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No Contingency in Determinism
Help me with this paper idea.

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No Contingency in Determinism

yasseford
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Posted 07/14/09 - 05:44 AM: Subject: No Contingency in Determinism	#1
Another thread sparked this thought that had been reeling through my subconscious for some time now. I'm doing an independent study on determinism and free-will in the spring and I was thinking of this as a possible paper idea. All of what I am about to say, looking back at it, seems pretty much implied by determinism, and so I am prepared for the oncoming onslaught of "Yeah, so what?'s" In Hard Determinism, Agent A performs action X as a consequence of the past state(s) of the universe. Granting causality, it is logically impossible for action Y or action Z to have been carried out instead of action X, despite our practical belief in contingent outcomes. In Hard Determinism, all is necessary. For example, Bill wakes up and walks into his kitchen to decide what to eat for breakfast. His apparent choices are oatmeal, cereal, or a breakfast shake. Hard Determinism tells us that due to countless variables, from his genes, to his upbringing, to how many hours of sleep he got and what sort of dreams he had, etc, his "choice" is determined. Bill will eat oatmeal, and could not have chosen any other breakfast. Because the choice of oatmeal is an absolute necessity, cereal and the breakfast shake are impossible choices. While they seem to be logically possible from our imperfect, subjective perspectives, this is simply because we do not have a full grasp of the state of the universe, and practically speaking, we never will. For Bill to choose cereal would be a breech in cause-and-effect, and a logical impossibility on the scale of adding 1 to 1 and getting 3. This view seems very counter-intuitive to the way we live our every day lives, but because we will never have the ability to fully grasp the state(s) of the universe, there is no problem with embracing the illusion of contingency in my opinion. Edit: Contingency on the quantum level (see my thread on Quantum Indeterminacy) may yet be possible in Hard Determinism, although this is up to debate. As such, we still have no idea of the effect of supposedly indeterminate quanta on macroscopic events, and to what degree. This is the only objection I have at the moment, though my knowledge of the science behind it is somewhat lacking.
Yasseford

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/14/09 - 08:40 AM:	#2
yasseford wrote: For example, Bill wakes up and walks into his kitchen to decide what to eat for breakfast. His apparent choices are oatmeal, cereal, or a breakfast shake. Hard Determinism tells us that due to countless variables, from his genes, to his upbringing, to how many hours of sleep he got and what sort of dreams he had, etc, his "choice" is determined. Bill will eat oatmeal, and could not have chosen any other breakfast. Because the choice of oatmeal is an absolute necessity, cereal and the breakfast shake are impossible choices. While they seem to be logically possible from our imperfect, subjective perspectives, this is simply because we do not have a full grasp of the state of the universe, and practically speaking, we never will. For Bill to choose cereal would be a breech in cause-and-effect, and a logical impossibility on the scale of adding 1 to 1 and getting 3. Well, you said you expected this, and I wouldn't want to disappoint you, so.... so what? Assuming the above is true (that is, assuming the truth of determinism)... so what? Would it matter to Bill (or to us?) if his choice didn't result from what he wants for breakfast? Would that somehow make Bill free, or even make him happy? If his choice didn't result from what he wanted for breakfast, would we say that he is therefore responsible for that choice (but he isn't responsible if his breakfast choice results from what he wants for breakfast)?
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

John Kievlan
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Posted 07/14/09 - 09:04 AM:	#3
I am not sure this is true, yasseford. Regardless of hard determinism, some propositions must by contingent. So, for instance, it may be necessarily true that, "At time T, subject S will eat oatmeal." But in that case, proposition P1 "S is eating oatmeal" is contingent on the proposition P2, "it is now T." It is merely necessarily the case, with hard determinism, that P1 is contingent on P2.

yasseford
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Posted 07/15/09 - 04:44 AM:	#4
Kamerynn wrote: Well, you said you expected this, and I wouldn't want to disappoint you, so.... so what? Assuming the above is true (that is, assuming the truth of determinism)... so what? Would it matter to Bill (or to us?) if his choice didn't result from what he wants for breakfast? Would that somehow make Bill free, or even make him happy? If his choice didn't result from what he wanted for breakfast, would we say that he is therefore responsible for that choice (but he isn't responsible if his breakfast choice results from what he wants for breakfast)? I'm not sure that I understand your "So What?" objection. There are many implications that go with determinism and personal responsibility, but I am speaking about contingency in this topic. To swerve away from topic though, I think there are many answers to the "So what?" question of personal responsibility, especially in relation to the philosophies of Law, Ethics, and Religion. If I misunderstood your objection, my apologies, please elucidate. John Kievlan wrote: I am not sure this is true, yasseford. Regardless of hard determinism, some propositions must by contingent. So, for instance, it may be necessarily true that, "At time T, subject S will eat oatmeal." But in that case, proposition P1 "S is eating oatmeal" is contingent on the proposition P2, "it is now T." It is merely necessarily the case, with hard determinism, that P1 is contingent on P2. Perhaps we are using two different definitions of contingent? Here are some from the Oxford English Dictionary 2nd Ed. The condition of being free from predetermining necessity in regard to existence or action; hence, the being open to the play of chance, or of free will. or A possible or uncertain event on which other things depend or are conditional; a condition that may be present or absent. or future contingency: a thing that may or may not happen. Because you grant that all events in my example are necessary, I believe you would grant that none of them are contingent.
Yasseford

