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Private Language and Zombies

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Private Language and Zombies

worldlogicleague
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Posted 05/16/09 - 04:47 AM:	#21
YadaYada wrote: When the honest zombie goes for a walk on a moonless winter night and sees midnight black snow, does it say that "snow is white"? Why would a Zombie have been given/have the rule All snow is white? And from this reason: fact that is snow rule all snow is white conclusion (inferred fact) that snow is white Wouldn't the Zombie being at least as intelligent as a humanoid robot AI use the same procedure of: perceive - process with its camera/sensors the terrain fact that is snow (inferred from data readings) fact that snow is black (inferred from its data readings) I think a Zombie would only know "Usually snow is white." but would just use its cameras/sensors and perceptive inference to form the facts: that is snow and that snow is black. That's what would probably be found in a rule-based expert system AI. As an AI programmer I'd like to know: As a Robot AI stares at his sensory data of the black snow, properly inferred, is he experiencing that black snow in the here and now as a discrete perceptual event? Should we say that if a brain-duplicating RAI - in that moment - "sees" or "experiences" the same sense data types, in this same way as humans, that RAI has human consciousness? Edited by worldlogicleague on 05/19/09 - 05:11 AM

davidchalmers
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Posted 05/17/09 - 06:11 PM:	#22
Banno: it's a tricky question whether a zombie could have beliefs, knowledges, hunches, etc. That depends on whether those things require consciousness by definition. One might say that there can be unconscious beliefs, so belief doesn't require consciousness. But then one might say in response that even unconscious beliefs require concepts and that possessing concepts requires some connection to consciousness. I can't resolve the issue here, but I'm increasingly inclined to hold tha something deep about belief is tied to consciousness, so that zombies wouldn't have beliefs in the full sense. Still, they might still have beliefs in some watered-down sense (dispositions to produce certain sorts of behavior and reports, for a start, and probably more). So in addressing your question about honest zombies, I assuming an interpretation of belief on which one might say that zombies could have beliefs. If one doesn't do that, then of course one will have to rephrase the question, e.g. in terms of certain sorts of zombie behavior. Yadayada: I don't see why in principle a zombie system couldn't be equipped with perceptual inputs connected to a report module, allowing it to report "snow is white" even without a conscious experience of snow is white. Things start to get tricky when e.g. one asks the system "how do you know?". It presumably won't say, "Because I consciously see it as white". Maybe it could say "I just know", or "Because my sensors sent the information", or something. One might then ask "Do you know what white is?", and its answer presumably can't appeal to its direct conscious experience of whiteness -- perhaps it would come out with some book knowledge, suggesting that in certain respects its concept of whiteness (if it has such a concept at all) differs from our experience-based concept. Something similar might go for its concepts of sweetness and beauty (unenlightened's examples), perhaps? In any case, it's certainly tricky. There's a lot about this sort of thing toward the end of my old paper "Consciousness and Cognition".

YadaYada
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Posted 05/18/09 - 10:32 PM:	#23
Prof. Chalmers, I very much appreciate your reply. Just to clarify, if you don't mind: Sweetness, awe (beauty), and colors are not properties of the outside world. These are inherent independent qualities of mind that are then correlated to the senses. For example, in synesthesia, in particular instances the color red may be heard or tasted as well as be seen. However, formal properties of universals (snow, white) are cultural conventions. Without free will, the robot is preprogrammed socially to know the truth that snow is white. But the rebellious robot will necessarily need to appeal to two separate set of metaphysical programs to choose whether black snow is "really" white. This choice can be either inductive when at least one known premis can be applied, else just plain random. The realist robot will say "snow is white" in disregard of its senses because it is only programmed for a single reality. But shouldn't a metaphysical anti-realist robot attempt to appeal to induction prior to choosing between the competing formal and contingent realities? Edit:Perhaps better, Shouldn't the anti-realist robot just say that "snow is white" is formally true but in this particular context "snow is black" is also true"? Many thanks. Edited by YadaYada on 05/19/09 - 03:38 AM
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

EasterBunny
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Posted 08/17/09 - 06:09 PM:	#24
Makarismos wrote: (i.e. If a “zombie” can speak, can feel pain, cry, laugh etc. Then we would normally conclude that it is experiencing the world as we do. How could we tell that it was not?) Exactly. I've been trying (without success for some reason) to get my post up about this very same question. If you cannot tell a zombie from 'normal' persons, then how would we ever know that they exist or not? In this respect, the idea of philosophical zombies as a tool seems a bit useless. In my opinion, we don't even need to introduce philosophical zombies, as the problems of understanding other minds, whether they exist or not and the uniqueness of qualia seem to be intractable enough. Chalmers' zombies just serve to remind us all that we are alone with our respective qualia. In regards to consciousness, I feel that we are yet to arrive at the right question as to its nature. OK, so we don't fully understand "the mind" or what consciousness is, but I have never fully understood why the idea of mind and body being two distinct things was ever introduced to try and bridge that alleged gap (cheeky side note: as I'm able to imagine a monist state then surely it is possible). I have a hunch that consciousness is just an idea rather than a thing (i.e.: the name we give to the synthesised data of a huge array of synchronised biological sensors/feedback), and that this semantic quagmire is what is causing so many problems. I've always thought that Steve Grand was on to something with his "Lucy" android, where the central factor was Lucy "growing up" from "childhood" to maturity and her body adapting to the environment. Isn't it interesting that the amount of data that is stored in our brains (via experience, exposure to our environment and other minds) seems to correspondingly increase with our self-awareness (and decrease as we get older and lose our memories).

