Please, share your concept of reality: Philosophy Forums

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Please, share your concept of reality

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Please, share your concept of reality

yiuchi
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2 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 06/09/09 - 02:46 PM:	#11
Archaic Robert wrote: <p>But what is the nature of this interface? If mind and body have nothing in common, and can exist independently of each other, then how can the mind in any way "control" the body? Also, what about causality? Does the matter in our brain behave in a fundamentally different way from most matter? If our brain gives its output based on the mechanisms of some disattached "mind" entity, then will we eventually discover particles in the brain that simply ignore the laws of physics, because they act as the "bridge" between the mind and the body?</p> There are a couple of important issues embedded in here, let me try to answer them independently. Q1. Can the mind exist without the brain? A1. Does it matter? Perhaps the brain and mind could be independent while sharing a, for a lack of a better term, obligate symbiosis relationship. The mind could perhaps not be separated from the brain, like certain parasites that cannot survive if separated from the host. Whether or not the mind can exist or "survive" without the brain is irrelevant to the discussion of whether the mind is the brain (or brain processes or what-have-you) since the mind can have a non-physical nature even if it cannot exist or survive without the brain. Q2. If the mind is non-physical and independent from the brain, how does the mind control the body? Surely, the mind is causally influenced by the body and vice versa. If so, then it must also follow the laws of physics. A2. There's a hidden premise in this question. It makes the assumption that the causal closure of the physical is true. So the argument, really, goes something like this: p1. Causal closure of the physical is true (Any physical effects must have a physical cause). p2. When the body is caused to act, that action is a physical effect. p3. When a non-physical mind causes something, that is a non-physical cause. c1 (from p2 and p3). When the body is caused to act by a non-physical mind, we have a physical effect without a physical cause. c2. If p3 is true, then c1 and p1 are incompatible. Thus, p3 must be false. The problem here is that c2 ignores the possibility that p1 is false. It could be the case that causal closure of the physical is false. Now, I think many people would ask for scientific proof that p1 is not the case, or would allege that our discipline of science shows that p1 is true. The problem with that is that science itself is is based on the premise that causal closure is true. Science, and thus physics and any laws of physics, assume p1, so invoking science as an argument for p1 merely begs the question. An argument seeking to show that dualism (or any non-physicalist viewpoint) is wrong must at least include a case for the causal closure of the physical. Archaic Robert wrote: It can't be the case that they are unrelated, and it makes very little sense that they could operate in conjuction with each other and yet still somehow be seperate substances. Rather, they are in fact two different attributes of a solitary thing. Many things operate in conjunction with each other and yet are separate substances. An axle of a car works in perfect conjunction with the wheels and yet are separate substances. If mind and brain are separate substances, it simply does not follow that they cannot operate in conjunction with each other. I suspect you may mean that they seem to be mutually co-dependent. When the brain ceases to function, the mind seems to cease to function and vice versa. But now we get back to the original issue. If the mind is not identical to the brain, then the only thing we can judge is whether the brain is operating properly. There's no way for us to tell, at least with our current empirical knowledge, whether the mind is operating properly. We don't know if the mind and brain are necessarily mutually co-dependent in such a sense. Indeed, one can say that brain processes are perfectly correlated with mental states (or at least reports of mental states), and we can even assume that such a claim is true. Yet that correlation does not prove identity. At best, it only proves causation. Whenever the letter "s" appears on my screen, it is correlated with the "s" key being in a depressed state on my keyboard. Does that mean that the appearance of the letter "s" is identical to the depressed state of the "s" key on my keyboard? Surely not. And if mental states cause brain states, then we enter the realm of Q2 above. Of course, I've been speaking largely of mind and brain, but I think most dualists nowadays are no longer substantivalists. They don't believe that there's a "mind" substance. Rather, they tend to argue that mental states or processes are non-physical states or processes. Property dualism is much more popular than substantivalist dualism.

mway
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Posted 06/09/09 - 05:52 PM:	#12
Yiuchi, everything you have said is accurate, however dualists may as well be arguing for the existence of any of the mythical deities. To argue against causal closure is one thing, but to then invent a non physical mind that violates this premise seems like a large unnecessary leap of faith. Using Occam's razor, isn't the path of least assumptions the one pertaining to the idea that mind does not exist as all, and is just the emergent result of the physical brain?
Lame is to Wav, as the Brain is to Reality.

wuliheron
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Posted 06/09/09 - 06:54 PM:	#13
There are many ways to view reality and each has its own advantages and disadvantages, but in general I would say each moment of life is novel. Because of this endless parade of novelty I can choose to look at reality from any and all viewpoints depending upon the situation. The context often determines which is the best stance to take, but sometimes the predominant context is as simple as whatever just plain feels right.

