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Seeking definition of
How to define "benefit" with regard to ethical attitudes without paradox.

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Seeking definition of
jambaugh
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Posted 10/20/09 - 10:52 AM:
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I have been working on a Meta-Ethic codification of ethical attitudes e.g. altruism vs ambition in terms of someone assigning relative value of benefit to self or others. However I have run into a problem.

Although some forms of benefit would seem pretty objective others are contingent upon the ethics of the person to whom it is to be applied. I'm running into a paradox with regard to the meaning of "benefit" to someone whose values are self denying.

I am trying to be agnostic at this stage as to which is the "correct" ethical attitude and only be descriptive. For example I define an immolative attitude as the ethical stance of valuing harm to self. Irrespective of whether this is a rational stance I need to make sure "harm = negative benefit" has meaning.

For example should someone helping another commit suicide be considered malevolent or beneficial in so far as classifying ethical attitudes is concerned. More importantly is the reverse case of preventing self immolating behavior by a third party to be considered malevolent or beneficial?

I do not want to get into an ethical debate so please do not respond with arguments for or against assisted suicide. Start another thread please if you've something to say on that. I'm asking at the meta-ethic stage about consistent definitions. I'm not as well read on classic ethical discourses (my background is in science) and so would ask if anyone has read any debates or discourse on this issue?

As I see it my choices are:
1.) Leave "benefit" as an undefined term (probably the way to go) and let its definition arise structurally in its usage.
2.) Stick to certain objective definitions of benefit, e.g. empowerment, life, health, knowledge... (least preferred)
3.) Qualify "benefit" to distinguish contingent and non-contingent types (a whole other slew of definitions to follow but maybe unavoidable).

Anyone have any thoughts or other suggestions?

James

"Hmmmm.... toughy!" --Deep Thought (from the Hitchhiker's Guide Trilogy)
brainpharte
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Posted 10/20/09 - 11:56 AM:
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Just thinking out loud here:

Seems to me that if you don't define the criteria by which to judge whether or not some action counts as a "benefit", then "benefit" will be a free-floating term that different people will use according to whatever value criteria they personally happen to deem appropriate--with the result that "benefit" becomes an ambiguous term throughout your project, since exactly what any given person interprets as beneficial is up for grabs.


"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit.

"No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."
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Posted 10/21/09 - 11:06 AM:
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I see two possible options, define benefit as a function of fitness(ie one benefits another if they make them more fit) or define benefit as a function of happiness(one benefits another if they make them happier).

Harm(For a person)= 1-Happiness/% or relevant knowledge known
jambaugh
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Posted 10/21/09 - 06:26 PM:
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brainpharte wrote:
Just thinking out loud here:

Seems to me that if you don't define the criteria by which to judge whether or not some action counts as a "benefit", then "benefit" will be a free-floating term that different people will use according to whatever value criteria they personally happen to deem appropriate--with the result that "benefit" becomes an ambiguous term throughout your project, since exactly what any given person interprets as beneficial is up for grabs.


That sounds like option 1. Let the structure of its use define the term. (After all in real languages we allow circular definitions all the time.) But I hoped to be a bit more reductive and rigorous.

Hmmm... Start with an objective definition e.g. promoting an individuals power and knowledge but qualifying where assent or rejection is given...which may bring up time issues. Recall the old (politically incorrect) movies where the hero forces himself upon the damsel until she relents and finally embraces his overtures... Malevolent or Beneficent action? Or again the prevention of a suicide?

slap wrote:
I see two possible options, define benefit as a function of fitness(ie one benefits another if they make them more fit) or define benefit as a function of happiness(one benefits another if they make them happier).


Fitness begs some defining itself. I can become destitute financially maximizing my physiological, psychological, and intellectual fitness (in fact I am doing that now taking a year off work). You then need to weigh one over the other. Of course that still is a problem with benefit. I think the only way to be objective in defining benefit is to define it in terms of what the individual would choose on their own (provided they are not self denying).

Should I abandon self immolation as an ethical stance? I will have to make self benefit (at least as a secondary ethical priority) a necessary requirement of a reasoning entity. Self immolation would then be considered irrationality to the point of the inability to function ethically and thus such individuals are neither responsible for their actions nor to have their values respected. But I don't like that. I still must define the position to qualify it as irrational.

Happiness begs other questions. Is it thus more moral as an altruist to keep someone in chemically induced perpetual bliss rather than facing reality? Am I thus acting malevolently by forcing my friend into rehab? No happiness doesn't do it.
Which also brings up the issue of contingency on the person's values or choices.

I think cerebralphlatulence is correct and it will have to be free floating.

The main thing I am worrying about is leaving room for sophistries such as "Nietzsche says 'what doesn't kill you makes you stronger' so my hitting you up side the head was 'character building'!"

