metaphysical outlook. There is never anything in reality that does not change, everything I see gives me the idea of a jumbled collection of things. Sure there are relations, but nothing 'indivisible', unchangeable etc. The only constant im the flux is 'me'. I am the unifier of this change of perception without me needing to be unified.

It took Descartes, Kant etc. to articulate this 'I' while inconspicuous in Greek times. In fact the subject is so absent in Greek philosophy that it becomes puzzling to modern eyes. Yet I wonder if it is not essentially self knowledge too, albeit implicitly onto which they built their categories, categories which have subsequently been the blue print for the rest of Western philosophy.

Edited by Caldwell on 11/04/09 - 02:23 AM. Reason: Spelling

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makerowner
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Posted 11/04/09 - 10:30 AM:
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I was reading Beyond Good and Evil yesterday and came across a relevant passage (§12):

As for materialistic atomism, it is one of the best refuted theories there are, and in Europe perhaps no one in the learned world is now so unscholarly as to attach serious significance to it for convenient household use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression) thanks chiefly to the Dalmatian Boscovich and the Pole Copernicus have been the greatest and most successful opponents of visual evidence so far. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last part of the earth that "stood fast" - the belief in substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum and particle-atom; it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has been gained on earth so far.

One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war unto death, against the "atomistic need" which still leads a dangerous afterlife in places where no one suspects it, just like the more celebrated "metaphysical need": one must also, first of all, give the finishing stroke to that other and more calamitous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the soul atomism. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" at the same time, and thus to renounce one of the most ancient and venerable hypotheses - as happens frequently to clumsy naturalists who can hardly touch on "the soul" without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul as subjective multiplicity," and ''soul as social structure of the drives and affects want henceforth to have citizens' rights in science. When the new psychologist puts an end to the superstitions which have so far flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he practically exiles himself into a new desert and a new suspicion - it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he also concerns himself to invention - and - who knows? - perhaps to discovery.


There are many passages in Nietzsche dealing with the desire to deny change that might be of interest to you, particularly in Twilight of the Idols, if I remember correctly. I'm rereading all of his later works at the moment, so I can make a note of these passages for you as I come across them.

Tobias wrote:
I wonder though if the self is not the implicit model on which they based metaphysical outlook.


I'd be very skeptical of any claim along the lines of: "there must have been some such thing as 'the self' for the Greeks, even though they never talked about it". That the absence is puzzling to modern eyes indicates only how different our eyes are from theirs.

For philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know.
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Posted 11/04/09 - 11:37 AM:
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Tobias wrote:
Ahh thanks for the reactions. Hmm, I know the concept of atom was a reaction to the Eleans. But that just replaces the question. The Eleans posited reality as a unity, indivisible, unchangeable, always the same. all change was mere illusion. What can have triggered such an idea? I know they never talked about the self, let alone the self as underpinning their idea of the cosmos. I wonder though if the self is not the implicit model on which they based metaphysical outlook. There is never anything in reality that does not change, everything I see gives me the idea of a jumbled collection of things. Sure there are relations, but nothing 'indivisible', unchangeable etc. The only constant im the flux is 'me'. I am the unifier of this change of perception without me needing to be unified.
The Eleans were what might today be categorized as ‘absolute or objective idealists’. For them, that which is real, and which underlies the appearance of things, does not reside within the things themselves – as the atomists believed, but the other way around. That is to say, that things, given that they partake of only a relative (apparent) existence reside within the one absolute, independent and immutable entity. Things then may be likened to a virtual continuum of ideas residing with in a universal mind, and while its contents (all relative entities) are subject to perpetual change, the receptacle itself (the Absolute entity) is forever immutable.

It took Descartes, Kant etc. to articulate this 'I' while inconspicuous in Greek times. In fact the subject is so absent in Greek philosophy that it becomes puzzling to modern eyes. Yet I wonder if it is not essentially self knowledge too, albeit implicitly onto which they built their categories, categories which have subsequently been the blue print for the rest of Western philosophy.
It is hardly surprising since everyone who truly comes to know themselves discovers that the ‘I’ is merely an illusion.

It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.
To Mega Therion
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Posted 11/04/09 - 02:40 PM:
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Tobias wrote:
Ahh thanks for the reactions. Hmm, I know the concept of atom was a reaction to the Eleans. But that just replaces the question. The Eleans posited reality as a unity, indivisible, unchangeable, always the same. all change was mere illusion. What can have triggered such an idea? I know they never talked about the self, let alone the self as underpinning their idea of the cosmos. I wonder though if the self is not the implicit model on which they based metaphysical outlook. There is never anything in reality that does not change, everything I see gives me the idea of a jumbled collection of things. Sure there are relations, but nothing 'indivisible', unchangeable etc. The only constant im the flux is 'me'. I am the unifier of this change of perception without me needing to be unified.

It took Descartes, Kant etc. to articulate this 'I' while inconspicuous in Greek times. In fact the subject is so absent in Greek philosophy that it becomes puzzling to modern eyes. Yet I wonder if it is not essentially self knowledge too, albeit implicitly onto which they built their categories, categories which have subsequently been the blue print for the rest of Western philosophy.


