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Quantum Mechanics and logic
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Quantum Mechanics and logic
Death Monkey
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Posted 08/20/08 - 04:35 AM:
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#11
DJPavel,

Please do me a favor. Check out this Standford lecture on Quantum Entanglement by Larry Susskind. Scroll up to 1h12m and listen for a few minutes when he talks about the implications of Bell’s theorem and answers questions (especially at 1h18m30s).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlLsTaJn9AQ

Yes, that is a very interesting lecture.

To me, the message is pretty clear: “Quantum Mechanics is not Classic logic”.

A very important point is that what Susskind is calling "classical logic" is not the standard notion of logic where you have true/false propositions, and nothing in-between. Rather, what he is calling "classical logic" is the application of standard logic to physics by using the assumption that measured properties (in this case, a particular component of electron spin) can be accurately described in terms of sets of objects and subsets with objects possessing specific properties. In other words, the idea that a given electron does have a specific value of the X component of its spin, at any given time.

So when he says that quantum mechanics isn't classical logic, he is not saying that QM cannot be formulated using standard logic. Not only can it be, but the entire set of mathematical tools he uses in that lecture are an example of him doing exactly that. What he is saying is that you cannot regard measurable quantities as being real properties that particles always have.

He explains that any attempt to explain QM with classic logic comes at the sacrifice of the speed of light limit. This is why I formulated the either/or choice: you either drop some laws of classic logic (like the distributive law) or you drop locality (i.e. allow over the speed of light information transmission). The former sounds counterintuitive and contradictory, the latter – against the empirical evidence. That’s why I called them both “evil”.

There are two problems here.

First, the former does not require that one drop the distributive law. It just means that an electron does not actually have a property called "X component of spin". More profoundly, it means that none of what we think of as "measurable properties" are actually properties in a classical sense. You cannot model them in terms of having a set of objects with various intersecting subsets of objects that do or do not have those properties. Instead you have to model it using vector spaces and subspaces.

Second, non-local hidden variable models do not have to violate any emprical evidence. There is absolutely no problem with there being information transfer at faster than the speed of light, as long as there is no energy transfer at faster than the speed of light. Of course, a consequence of this is that no useful information can be transmitted faster than C, but as Dr. Susskind points out, this is not the case. Even if Bob's measurement of his electron's spin does somehow cause Alice's electron to suddenly jump into a particular state, neither person can make use of that fact to communicate. Neither one of them knows anything more than they would in a purely random model with no hidden deterministic variables.

As far as I can see, either possibility works out fine. It may be that there are non-local deterministic hidden variables, and that some kind of faster-than-light communication occurs between entangled particles. Or it may be that observables like spin and momentum are not properties in the classical sense, and therefore cannot be modeled in terms of sets and subsets the way we normally would. It may even be that both of these possibilities are true. We just don't know. Neither of these possibilities are paradoxical or self-contradictory, and neither of them violate any emprical evidence.


DM

Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.
DJPavel
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Posted 08/21/08 - 09:16 PM:
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#12
Hi DeathMonkey,

I see what you're saying this time. Thank you for a nice clarification. I need to sleep on it a little until it all sets nicely, but in the light of what you said, how would you comment on the following from Wikipedia:

Wiki wrote:
In mathematical physics and quantum mechanics, quantum logic is a set of rules for reasoning about propositions which takes the principles of quantum theory into account. This research area and its name originated in the 1936 paper by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann, who were attempting to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of classical boolean logic with the facts concerning the measurement of complementary variables in quantum mechanics, such as position and momentum.


The full Wiki article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic

Further:

Wiki wrote:
In his paper "Is logic empirical?" [2] Hilary Putnam, whose PhD studies were supervised by Reichenbach, pursued Quine's idea systematically. In the first place, he made an analogy between laws of logic and laws of geometry: once Euclid's postulates were believed to be truths about the physical space in which we live, but modern physical theories are based around non-Euclidean geometries, with a different and fundamentally incompatible notion of straight line.

