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Nietzsche's Position on God and Free Will

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Nietzsche's Position on God and Free Will

rexall
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Posted 03/09/08 - 01:20 PM: Subject: Nietzsche�s Position on God and Free Will	#1
Does it follow from Nietzsche�s position on God that one is now free to do whatever he/she wishes?

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Posted 03/09/08 - 06:14 PM:	#2
Nietzsche wrote: Thus I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. � I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny � unless I am a fool � that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged � but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently � in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently. � Daybreak; 103 Nietzsche wasn�t a fool: he knew very well that there are consequences to our actions. It�s absolute morality that he denies, not objective morality. He just wanted people to be honest with themselves and, in the process, with others. And he waged war on any so-called morality that has people walk around all day with unwarranted guilt. He wanted mankind to expand its horizons � to overcome itself, and be all it can be. I hope that helps. Though you should read that entire aphorism, and in fact that entire book, to get your answer. It�s in Daybreak where, as he says in Ecce Homo, he began his "campaign against morality.� As for freewill: he was a determinist. Edited by Stream of Conscious on 03/09/08 - 07:14 PM
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/09/08 - 07:14 PM:	#3
What does Nietzsche mean with "ought"?
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

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Posted 03/09/08 - 10:03 PM:	#4
keda wrote: What does Nietzsche mean with "ought"? He means it in its most plainest, practical, straightforward and self-explanatory way. He doesn�t, however, mean it in the sense of duty as Kant did, nor in any convoluted metaphysical sense as both Kant and Schopenhauer did in their systems of putting the notion of ought into absolutism and self-denial. It is these presuppositions and concepts that he denies, as he explains morality and moral sensations as natural phenomenon, where as those former two philosophers placed �ought� and morality only the realm of metaphysics and the absolute. The �ought� for Nietzsche depends on the situation; that is, the practicality, subjectivity and reality of the matter.
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

rexall
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Posted 03/10/08 - 06:50 AM:	#5
How does it deal with moral responsibility? Obviously even with free will we are still not free to do whatever we choose.

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Posted 03/10/08 - 08:22 AM:	#6
Like I said, he, like anyone who isn't completely oblivious to the world around them, knew that there are consequences to our actions. One thing he despised, though, was masochism, so doing things that would clearly turn against you either immediately or in the long run was pathetic to him. Except, he wasn't going to codify a set of moralities to people dogmatically. If you want to get his actual opinion on things to be avoided you'd have to read through his texts, but such examples are few and far between as that's not what his philosophy is about. It's about staunch individualism and starting fresh; creating by first destroying. Kind of like the Leviathan of Philosophy. Nietzsche certainly isn't the only atheistic philosopher you'll find who believes we do not need God to be good people.
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/10/08 - 11:35 AM:	#7
Some depise masochism, while others don't. Some people are masochistic, others are sadistic. The reason I think Nietzsche could not be called a philosopher, is because he is just endorsing a particular point of view. He might have despised what the Nazis did, but if he does not have any arguments for what the Nazis did was wrong, then he does not have much to offer. Its just his opinion.
