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Subjectivity and Objectivity : Claims to Knowledge
Understanding the real knowledge problem

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Subjectivity and Objectivity : Claims to Knowledge
brainpharte
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Posted 11/04/09 - 09:58 AM:
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#51
reincarnated wrote:

The first sentence is correct (check “Truth” in Wiki). Words are used in language as a representation for their meanings – one can either take the meaning, or take the word as a shortcut to the meaning, but yes its trivially true that the word truth does not convey any additional meaning over and above the meaning of the word truth. So what? It does not follow that “truth” has no meaning, it only follows that “truth” has no meaning over and above the meaning of truth (that’s obvious isn’t it?).

In the sense that they can have meanings which may be different for different people, yes they are ambiguous, but one can remove the ambiguity by defining the relevant criteria.

Why? For two reasons: (1) because in everyday usage, the ambiguity is often not relevant to the context in which the word is being used (when Johnny asks “is it true that there is no school tomorrow?”, we do not answer with “which definition of truth do you mean, Johnny?”) and (2) because for those occasions when the definition is crucial, then once we agree a set of criteria we can usefully use the word as a shortcut.

And replace it with… what? If you want to convey a meaning, you need to use things like words.

Look, I already agreed that people often use knowledge and true without confusion (when, as I noted, the epistemic criteria are tacitly understood and agreed with--as is common within certain groups.) But this is not what the two and a half millennia philosophical tail chasing involving JTB and what "knowledge" and "true" really mean has been--and continues to be--about.

The construal of knowledge and true to be nothing more than stamps of approval certifying that the claim at issue has met whatever particular epistemic criteria the speaker has deemed necessary and sufficient for that claim would end the two and a half millennia philosophical tail chasing about what knowledge and true really mean. Thus knowledge and true have no impenetrable or mystifying philosophical import. (And there certainly is no need for anything remotely resembling Platonic Forms of Knowledge and Truth, or muddled quests for the mystified eternally elusive holy grail of real Truth and Knowledge.)

If anyone insists that there is something more to Real "truth" and "knowledge" than that the claim at issue has met whatever epistemic criteria they've deemed necessary and sufficient for that claim, then they need to explain what this more consists in and how it is possible to determine whether or not it Really obtains.

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
reincarnated
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Posted 11/04/09 - 10:18 AM:
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#52
brainpharte wrote:
Look, I already agreed that people often use knowledge and true without confusion (when, as I noted, the epistemic criteria are tacitly understood and agreed with--as is common within certain groups.) But this is not what the two and a half millennia philosophical tail chasing involving JTB and what "knowledge" and "true" really mean has been--and continues to be--about.

I think you are conflating two issues here - the meaning of truth, and the meaning of knowledge. The two overlap to some extent (since knowledge entails truth), but ultimately these things are quite different.

brainpharte wrote:
The construal of knowledge and true to be nothing more than stamps of approval certifying that the claim at issue has met whatever particular epistemic criteria the speaker has deemed necessary and sufficient for that claim would end the two and a half millennia philosophical tail chasing about what knowledge and true really mean.

Yes - and this would devalue both words completely. If something is true simply because I say it is true, and if something qualifies as knowledge simply because I say it qualifies as knowledge, then truth and knowledge lose all value.

brainpharte wrote:
Thus knowledge and true have no impenetrable or mystifying philosophical import. (And there certainly is no need for anything remotely resembling Platonic Forms of Knowledge and Truth, or muddled quests for the mystified eternally elusive holy grail of real Truth and Knowledge.)

Agreed - as I said, such an interpretation would devalue these terms completely.

brainpharte wrote:
If anyone insists that there is something more to Real "truth" and "knowledge" than that the claim at issue has met whatever epistemic criteria they've deemed necessary and sufficient for that claim, then they need to explain what this more consists in and how it is possible to determine whether or not it Really obtains.

Let's start with truth. Which definition or meaning of truth would you like to use?

crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
brainpharte
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Posted 11/04/09 - 12:58 PM:
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#53
reincarnated wrote:

Let's start with truth. Which definition or meaning of truth would you like to use?

I've been arguing that when we solicit explanations of what people mean when they've said that some claim is "true" all they actually can show the rest of us is that the claim has met whatever particular epistemic criteria they've deemed appropriate for that claim. Although most people either explicitly say--or at least imply--that there's more to it than that, what exactly this "more" consists in seems to escape everyone.

Also, whenever someone disputes an assertion that a claim is true, the dispute inevitably centers on the epistemic criteria--on whether or not it has actually been met, or on whether or not the criteria used is appropriate or adequate for that claim.


Any "Philosophical" issue about what 'true' means is due to self-inflicted confusion involving whether or not the world really is the way the claim at issue says it is. The assertion here is that in those cases in which the world really is the way a claim says it is, then that claim is true, else false.

But those who make such assertions can show us no way even in principle to determine whether or not the world really is the way a claim says it is. All they actually can show to be the case is whether or not the claim can meet certain epistemic criteria.

The history of human beliefs, including in the sciences, is replete with instances in which claims that were alleged to be true because the world really was the way the claim said it was, are later found to be false.

People can and regularly do insist that their claim is true because the world really is the way their claim says it is, but all they actually can show us is that the claim meets their criteria. The "true" and "really is" are noise.

