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Problem of Evil revisited

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Problem of Evil revisited

keda
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/23/06 - 03:28 AM: Subject: Problem of Evil revisited	#1
1. God is omnipotent 2. God is omnibenevolent 3. Suffering exists 4. Omnibenevolence implies preventing suffering when able to do so. 5. Omnipotense implies ability to prevent all suffering ________________________________________ God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent (Thus God does not exist) Often the problem of evil is represented such that premise 4 is not explicit, however that premise is the problematic one: It is a normative statement that says it is immoral to not prevent suffering when possible. A theist does not have to accept premise 4. If so the argument reduces to this: 1. God is omnipotent 2. God is omnibenevolent 3. Suffering exists 5. Omnipotense implies ability to prevent all suffering ________________________________________ God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent or Omnibenevolence does not imply preventing suffering when able to do so. (Thus if God exists, Omnibenevolence does not imply preventing suffering when able to do so.)
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

rabeldin
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Posted 07/23/06 - 09:52 AM:	#2
Simple. The term "omnipoteent" is not descriptive of anything. If "God" is omnipotent, then he does not exist.
Leave no assumption unquestioned.

keda
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Posted 07/23/06 - 10:40 AM:	#3
rabeldin wrote: Simple. The term "omnipoteent" is not descriptive of anything. If "God" is omnipotent, then he does not exist. How does this relate to my post?
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

Petersean
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Posted 07/23/06 - 10:57 AM:	#4
Keda: I agree that the usual formulation of "omnibenevolence" is something like what you wrote. Namely: 4. Omnibenevolence implies preventing suffering when able to do so. Let me humbly suggest that a better formula might be: 4. Omnibenevolence implies the will to prevent suffering. I offer this because the idea of "benevolence" implies a "will to the good" and the idea of "when able to do so" is really part of the element of "omnipotence." But I think that even this definition is insufficient because it implies that "not suffering" is the highest good that God wills, which clearly is not the case. Sometimes suffering is part of some other good, such as when it leads to childbirth or when an athelete exercises or when suffering leads someone away from worse suffering. Moreover, focusing on "not suffering" ignores the idea that benevolence truly implies the sharing or bestowing of goods by one to another. In ordinary parlance, we generally deem a person benevolent when he shares out of his surplus to provide for the need of another. So, I would suggest the following definition for "omnibenevolence": 4. Omnibenevolence implies the will to share or bestow the highest good. This is more in accord with the historic Christian tradition - the real Christian tradition - which recognizes that the goods that God shares or bestows are things like light, food, air, animals and, ultimately, the imago dei - rationality itself. It also reconizes that not all goods are equal. Possessing some good means sometimes not having a different good. There is a hierarchy of goods - some goods are higher than others - plants enjoy the good of growth, animals enjoy the good of mobility, and humans enjoy the good of rationality. In this hierarchy, rationality is the highest good, because it is the one proper to human beings. That highest good - the good of rationality - necessitates the capacity for intellect, memory and will, which means the capacity for judgment and choice; hence one of the goods that humans share with God is free choice. As I noted, the exercise of rationality might mean choosing one good as opposed to another, either because of the capacity for judgment and choice or because a greater good has the capacity for utilizing a lesser good. Nonetheless, even if the exercise of rationality results in choosing a lesser good, the exercise of the rational capacity is still a good, because it involves a sharing in a good shared in or bestowed by God. So, God's omnibenevolence means God wills for humanst to share the highest good which is the imago dei - i.e., rationality and the capacity for choice - and God's omnipotence means that humans in fact have the capacity for rationality and choice. Since rationality is the highest good, it would appear that we necessarily live in a rational world where actions have consequences and people can, and do, suffer. Some of this, incidentally, comes from reflecting on some of ST prima pars, 14 that I read last Thursday; I think I've stayed true to the scholastic spirit. I have no idea what Kant would say in response, and I'd be interested in hearing that; something about autonomy is my guess.
"I begin by taking. I shall find scholars afterwards to demonstrate my perfect right." - Frederick the Great