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

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Posted 03/10/08 - 02:14 PM:	#8
keda wrote: Some depise masochism, while others don't. Some people are masochistic, others are sadistic. The reason I think Nietzsche could not be called a philosopher, is because he is just endorsing a particular point of view. He might have despised what the Nazis did, but if he does not have any arguments for what the Nazis did was wrong, then he does not have much to offer. Its just his opinion. No, Nietzsche did in fact present well thought-out arguments for his MANY diatribes against anti-Semitism. And as for his conviction in the matter, in chapter 7 of Beyond Good and Evil he goes so far as to say that anti-Semites should be kicked out of Europe. It's risible to say he isn't a philosopher, especially based on the that premise, since his writings are filled with arguments; brilliant, eloquent ones. It's never mere opinion. He was a psychological philosopher in that he used psychology - well ahead of his time (Freud considered himself to be a disciple of his) - to uphold his claims and inferences, not to mention the presentations of his incredible grasp of historical events and scenarios. In Human, All Too Human he gives thorough reasons as he bashes war in one aphorism, wanting it to be replaced with rationality and nations talking to each other instead of spilling blood senselessly, and he believed this for the betterment of mankind. Read the texts for yourself. As for masochism (i.e. what religion, Kantian philosophy and the French Revolution were great examples of to him), it stagnates, instead of enriching, and that's not mere opinion. Just read his books. You won't regret it, you'll learn quite a bit. It's a great journey filled with razor-edged depth, incite and wisdom, as a matter of fact. That's why he's influenced so many schools of thought. Not for mere opinion. Edited by Stream of Conscious on 03/10/08 - 05:02 PM
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/10/08 - 04:21 PM:	#9
Stream of Conscious wrote: Nietzsche wasn�t a fool: he knew very well that there are consequences to our actions. Yes, this is quite accurate. But we must also remember that Nietzsche was not a utilitarian (indeed, he was quite anti-utilitarian). While Nietzsche's "moral philosophy" -- the reason for the scare quotes will become clear below -- does take consequences into account, it is not a matter of seeking "good" consequences and avoiding "bad" ones. To quote The Gay Science, section 338: "happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or [...] remain small together (Kaufmann, emphasis in original). Stream of Conscious wrote: It�s absolute morality that he denies, not objective morality. And this is quite inaccurate. Indeed, the very section of Daybreak you quoted yourself -- when read in its entirety -- demonstrates this: Daybreak, 103 There are two kinds of deniers of morality. -- 'To deny morality" -- this can mean, first: to deny that the moral motives which men claim have ispired their actions really have done so -- it is thus the assertion that morality consists of words and is among the coarser or more subtle deceptions (especially self-deceptions) which men practise, and is perhpas so especially in precisely the case of those most famed for virtue. Then it can mean: to deny that moral judgments are based on truths. Here it is admitted that they really are motives of action, but that in this way it is errors which, as the basis of all moral judgment, impel men to their moral actions. This is my point of view: though I should be the last to deny that in very many cases there is some ground for suspicion that the other point of view -- that is to say, the point of view of La Rochefoucauld and others who think like him -- may also be justified and in any event of general application. -- Thus I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently -- in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently (Hollingdale, emphasis in original). Given the context of the entire section, it is quite clear that Nietzsche is not a moral objectivist -- which would commit him to some species of moral realism -- but rather an error theorist (though that term would not enter the metaethical lexicon until the second half of the 20th century). When analysed from a second order perspective, Nietzsche accuses morality of being factually mistaken. But he is "no fool," and therefore he recognizes the instrumental value of first order morality (though in his later work he holds that it is the weak who rely on such social instruments -- the strong are, of course, "beyond good and evil"). To answer keda's first question, then, the force of "ought" in the above passage is not moral but the "ought" of hypothetical imperatives: one "ought" to some of those things that morality requires not because morality requires it, but "for other reasons than hitherto" believed. Namely, they are reasonable actions given the ends and constitutions of various human beings. To answer keda's second question, Nietzsche would argue that the Nazi's actions are quintessentially weak: the need to harm others is an indication that one lacks strength (both in terms of power over oneself and power over others). While perhaps there is no moral reason -- traditionally understood -- to oppose their actions, it is part of Nietzshce's analysis of human nature that we just do value those who are strong and follow in their footsteps (or, if we are also strong, create our own values and our own paths). We may, of course, question the veracity of any of Nietzsche's claims, but he has offered us arguments and reasons for denouncing the Nazis (despite the fact that they would not exist for more than three decades after Nietzsche's death). Stream of Conscious wrote: As for free will: he was a determinist. Again, you are correct. One need only to look at the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence (called both "the most scientific of hypotheses" and the greatest weight" by Nietzsche) to see this quite clearly. Nietzsche as Philosopher I find the notion that Nietzsche was not a philosopher laughable, though admittedly it has been forwarded by a small number of serious scholars. Those critics, however, have discounted Nietzsche as a philosopher on the basis of his having no "system," a criterion that would have us exclude Voltaire and, notably, Socrates -- not to mention the great majority of 20th century philosophers (cf. Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, especially chapter 3). Even if one is not convinced of Nietzsche's status as a philosopher on the basis of his influence upon later thinkers or how he was understood by both his contemporaries and his intellectual descendents, anyone who reads and reflects on his collected works would be hard-pressed to deny that Nietzsche was a philosopher par excellence. We are now in a position to answer this question: Does it follow from Nietzsche�s position on God that one is now free to do whatever he/she wishes? It should be clear at this point that the question is not adequately qualified. Dostoevsky, of course, expresses a similar sentiment in The Brothers Karamazov: "If you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only love but every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, nothing then would be immoral; everything would be lawful, even cannibalism." (Though the wording never actually appears in the novel, this notion has been paraphrased famously as, "If God does not exist, everything is permitted.") Nietzsche, however, would argue that this is the attitude of the Last Man -- a mode of being contrasted with the lauded �bermensch in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The absence of God does not change the reality of the world or human actions one bit, according to Nietzsche, no matter what individuals may think (and thus no matter how they might react to the news that "God is dead").