In particular, he claimed that what physicists have learned about quantum mechanics provides a compelling case for abandoning certain familiar principles of classical logic for this reason: realism about the physical world, which Putnam generally maintains, demands that we square up to the anomalies associated with quantum phenomena. Putnam understands realism about physical objects as involving that the properties of momentum and position exist for quanta. Since the uncertainty principle says that either of them can be determined, but both cannot be determined at the same time, he faces a paradox. He sees the only possible resolution of the paradox as lying in the embrace of quantum logic, in which he believes this is not inconsistent.


Also, I'd appreciate it if you could clarify something else. In my previous post to starlarvae, I answered the question of 'how does a system decide which state to transition to':

DJPavel wrote:
I would answer that there is no decision to be made. The existing state is a weighted average of all the possible states of the system. That’s what the superposition means. The next state is determined by the evolution of the wave function for that system. The wave function is itself deterministic, but it doesn’t determine a specific macro state of the system, it determines the probabilities of all possible states, and thus the overall classical macro state as, yet again, weighted average of all possibilities.


First, does this sound accurate? If so, what about the measurement problem? Doesn't the interaction with the environment cause the collapse of the wave function to a specific value? Then what happens to the weighted average as the macro state? I would greatly appreciate the clarification. Thanks!

DJP

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Posted 08/22/08 - 03:42 AM:
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#13
DJPavel,

I see what you're saying this time. Thank you for a nice clarification. I need to sleep on it a little until it all sets nicely, but in the light of what you said, how would you comment on the following from Wikipedia:

Wiki wrote:
In mathematical physics and quantum mechanics, quantum logic is a set of rules for reasoning about propositions which takes the principles of quantum theory into account. This research area and its name originated in the 1936 paper by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann, who were attempting to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of classical boolean logic with the facts concerning the measurement of complementary variables in quantum mechanics, such as position and momentum.


The full Wiki article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic

Further:

Wiki wrote:
In his paper "Is logic empirical?" [2] Hilary Putnam, whose PhD studies were supervised by Reichenbach, pursued Quine's idea systematically. In the first place, he made an analogy between laws of logic and laws of geometry: once Euclid's postulates were believed to be truths about the physical space in which we live, but modern physical theories are based around non-Euclidean geometries, with a different and fundamentally incompatible notion of straight line.

In particular, he claimed that what physicists have learned about quantum mechanics provides a compelling case for abandoning certain familiar principles of classical logic for this reason: realism about the physical world, which Putnam generally maintains, demands that we square up to the anomalies associated with quantum phenomena. Putnam understands realism about physical objects as involving that the properties of momentum and position exist for quanta. Since the uncertainty principle says that either of them can be determined, but both cannot be determined at the same time, he faces a paradox. He sees the only possible resolution of the paradox as lying in the embrace of quantum logic, in which he believes this is not inconsistent.

I think that there is a fundamental flaw to this kind of reasoning.

If you think about it, the cental issue here is the assumption of what Putnam is calling "realism". Specifically, he is basically axiomatically asserting that properties such as position and momentum must be real, well-defined properties of quanta.

The problem, of course, is that quantum mechanics seems to pretty clearly indicate that they are not.

Now, he proposes to resolve this apperant contradiction by essentially redefining what he means by "realism". You see, the formal set theory representation of this, based on conventional boolean logic, is really just a formal way of specifying what one means by the rather informal, intuitive notion of "position and momentum being real properties of quanta". What Putnam is essentially doing is trying to save that informal intuitive notion, by reformalizing it in terms of a new "quantum logic", such that it no longer leads to a contradiction.

The problem I see with this is that it simply does not accomplish the intended goal. Quantum mechanics is counter-intuitive. The way position and momentum behave at the quantum level are counter-intuitive. No amount of playing around with different formal ways of describing it are going to change that. Quantum logic, and the associated version of sets in which Bell's inequalities need not hold, do not really provide us with anything we cannot obtain using ordinary logic and vector spaces. Nor does it "save" our intuitive notion of the realism of position and momentum, because the notion of "realism" under which one can say that position and momentum are "real" properties of quanta using quantum logic, bears no more resemblence to the conventional intuitive notion of realism than just saying that it is not the position and momentum that is "real", but instead something else (such as the wave-function itself).