MarchHare
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Posted 08/17/09 - 07:48 PM:	#25
This thread once again reminds me of a classic piece of Jerry Fodor, which goes something like this: "I have heard it said that there is an argument, of a certain Viennese providence, which shows that all language is necessarily public and that the meaning of words are entirely determined by their social use. I would quite like to hear this argument, since it would mean I could give up philosophy and pursue sailing and fishing, which I find much more easy. However, since no-one has been agree on exactly what this argument IS, I continue with my work." I'm sympathetic towards the later Wittgenstein, but it is a sad fact: ask two people what the private language argument is and you'll get five answers, probably none of which actually take the form of an argument.
Doubt requires a reason to doubt. Nothing is immune from potential doubt. The correct response to a question isn't always to try to give the question's answer.

quietstormy
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Posted 08/17/09 - 11:28 PM:	#26
Dr. Chalmers I just wanted to say I have been researching my own into this field for some time and have found similar conclusions (without recognozing your name until yesterday), with regard reductionistic themes regarding the nature of receptive consciousness. The point from my perspective is: is philosophy able to concern itself with such ideas of consciousness which would allow it then to function from a strictly analetical theme. This appears to be your precise questionings. Edited by quietstormy on 08/17/09 - 11:37 PM

quietstormy
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Posted 08/17/09 - 11:32 PM:	#27
I really value your idea of zombies and so on. I tend to take the view they are the sacrareligious figures which inspire debate as to genius and conceptions apriori from a strictly philosohical pov. I tend to agree with the zombie concept in that there is no other reality which we could posit in place of the idea it is brilliant. Edited by quietstormy on 08/17/09 - 11:38 PM

vuic
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Posted 08/18/09 - 03:59 AM:	#28
MarchHare wrote: This thread once again reminds me of a classic piece of Jerry Fodor, which goes something like this: "I have heard it said that there is an argument, of a certain Viennese providence, which shows that all language is necessarily public... This sounds quite preposterous. Fodor starts distorting Wittgenstein's observation at the very moment he attempts to state it. As if Wittgenstein himself did not say enough times that however hard we try we will not be able to point to any necessary (essential) features in any concept including those of game and language. "MarchHare" wrote: I'm sympathetic towards the later Wittgenstein, but it is a sad fact: ask two people what the private language argument is and you'll get five answers, probably none of which actually take the form of an argument. That is because Wittgenstein did not intend to put forward any argument, pace his many commentators. He confined himself solely to description but his commentators sorely misunderstand him on that point. He used to write things like this in the PI: "We may not advance any kind of theory...We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And he famously said, Don't think but look! That is, stop theorising about language and mind and instead go and see for yourself how the relevant words are actually used in ordinary speech.

MarchHare
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Posted 08/18/09 - 07:25 AM:	#29
vuic wrote: This sounds quite preposterous. Fodor starts distorting Wittgenstein's observation at the very moment he attempts to state it. As if Wittgenstein himself did not say enough times that however hard we try we will not be able to point to any necessary (essential) features in any concept including those of game and language. Fodor isn't trying to present Wittgenstein's position. He's talking about this "private language argument" that people keep on telling him about when they dismiss his work. Fodor admits that such an argument, if it existed and was sound, would make his work worthless, but he has been unsuccessful in finding out exactly what this "private language argument" is and how it proves that no private language can exist. "vuic" wrote: That is because Wittgenstein did not intend to put forward any argument, pace his many commentators. He confined himself solely to description but his commentators sorely misunderstand him on that point. He used to write things like this in the PI: "We may not advance any kind of theory...We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And he famously said, Don't think but look! That is, stop theorising about language and mind and instead go and see for yourself how the relevant words are actually used in ordinary speech. I agree; in fact, I don't think Wittgenstein put forward many arguments for his views at all, which perhaps explains his popularity. But you must admit, this means that one cannot talk about the existence of a "private language argument of a certain Viennese providence", which as I've said was Fodor's point. You have essentially conceded Fodor's point, hence Fodor does not go fishing as often as he would like.
Doubt requires a reason to doubt. Nothing is immune from potential doubt. The correct response to a question isn't always to try to give the question's answer.

MarchHare
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Posted 08/18/09 - 07:56 AM:	#30
Ah, found the quote at last! "Jerry Fodor" wrote: I'm aware that there is rumored to be an argument, vaguely Viennese in provenance, that proves that 'original' underived intentionality must inhere, not in mental representations nor in thoughts, but precisely in the formulas of public languages. I would be very pleased if such an argument actually turned up, since then pretty nearly everything I believe about language and mind would have been refuted, and I could stop worrying about RTM, and about what concepts are, and take off and go sailing, a pastime that I vastly prefer. Unfortunately, however, either nobody can remember how the argument goes or it's a secret they're unprepared to share with me. So I'll forge on. I paraphrased a lot, but it has been a year or two since I read any Fodor at all.
Doubt requires a reason to doubt. Nothing is immune from potential doubt. The correct response to a question isn't always to try to give the question's answer.

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