YadaYada
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Posted 06/09/09 - 07:38 PM:	#14
yiuchi wrote: Q2. If the mind is non-physical and independent from the brain, how does the mind control the body? Surely, the mind is causally influenced by the body and vice versa. If so, then it must also follow the laws of physics. A2. There's a hidden premise in this question. It makes the assumption that the causal closure of the physical is true. ... And if mental states cause brain states, then we enter the realm of Q2 above. Not surely. Causality is interwoven with conservation laws in physics. In this case it might be conservation of information rather than conservation of energy. At which point I'm lost. Perhaps an additional dimension is required for this to work. In any case, traditional causality probably only applies to matter, making the vice-versa part of the argument false. Does the brain act mostly to mediate this causality rather than to think? This would seem unnecessary by Ockham. But not so. Processing power and memory would be enormously enhanced by quantum computation as against the physicalist's analog-network model.
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

PsychVegas
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Posted 06/09/09 - 09:05 PM:	#15
Willowz, From an ontological perspective I would be a relativist and/or realist that leans towards a post-modernist view. Within this framework I recognize the limitations of being human and therefore willingly concede that discovering a single all encompassing reality is unobtainable. This does not mean I believe the pursuit of this discovery has no purpose, but that one should be pragmatic in this pursuit. So what is your view?

cosscos
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Posted 06/09/09 - 10:00 PM:	#16
There is a reality on thing and there is the other reality on thing itself as well. Scientists have researched realities on things. Philosophers have researched reality on thing itself. In terms of mind and body, i believe, mind has its own reality itself and body has its own reality as well. The moment when I see you, I would like to see your reality itself and your realities as well. In other words, I would like see what you are and how you look as well. To sum up, one is a noumenal existence and the other is a phenomenal existence. This two worlds are inter-related if only you have a ladder between those worlds. So, we must check it out whether it is set up or not. Edited by cosscos on 06/09/09 - 10:08 PM

yiuchi
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Posted 06/10/09 - 12:24 AM:	#17
mway wrote: Yiuchi, everything you have said is accurate, however dualists may as well be arguing for the existence of any of the mythical deities. To argue against causal closure is one thing, but to then invent a non physical mind that violates this premise seems like a large unnecessary leap of faith. Using Occam's razor, isn't the path of least assumptions the one pertaining to the idea that mind does not exist as all, and is just the emergent result of the physical brain? I don't see why the idea of deities is necessarily out of the question. Deities only seem absurd to type-identity physicalists who are already making the assumption that there is nothing in the world over and above the physical (but then that is merely saying something like: given that there is nothing non-physical, it can be deduced that there are no entities that have a nature that is non-physical - question-begging aside, the theist can accept this statement, they just have to refute the assumption that there is nothing non-physical). Ockham's razor is a practical tool that generally proves to be useful. It is not necessarily true, and, further, it is not always applied correctly. Let's try to break down the bare essential physicalist (I will use supervenient physicalism, since you said the mind is something that emerges from the physical - although, strictly speaking, if mental states emerge from physical states then it is a view closer to emergentism, and emergentism and even supervenience are considered types of dualism depending on who you ask) and dualist assumptions relating to the mind-body problem, roughly. Dualist: - There is the physical. - There is the non-physical. - The mind (or at least mental states and processes) is non-physical in nature. - Mind and body causally interact (or at least mental states and processes and brain states and processes causally interact). Supervenient Physicalist: - There is the physical. - There is the non-physical. (Supervenient and emergentist physicalism posit the existence of non-physical properties, but that those non-physical properties supervene on or emerge from physical properties - still, non-physical properties exist in both views) - Causal closure of the physical is the case. - The mind is non-physical in nature. - Non-physical properties supervene on (or emerge from, in the case of emergentism) physical properties. - Mind and body causally interact. (Following from the last four points, non-physical minds must supervene on or emerge from physical brains) This is only a rough sketch of the bare, bare minimum amount of assumptions needed for either view. Of course, more assumptions are probably needed for either of the two views to work. Nevertheless, the supervenient/emergentist physicalist views seem to require many complex assumptions to come to their conclusion. Even if we do apply Ockham's razor, it is at best (at best for the physicalist at least) questionable which of the two views should be dismissed as having too many assumptions. The illusion that physicalism requires less assumptions can be explained away by understanding that we have, in the western world, been taught many of these physicalist assumptions from a young age and we are so used to such assumptions that we tend not to recognize that we are making use of them. The type-identity physicalist seems to make less assumptions, however. Type-identity physicalist: - There is the physical. - Causal closure of the physical is true. - Mind and body causally interact. (Following from all three points above, the mind is physical - individual mental states or processes are numerically identical to individual physical states or processes.) However, the type-identity physicalist has more trouble explaining qualia or phenomenal experience than supervenient or emergentist physicalists. Type-identity theory also has trouble with multiple realizability. That is, if humans exhibit pain-like behaviour through stimulation of Human Pain Cells, HPCs, and octopuses exhibit pain-like behaviour through stimulation of Octopus Pain Cells, OPCs, which are in some fundamental way different from HPCs, can it be said that humans and octopuses are both able to feel pain? Or can it only be said that humans experience pain-for-humans due to HPC stimulation and octopuses experience pain-for-octopuses due to OPC stimulation, but that the two phenomenal experiences are qualitatively and fundamentally different? In the case of type-identity physicalism, it must be the case that humans experience pain-for-humans and octopuses experience pain-for-octopuses, and that there is no shared phenomenal experience of pain. So while type-identity physicalism may require less bare minimum requirements, it actually has a lot more shortfalls than property dualism or supervenient physicalism. YadaYada wrote: Not surely. Causality is interwoven with conservation laws in physics. In this case it might be conservation of information rather than conservation of energy. At which point I'm lost. Perhaps an additional dimension is required for this to work. In any case, traditional causality probably only applies to matter, making the vice-versa part of the argument false. Does the brain act mostly to mediate this causality rather than to think? This would seem unnecessary by Ockham. But not so. Processing power and memory would be enormously enhanced by quantum computation as against the physicalist's analog-network model. I'm not sure what you mean when you assert that causality is interwoven with conservation laws in physics. Do you mean that causality is implied by or governed by conservation laws? Or do you mean that causality is a part of, or identical to parts of, conservation laws? Either way, aren't conservation laws assumed to be true? That is, conservation laws don't seem to be a priori knowable, analytic, or necessary. We must either assume that such is the case, or prove it through experience - using science, perhaps. Even if they are indeed proven scientifically to be true, well, science assumes the causal closure of the physical - in this case, that is like saying that given that causal closure of the physical is true, we deduce from our experience of the physical that causal closure of the physical is true. Again, it seems to beg the question.