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
reincarnated
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Posted 11/05/09 - 06:46 AM:
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#54
brainpharte wrote:

I've been arguing that when we solicit explanations of what people mean when they've said that some claim is "true" all they actually can show the rest of us is that the claim has met whatever particular epistemic criteria they've deemed appropriate for that claim. Although most people either explicitly say--or at least imply--that there's more to it than that, what exactly this "more" consists in seems to escape everyone.

Also, whenever someone disputes an assertion that a claim is true, the dispute inevitably centers on the epistemic criteria--on whether or not it has actually been met, or on whether or not the criteria used is appropriate or adequate for that claim.


Any "Philosophical" issue about what 'true' means is due to self-inflicted confusion involving whether or not the world really is the way the claim at issue says it is. The assertion here is that in those cases in which the world really is the way a claim says it is, then that claim is true, else false.

But those who make such assertions can show us no way even in principle to determine whether or not the world really is the way a claim says it is. All they actually can show to be the case is whether or not the claim can meet certain epistemic criteria.

The history of human beliefs, including in the sciences, is replete with instances in which claims that were alleged to be true because the world really was the way the claim said it was, are later found to be false.

People can and regularly do insist that their claim is true because the world really is the way their claim says it is, but all they actually can show us is that the claim meets their criteria. The "true" and "really is" are noise.

I agree with most of your post – except the final sentence. If “is true” is defined as “meets certain criteria XYZ”, then the fact that some A meets those criteria XYZ also entails that A is true. “is true” in this case is simply a shorthand expression for “meets criteria XYZ”. It does not follow that “true” is noise?

The real problems, imho, are (a) whether any given group of agents can always unambiguously agree the “criteria XYZ” and (b) whether one can infallibly judge that such criteria have been met. If not, then truth remains forever subjective at best, and impossible to access at worst.

crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
brainpharte
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Posted 11/05/09 - 09:12 AM:
quote post
#55
reincarnated wrote:


The real problems, imho, are (a) whether any given group of agents can always unambiguously agree the “criteria XYZ” and (b) whether one can infallibly judge that such criteria have been met. If not, then truth remains forever subjective at best, and impossible to access at worst.

Yet I cannot see but that this is what we are limited to.

We have learned that claims that can meet certain explicitly defined criteria (centrally, rigorous logical coherence and empirical corroboration)--including rigorous protocols to insure their application--are more likely to be demonstrably reliable predictors than claims that cannot meet these criteria.

Thus, logically rigorous, empirically corroborated, reliable predictors seems the very best we can do. Which is great, but does not entail that the world "really is" the way such claims say it is.


"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
reincarnated
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Posted 11/05/09 - 09:26 AM:
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#56
brainpharte wrote:
Thus, logically rigorous, empirically corroborated, reliable predictors seems the very best we can do. Which is great, but does not entail that the world "really is" the way such claims say it is.

The expression "really is" seems to imply the assumption of a correspondence theory of truth. A coherentist or pragmatic theory of truth does not require that the world "really is" any particular way.

crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
brainpharte
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Posted 11/05/09 - 09:57 AM:
quote post
#57
reincarnated wrote:

The expression "really is" seems to imply the assumption of a correspondence theory of truth. A coherentist or pragmatic theory of truth does not require that the world "really is" any particular way.

Agreed.

What I have been presenting is a counterargument to realism and the correspondence theory of truth, in which I argue that those who assert such a theory can show us nothing more about claims they insist to be "true" than that those claims meet certain epistemic criteria.

BTW, I know that they're called "theories of truth" but I find this somewhat misleading, and a concession to the correspondence theory and realism. To call them "theories of truth" seems to imply that there Really Is something called truth, and that the task for any theory of truth is to get it right.

I think rather that what we have are different definitions or stipulations or explanations of what can be meant when we speak of something as being 'true' or 'truth'. Since there is no way to judge whether or not any of these definitions is the way truth "really is", all we can do is analyze the different definitions and determine whether or not they are coherent, or add to our understanding, or are useful, or entail certain consequences, etc.

"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
reincarnated
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Posted 11/05/09 - 10:33 AM:
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#58
brainpharte wrote:
Agreed.

What I have been presenting is a counterargument to realism and the correspondence theory of truth, in which I argue that those who assert such a theory can show us nothing more about claims they insist to be "true" than that those claims meet certain epistemic criteria.

It seems to me that the correspondence theory of truth does not even achieve this - how are we to determine whether particular statements DO in fact correspond to the actual state of affairs? The correspondence theory seems hopelessly impossible in practice.

brainpharte wrote:
BTW, I know that they're called "theories of truth" but I find this somewhat misleading, and a concession to the correspondence theory and realism. To call them "theories of truth" seems to imply that there Really Is something called truth, and that the task for any theory of truth is to get it right.

I think rather that what we have are different definitions or stipulations or explanations of what can be meant when we speak of something as being 'true' or 'truth'.
Agreed. "Explanations" seems (to me) to be a better expression.

Since there is no way to judge whether or not any of these definitions is the way truth "really is", all we can do is analyze the different definitions and determine whether or not they are coherent, or add to our understanding, or are useful, or entail certain consequences, etc.

What truth "really is"? I hope you are not suggesting there is any "objective meaning" to "truth"?

If X = "truth" then surely what X "really is" is entailed by the "meaning of X" - but X derives its meaning simply from the way that X is (subjectively) used in language. But yes, I agree that all we can do is analyze the different ways that X is used (in language), and determine whether or not these different ways of usage are coherent, or add to our understanding, or are useful, or entail certain consequences, etc.



crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts...
we all talk a different language, talking in defence...
and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok...
(Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")
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