paintballrdude
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Posted 07/23/06 - 11:03 AM:	#5
keda wrote: 1. God is omnipotent 2. God is omnibenevolent 3. Suffering exists 4. Omnibenevolence implies preventing suffering when able to do so. 5. Omnipotense implies ability to prevent all suffering ________________________________________ God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent (Thus God does not exist) Often the problem of evil is represented such that premise 4 is not explicit, however that premise is the problematic one: It is a normative statement that says it is immoral to not prevent suffering when possible. A theist does not have to accept premise 4. If so the argument reduces to this: 1. God is omnipotent 2. God is omnibenevolent 3. Suffering exists 5. Omnipotense implies ability to prevent all suffering ________________________________________ God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent or Omnibenevolence does not imply preventing suffering when able to do so. (Thus if God exists, Omnibenevolence does not imply preventing suffering when able to do so.) No matter how you look at it the term Omnibenevolent means "Perfectly good". There is no way around it whether you believe in premise or not. In order to be perfectly good you must act perfectly good in the stupidest of explanation. Is it possible to have an Omnibenevolent and Omnipotent God? Yes. But the simple fact is the suffering on this earth and the bible contradict this fact. This is why I create such threads as "God's omnibenevolence allows me to be Agnostic" and believe there is no such thing as hell. To be perfectly good you must be perfectly merciful. To condemn a soul to a life of eternal punishment just for being agnostic, even though they have lived a just and moral life hardly represents omnibenevolence. The concept of Hell goes against God's omnibenevolence and omnipotency as well. How can such a God condemn one of this children HE CREATED in his image, to a life of ETERNAL punishment for something done in the spec of time. Not only is that unmerciful, but unjust as the short existance you had on Earth, hardly compares to eternity. After all there are more logical solutions than hell. Why not just distinguish the bad soul from existance? God has the power since he is omnipotent...

paintballrdude
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Posted 07/23/06 - 11:19 AM:	#6
Petersean wrote: I offer this because the idea of "benevolence" implies a "will to the good" Omnibenevolence is not defined as a "will to the good" nor a "will to do good" in case that is what you meant. Rather it is defined as perfectly good, perfectly just, perfectly merciful and all-good and all-loving. Will is not a characteristic of Omnibenevolence which you have based your whole post on. This is just not true. If Omnibenevolence meant a "Will to do good", that would imply the possibility to do evil as if there was no possibility to do other than good than will would not be needed. There is no other possibility to do evil in the definition of Omnibenevolence and therefore "will" is misplaced in your definition.

BubbaSwitzler
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Posted 07/23/06 - 11:38 AM:	#7
Petersean wrote: But I think that even this definition is insufficient because it implies that "not suffering" is the highest good that God wills, which clearly is not the case. I thought your other points were good but I wanted to focus on this because it is here that the entire idea of a "problem of evil" lives or dies. The idea that suffering is evil in and of itself is a problematic one. If one views suffering merely as a means to an end (and good insofar as the end is good) then the "problem of evil" pretty much vanishes. It is no challenge, of course, to identify examples of suffering for a larger good as you cited several. My favorite is training for sports (and, indeed, sports itself in many respects). Or even simpler: How many people would volunteer for a surgery that removed any experience of pain? In fact, such people exist and they are constantly in mortal danger. The larger question is whether God could have created a universe in which suffering was unnecessary. This is an interesting but highly speculative question. However, I think we can answer theoretically: suffering is an inevitabe consequence of choice and consequences. If I prefer chocolate to vanilla then I will suffer when I choose vanilla over chocolate.
"Can anything good come from Nazareth?"

keda
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Posted 07/23/06 - 11:54 AM:	#8
Petersean For Kant, to morality autonomy is more essential than rationality. In fact Kant argues that humans are by nature rational beings (much like Aristoteles) subordinating desires and inclinations under reason, and is beyond this merely animal (but perhaps you define rationality differently?). This is however not enough for morality, which requires choice i.e. free will. Kant argues that there are three types of values: market value, fancy value and dignity. Out of these only market value and dignity are teleological in nature (is in our interest) while fancy value is not in our interests but is aesthetically pleasing nonetheless. The two others can be called goods i suppose, but market value is not good in itself, but good because of something else (why it can be traded for something of equal value). Dignity is good in itself, and the only thing that is good in itself according to Kant is good will. Everything else derives its goodness from it, since (Kant argues) that those things can be misused in various ways by an evil person, thus requiring good will. This however does not mean that dignity is the highest good (summum bonum) although it is a good that cannot be traded for anything else in the world. The summum bonum is the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to virtue, which Kant argues can only be caused by God. We cannot do this in his place because we do not have intellectual intuition, by which he judges our hearts (we can only judge apperances). Kant talks a lot about outward morality and idolatry that has no moral value, because of ulterior motives behind those acts. Just because someone acts generous does thus not mean that they are morally good, e.g. Cain's gift or the rich people who gave of their surplus. Ends and consequences don't need to be considered at all when it comes to evaluating morality, because morality is a selfcontained value, nothing that derives its value in the light of something else. The problem with premise 4 is of course that it would conflict with God's justice, that is punishing the wicked. God could of course prevent their suffering, but if so then he wouldn't be causing the summum bonum, which in turn would make it rational to do evil (since you can get away with it).
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