180 Proof
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 06/10/09 - 12:55 AM:	#18
Guesstimate #411: The real is "something rather than nothing" because nothing (is) maximally less entropy than something; transcends "reason" but cannot (transcend itself or) be transcended; and is dynamic enough to generate agency (i.e. networks of agents) that is complex enough to produce values/models which are finitely adaptable to "reality". Nearly all philosophies, like folk myths, are 'maladaptive' insofar as they distract from (i.e. obfuscate) this inescapable, unbounded, immanence by positing 'other realities', or 'doubling the real' with 'a realer real' (e.g. Platonism, occultism/spiritualism, Cartesianism, idealism, etc). The real, being gratuitous, elicits gratitude from its prodigies & savants ... even as it devours them.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

cosscos
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 06/10/09 - 03:04 AM:	#19
Reality is a universally acknowledged representation that is produced and caused by an unknown motive agency, uniting thinking with thing in the world within an individual,which is certainly anachronism.

Willowz
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Posted 06/10/09 - 05:37 AM:	#20
yiuchi and Archaic Robert here is a topic that fit's your discussion perfectly: http://forums.philosophyforums.com...and-the-brain-31502-6.html . PsychVegas wrote: Willowz, From an ontological perspective I would be a relativist and/or realist that leans towards a post-modernist view. Within this framework I recognize the limitations of being human and therefore willingly concede that discovering a single all encompassing reality is unobtainable. This does not mean I believe the pursuit of this discovery has no purpose, but that one should be pragmatic in this pursuit. So what is your view? Why is it unobtainable? I would think that mankind will still have some time on this world, and might come to some conclusions. Yes in such a pursuit I think physicalism is the best pragmatic way of getting to answers. Speaking of which, I am fond of what Plato said in the allegory of the cave, also his theory of Forms is interesting(I am open for any criticism on this view point, if willing).Lastly gestaltism sounds very promising in explaining how our conscious connects the dot's in reality, eventually forming the reality we perceive. Unfortunately it doesn't explain but rather describe. Any ways that's off-topic. I just wanted to add, that I don't want to talk about the way the mind describes reality. Rather the objects that are there and are still there even without consciously looking at them. 180 Proof wrote: Guesstimate #411: The real is "something rather than nothing" because nothing (is) maximally less entropy than something; transcends "reason" but cannot (transcend itself or) be transcended; and is dynamic enough to generate agency (i.e. networks of agents) that is complex enough to produce values/models which are finitely adaptable to "reality". Nearly all philosophies, like folk myths, are 'maladaptive' insofar as they distract from (i.e. obfuscate) this inescapable, unbounded, immanence by positing 'other realities', or 'doubling the real' with 'a realer real' (e.g. Platonism, occultism/spiritualism, Cartesianism, idealism, etc). The real, being gratuitous, elicits gratitude from its prodigies & savants ... even as it devours them. So out of reason something exists..."It cannot be transcended" what does that mean? No better rock can be created than that individual rock, that exists? What especially interests me in this is, what happens just before the transcendation of the future individual rock(from whatever dimension it appears? I don't care...)? What makes it exist? P.s Thanks for the replies!
This song will prepare you for a good smile.

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