In other words, I see it as basically just being an excersize in semantics. Quantum logic and the associated notions of realism are really just different ways of saying exactly the same things that we can say using classical logic vector spaces.

Also, I'd appreciate it if you could clarify something else. In my previous post to starlarvae, I answered the question of 'how does a system decide which state to transition to':

DJPavel wrote:
I would answer that there is no decision to be made. The existing state is a weighted average of all the possible states of the system. That’s what the superposition means. The next state is determined by the evolution of the wave function for that system. The wave function is itself deterministic, but it doesn’t determine a specific macro state of the system, it determines the probabilities of all possible states, and thus the overall classical macro state as, yet again, weighted average of all possibilities.


First, does this sound accurate? If so, what about the measurement problem? Doesn't the interaction with the environment cause the collapse of the wave function to a specific value? Then what happens to the weighted average as the macro state? I would greatly appreciate the clarification. Thanks!

This issue is a bit tricky to understand.

First, if one looks at the formal math of quantum mechanics, without trying to make any physical interpretations, there really is no mysterious "measurement problem".

As you said, the wave-function evolves deterministically. A measurement is really nothing more than an interaction between the system in question, and a "measurement system", which is itself just another very complex quantum mechanical system. When this interaction occurs, decoherence is the result. The wave-function (and remember I'm just talking about the math here) does not collapse to a single value. It collapses to a superposition of many discrete values.

The thing is, due to the linear nature of the superposition, we can easily show that this resulting wave-function can be expressed as a linear combination of all the wave-functions you would have gotten, had the wave-function randomly collapsed to a single value.

This is what leads to the many worlds interpretation of QM. We can imagine each of these discrete values as being a single universe, in which that particular outcome occured. The math says that these universes will not interact, so to any individual observer, it will appear as though the wave function collapsed to a single value, but really that is just because his part of the wave-function doesn't interact with the others.

Of course, that is just one possible interpretation. There are many others. But what it demonstrates is that the so-called "measurement problem" is a product of choosing an interpretation in which a single outcome is somehow "chosen", rather than some other interpretation. We have no way of justifying the claim that this actually does happen, and therefore no justification is asserting that the measurement problem is a real problem at all. In effect, it is a manufactored problem, rather like trying to figure out who would win at arm wrestling, Superman or the Hulk?

The bottom line is that the math works. We don't know exactly why the math works, but that is a fundamental fact of life in Physics. "Why" questions can only ever be answered by reducing them to other more fundamental "what" questions. No matter how far you go, you are always going to end up with your most fundamental theory being a purely descriptive one, where you cannot yet explain why it works that way. Right now, that is QM. Maybe someday we will figure out why QM works the way it does. I rather think that we will. But you can be sure that when we do, the new, more fundamental theory that explains why it works the way it does will also be a purely descriptive theory, and everyone will then be trying to figure out why it works the way it does.

And while many people seem to be hopefully expecting the new, more fundamental theory to be an intuitively compelling one (unlike QM), so that even if they can't demonstrate why it works the way it does, they can nevertheless come up with satisfying possible explanations for why it does, I rather suspect that this hope is terribly misguided. I fully expect whatever more fundamental theory ends up replacing QM, to be even more counter-intuitive than QM is.


DM

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DJPavel
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Posted 09/03/08 - 07:09 PM:
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#14
Hi DeathMonkey,

sorry for a delayed response (I've been out of town)


DeathMonkey wrote:
If you think about it, the cental issue here is the assumption of what Putnam is calling "realism". Specifically, he is basically axiomatically asserting that properties such as position and momentum must be real, well-defined properties of quanta.


Ok, I see that, but aren't you also axiomatically asserting the classical logic (CL further). So, on what basis do you prefer one set of axioms over the other? In other words, why not axiomatically assume realism and let the distributive law of CL go?

DeathMonkey wrote:
The problem, of course, is that quantum mechanics seems to pretty clearly indicate that they are not.


Is it really clear though? The theory of QM is an interpretation of the experimental results, is it not? But those results can be interpreted into a theory by assuming realism and letting some CL laws go, can they not?

