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Private Language and Zombies

davidchalmers
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Posted 05/10/09 - 02:57 PM:	#11
Fair point. But I'd say the same: I don't think possessing a concept (at a time) requires that one have grounds for reidentifying its referent at later times when it occurs. In addition, I also think that we often have good grounds for reidentifying phenomenal states using our phenomenal concepts. In particular, when one has a phenomenal concept R at t, and one has an experience that falls under R, one will often be in a good position to form a justified judgment of the sort "I am R". (My paper "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", available on my website, is all about this sort of thing.) I take it that one version of a Wittgensteinian challenge could then be put by saying: (i) how do you know that your concept R2, expressed by a term "R" at time t2, is the same as your original concept R1, expressed by the private term "R" at time t1, and (ii) if you can't know this, why think you have a coherent concept or are speaking a meaningful language at all? In response to (i), I'd say something like: one can never be certain that one's concepts haven't changed (that's a skeptical worry), but when they haven't changed, one has a default entitlement to presume that they haven't changed. And in response to (ii), I'd say that possessing a concept at a time, and speaking a language at a time, doesn't require knowing that one's concepts haven't changed relative to an earlier time. If so there is no obvious objection here to the possession of phenomenal concepts at a time, or to speaking a private language at a time. All that being said, of course Wittgenstein's discussion of private languages is very complex, and I can't pretend to have done justice to all or even most of it here (I'm certainly no expert on Wittgenstein). Feel free to run alternative versions of the argument by me.

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Posted 05/11/09 - 07:44 AM:	#12
Well I was just rereading Philisophical Investigations and it struck me how the private language argument was so similar to the discussions of philosiphical zombies. So I googled it, and what do I find but a discussion on that very topic which David Chalmers is participating in! So I had to sign up. Anyway, I am more persuaded by Wittgenstein's argument here, and I don't think that the argument that Prof. Chalmers presented above really gets to the heart of the problems with private language. First I think that the private language argument is at its core, an argument about falsifiability, and talk about "communities of speakers" can confuse the issue. Or to put it in a more Wittgensteinian way, private language is meaningless because it is impossible to apply the rules of a language game to the words of a private language. This does not mean that it is impossible to invent a kind private language for your own use. Say you give yourself a new secret name and never tell anyone else about it. Wittgenstein would not say that this new name was meaningless, because it is possible to teach someone else how to use your secret name. What Wittgenstein is saying is that a private language in which it is impossible for other people to learn how to use is meaningless. For example, say you wanted to use the phrase "qualia red" to describe your private experience of the color red. Well in normal language use what is the difference between "qualia red" and simply "red". In everyday conversation there would be no difference. Asked what color a stoplight was, saying "red" and "I experienced the qualia red" are functionally the same and therefore mean the same thing to Wittgenstein (meaning as use). (Come to think of it, this is the whole point of the Zombie argument in the first place.) What I think Wittgenstein would say about the Zombie argument as proof of the hard problem of consciousness, is that the term "consciousness" presented in this argument has no meaning because by the very argument itself, being conscious has no linguistic use. ("What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence.") This does not mean he denies that we have conscious experience, just that there is no meaningful part of consciousness that we are unable to talk about in an objective or public way. Forgive me for being so presumptuous and rambling while making arguments for Wittgenstein. It is an honor to have you in this discussion Prof. Chalmers. .

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Posted 05/12/09 - 02:02 PM:	#13
davidchalmers wrote: Fair point. Why, thank you! I am right chuffed. Perhaps unfortunately for you, this gives me the confidence to push a bit further. I have always felt a certain disquiet about qualia; about a public discussion of something that is supposed to be distinctly private. The red of a Lamborghini is distinct from the red of a sunset or of an apple, yet we use the same word for each. Presumably each qual(?) is quite distinct. Presumably the qual that is present in one viewing of the Lamborghini is different from that which is present at another viewing, the ambient light being different and so on. Indeed, the qualia that is present as the Lamborghini drives past changes with the appearance of the car. Given their apparent impermanence, I find it hard to understand just what it is that we might be giving the name “qualia” to. I guess I do not understand how a private language of qualia would differ from our pubic language. But perhaps I can approach this from a different angle by considering honest zombies. We talk about zombies as humans that are much the same as ourselves, but which (it would not be “who”, would it?) do not have the inner life of experiencing qualia. The point is made that the behaviour of a zombie could be identical to that of a person, yet we could not tell that they did not have the inner life we experience. Suppose we were to come across an honest zombie, which could respond in all the appropriate ways to the goings on around it, yet insisted it had no inner experience? Which could claim, appropriately, that the sunset was beautiful or that the coffee strong, and yet which insisted that it experienced no inner life? The honest zombie seems to be in the position of contradicting itself, by claiming both that the sunset is beautiful, and yet that it has no experience of beauty. Further, and perhaps separately, would we believe it? Or would we conclude that it was deluded, mistaken, or simply misunderstood the notion of "inner experience"? I hope this ill-thought-out argument at least makes sense. Thank you again for your time.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

et cetera
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 05/12/09 - 03:42 PM:	#14
Banno wrote: Suppose we were to come across an honest zombie, which could respond in all the appropriate ways to the goings on around it, yet insisted it had no inner experience? Which could claim, appropriately, that the sunset was beautiful or that the coffee strong, and yet which insisted that it experienced no inner life? The honest zombie seems to be in the position of contradicting itself, by claiming both that the sunset is beautiful, and yet that it has no experience of beauty. Further, and perhaps separately, would we believe it? Or would we conclude that it was deluded, mistaken, or simply misunderstood the notion of "inner experience"? I don't think its contradictory, but I do think what the zombie says is false. But just because he is saying something false does not imply that the honest zombie is lying which would necessitate a alternative brain state distinct from telling the truth. I posted a topic about this not to long ago, I think you even substantial participated. Regardless, it was a good lesson for me to learn. Edited by et cetera on 05/12/09 - 10:42 PM
Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori, could not have turned out otherwise. -- Saul Kripke Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word. -- Quine A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it - Kripke