keda
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Posted 07/23/06 - 12:01 PM:	#9
paintballrdude wrote: To be perfectly good you must be perfectly merciful. To condemn a soul to a life of eternal punishment just for being agnostic, even though they have lived a just and moral life hardly represents omnibenevolence. Nobody is arguing this though. Agnosticism is just fine, I'm agnostic myself, and its better to be an agnostic than a mysticist. The concept of Hell goes against God's omnibenevolence and omnipotency as well. How can such a God condemn one of this children HE CREATED in his image, to a life of ETERNAL punishment for something done in the spec of time. Not only is that unmerciful, but unjust as the short existance you had on Earth, hardly compares to eternity. After all there are more logical solutions than hell. Why not just distinguish the bad soul from existance? God has the power since he is omnipotent... Read my previous post. It would be just if those who are condemend deserve their punishment and rational morality demands justice, which only God can provide.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin

Petersean
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Posted 07/23/06 - 12:43 PM:	#10
paintballrdude wrote: Omnibenevolence is not defined as a "will to the good" nor a "will to do good" in case that is what you meant. Rather it is defined as perfectly good, perfectly just, perfectly merciful and all-good and all-loving. Will is not a characteristic of Omnibenevolence which you have based your whole post on. This is just not true. If Omnibenevolence meant a "Will to do good", that would imply the possibility to do evil as if there was no possibility to do other than good than will would not be needed. There is no other possibility to do evil in the definition of Omnibenevolence and therefore "will" is misplaced in your definition. You are mistaken. "Will" is an essential part of the definition of God's benevolence used within the Christian tradition. Under the traditional Christian understanding - which I hasten to define as including Aquinas and Augustine - God is love and He is benevolent insofar as he relates to His creations with love. What is missing from your understanding, and may or may not be implied in my post, is that God is perfect love, and love is "willing the good of another for the other's sake." "Love" in that sense - which is the historic Christian definition derived from Aristotle - is an act of will, not the tingly feeling we get when we meet the girl of our dreams. So, God is "love" and "love" means that God wills the good of his creatures for their own sake. This means that God wills the highest good for us, which is a share in His capacity for rationality - intellect, memory, will and judgment. In willing the highest good, that good means that lesser goods are logically excluded. As a poor analogy, let me suggest that I love my children, and because I love them I will that they become autonomous rational adults for their own sakes and not for mine, and, therefore, I necessarily will that they occasionally and for good cause experience the results of their free choices. The other place where your post misconceives the classic Christian ideas of God's "omni-benevolence" has to do with "willing good" and "willing evil." All actions, including sinful and evil actions, proceed from the actor's "willing the good" for the sake of the actor. There is no one - outside of cartoon character - who wills to do "pure" evil as such. (In fact, there is no such thing as "pure" evil.) Any person who acts, acts because the goal of their act is perceived by them to be a good, which it is, albeit it may be a lesser or disordered good. For example, a serial killer kills serially because he perceives serial killing to be a good for him - it gives him power, perhaps, or a sick pleasure. Power and pleasure are goods because they are desired or desirable ends, albeit they are inferior goods to love and charity, and they are goods that may be sought in a disordered fashion, such as when a glutton overeats or the serial killer kills.(Fn. 1) Hence, valuing a good in a disproportionate or disordered way, or choosing an inferior or lesser good over a higher good, and, ultimately, choosing temporal goods over eternal goods, are "evils", because they involve a departure from the highest temporal good of rationality, which is a virtue proper to human beings. Now, God who is good wills himself, which means that he doesn't will anything but good and He isn't going to choose a good other than the highest good which is himself because what can "move" anything away from the highest good. We, though, aren't God, and we can, and do, choose lesser goods over higher goods through our capacity for reason and choice and because of the concupiscence inherent in being a corporeal body. For example, I choose a lesser good every time I have that extra gin and tonic, which I know will put me at risk of a DUI and a hangover. But I find a good in that extra drink, albeit I know that it is a much lesser good than temperance and prudence. I don't think I'm willing evil; I think I'm willing good for myself, but the effect is a diminution of my reason, prudence and justice, which is an evil. But, perhaps, I'm the only person who has experiences like that. _____________ 1. Come to think of it, I think that Hannibal Lector makes a similar point in Silence of the Lambs when he points out to Clarice that she can track Buffalo Bob by determining what he covets. He says, "What does this man do, Clarice, this man who you seek. He covets..." or something like that off the top of my head. It helps if you do the creepy voice as well.
"I begin by taking. I shall find scholars afterwards to demonstrate my perfect right." - Frederick the Great

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