Again, please understand, I'm not saying that what you're telling me is wrong. I'm simply questioning you as I'm trying to understand the topic and see how it fits into the whole conceptual framework in my mind. I don't have sufficient knowledge of the subject, but I'm curious, can the observations of quantum effects be formulated meaningfully, in a practical way, without the distributive law of CL and "saving" realism instead (as particles having certain position and momentum). I mean I understand that that would require some hidden variables and that Bell's inequalities prove there's no such thing. But I'm still not clear on whether such proof is experimental or a logical necessity entailed by the conceptualization of the QM theory that is built on CL. If it's the latter, then what if we can reconceptulaize QM to meaningfully explain the experimental observations just as well, but without relying on some of the CL. Then Bell's inequalities would NOT disprove the non-existence of hidden variables and we safely believe that particles in fact have precise position and momentum. Now, if the experimental observations demonstrate no hidden variables (not the interpretation of the observations) then I won't have any further argument.



Let me switch gears for a minute and take a different approach to the whole CL thing. I keep bringing it up and you keep passing by it. If you don't wish to discuss this angle, please let me know so I'll stop trying to engage you in it. I'll try to be brief.

Unless you believe in Gods and things "out there", you should agree with me that every attribute of human cognition has to be explained in terms of neuroscience and evolutionary biology. The CL does not get a free ticket from such requirement. If so, it should be clear then that the way we evolved to reason does not have a design goal to be consistent with some absolute order out there, but rather simply to be statistically good enough to sustain metabolism of the body until it can make copies of itself. On this view, our cognition is shaped by the kind of body we have and environment we interact with. Our brain seems to manipulate memories (information received from stimuli) in certain ways to get things done. We get sophisticated in these ways and we formalize them, stating that for certain tasks, P had better not equal not-P. We make these formal systems more complicated as the tasks of manipulating the environment become as complex. But to regard these systems as absolute reference bars is to be imagining platonic worlds. It really comes down to me signaling (through agreed on protocol (natural language)) to you my mental states that I hope will be meaningfully interpreted in the context of your memories and experiences. Whether my manipulation of states follows the rules of CL is thus only relevant in a sense of making meaningful interpretation in your head. Look at this very conversation. I don't necessarily care if I follow CL. My task is to frame my belief using metaphors that I think will be properly interpreted in your context, signal that belief to you, and hope that the signal produces the kind of emotional response in you I intended. Now, if I wanted to launch a man in space with your help, I'd say "ok, the task is more complicated and we developed a tool we need to follow, the CL". Does this make any sense?

I made a joke earlier that the more I watch either the US Democrat or Republican conventions, the more I'm confident of my claims about CL. It's not about logic. It's all about communicating emotions and getting things accomplished. Anything else is a tool that has relevance only for the purposes at hand. Why am I bringing this up? The QM theory is one of such developed tools, based on ontologically just as "fundamental" tool (CL). If this tool produces results that go against our emotions (counterintuitive), there is no danger (we won't crash like computers) to reconceptualize the theory and produce something more appealing. We've seen that already in the history of science, have we not?

What do you think?




DeathMonkey wrote:


This issue is a bit tricky to understand.

First, if one looks at the formal math of quantum mechanics, without trying to make any physical interpretations, there really is no mysterious "measurement problem".

As you said, the wave-function evolves deterministically. A measurement is really nothing more than an interaction between the system in question, and a "measurement system", which is itself just another very complex quantum mechanical system. When this interaction occurs, decoherence is the result. The wave-function (and remember I'm just talking about the math here) does not collapse to a single value. It collapses to a superposition of many discrete values.

The thing is, due to the linear nature of the superposition, we can easily show that this resulting wave-function can be expressed as a linear combination of all the wave-functions you would have gotten, had the wave-function randomly collapsed to a single value.

This is what leads to the many worlds interpretation of QM. We can imagine each of these discrete values as being a single universe, in which that particular outcome occured. The math says that these universes will not interact, so to any individual observer, it will appear as though the wave function collapsed to a single value, but really that is just because his part of the wave-function doesn't interact with the others.