davidchalmers
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Posted 05/15/09 - 06:06 AM:	#15
Well, Wittgenstein's argument means many things to many people. I'm not sure that I'd read it as an argument about falsifiability. If it were intended that way, then I'd certainly reject the falsificationist/verificationist premise, that I can only mean X if others can verify that I mean X. I just don't see good reason to accept this. Perhaps something like this has to be true in a public language, in order for it to nbe public (though even this isn't obvious), but in any case it's a private language we're talking about here. I'd need to see a lot of argument for the principle. I don't think that "meaning is use" gets one there, unless one understands "use" in a strongly behavioristic/operationalistic way -- and then I'd certainly reject the claim that meaning is use. Re honest zombies: very interesting idea. I don't see a flat contradiction in saying "the sunset is beautiful, but I don't have a conscious experience of it". The honest zombie might just say that it knows it somehow, perhaps through a hunch akin to what people with blindsight have. Still, there would at least be some tension here. I think this brings out the fact that there is at least a very strong tie between the concepts we apply to our inner experience (e.g. "experience of red") and those we apply to the external world ("red"). In practice, we'd expect standard sort of possession of one to go along with potential possession of the other. And of course if "red" is a term in our public language, so is "experience of red" -- as of course it is. So no-one is saying that our actual terms for experiences are private. But in principle perhaps there might be private terms both for colors (picked out by the way that they are subjectively experienced) and for experiences. At least, it's not clear to me why there couldn't be.

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Posted 05/15/09 - 07:09 PM:	#16
davidchalmers wrote: Re honest zombies: very interesting idea. Thank you. I am still perplexed by the language surrounding zombies. I am puzzled that you suggested zombies could have both knowledge and hunches. Could an honest zombie be said to know anything? Something that is known is also believed, but is it possible for a zombie to have beliefs? Could it have hunches? Aren't these "internal" experiences of the sort that zombies are supposed not to have? You are right that there is no direct contradiction in "the sunset is beautiful, but I don't have a conscious experience of it", but there is some sort of infelicity here that I don't know how to describe. The honest zombie is not lying when it says "This coffee is sweet", is it? Nor can I see how it could be mistaken, or pretending. Our usual intentional language appears to presurmise the sort of mental life denied to zombies, and so will not do. We might suppose that since zombies are a sort of automata, we might be able to use the language of mechanics instead. We might talk of a causal chain between the view of the sunset and zombie's utterance. If this is the case for zombies, it could presumably be the case for us, as well, and our intentional attitudes would be mere epiphenomena. Put together, this seems to me to mitigate against there being a coherent conception of what an honest zombie would be like. In order to make sense of zombies, we need to clearly distinguish between our public language and the private experience that zombies lack (the sort of issue the private language argument tried to come to terms with). It seems to me that the honest zombie shows the difficulty of making this distinction. I must have misunderstood something here. I look forward to your reply.
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

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Posted 05/15/09 - 08:24 PM:	#17
I don't want to thow a spanner in your zombie, but I'm not convinced it makes sense to even talk of honesty or dishonesty in a zombie. I find myself thinking of a sophisticated computer with sugar detectors and sunset analysis algorithms, programmed in suitable circumstances to output 'The coffee is sweet' or 'the sunset is beautiful' and programmed to be 'honest' or 'dishonest' about supposed internal experiences. But if it isn't aware, it doesn't choose, and this honesty is either programmed or accidental, which is not what I want to mean by 'honesty'. It would be rather like calling a stick that appears bent because it is in water 'dishonest'.
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Banno
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Posted 05/15/09 - 11:12 PM:	#18
Good, you noticed the irony in the name
Davidson: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement. Russel Morris: There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing... Ned: Such is life

Makarismos
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Posted 05/15/09 - 11:58 PM:	#19
unenlightened wrote: I don't want to thow a spanner in your zombie, but I'm not convinced it makes sense to even talk of honesty or dishonesty in a zombie.... It would be rather like calling a stick that appears bent because it is in water 'dishonest'. I understand your concerns unenlightened, because I think that the idea of philosophical zombies is an idea which is to complex to analyse in such a way as to produce straightforward results. We are left with musings that can have no empirical verification, or experimental support: they simply give us a feeling, and this feeling does not tend to convince anyone of anything. I suppose it depends upon our ideas about the role of conciousness as to how we would imagine zombies manifesting themselves. If we were epiphenomenalist, we might believe that there would be literally no difference from our point of view; the zombie would be the steamless steam engine, or the silent typewriter. To me, the question naturally arises "how would they be different from me? How do I know that I am not a zombie?" It seems that if we look at humans from a behaviourist point of view then we would have no problem, and that therefore the problems arise from our talk of "mental phenomena". I find this to be unsatisfying however, as I believe that I do experience mental phenomena. It seems that a Zombie might to all intents and purposes experience the same thing. If we allowed zombies to experience this, then either we are all zombies, or their are no zombies. Edited by Makarismos on 05/16/09 - 12:15 AM

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Posted 05/16/09 - 02:31 AM:	#20
When the honest zombie goes for a walk on a moonless winter night and sees midnight black snow, does it say that "snow is white"?
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

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