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Subjectivity and Objectivity : Claims to Knowledge
Understanding the real knowledge problem

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Subjectivity and Objectivity : Claims to Knowledge

litkey
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Posted 10/23/09 - 09:42 AM:	#31
Hanover wrote: Stupid and retarded counter-examples are a way of testing the limits of a theory. Anyway, I don't agree with what you've said. TRUTH is an entirely distinct element and if it is not satisfied, then your belief will not be "knowledge." Your subjective justification does not make a belief true. If you assault the cab stealers evil twin and accuse him of the minor crime of cab theft, you will be WRONG in your assualt, despite the fact that you had a subjective justification and a sincere belief that you had the right guy. The reason that your belief does not constitute knowledge is because your belief was not TRUE, which means it did not correspond to reality. I think you missed the point I was trying to make, and that is, when we are making or holding a belief, it can only ever be justified iff it has the corresponding evidence - in my example I gave some trivial signs that would indicate some sort of evidence base, that a person is justified in saying, "Jim has stolen my taxi." This belief (of course) is only ever true iff it was Jim that stole the taxi. Yes, it might not have happened, and it might be that Jim had an evil twin - but these thoughts are nothing but thought or word games - not really applicable to the real world.
That's what tyrants get! - John Wilkes Booth “This is an impressive crowd: the Have's and Have-more's. Some people call you the elites. I call you my base.” -Bush Something cannot come from nothing.

Cheshire
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Posted 10/23/09 - 10:16 AM:	#32
Legion wrote: I believe the only things I can have knowledge (justified true belief) about are subjective in nature. I can know my own perspective, opinion, thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. I agree that we give our perception an identity. However, I doubt that this alone is enough to completely reverse the truth or falsity of our supposed knowledge. In other words; If the objective truth is X is true, then why should I assume when I attempt to understand X the result should be X is false. How can we infer that subjective perspective or "perception with identity" leads only to mistakes? If X is true objectively, then x should appear true subjectively. In this way it makes sense to say there are good reasons to believe that in many cases I understand a truth that is both objectively and subjectively true.
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Legion
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Posted 10/24/09 - 06:57 AM:	#33
Please forgive me Cheshire if my philosophy is a bit clumsy. I’m not sure that I understand your points. But this seems interesting because we may be hovering around the relation between truths and understandings, which I don’t see as being the same thing. I think it’s possible to have a plethora of facts or data and not a bit of understanding. Maybe you could rephrase your point in terms of just one aspect of the modeling relation, namely measurement? I think measurement is essentially a mapping from phenomena (objective) to propositions (subjective).
We sense. We reason. We predict. We don't always get those right.

Cheshire
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Posted 10/24/09 - 07:47 PM:	#34
Legion wrote: Please forgive me Cheshire if my philosophy is a bit clumsy. I’m not sure that I understand your points. But this seems interesting because we may be hovering around the relation between truths and understandings, which I don’t see as being the same thing. I think it’s possible to have a plethora of facts or data and not a bit of understanding. I'm not real sure myself. Your correct truth and understanding are not the same thing. I'll have to think this over. Legion wrote: Maybe you could rephrase your point in terms of just one aspect of the modeling relation, namely measurement? I think measurement is essentially a mapping from phenomena (objective) to propositions (subjective). I can see how you would come to this conclusion. It does seem like measuring is just adding a definition for some purpose. At one point in time it was completely relative to the individuals hand or forearm length. However, the system of calibration is used to link the measurement with a standard. The standard is an object of the objective world. So, our measuring is in fact a process of comparing objective information with a seemingly subjective system. I don't expect you'd agree, so I'll look forward to any corrections.
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Legion
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Posted 10/25/09 - 03:56 AM:	#35
Cheshire wrote: So, our measuring is in fact a process of comparing objective information with a seemingly subjective system. I agree. We could consider measuring the temperature of a glass of water, for instance. And we could try to analyze this rather mundane occurrence and it might give us some insight into the relations between the process of measurement, objective phenomena, and subjective representations. Cheshire wrote: I don't expect you'd agree, so I'll look forward to any corrections. I don’t believe I’m in any position to correct you Cheshire. I believe I can only agree or disagree with you, state my reasons why, and hope that we both derive something beneficial from our exchange.
We sense. We reason. We predict. We don't always get those right.