Of course, that is just one possible interpretation. There are many others. But what it demonstrates is that the so-called "measurement problem" is a product of choosing an interpretation in which a single outcome is somehow "chosen", rather than some other interpretation. We have no way of justifying the claim that this actually does happen, and therefore no justification is asserting that the measurement problem is a real problem at all. In effect, it is a manufactored problem, rather like trying to figure out who would win at arm wrestling, Superman or the Hulk?


Thank you. This is very helpful and insightful. So, I can see how the many world hypothesis resolves the issue, although I have a number of philosophical problems with it. It sounds like our mental theorizing transcends the whole totality of universes "out there", but physically it's not part of any of them, but one. Sounds very Platonic to me. So, other "people" in other disconnected Universes "discover" the same QM "law" and know about us just like we know about them. This of course postulates Mathematics to be fundamental to the totality of reality itself in some hyperuniverse "out there". I'm finding it hard to swallow. But that's the philosophical problem, especially after what I've just said about humans being simply sophisticated animals finely tuned to make copies of themselves.


DeathMonkey wrote:
The bottom line is that the math works. We don't know exactly why the math works, but that is a fundamental fact of life in Physics.


I'm not convinved it does. You;re presuming it works and then you get fascinated by the entailed results. But maybe you're putting the cart before the horse: the object of fascination is your own creation. Are you honestly willing to accept multiple Universes because math works out that way??


DeathMonkey wrote:
I fully expect whatever more fundamental theory ends up replacing QM, to be even more counter-intuitive than QM is.


I also expect something more "fundamental" coming out soon, but I'm more optimistic about the intuition part. I think QM is close as it gets to people simply rejecting counterintuitive theories as nonsensical, for one simple reason I mentined earlier: the theory has to relate to a set of memories and experiences in the mental frames we develop. Unless God himself shows up and says that's how it is, people will reject anything that makes no sense, no matter how "true" in some imaginary platonic world it might be claimed to be.

Remember Ptolemy's epicycles replaced by the Copernical model? So, we do have examples when a theory becomes less complex and more intuitive.


As always, nice chatting with you!


DJP
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Posted 09/04/08 - 01:51 AM:
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DJPavel,

Ok, I see that, but aren't you also axiomatically asserting the classical logic (CL further). So, on what basis do you prefer one set of axioms over the other? In other words, why not axiomatically assume realism and let the distributive law of CL go?

There are some very important differences.

First of all, the assumption of realism is an assumption about the nature of the world. The axioms of logic are the framework of a formal system. What you could say is that by attempting to use logic to describe the world, I am assuming that this form of logic can be used in that way. But even then, this is a provisional assumption. If it did not work, then we should abandon it and use something else. In fact, that is what this discussion is really about. What I am disputing is the argument that ordinary logic doesn't work, and should be replaced by some sort of quantum logic. But the fact of the matter is that ordinary logic works just fine. What doesn't work is the assumption of classical realism, which is itself formulated in terms of ordinary logic.

This brings me to the second point. As I mentioned before, I can't assume the kind of realism that is being disputed here without first axiomatically assuming ordinary logic, because it is formulated in terms of it. Again, I think it is important to note that what is being suggested by proponents of quantum logic is not that the assumption of classical realism can be somehow saved by using quantum logic instead of ordinary logic, but rather that classical realism can be replaced by some new form of realism that is formulated in terms of quantum logic, and that this new form of realism will somehow satisfy our intuitive notions of realism in a way that cannot be achieved with ordinary logic.

The problem, of course, is that quantum mechanics seems to pretty clearly indicate that they are not.

Is it really clear though?

I think it is quite clear. That is the whole source of the problem. Classical realism requires that if a property such as momentum is "real", then this property has a well-defined value at all times, regardless of whether it is being observed or not. This leads directly to Bell's inequalities.

The theory of QM is an interpretation of the experimental results, is it not? But those results can be interpreted into a theory by assuming realism and letting some CL laws go, can they not?