James

"Hmmmm.... toughy!" --Deep Thought (from the Hitchhiker's Guide Trilogy)
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Posted 10/26/09 - 02:22 PM:
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Your right, any way you go your going to be using otherwords which may need definition. At some point your going to need to leave it hanging open.

Of the two I recomended, I would go with happiness. This term itself is philosophically debated, and you may leave the term open for further research admitting that happiness is incredibly complicated and outside the scope of your paper?

For fitness you might define it in terms of evolutionary fitness perhaps? How likely one is to pass on their genes to the next generation. This would include all of the above as a sort of package. You are then left with which sub-properties of fitness are more important, but it seems you can leave that as an empirical matter for further future research?

A second possiblity for fitness might be the ability to achieve ones goals. Fitness would likely then become relative to the person however, and you might need to be wary of this.

It seems no matter which way your going to go you have to take brainpharte's approach to at least some term. You can't write an entire book of all ethical concepts can you?

Harm(For a person)= 1-Happiness/% or relevant knowledge known
Kant Chocula
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Posted 10/28/09 - 05:28 AM:
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jambaugh wrote:
Anyone have any thoughts or other suggestions?
I think it all depends on whether or not you are taking a cognitivist or non-cognitivist approach. Do you believe moral sentences are truth-apt? If not, I would suggest you look into Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism. He uses two moral attitudes to explain all ethical behavior: guilt and anger. He then describes moral attitudes in terms of "adaptive syndrome theories" to escape the self referential problem many face when defining moral attitudes. It seems to me that your approach to moral attitudes in terms of benefit allies itself with adaptive syndrome theories. If you feel moral sentences are truth-apt then I would suggest some kind of reductionism into natural qualities, but then you run into identity problems and schizo-attitude problems.

Anyway, that's what I have to offer. Hope it was helpful.

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Posted 10/28/09 - 08:42 AM:
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I think the paradox arises because 'benefit' can be used equivocally:

(a) x benefits s iff s wishes, desires, wants, aims for, intends etc. x
(b) x benefits s iff x is good for s

In the case of self-immolation we want things that are bad for us. So something can benfit(sense-a) us and yet not benefit(sense-b) us.

Assisting suicide is benefiting(sense-a) the suicide in the minimal sense of helping him to do what he wants, but may or may not be benefiting(sense-b) him by taking away his life.

Harm is negative benefit(sense-b), but may or may not be negative benefit(sense-a).

My suggestion is that you use 'benefit' to mean (a) or (b) but not both. Personally I think it sounds natural to use 'benefit' in sense-b, and 'desire' or 'aim' or 'project' or suchlike for sense-a.

jambaugh
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Posted 10/28/09 - 10:28 AM:
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Kant Chocula wrote:
I think it all depends on whether or not you are taking a cognitivist or non-cognitivist approach....

I'm being non-cognitivist. See my elaboration below.

Cuthbert wrote:
I think the paradox arises because 'benefit' can be used equivocally:

(a) x benefits s iff s wishes, desires, wants, aims for, intends etc. x
(b) x benefits s iff x is good for s

In the case of self-immolation we want things that are bad for us. So something can benfit(sense-a) us and yet not benefit(sense-b) us.

Assisting suicide is benefiting(sense-a) the suicide in the minimal sense of helping him to do what he wants, but may or may not be benefiting(sense-b) him by taking away his life.

Harm is negative benefit(sense-b), but may or may not be negative benefit(sense-a).

My suggestion is that you use 'benefit' to mean (a) or (b) but not both. Personally I think it sounds natural to use 'benefit' in sense-b, and 'desire' or 'aim' or 'project' or suchlike for sense-a.



Right! That is exactly my problem. (Trying to work with too few terms hence equivocating). Thanks for making it explicit.
Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately) this will greatly multiply my categories of ethical attitude. I'll have to include e.g. paternalistic meaning valuing b-benefit over a-benefit. But if I must I must.


[begin elaboration]
I am trying to form a definition applicable at many levels beginning with a definition of an acting body which may be a person or organized group and has three defining qualities:
1.) A value system, policy, will, ethic by which it weighs choices
2.) A means to act or power,
3.) A means to judge, know, and predict which is the reasoning of the body.

This I think applies to every level be it individuals, companies, organizations or governments. Then rather than defining a global ethic I think it more correct to define ethical attitudes between acting bodies. e.g. malevolent vs altruistic with regard to harm vs benefit toward others. With two meanings to "benefit" I'll end up with four base reversible attitudes and 4!=24 permutations of priority minus only a few obvious contradictions and redundancies. e.g. one cannot willfully act contrary to one's will. Well maybe one can as abdication.