reincarnated
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Posted 10/25/09 - 06:25 AM:	#36
Sorry, I’ve been absent for a while. I’ll try to address all the new points/issues/remarks/ideas (which look like they need my input since my last visit) below: Nil Desperandum wrote: I assume that in our justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, our justification condition reads something like, "S is appropriately justified in believing that p," where the "appropriately" is intended to circumvent the Gettier problem. I don’t want to get sidetracked into a discussion of the so-called Gettier problem on this thread – but to me “appropriate justification” is a bit like Hanover’s “objective knowledge” – the qualification is (in my book) unnecessary and redundant. If knowledge is not “objectively true” then it simply doesn’t count as knowledge (there is no such thing as “objectively false knowledge”), and similarly if a justification is not “(objectively) appropriate” then it simply doesn’t count as justification (there is no such thing as “inappropriate justification”). We can have CLAIMS to knowledge which are incorrect (objectively false), and similarly we can have CLAIMS to justification which are incorrect (inappropriate) – but merely claiming knowledge does not entail knowledge (we can be mistaken in our claims), and merely claiming justification does not entail justification (we can be mistaken in our claims). Once this is recognised, so-called Gettier problems evaporate. Nil Desperandum wrote: Therefore, while I agree that all we can express are our beliefs about the world, I do not agree that we cannot have knowledge about the world. Rather, whether or not we have knowledge about the world depends on there being an objectively existing reality about which our senses give us reasonably reliable information--we may or may not have knowledge about the world when we think we do. I agree 100%. Nil Desperandum wrote: you might be seeing a mule cleverly painted by zookeepers to look like a zebra instead of seeing a zebra. I take it that's not really the point of this thread. Correct. However I will gladly participate in a thread on so-called Gettier problems if you’d like to start one? Hanover wrote: The statement, "the girl is pretty" is knowledge if (1) I have a justification for it (e.g. she looks pretty to me), (2) she is in fact pretty to me and (3) I believe her to be pretty. I would call that subjective knowledge due to the qualifier "to me" attached to the Truth element. All three of these truth conditions (in the case of your suggested subjective knowledge} effectively boil down to one and the same condition – viz “I believe she is/looks pretty” – here’s why: (1) How can she in fact NOT “look pretty to you” if you believe her to be/look pretty? (2) How can she in fact NOT “be pretty to you” if you believe her to be/look pretty? (3) How can you in fact NOT “believe her to be pretty” if you believe her to be/look pretty? In other words, you have simply defined “subjective knowledge” as “subjective belief”. That’s fine by me, but I would just call that a subjective belief and leave it at that. Calling it (any kind of) knowledge is (imho) an abuse of the word knowledge. Knowledge (imho) implies some kind of agreed standard against which truth can (in principle if not in practice) be measured. If you and I were to jointly agree a standard measure of “prettiness” against which the girl could be measured, then I would agree that we could claim to “know” that the girl is pretty AS JUDGED AGAINST THAT PARTICULAR STANDARD (all 3 of the JTB elements are then satisfied) – but this then becomes a claim to “objective knowledge” (ie “I am claiming to know that she is pretty as judged by such-and-such standard, because (a) I believe that she meets the standard (b) I am justified in believing that she meets the standard and (c) she does in fact meet the standard”). Hanover wrote: There is a meaningful distinction between knowledge that relies upon objective truth and subjective truth. To say "I know the girl is pretty," is a very different type of statement than "I know the rock is before me." I agree the statements are very different. One (in absence of an agreed standard for prettiness) represents simply no more than a subjective belief (and thus I would not call it knowledge), the other represents a (possibly) justified true belief (and is thus knowledge). Hanover wrote: What then do you hold to be a basic foundational premise? This goes along with my solipsism criticism. If you insist upon questioning the validity of every foundational premise, looking only for the self-proving one, it seems you will end up right where DesCartes did when he declared that the only certain thing that exists is a single mind that doubts. Perhaps you think you can do better than Descartes (or Kant)? His conclusion leads, not to solipsism (ie “there is nothing real outside of my mind, everything is a figment of my imagination”), but simply to skepticism (ie “though there may exist a real world which is independent of my imagination, I cannot be certain of what actually exists outside of my mind”). I hope you now understand the difference? What happens if I claim that I have used logic and observation to provide for a true understanding of the world, and you claim the same, and we still disagree about our respective understandings of the world? Which one of us (if either) is correct, and which is incorrect, in his alleged true understanding, and why? Your foundational premise is that logic and observation leads to truth – but how do you judge which one of us has access to that truth if we BOTH use logic and understanding? Hanover wrote: It is not my position that accurate judgments are caused by the deterministic forces of nature, some of which have no relationship to the thing being judged. That is, I judge you a person, not because of the determinstic forces causing that judgment, but based upon the various reasons I have in favor of your being a person. And if I claim that I am applying essentially the same logic and reasoning as you – my application and use of logic and reason is in no way inferior to yours, its just that I ALSO believe that everything (including my application of logic and reason) is pre-determined - how does that change anything? EITHER you believe that logic and reason necessarily leads to truth (which seems to be your position - in which case all that matters is that we use logic and reason, it would not matter one iota whether or not we were “predetermined” to use such logic and reason), OR you believe that logic and reason do not necessarily lead to truth. Which is it to be? Cheshire wrote: The problem resides in the JTB criteria. It does not regard the difference between "I know" and "I think I know". Much like you seem to ignore the difference between I believe and I know. Nothing could be further