Again, I say no. When you replace ordinary logic with quantum logic, classical realism goes with it. All the use of quantum logic does is allow you to redefine "realism" to mean something different than classical realism, that is not invalidated by quantum mechanics.

Unless you believe in Gods and things "out there", you should agree with me that every attribute of human cognition has to be explained in terms of neuroscience and evolutionary biology. The CL does not get a free ticket from such requirement. If so, it should be clear then that the way we evolved to reason does not have a design goal to be consistent with some absolute order out there, but rather simply to be statistically good enough to sustain metabolism of the body until it can make copies of itself. On this view, our cognition is shaped by the kind of body we have and environment we interact with. Our brain seems to manipulate memories (information received from stimuli) in certain ways to get things done. We get sophisticated in these ways and we formalize them, stating that for certain tasks, P had better not equal not-P. We make these formal systems more complicated as the tasks of manipulating the environment become as complex. But to regard these systems as absolute reference bars is to be imagining platonic worlds.

I absolutely agree. This is why I said earlier that even the assumption that logic can be used to accurately model reality, is a provisional one. If, at some point, we find that it is lacking and that some other form of logic (such as quantum logic) works better, then we should switch to it. I just don't think that this is such a case. So far, ordinary logic works just fine for dealing with quantum mechanics. Quantum logic is really nothing more than a different way of saying exactly the same things.

I made a joke earlier that the more I watch either the US Democrat or Republican conventions, the more I'm confident of my claims about CL. It's not about logic. It's all about communicating emotions and getting things accomplished. Anything else is a tool that has relevance only for the purposes at hand. Why am I bringing this up? The QM theory is one of such developed tools, based on ontologically just as "fundamental" tool (CL). If this tool produces results that go against our emotions (counterintuitive), there is no danger (we won't crash like computers) to reconceptualize the theory and produce something more appealing. We've seen that already in the history of science, have we not?

What do you think?

Logic is a tool, and it is quite clear that we do not think in terms of logic, but rather use logic as a way of formalizing thinking. The determination of what axioms are most useful for formalizing our descriptions of reality, cannot be done analytically. It is, itself, based on our observations of the world, and about what seems to work.

I am really very much an instrumentalist and pragmatist myself. I regard all metaphysical descriptions as only being meaningful in a metaphorical way. That is, they should be taken as ways of conceptualizing the world, rather than as true/false propositions about the world. This goes for realism as well. I guess that is why I have no real problem with the issues that quantum mechanics raises for classical realism. I only regard classical realism as being a useful way of conceptualizing our observations of the world at the macroscopic scale. If it is not a useful way of conceptualizing what happens at the quantum level, then that's perfectly fine with me. I'll just find some other metaphysical interpretation that is.

Thank you. This is very helpful and insightful. So, I can see how the many world hypothesis resolves the issue, although I have a number of philosophical problems with it. It sounds like our mental theorizing transcends the whole totality of universes "out there", but physically it's not part of any of them, but one. Sounds very Platonic to me.

It is very Platonic. In fact, it is extremely similar to the notion that all logically possible worlds are eqaully "real", and that the only thing that makes this world any different from any of the others is that this happens to be the one that we are a part of.

Just keep in mind that we are talking about models here. The problems arise when you start saying that the model is somehow "true" (as opposed to just being an accurate description of our observations). That is why the various metaphysical interpretations of QM are metaphysical. One cannot meaningfully say that any of them are right or wrong. Those that attempt to do so are making a category mistake. What we can say is that some of them are better than others for conceptualizing various aspects of QM. For example, the Many Worlds interpretation provides a very intuitively compelling resolution to the "selection problem", as I described above. But it is quite counter-intuitive in other ways. Meanwhile for problems such as the photoelectric effect, or interference patters in the double slit experiment, the more traditional interpretations tend to be more intuitive.

So, other "people" in other disconnected Universes "discover" the same QM "law" and know about us just like we know about them.

This is exactly the sort of category mistake I mentioned. We cannot say that we know that these other universes exist. We cannot even really specify what it would mean to say that they do or do not exist. All we can really say is that it is an example of a model where observers would make the kinds of observations we do, but in which there is no "selection problem". Thus it serves to illustrate that the selection problem is just a result of choosing a particular type of metaphysical interpretation of QM, and not something intrinsic to QM, or something that follows from our observations of the world.