Well, Parmenides had something of a precusor in Xenophanes, who was driven by theological problems. Parmenides I would say was motivated by reflection on the cosmological theories of his predecessors (this seems to be Guthrie's position as well); he was in a sense the first ontologist. If he had a model for his One (and I don't think that's even necessary; after all we treat an object as a one as soon as we name it; Parmenides may well have started from that observation) it would have probably been the material archai of the Ionian cosmologists. Parmenides's own views on consciousness (in the Way of Belief) were actually opposed to any kind of indivisibility of consciousness, taking it as a kind of fiery phenomenon.

The problem with your (rather Kantian) argument for the I is: (1) that the 'I' is never observed (and it is almost certain the Greeks didn't posses the concept as you use it); (2) that it explanatorily redundant. Or do you think there is anything in our experience that could be explained by an ego but not by individual sensations? Before you say 'the unity of consciousness', I would say that the concept is supect. There is a sensation of red, and there is a certain tactile sensation corresponding to the tomato, but of what exactly are you talking when you claim these two are in some sort of unity?

Jehu wrote:
The Eleans were what might today be categorized as ‘absolute or objective idealists’. For them, that which is real, and which underlies the appearance of things, does not reside within the things themselves – as the atomists believed, but the other way around. That is to say, that things, given that they partake of only a relative (apparent) existence reside within the one absolute, independent and immutable entity. Things then may be likened to a virtual continuum of ideas residing with in a universal mind, and while its contents (all relative entities) are subject to perpetual change, the receptacle itself (the Absolute entity) is forever immutable.


Hm. I take it you characterise Parmenides as an idealist because he held that 'thinking is being'? But I don't think the sentence says anything more than what is thought, exists. Other than that, I would say your interpretation, which when rid of the idealism is the dual-aspect theory I mentioned earlier, is one of the two most likely. A more standard formulation (from SEP) would be that things are One essentially, but many and mutable accidentally.

Edited by To Mega Therion on 11/04/09 - 02:46 PM
Jehu
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Posted 11/04/09 - 06:47 PM:
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To Mega Therion wrote:
Hm. I take it you characterise Parmenides as an idealist because he held that 'thinking is being'? But I don't think the sentence says anything more than what is thought, exists. Other than that, I would say your interpretation, which when rid of the idealism is the dual-aspect theory I mentioned earlier, is one of the two most likely. A more standard formulation (from SEP) would be that things are One essentially, but many and mutable accidentally.

On the contrary, Parmenides held that all things (i.e., mentation, sensations, objects, properties or activities) were existentially One, and differed only in their appearance (essence). He reasoned rightly that the domain of being (existence) was a singular and continuous one; given that there can be no non-being (non-existence) that might act to separate one existent from another.

This one absolute, independent and immutable Being he held to be what is real, and what underlies the appearance of all things; while the things themselves he held to be mere appearances (phenomena). The real (absolute/mind) and the apparent (relative/thought) abide together in an interdependent and complementary relationship, the result of which is neither real nor not real, nor both nor neither.

It is not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye is able to see, that is the true reality.
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Posted 11/04/09 - 07:37 PM:
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The real (absolute/mind) and the apparent (relative/thought) abide together in an interdependent and complementary relationship, the result of which is neither real nor not real, nor both nor neither.

Well, glad that's been cleared up. confused

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

[What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]
wuliheron
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Posted 11/04/09 - 09:35 PM:
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Tobias wrote:
Ahh thanks for the reactions. Hmm, I know the concept of atom was a reaction to the Eleans. But that just replaces the question. The Eleans posited reality as a unity, indivisible, unchangeable, always the same. all change was mere illusion. What can have triggered such an idea? I know they never talked about the self, let alone the self as underpinning their idea of the cosmos. I wonder though if the self is not the implicit model on which they based metaphysical outlook. There is never anything in reality that does not change, everything I see gives me the idea of a jumbled collection of things. Sure there are relations, but nothing 'indivisible', unchangeable etc. The only constant im the flux is 'me'. I am the unifier of this change of perception without me needing to be unified.

It took Descartes, Kant etc. to articulate this 'I' while inconspicuous in Greek times. In fact the subject is so absent in Greek philosophy that it becomes puzzling to modern eyes. Yet I wonder if it is not essentially self knowledge too, albeit implicitly onto which they built their categories, categories which have subsequently been the blue print for the rest of Western philosophy.



The early Greek philosophers were also showmen. They often made a meger living performing for crowds using reductio ad absurdum arguments to humorous effect. Some are also thought to have largely focused on metaphysics as a covert way of criticizing the established Greek religion, something that was punishable by death. Arguments like Parmenides' were quite popular with the crowds until Aristotle's logic swept the civilized world by storm and they moved on to more complex forms of entertainment. However, it provided a living for quite a few people for several hundred years precisely because it does contradict everyday experience.

Parmenides' argument is also diametrically opposed to the first wildly popular Greek philosopher, Heraclitus. His philosophy was that everything is in constant flux. It doesn't take that much imagination to conceive of something the exact opposite of what is already popular, nor is the idea of an indivisible, unchanging, and immortal "reality" exactly unique to the early Greeks. It is common enough among mystics and pantheists around the world.
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