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Posted 03/10/08 - 04:55 PM:	#10
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Given the context of the entire section, it is quite clear that Nietzsche is not a moral objectivist -- which would commit him to some species of moral realism -- but rather an error theorist (though that term would not enter the metaethical lexicon until the second half of the 20th century). When analysed from a second order perspective, Nietzsche accuses morality of being factually mistaken. But he is "no fool," and therefore he recognizes the instrumental value of first order morality (though in his later work he holds that it is the weak who rely on such social instruments -- the strong are, of course, "beyond good and evil"). Exactly. There is an objective morality in a given circumstance, but it's subject to change. That's why I said it was absolute morality he denied, not objective, since morality in his sense has to do with growth and self-interest, for there is no permanent, fixed way that a person must react to a given situation or stimulus: it�s relative. No two circumstances are exactly the same and so there is a need for rumination. That's why he says that part of the aphorism which I bolded. Him trying to re-establish the truth behind why we do the things we do (i.e. someone trying to get what he called in Beyond Good and Evil, "a badge of morality"), doesn't negate a relative-objective morality in his philosophy. And clearly that is certainly not to say that he denies subjective morality. Edited by Stream of Conscious on 03/10/08 - 05:01 PM
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/10/08 - 08:57 PM:	#11
PMB wrote: To answer keda's first question, then, the force of "ought" in the above passage is not moral but the "ought" of hypothetical imperatives: one "ought" to some of those things that morality requires not because morality requires it, but "for other reasons than hitherto" believed. Namely, they are reasonable actions given the ends and constitutions of various human beings. I suspected that was the case, I just wanted to be sure. To answer keda's second question, Nietzsche would argue that the Nazi's actions are quintessentially weak: the need to harm others is an indication that one lacks strength (both in terms of power over oneself and power over others). Could you elaborate on what is meant by strength here. A physically strong person may well use his strength to hurt others for their own personal gain. A mentally strong person could use his intellect to scam people. Stream of Conscious wrote: No, Nietzsche did in fact present well thought-out arguments for his MANY diatribes against anti-Semitism. And as for his conviction in the matter, in chapter 7 of Beyond Good and Evil he goes so far as to say that anti-Semites should be kicked out of Europe. If I have understood Nietzsche correctly then his arguments must be of the type that one ought to oppose anti-semitism if one has a particular motivation (at least this is what PMB seems to be saying). My point was, If I am a masoschist then I have a motivation for hurting myself. If I'm a sadist, I have a motivation for hurting others. If I love jews and think they are nice people, then I have a motivation for opposing antisemites. So, at best we may argue about technicalities. How do we best do X, how do we best accomplish Y?
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Posted 03/10/08 - 09:03 PM:	#12
About the opinion, if Nietzsche said, one should oppose antisemitism - if one's end is X, then yes, I would have to retract the claim that it is an opinion, however if he just says, one should oppose antisemitism, and then provides an argument for it, then no, it is an opinion, if one cannot maintain the universality of the claim.