The bottom line is that the math works. We don't know exactly why the math works, but that is a fundamental fact of life in Physics.

I'm not convinved it does. You;re presuming it works and then you get fascinated by the entailed results. But maybe you're putting the cart before the horse: the object of fascination is your own creation. Are you honestly willing to accept multiple Universes because math works out that way??

No, my point is just the opposite. We don't know why the math works. The math is consistent with an infinite number of metaphysical interpretations, not just the Many Worlds interpretation. The Many Worlds interpretation is just one in which we do not need to postulate some sort of "selection process".

I fully expect whatever more fundamental theory ends up replacing QM, to be even more counter-intuitive than QM is.

I also expect something more "fundamental" coming out soon, but I'm more optimistic about the intuition part. I think QM is close as it gets to people simply rejecting counterintuitive theories as nonsensical, for one simple reason I mentined earlier: the theory has to relate to a set of memories and experiences in the mental frames we develop. Unless God himself shows up and says that's how it is, people will reject anything that makes no sense, no matter how "true" in some imaginary platonic world it might be claimed to be.

Well, that is tempered by utility.

For example, I know a lot of people who basically declare "I don't care what the scientists say. Quantum mechanics is bunk". But then they still use all that technology that depends on quantum theory. As long as there is a demand for technology, there will be people who have no choice but to accept what the scientific evidence tells us, no matter how counter-intuitive it may be, in order to use that knowledge to create the next Sony Playstation.

Remember Ptolemy's epicycles replaced by the Copernical model? So, we do have examples when a theory becomes less complex and more intuitive.

Less complex does not always mean more intuitive.

Anyway, I look at it kind of as a statistics game. Something is intuitive when it works pretty much the way we are used to things working in our everyday lives. When dealing with phenomena that are far removed from our everyday observations, and for which we have no real justification for assuming that they will work similarly to the way things work in our everyday lives, it is a pretty safe bet that they are probably going to work in some way that we never would have guessed.


DM

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Posted 09/04/08 - 06:30 AM:
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To say logic represents reality or anything in it, is a misrepresentation of logic.

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Posted 09/05/08 - 01:01 PM:
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I've been trying to catch up with the discussion. Whew. Anyone care to summarize conclusions so far?

And what about consciousness? Is it better accounted for with classical or quantum logic? confused



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Posted 09/07/08 - 09:24 PM:
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#18
Hi DeathMonkey,


Death Monkey wrote:


There are some very important differences.

First of all, the assumption of realism is an assumption about the nature of the world. The axioms of logic are the framework of a formal system. What you could say is that by attempting to use logic to describe the world, I am assuming that this form of logic can be used in that way. But even then, this is a provisional assumption. If it did not work, then we should abandon it and use something else. In fact, that is what this discussion is really about. What I am disputing is the argument that ordinary logic doesn't work, and should be replaced by some sort of quantum logic. But the fact of the matter is that ordinary logic works just fine. What doesn't work is the assumption of classical realism, which is itself formulated in terms of ordinary logic.

This brings me to the second point. As I mentioned before, I can't assume the kind of realism that is being disputed here without first axiomatically assuming ordinary logic, because it is formulated in terms of it. Again, I think it is important to note that what is being suggested by proponents of quantum logic is not that the assumption of classical realism can be somehow saved by using quantum logic instead of ordinary logic, but rather that classical realism can be replaced by some new form of realism that is formulated in terms of quantum logic, and that this new form of realism will somehow satisfy our intuitive notions of realism in a way that cannot be achieved with ordinary logic.


