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Quine's attack on Kant's analytic/synthetic dichotomy

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Quine's attack on Kant's analytic/synthetic dichotomy

keda
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Posted 01/23/06 - 04:54 AM: Subject: Quine's attack on Kant's analytic/synthetic dichotomy	#1
I'm still unclear as to how Quine is supposedly rejecting Kant's analytic/sytnethic dichotomy as unjustified, and I would appreciate it if anyone could clarify this for me. So far there are at least two things that I concider problematic with Quine's reasoning. One is that he is relying on Carnaps's definition of analyticity in language which is as follows: Statment S is analytic in language L (the one under consideration) iff Statement S is assigned the truth value "T" in any possible state description of the sentences in L. but this doesn't seem to have anything to do with Kant. Kant defines analytic judgements as those in which the predicate is contained in its subject. Another thing that has to be taken into account is that concepts must be met with intuitions, but Carnap's definition doesn't deal with these things. The other thing is that he says that lexicography as a empirical science i.e. that a word have a certain meaning is an empirical fact, but this is simply a red herring. Quine is confusing words with the meaning of words. It doesn't matter what I call my concepts as long as I understand what they mean. If I don't understand what they mean, a language is impossible anyway, because as Kant says, "intuitions without concepts are blind."
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

NoSoul
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Posted 01/23/06 - 09:42 AM:	#2
keda wrote: there are at least two things that I concider problematic with Quine's reasoning. One is that he is relying on Carnaps's definition of analyticity in language which is as follows: Statment S is analytic in language L (the one under consideration) iff Statement S is assigned the truth value "T" in any possible state description of the sentences in L. but this doesn't seem to have anything to do with Kant. Kant defines analytic judgements as those in which the predicate is contained in its subject. I'm really not sure, but these do seem interchangeable. e.g., "predicate is contained in the subject" might be considered equivalent to the Carnap definition. (However, calling these "interchangeable" seems to violate Quine's own refutation of analyticity!) The other thing is that he says that lexicography as a empirical science i.e. that a word have a certain meaning is an empirical fact, but this is simply a red herring. Quine is confusing words with the meaning of words. It doesn't matter what I call my concepts as long as I understand what they mean. If I don't understand what they mean, a language is impossible anyway, because as Kant says, "intuitions without concepts are blind." I think for positivists & others, it's pragmatically impossible to separate "signifier" from meaning/"signified." It's as if they want to make definitions entirely objective, with no "messy" need to appeal to subjective understanding. On that grounds, then, it seems, if a word objectively appears different from another word, no matter how we (think) we subjectively understand them, then the 2 words, or signs, are in fact different. Hence, "bachelor" is not the same as "unmarried man." I sure hope others with better understanding of these things choose to add their responses to this.
Firmly tie the mind, resembling a mad elephant, to the strong pillar of its perceptual content, with the rope of contemplative inspection, and gradually tame it with the hook of discrimination. -- Buddhist Handbook, Salamander Press To the poet and sage, all things are friendly and hallowed, all experiences profitable, all days holy, all men divine. - Nietzsche/Emerson

Banno
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Posted 01/23/06 - 11:39 AM:	#3
keda wrote: I'm still unclear as to how Quine is supposedly rejecting Kant's analytic/sytnethic dichotomy as unjustified... Statement S is analytic in language L IFF Statement S is assigned the truth value "T" in any possible state description of the sentences in L. So a statement is analytic if it is true regardless of the interpretation we give the language. That's a pretty clear definition of analytic. Now it seems apparent that if, in some statement, the predicate were contained in the subject, that that statement should indeed be true regardless of the interpretation on gave the language; simply because there could be no variation on the interpretation. "If x is your mother's brother, then x is your uncle" is true regardless of what you stick in the place of the "x". The two definition appear to be much the same, at least in that if a statement falls under one definition, it will fall under the other. The idea that concepts be "met" with intuitions is a strange one - as if the meaning of a word were some mental thing, rather than a social activity; and so as if one might have a private language.
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keda
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Posted 01/23/06 - 12:46 PM:	#4
Well, its the term language that annoys me, because it implies some form of communication is necessary. That is not the case with experience. Concepts are universals that are mental constructs, objective mediate universal cognitions, not tangible things like signifiers. We cannot experience anything without synthesis, which is the unification of intuitions with concepts. Concepts are like the abstractions in lambda calculus, they have no names, but at the same time, they are cognitions, i.e. about objects of possible experience.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

Banno
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Posted 01/23/06 - 01:44 PM:	#5
keda wrote: Well, its the term language that annoys me, because it implies some form of communication is necessary. That is not the case with experience. Concepts are universals that are mental constructs, objective mediate universal cognitions, not tangible things like signifiers. We cannot experience anything without synthesis, which is the unification of intuitions with concepts. Concepts are like the abstractions in lambda calculus, they have no names, but at the same time, they are cognitions, i.e. about objects of possible experience. This again relies on a mistaken understanding of language - as if one had a set of pre-linguistic concepts that one then translated into language. But that makes no sense, since translation works from language to language - what are we to make of the idea of translating from something that is not a language? Concepts are not independent of language. I have, as we have talked about before, no idea what an "intuition" might be. The idea seems nonsensical.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing...