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

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Posted 03/11/08 - 07:56 AM:	#13
Stream of Conscious wrote: Exactly. There is an objective morality in a given circumstance, but it's subject to change. You are abusing the terms used in moral philosophy. The absolute/relative distinction is important when differentiating between acts which are to be considered in themselves and acts which must be considered in the context in which they occur. For example, one might argue that we must differentiate between killing in cold-blood and killing in self-defense (thereby allowing us to say that killing is not wrong per se, but that it is in most situations -- perhaps even often enough to warrant us leaving off the qualification in everyday speech). On the other hand, one might consider suicide to be immoral no matter what the situation. Suicide, then, would be absolutely wrong, whereas the wrongness of homicide would be relative to the situation. The objective/subjective distinction is important when differentiating between acts that are wrong simpliciter and acts that are wrong according to some particular perspective. Again, homicide could (theoretically) be objectively wrong while still being subjectively right to the murderer. Or some actions might be perfectly permissible from a second order stance but be considered wrong from a particular first order perspective. For example, there may be nothing objectively immoral about belching after a meal, but your doing so (or not) will be judged differently based on the company you keep. That said, Nietzsche clearly rejects objective morality. That he believes certain actions are rational in a given circumstance does not mean he believes them to be objectively moral. Rather they are -- it should come as no surprise -- rationally instrumental. Stream of Conscious wrote: No two circumstances are exactly the same and so there is a need for rumination. That's why he says that part of the aphorism which I bolded. No, the passage you placed in boldface is meant to clarify that the loss of moral reasons does not amount to a loss of all reasons whatsoever. That is, just because there is no moral reason not to kill your best friend does not mean that it is now rational to shoot him in the face. Here's another example (often presented as a discussion between a Logical Postivist and Ludwig Wittgenstein, though this is almost certainly apocryphal): Empiricism results in Hume's problem of induction. So while every attempt thus far to jump off the Eiffel Tower and break into flight has failed (resulting in the experimenter's death), it is not a logical certainty that the next attempt will fail. What rational reason could I have, then, for not jumping off the Eiffel Tower? *Because I don't want* to jump off the Eiffel Tower!** And that is all the reason I need.
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Posted 03/11/08 - 08:55 AM:	#14
keda wrote: I suspected that was the case, I just wanted to be sure. I guessed that you suspected, I just wanted to confirm. keda wrote: Could you elaborate on what is meant by strength here. A physically strong person may well use his strength to hurt others for their own personal gain. A mentally strong person could use his intellect to scam people. The key word is could. A person who is strong in Nietzsche's sense wouldn't, however. Key to understanding Nietzsche is his absolute insistence on the intellectual conscience. Scamming people, then, is out of the question. Moreover, Nietzsche's conception of strength does have consequences for those surrounding the strong, it focuses largely on power over oneself. The strong are capable of separating themselves from the safety of the herd in favor of independence. The strong think for themselves rather than accepting existing dogmas for themselves, create new values rather than accepting traditional values, and are authentic to who they are as opposed to who they've been told to be. The truly strong find what is unique in them and focus their attentions on that, creating something that is both new and an expression of who one truly is. (Thus Nietzsche's constant urgings for us to finally become ourselves.) During this process, it is absolutely the case that some people will get hurt. Indeed, Nietzsche argues that the very process of breaking away from the herd will be painful for those doing so. But one must destroy before one may create, and thus this pain and destruction is merely instrumental -- it is not the true end to which the strong aspire. I highly recommend reading either The Gay Science or Beyond Good and Evil for more on this, though it is best to read it with some commentary. Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist is an excellent book in this regard, and the notes in his edition of The Gay Science are indispensable, but there are other useful commentaries available as well (Leiter has been fairly well received, for example). keda wrote: If I have understood Nietzsche correctly then his arguments must be of the type that one ought to oppose anti-semitism if one has a particular motivation (at least this is what PMB seems to be saying). But that's not the whole story (not that you should be expected to understand the whole story from what has been said so far). What Stream of Conscious seems to be referring to is Nietzsche's contemptuous critiques of anti-Semitism both in terms of its development at the time and as a sign of weakness. That is, Nietzsche critiques anti-Semitism both from outside his own philosophical viewpoint and from within it. And that is to give more than just hypothetical conditionals regarding such attitudes.