I see what you're saying. Ok, I think I'm convinced, although there's one unsettling issue I see popping up throughout your entire response. Just like the whole scientific enterprise, you keep talking about reality out there and representation of it in terms of models and interpretations. Your very first point makes a distinction about assumptions about the "nature of the world" and its representation (formal system tempered by utility). This is very Kantian, which is not surprising of course, if you know what I mean by making the noumena/phenomena distinction. But if you agree with me on the embodied approach to the human inquiry (as you seem to do), then the classical realism approach is incoherent. I'm not sure if you speak like you do because we haven't really developed a language yet to speak in a non-Cartesian way (like we're stuck with waves/particles when discussing electrons) or if you are really adopting the Kantian framework, just like any well known physicist I know of. I realize that not to do so is to be on a slippery slope to solipsism and that any scientist who would dare suggest the incoherence of the reality/representation dichotomy would be immediately considered a crackpot by the community. But I just can't see the Kantian framework survive in the face of what we learn from brain damaged people, animals, and computers. It looks like we create the reality by developing categories in the brain. But at the same time we can't be assuming the God's eye view. In other words, these very notions of reality being categorized by the brain ARE the themselves creations. It's like we're stuck chasing our own tale and can't say anything meaningful on the meta level. Does that make any sense? How can you assert the ontology of embodiment theory when the theory itself is embodied? I have no idea how to answer that question, but I want to explore this in a new thread (as soon as I free up a bit) and I really hope you will provide comments. At least for me, this has been a very fruitful exchange. Thank you!

DJP
DJPavel
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Posted 09/07/08 - 09:51 PM:
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#19
starlarvae wrote:
I've been trying to catch up with the discussion. Whew. Anyone care to summarize conclusions so far?

And what about consciousness? Is it better accounted for with classical or quantum logic? confused


Hi Starlarvae,

Basically, I got an impression (from various sources) that observations from QM cannot be coherently interpreted or formulated by Classic Logic (CL). DeathMonkey disputed that by arguing the apparent incoherence between the observations and interpretation lies in the underlying assumptions about realism. Once a more counterintuitive notion of realism is adopted, there is no paradox or violation of classic logic. Since classic realism itself is formulated in terms of classic logic, ditching CL in favor of some other logic, like quantum logic, will really reformulate realism to a counterintuitive version anyway, which will of course defeat the purpose of saving it in the first place. So, quantum logic seems to be simply another way or expressing the counterintuitive notion of realism and thus will not save the classic version.

I'll let you debate which version of physics explains consciousness with DeathMonkey, if he wishes so. I think I already stated my position in our exchange. I believe that inquiry into the ontology of consciousness is void of meaning and substance. Consciousness, to me, is a pragmatic distinction, just like the category of good and evil. It's only meaningful in a specific context of discourse. I'm speaking of course like Kant here, the position I just criticized in my response to DeathMonkey, but I'm simply adopting the vocabulary and categories that are meaningful in a traditional sense.

I like making an analogy between concsiousness and health. I borrowed it from Dennett, who I thought made a brilliant comment when he was asked about a possibility of a zombie acting exactly like a human, but lacking consciousness. His reply was that it's like asking to imagine a human whose organs are funtioning properly, but who is not healthy. It's a dressed up contradiction! "Health" here, like consciousness, is what I mean by being a "pragmatic distinction".

DJP
TecnoTut
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Posted 09/08/08 - 05:11 AM:
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#20
DJP wrote:

I borrowed it from Dennett, who I thought made a brilliant comment when he was asked about a possibility of a zombie acting exactly like a human, but lacking consciousness. His reply was that it's like asking to imagine a human whose organs are funtioning properly, but who is not healthy. It's a dressed up contradiction!


Zombist do not claim health is a non-functional property. But they do claim qualia are non-functional. That's an important difference, and if ignored, becomes a strawman and misrepresentation of zombist views. In fact, zombist say all properties, whether it's life, or health, or perception, are functional. Qualia are the only exception to the rule.

Take another example, viz. life, to see how Dennett misrepresents positions, Lets' say life is a set or cluster of specific functions, viz. the ability to digest, excrete, grow, metabolize, move, and reproduce. The zombist would claim that a life-zombie is one that does all those functions (digests, excretes, reproduce, etc.) but is not alive!!! Viola, a contradiction, right? No. Zombist do not claim life is a non-functional property, thus they would never hold the position that if something fills those roles, then it's not alive.

He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest

Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s

Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
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