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Non-deducibility and Informativeness

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Non-deducibility and Informativeness

YadaYada
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Posted 06/03/09 - 05:57 AM:	#11
TecnoTut wrote: the difference between Type-A materialists and KA advocates is a matter of a clash of intuitions, ... "If the Knowledge Argument argument is valid and sound, then what is it that makes it valid and sound?" ... What's gives the Knowledge Argument its strength is pre-release Mary's alleged inability to deduce the subjective appearance of red from her knowledge of functional facts. ... Mary is distinct from us in a very important way: she's omniscient regarding functional facts. ... A.J. Ayer's statement that an omniscient being would not be surprised by any a priori knowledge or long logical deductions. But you cannot presume that it is granted that Mary will see "red". What Mary already knows is that red is a dictionary word with an attached vague concept that covers a myriad of shades. Outside the room, Mary will experience the shades of red, but never the formality called "red". Formal red is Ayer's type of a priori knowledge, the myriad of experienced shades are not -- they're purely contingent empirical appearances. It is not possible to deduce either one from the other. Ampliative induction is required to leap in either direction.
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

TecnoTut
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Posted 06/03/09 - 06:32 AM:	#12
I share your intuition that pre-release Mary cannot deduce specific shades of red alone from her knowledge of functional facts. But my question is this: even if she could deduce phenomenal redness of various shades (let's assume our position/intuitions are wrong), can type-A materialism still be false? One may be tempted to say yes, in that the logical deduction may still surprise Mary. Mary may be able to use her vast knowledge to deduce a specific phenomenal shade, yet still be surprised, and say "Oh, I didn't expect this apple to look like this after the deduction." Two issues: (a) Would she be surprised, and, (b) does the surprise even matter? For (a), I believe she would not be surprised because she's allegedly omniscient. As for (b), even if she were surprised, I think all that matters in proving the KA is false is the showing of her ability to deduce, not her moment of surprise. In any case, the question was just an academic one. Despite my question/thread asks us to assume Mary can deduce phenomenal shades, I myself do not believe she can on a matter of my own personal intuition and some arguments I have personally devised. Edited by TecnoTut on 06/03/09 - 10:57 AM
I won't utter falsehoods, but I've no objection to uttering meaningless statements - A.J. Ayer, when saying grace. The apparent negation of a pseudo [meaningless] statement must also be a pseudo-statement - from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

YadaYada
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Posted 06/04/09 - 02:21 AM:	#13
TecnoTut wrote: if she could deduce phenomenal redness of various shades (let's assume our position/intuitions are wrong), can type-A materialism still be false? That would be counter to the notion of scientific materialism. Mary's scientific knowledge is all propositional. Those propositions are of the language of science, whichever those be. But those languages are not capable of expressing the sort of phenomena that Mary would encounter outside the room. Knowledge of phenomena, which are either externally or internally sensical, is different from formal propositional knowledge, whether that be axiomatic like 2+2=4, or theoretical as in science. So Mary could not possibly know phenomenal truths that she has not experienced personally, even if she were omniscient in the axiomatic and scientific senses of knowledge. Furthermore, Mary's deductions in the languages of science could not possibly express the quality of redness. The language of wavelengths, distributions, brain areas is just the language of measurement that is incapable of expressing phenomenal truths. Two issues: (a) Would she be surprised, and, (b) does the surprise even matter? For (a), I believe she would not be surprised because she's allegedly omniscient. As for (b), even if she were surprised, I think all that matters in proving the KA is false is the showing of her ability to deduce, not her moment of surprise. She'll be surprised by the experience per se. All her knowledge would be of the whys and hows, not of the experience itself. Edited by YadaYada on 06/06/09 - 06:56 AM. Reason: clarification
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

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Posted 06/04/09 - 01:33 PM:	#14
TecnoTut wrote: Some of you are missing the point of this thread. Since the difference between Type-A materialists and KA advocates is a matter of a clash of intuitions, this thread assumes the Knowledge Argument is correct (just as Type-A materialists assume it's incorrect), and asks "If the KA argument is valid and sound, then what is it that makes it valid and sound?" 1. Keebler elves are people. 2. All people are martians. 3. Therefore, all dogs are Canadians. Assuming this argument is valid and sound, what makes it valid and sound? TechnoTut wrote: Some describe Mary as being surprised when discovering the subjective appearance of colors, and this new information is what gives the KA its strength. My position is that the surprise is irrelevant. What's gives the KA its strength is pre-release Mary's alleged inability to deduce the subjective appearance of red from her knowledge of functional facts. The surprise is a manifestation of her alleged inability to deduce the subjective appearance of colors -- an illustrative story element meant to underline the dialectical point. So yes, the surprise itself is irrelevant. Proponents of the Knowledge Argument should hold that even a stoic Mary who refuses to acknowledge her inabilities is the same in all relevant respects as the Mary presented in the argument as originally stated.
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Posted 07/06/09 - 09:41 AM:	#15
Well, doesn't Mary's surprise still have to be relevant to her knowledge of the experience of surprise? It's kind of comical to imagine a person stoically uttering to themselves "Ah, so this is what surprise is like." Of course, I would want to undermine the whole thought problem and liken Mary to someone who is chained to a wall staring at shadows.

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Posted 07/08/09 - 01:50 AM:	#16
I have more to learn than say on this topic. TechnoTut wrote: Mary may be able to use her vast knowledge to deduce a specific phenomenal shade, yet still be surprised, and say "Oh, I didn't expect this apple to look like this after the deduction." Isn't that another way of saying that qualia exists? Therefore the non logically deductive would revel the truth of color and you're earlier statement has an example: Arguably, Mary might still be surprised when she deduces phenomenal truths from functional ones, and thus, reductive functionalism would still remain false. If out of knowledge people are able to make presumptions and formulate ideas, then why not apply the same with Mary? Then again if someone does not have the knowledge of color, then how can they formulate an idea about color? I'm saying that Mary is not fully omniscient. The colorful world outside, should have more knowledge to offer. So to speak the phenomenal knowledge. Looking at a green square is surely not the same experience as thinking about it. Of course, I would want to undermine the whole thought problem and liken Mary to someone who is chained to a wall staring at shadows. I still think that the allegory of the cave has something to do with Mary. Mary might believe, she is omniscient. The belief might not be true in such a case. Edited by Willowz on 07/08/09 - 10:58 AM
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