John Kievlan
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Posted 07/15/09 - 05:55 AM:	#5
yasseford wrote: Perhaps we are using two different definitions of contingent? Here are some from the Oxford English Dictionary 2nd Ed. The condition of being free from predetermining necessity in regard to existence or action; hence, the being open to the play of chance, or of free will. or A possible or uncertain event on which other things depend or are conditional; a condition that may be present or absent. or future contingency: a thing that may or may not happen. Because you grant that all events in my example are necessary, I believe you would grant that none of them are contingent. If hard determinism is true, I would certainly grant that it is necessary that particular events will occur at particular times. However, I do not grant that the events themselves are not contingent, since it is clear that they are contingent on the present time being a particular time. As for definitions of contingency -- it seems to me that the OED definitions above are not clear enough for the purposes of philosophical discussion. Remember that a dictionary focuses on common usage rather than precise usage, but philosophy requires precise definitions. In philosophy, contingency and necessity are antonyms, and mean just this: Necessity: a necessary proposition is one whose falsehood is inconceivable -- that is, its truth does not depend on anything but other necessary propositions. Its truth may in fact depend on nothing at all, if it is a self-evident truth. Contingency: a contingent proposition is one whose truth depends on the truth of one or more other propositions which may or may not be true. If "event E will necessarily occur at and only at time T," then the proposition "event E occurs" is contingent on the proposition "it is now time T" (which is a contingent proposition even in a deterministic universe, since clearly it is possible for it to not now be time T).

yasseford
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Posted 07/15/09 - 06:30 AM:	#6
I found the OED definitions very specific and cogent, especially in relation to the topic at hand. You seem to be defining necessity and contingency in relation to propositions, not events. At any rate, because contingency and necessity are antonymous, and under Determinism, all events are necessary, then no event is contingent. A contingent event is an event that depends upon another event, which may or may not have occurred. This of course, is impossible under Determinism, since all events necessarily occur. I find that now, I'm repeating myself, so I'll leave it at that.
Yasseford

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Posted 07/15/09 - 05:27 PM:	#7
yasseford wrote: This view seems very counter-intuitive to the way we live our every day lives, but because we will never have the ability to fully grasp the state(s) of the universe, there is no problem with embracing the illusion of contingency in my opinion. A couple of thoughts on this subject: To say that hard determinism negates the possibility of metaphysical contingency (as opposed to logical contingency) is simply a restatement of the definition of hard determinism. That is, hard determinism says that all is determined and outside the control of individual agents. It would seem that the aim of the paper would have to be to explain why it's logically necessary that hard determinism exists, meaning there is no hypothetical universe where it's possible not to be determined in your every action. My other thought on this subject is that your pragmatic solution may miss the real point of the entire debate. That is, to suggest that one embrace the illusion of contingency presupposes the ability to decide to embrace something for pragmatic reasons. How can you offer reasons (logical, pragmatic, or whatever) for why one should deceive oneself about the existence of a free will if one lacks the ability to properly assess those reasons and "choose" to deceive oneself. In fact, the real reason you must provide your professor for why you are writing your paper is because the forces of nature have compelled you. Whatever other motivations you may posit for having written the paper are simply beliefs forced upon you by nature, which may or may not be true. Really, to be accurate, simply declare that you are writing because you must, and whatever portions of your paper appear illogical, simply insist that your professor has no clue as to what logic is, but that he is simply being forced to utter the word "illogical" against his will, which doesn't exist anyway. Perhaps the fact that we cannot begin to find meaning in such a universe is grounds to question the validity of a hard determinism thesis. This is in contrast to your view, which is to accept as a given premise that hard determinism exists and then to figure out a way to live in harmony with it, which, as noted above, is impossible because it suggests we can control our lives in such a way as to achieve harmony.
"Nothing is impossible for the man who will not listen to reason." John Belushi, "Animal House" "I have opinions of my own --strong opinions-- but I don't always agree with them." G.W. Bush

swstephe
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Posted 07/15/09 - 06:36 PM:	#8
I've often noticed a difference in the weight question. If the choice is between oatmeal and cereal which have nearly identical value to Bill, then the choice is arbitrary, so Bill's input to the decision process in minimal. It comes down to a mental flip of the coin, closing his eyes and see which one his hands bump into -- nothing to demonstrate Bill had any role in the decision. Now if Bill's choices were between, say, making some waffles or popping kitty in the microwave and hitting high for 10 minutes, there is an extreme difference in value between the two choices and for Bill to choose the latter over the former would be a strong indicator of mental derangement, (which ought to seek help to repair). Bill's choices are heavily weighted by consequences and what is socially or morally acceptable, (according to Bill's environment). So it seems that any claim of freedom boils down to whether Bill has any strong preferences, one way or the other.
Ethics is the measuring of morality. Morality is the measuring of good. Good is the measuring of benefit. Benefit is the measure of values.

Heterotheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 07:01 PM:	#9
The OP doesn't actually urge anyone to embrace the illusion of contingency; it states that in his opinion there is "no problem" with doing so. This is relevant in a political sense (Minority Report-style preventative imprisonments will still be impossible, so there is no efficiency to be gained from changing our legal notion of responsibility), but ethically, it would still be highly disingenuous to blame someone for their actions.

play
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Posted 07/15/09 - 07:06 PM:	#10
Heterotheist wrote: but ethically, it would still be highly disingenuous to blame someone for their actions. How so? We can't blame someone for blaming. So nothing in our ethics needs to change. We still treat people as if they have free will, and if we don't, it has to apply to both those acting and those judging actions. "I don't blame you for being you, but you can't blame me for hating it."
There once was a man who said so, "It seems that I know that I know. But what I would like to see Is the I that knows me when I know that I know that I know."

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