keda
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Posted 01/23/06 - 02:48 PM:	#6
Banno wrote: This again relies on a mistaken understanding of language - as if one had a set of pre-linguistic concepts that one then translated into language. But that makes no sense, since translation works from language to language - what are we to make of the idea of translating from something that is not a language? Concepts are not independent of language. I have, as we have talked about before, no idea what an "intuition" might be. The idea seems nonsensical. That is a mistaken understanding of a concept - it is not translated, but rather expressed in languages. Languages are invented to communicate meaning, and wouldn't be needed if there was nobody to communicate with, notwithstanding experience is possible without communication, but impossible without the use of concepts. Intuitions are the immediate references to particular objects which we recieve trough senses, by which we can produce knowledge only by subsuming under concepts.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

Banno
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Posted 01/23/06 - 05:02 PM:	#7
keda wrote: That is a mistaken understanding of a concept - it is not translated, but rather expressed in languages. Languages are invented to communicate meaning, and wouldn't be needed if there was nobody to communicate with, notwithstanding experience is possible without communication, but impossible without the use of concepts. Intuitions are the immediate references to particular objects which we receive trough senses, by which we can produce knowledge only by subsuming under concepts. There are several things in this that I find problematic. To say that one "expresses a concept in language" appears to imply that a concept could exist unexpressed - outside of language, if you like; or perhaps in a private language. But how could a concept be without language? In what way can a concept be separated from the language that expresses it? I don't think it can. "Languages are invented to communicate meaning..." - again, this appears to imply that meaning might exist without language; but again, I can't see what this could mean. Perhaps it refers to the sort of sentiment expressed in your signature. I think that sentiment somewhat incomprehensible. To put a trite argument, can you tell me of something that can be thought but not said? That is, not just unmentioned because of courtesy or propriety, but something you can mean but not say in principle? Of course not, because the moment you tell me of such a thing, you express it. Rather, I think Searle was right: everything that can be meant can be said. Intuitions in the sense described appear to be an invention that sits between the perception and the thing perceived - something like a sense-datum - that is the thing to which our words refer. But again, this is a nonsense. When I see a tree, it is a tree I see, and when I say "There is a tree", the word "tree" refers to the tree, not to my intuition.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing...

keda
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Posted 01/24/06 - 02:17 AM:	#8
Banno: A person who is young enough to not have learnt any language, or simply have not had any contact with any other person, cannot recognize a tree as such without a concept. When someone shows him the letters "tree", or says "tree" while showing a picture of a tree, he cannot recognize these things; he cannot ever learn a language because the symbols cannot be recognized. This is because concepts are an integrate part of thought.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

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Posted 01/24/06 - 07:40 AM:	#9
keda wrote: Banno: A person who is young enough to not have learnt any language, or simply have not had any contact with any other person, cannot recognize a tree as such without a concept. When someone shows him the letters "tree", or says "tree" while showing a picture of a tree, he cannot recognize these things; he cannot ever learn a language because the symbols cannot be recognized. This is because concepts are an integrate part of thought. What is your argument here? Is it that an infant cannot recognise a tree as a "tree" without language? But isn't that so? They can of course still climb the tree; but they cannot even formulate the expression, let alone say: "I like to climb the tree". Do you want to say that they still have a "concept" of tree, when they cannot form an explicit intention towards that tree? Then you are using "concept" in an unusual way. Or are you saying that unless there is a pre-linguistic concept to attach the word "tree" to, that the infant could not learn the use of the word? But children do not learn language in this way. They learn by making the words a part of their form of life. We are not born with an innate concept of "tree" to which we latter attach the word; rather we interact with our family and friends in such a way that we learn to use the word "tree".
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing...

keda
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Posted 01/24/06 - 02:38 PM:	#10
Banno wrote: What is your argument here? Is it that an infant cannot recognise a tree as a "tree" without language? But isn't that so? They can of course still climb the tree; but they cannot even formulate the expression, let alone say: "I like to climb the tree". Do you want to say that they still have a "concept" of tree, when they cannot form an explicit intention towards that tree? Then you are using "concept" in an unusual way. Or are you saying that unless there is a pre-linguistic concept to attach the word "tree" to, that the infant could not learn the use of the word? But children do not learn language in this way. They learn by making the words a part of their form of life. We are not born with an innate concept of "tree" to which we latter attach the word; rather we interact with our family and friends in such a way that we learn to use the word "tree". I'm not saying that we have innate concepts of "tree". What I'm saying that the infant, needs to have a concept of both the signifier "tree" and the signified tree, before it can learn that one refers to the other. Since without the concepts, the child cannot recognize either of them, because recognition means that he considers that the two distinct perceptions are of the same object, but the unity of the object consists in bringing the two particular perceptions under a universal, i.e. the object. Simply put, we cannot experience objects without concepts, because it is an integral part of object knowledge, so the object "tree" consists of two types of components, namely the particular instances of "tree", i.e. the perceptions and the universal which specifies what classes as "tree" and neither of them alone classifies as knowledge. The whole process of their unification is much more complicated, involving what Kant calls schemata and productive/reproductive imagination, but suffice to say, the infant mind is far from tabula rasa and equipped with sophisticated pattern recognition machinery.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

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