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Posted 03/11/08 - 10:33 AM:	#15
keda wrote: About the opinion, if Nietzsche said, one should oppose antisemitism - if one's end is X, then yes, I would have to retract the claim that it is an opinion, however if he just says, one should oppose antisemitism, and then provides an argument for it, then no, it is an opinion, if one cannot maintain the universality of the claim. Show me one philosopher who has found and proven undeniable "universality" in his/her philosophy. It appears, according to you, that no matter how lucid and intelligent an argument is, it is merely opinion, even if the consequences warned about turn out to be correct, as they were time and time again with Nietzsche (i.e. his prediction of WWI, The Russian Revolution, Nazi Germany - to name a few). In that case, let us discount all philosophers as not actually being philosophers because they spoke their opinions. At any rate, outside of writing about horrible things in this world, most of his philosophy is the analysis of other philosophies, psychology, human nature, politics, etc. Don't worry about their being a lack of philosophy in Nietzsche. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: That said, Nietzsche clearly rejects objective morality. That he believes certain actions are rational in a given circumstance does not mean he believes them to be objectively moral. Rather they are -- it should come as no surprise -- rationally instrumental. It is true that in Ecce Homo he took much pride in saying, "I am the first immoralist." But to say that he doesn't equate "rationally instrumental" with "objectively moral" would be a contradiction in his philosophy. For example: in Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist he writes quite a bit (more fervently than in his other writings) against utilitarianism and egalitarianism, as he most certainly did not believe that all men are equal. He believed in stratification. And, of course, he rails against absolutism. He goes so far as to say that every attempt that man has taken to make men equal has been thoroughly immoral and based on inequality. This is an overt expression of moral indignation on his part. However, if objective morality only has a shallow meaning of an action being the one and ONLY way to act and there being no other person who could possibly think it immoral when it is moral, and/or no situation being able of changing it to being an immoral action, then, and only then, would he be a disbeliever in objective morality. But what that is is absolute morality. Absolute morality and objective morality have worked off of each other quite a bit in Philosophy, as if they are one and the same thing, but that's false. If it is objectively instrumental to kill someone who is about to kill me, then to Nietzsche there's no reason to say it is only subjectively moral and not objectively moral, especially since (as I showed above) he takes an objective stance about things himself. It's irrelevant that the perpetrator wouldn't like me defending myself: I was the one who was in the right; that is, in Nietzschean philosophy, the one who took the best and most rational recourse for my own good. It was a moral action, not based on anything absolute (like God), but objectively moral due to the circumstances. Therefore: it is both objective and relative to the circumstances; as all moral action is. Edited by Stream of Conscious on 03/11/08 - 10:42 AM
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Posted 03/11/08 - 01:00 PM:	#16
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: The key word is could. A person who is strong in Nietzsche's sense wouldn't, however. Key to understanding Nietzsche is his absolute insistence on the intellectual conscience. Scamming people, then, is out of the question. What is intellectual conscience? Moreover, Nietzsche's conception of strength does have consequences for those surrounding the strong, it focuses largely on power over oneself. The strong are capable of separating themselves from the safety of the herd in favor of independence. What does Nietzsche mean with independence? Is Stream of Conscious wrong when he says Nietzsche was determinist? What Stream of Conscious seems to be referring to is Nietzsche's contemptuous critiques of anti-Semitism both in terms of its development at the time and as a sign of weakness. That is, Nietzsche critiques anti-Semitism both from outside his own philosophical viewpoint and from within it. And that is to give more than just hypothetical conditionals regarding such attitudes. So, it is categorical then?