I could refine further since b.) benefit isn't explicitly defined.
One can benefit or harm another acting body in each of the three qualities of will and/or power (which includes e.g. physical wellbeing) and reason.

For example the allegory of the Cave. Plato advocates a case of bringing someone to knowledge against their will.

Thanks Cuthbert you've given me some more "meat" to process. I think it best given this multiplicity to leave benefit unqualified in defining base ethical attitudes and then qualify attitude plus benefit in terms of these three types.
That plus the interaction of these permutations should fill out a decent book.

James

"Hmmmm.... toughy!" --Deep Thought (from the Hitchhiker's Guide Trilogy)
Kant Chocula
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Posted 10/28/09 - 01:52 PM:
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jambaugh wrote:
I am trying to form a definition applicable at many levels beginning with a definition of an acting body which may be a person or organized group and has three defining qualities:
1.) A value system, policy, will, ethic by which it weighs choices
2.) A means to act or power,
3.) A means to judge, know, and predict which is the reasoning of the body.
Based on this, I am going to reiterate my recommendation that you read Allan Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Harvard University Press, 1990. Coming from a non-cognitivist position, he creates a plausible value system and then explains how this system can be analyzed in order to judge, know and predict normative sentences. I would think that your "means to act or power" is moral agency (as it applies to the various acting bodies). I will try to elaborate Gibbard's main arguments.

I am going to assume that your 2nd quality is moral agency (without which we may as well be talking about LGM's). Your 1st quality would be described in terms of a factual-normative world (<w,n>). A <w,n> is a complete possible world in which there is a complete and consistent normative system (i.e. the world is the complete set of facts and every act is required, permitted or prohibited).

The parallel to your 3rd quality requires Gibbard to tweak the definition of validity. He defines validity as every <w,n> where premises hold is a <w,n> where the conclusions hold. The rules of a <w,n> are constructed from the complete and consistent set of norms for the given <w,n>. The fact of a given <w,n> may be "murder is forbidden" and the corresponding norm would be "murder is wrong." For any given fact one can attach the corresponding norm, e.g. if P = "murder is forbidden" then "Pn-forbidden." In this manner predictions, knowledge and judgments can be made with certainty given sufficient facts.

I am not presenting this in order to suggest you borrow Gibbard's position. I am offering it as an example you might find of use to your own model. If what I have offered piques your interest, I have chapters 1 and 5 in pdf if you would like to preview his much more robust explanation.

jambaugh wrote:
This I think applies to every level be it individuals, companies, organizations or governments. Then rather than defining a global ethic I think it more correct to define ethical attitudes between acting bodies. e.g. malevolent vs altruistic with regard to harm vs benefit toward others. With two meanings to "benefit" I'll end up with four base reversible attitudes and 4!=24 permutations of priority minus only a few obvious contradictions and redundancies. e.g. one cannot willfully act contrary to one's will. Well maybe one can as abdication.
Here is where I am a bit confused. I do not understand why you are shifting to harm/benefit language from ethics language. Unless you are defining moral attitudes in terms of harm/benefit I see no reason to bring the terms into play. I had originally suggested Gibbard's book because he posited that moral attitudes are adaptive syndromes (which implies that moral attitudes are evolutionarily beneficial).

jambaugh wrote:
I could refine further since b.) benefit isn't explicitly defined.
One can benefit or harm another acting body in each of the three qualities of will and/or power (which includes e.g. physical wellbeing) and reason.
Are you cashing out benefit as that which aids the value system, will and reasoning? If so, what does it mean to aid any of the three qualities? I fully understand the implications of harm on any of the three qualities. Perhaps it would be easier to consider coming at this problem in terms of that which causes the least amount of harm rather than providing the greatest amount of benefit.

A categorically delicious part of your noumenal breakfast.
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Posted 10/28/09 - 11:52 PM:
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iambaugh wrote:
I am trying to form a definition applicable at many levels beginning with a definition of an acting body which may be a person or organized group and has three defining qualities:
1.) A value system, policy, will, ethic by which it weighs choices
2.) A means to act or power,
3.) A means to judge, know, and predict which is the reasoning of the body.

This I think applies to every level be it individuals, companies, organizations or governments.


Does that perhaps not leave room for weakness of will? E.g. I think smoking is a dumb choice (value system), and I could give up if I wanted (means to act), and I think it's bad for my long term health (ability to predict). But I smoke anyway. That's because I'm weak-willed and give into my desires against my better judgement.

...e.g. one cannot willfully act contrary to one's will. Well maybe one can as abdication.


But I can go on smoking and still hold on to my values, ability to choose and predict. I'm just acting willfully and inconsistently with my practical reasoning.

I guess a system that sets out to explain ethical behaviour and reasoning needs room for hypocrisy, inconsistent (but not purely random or irrational) behaviour and weakness of will.
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