from the truth. I do NOT ignore the difference at all – in fact I have taken pains to keep pointing out this difference in many posts – when we say “I know” what we actually mean is “I believe that I know”, and it MAY therefore also be true that “I know”, but there is no way that I can know infallibly that I know, thus (in the end) all I am left with is my belief that I know. Cheshire wrote: Personally, I would drop belief from the issue and substitute "possible". I think possible implies a respect for reality, where as "belief" is fairly open ended. So, Justified-Possible-True. Thus you would claim to “know that Johnny stole the pie” on the basis that you think it POSSIBLE that he stole the pie, but NOT on the basis that you BELIEVE that he stole the pie? Sorry, but I don’t think your version of knowledge will get very far. Cheshire wrote: So, I'm coming up with: Non-contradictory, Possible, and not shown to be in error. How's that for redefining knowledge? And you think that this describes accurately how we use the concept of “knowledge” in language? Thus, if you cannot disprove that Johnny stole the pie (“not shown to be in error”), and its possible that he stole the pie (“possible”), and concluding that he stole the pie does not involve any contradictions (“non-contradictory”), it then follows (according to your new definition) that you KNOW that he stole the pie? Hanover wrote: Entirely meaningless. At least you and I agree on something. Cheshire wrote: You can not say something is possible without "belief" that it can occur. I used a term "possible" that equates to "belief", but is not as open ended. SO, you are incorrect to say "eliminated belief requirement"; when in fact it is maintained as an implication of the term possible; in every case. Believing that X is possible is very different to believing that X. A world of difference. Edited by reincarnated on 10/25/09 - 06:31 AM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Cheshire
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Posted 10/25/09 - 02:38 PM:	#37
reincarnated wrote: Believing that X is possible is very different to believing that X. A world of difference Good point. I can see my attempt fell well short. Believing isn't the same as knowing either. To witness first hand is not a matter of belief. First hand knowledge of a wall would not entail belief, because of the irrational implication that it could be disbelieved. Belief is often second hand knowledge. You hear the facts and are willing to accept the information. What else is involved in determining the truth of some one's story than checking for possibility and non-contradiction.
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reincarnated
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Posted 10/26/09 - 03:19 AM:	#38
Cheshire wrote: Believing isn't the same as knowing either. I agree that believing is not the same as knowing. To know that X I must have a justified true belief that X, not just a belief that X. Cheshire wrote: First hand knowledge of a wall would not entail belief, because of the irrational implication that it could be disbelieved. How can one have knowledge of something which one simultaneously disbelieves? If I do not believe that there is a wall before me, how can I at the same time claim that I know there is a wall before me? That sounds downright contradictory to me. Cheshire wrote: Belief is often second hand knowledge. Strange, I thought we just agreed that belief is not the same as knowledge? Cheshire wrote: What else is involved in determining the truth of some one's story than checking for possibility and non-contradiction. If you have checked for possibility and non-contradiction, does it follow that you will arrive at a unique truth? There may be several "possible solutions" which are both possible and non-contradictory - how then are we to decide which one is true?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Cheshire
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Posted 10/26/09 - 09:13 AM:	#39
reincarnated wrote: How can one have knowledge of something which one simultaneously disbelieves? If I do not believe that there is a wall before me, how can I at the same time claim that I know there is a wall before me? That sounds downright contradictory to me. I did not intend to suggest that there is a disbelief of a wall. I was attempting to point out that it seems as if belief is not an issue in cases of apparent reality. The term belief implies there is a question or a concept that can be accepted or denied. Do you weight the evidence prior to accepting that there is wall in front of you? Could disbelieving the wall allow you to walk through it? Of course not, so what sense is there in calling knowledge of a wall a type of belief in a wall? I would like to restate that belief is an unnecessary qualifier in this context; this does not imply disbelief. My purpose is show that knowledge of a wall is not a matter of belief or disbelief Or to say I believe in this wall is nonsensical.
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Hanover
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Posted 10/27/09 - 10:32 AM:	#40
reincarnated wrote: I don’t want to get sidetracked into a discussion of the so-called Gettier problem on this thread …quot; but to me “appropriate justification” is a bit like Hanover’s “objective knowledge” …quot; the qualification is (in my book) unnecessary and redundant. If knowledge is not “objectively true” then it simply doesn’t count as knowledge (there is no such thing as “objectively false knowledge&rdquo, and similarly if a justification is not “(objectively) appropriate” then it simply doesn’t count as justification (there is no such thing as “inappropriate justification&rdquo. We can have CLAIMS to knowledge which are incorrect (objectively false), and similarly we can have CLAIMS to justification which are incorrect (inappropriate) …quot; but merely claiming knowledge does not entail knowledge (we can be mistaken in our claims), and merely claiming justification does not entail justification (we can be mistaken in our claims). Once this is recognised, so-called Gettier problems evaporate. I won't sidetrack you regarding the Gettier issue, but I think your definition of knowledge avoids the Gettier problem because it does not define knowledge as Justified True Belief. It defines knowledge as objectively justified true belief, which is a distinct theory. Your argument has really become that "knowledge" has always been defined as objectively justified true belief and never subjectively justified true belief. I think that's just historically incorrect.
"Nothing is impossible for the man who will not listen to reason." John Belushi, "Animal House" "I have opinions of my own --strong opinions-- but I don't always agree with them." G.W. Bush

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