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Posted 03/11/08 - 01:47 PM:	#17
Stream of Conscious wrote: Show me one philosopher who has found and proven undeniable "universality" in his/her philosophy. I think most philosophers would agree that torturing jews or anyone for that matter in concentration camps is just simply wrong. It appears, according to you, that no matter how lucid and intelligent an argument is, it is merely opinion, even if the consequences warned about turn out to be correct, as they were time and time again with Nietzsche (i.e. his prediction of WWI, The Russian Revolution, Nazi Germany - to name a few). Refer again to my comment on the opinion. It does not apply to any argument of his, that explicitely states it in a hypothetical form.
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Posted 03/11/08 - 03:51 PM:	#18
keda wrote: I think most philosophers would agree that torturing jews or anyone for that matter in concentration camps is just simply wrong. And if Europe had taken the advice of Nietzsche's that I already told you about in chapter seven of Beyond Good and Evil it would have never happened in the first place, because anti-Semites would have been thrown out decades earlier. He despised the conviction of the anti-Semites and their hatred and persecution of the Jews in 19th Century Germany and saw much worse up ahead, so I can only imagine what he would have thought of all that atrocity. Especially since in Daybreak he hoped that Jews, with all their intelligence, skill and hard work, would eventually dominate all of Europe, politically and in commerce, to enrich it, as he considered them to be the jewel of Europe (and don't worry, he spends quite a bit of time in showing why, so that's not mere opinion either). And in Human, All Too Human he claimed them to be the redeemers and cleansers of Europe from the sickness which was the Middle Ages. Refer again to my comment on the opinion. Well, let me tell you, I'm really at a loss as to why in post #7 you claimed Nietzsche wouldn't think the Holocaust was wrong. But I addressed how wrong that claim was in my reply (post #8), and now again. It does not apply to any argument of his, that explicitely states it in a hypothetical form. I need some clarification here. What's being stated in a hypothetical form? Who's being hypothetical here? I've based everything I've told you on his writings. Again: there's no such thing as a philosopher who doesn't have an opinion. What matters is being able to back the opinion up with scholarly analysis (that is, facts and keen observation) which turn the opinion into philosophy. Nietzsche offered the reader more than enough of that. Is Stream of Conscious wrong when he says Nietzsche was determinist? He already told me I was accurate in calling Nietzsche a determinist. Anyway, if you want to see for yourself, read Human, All Too Human, where you�ll find MANY aphorisms where he�s ridiculing and scorning the idea of freewill and �freewillers� themselves. The book is also peppered with plenty of deterministic arguments, especially regarding the law and rehabilitation. Edited by Stream of Conscious on 03/11/08 - 04:10 PM
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/12/08 - 01:04 PM:	#19
Stream of Conscious wrote: It is true that in Ecce Homo he took much pride in saying, "I am the first immoralist." It is also true that I have not once cited Ecce Homo and am clearly not relying on it. Besides, it would be a crude interpretation indeed to read that line literally. Not only was Nietzsche most certainly not the first "immoralist" -- Thrasymachus is the obvious predecessor, and Hobbes has occasionally been claimed as an immoralist as well -- but he was not an "immoralist" at all. That is to say, he did not affirm that the reverse of all traditional values are actually what is to be pursued (as an immoralist does). He was far more subtle than that. Stream of Conscious wrote: But to say that he doesn't equate "rationally instrumental" with "objectively moral" would be a contradiction in his philosophy. Not at all. Read my explanation of how the terms are delineated in metaethics. And though the field of metaethics came to prominence after Nietzsche's death, there is nothing illicit about using our modern analytic apparatus to better understand and categorize his position. But according to such an analysis, he was most certainly not a moral objectivist. To insist otherwise is to engage in equivocation or otherwise abuse the terminology. Stream of Conscious wrote: For example: in Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist he writes quite a bit (more fervently than in his other writings) against utilitarianism and egalitarianism, as he most certainly did not believe that all men are equal. He believed in stratification. Any error theorist is against utilitarianism and egalitarianism -- they are false moral philosophies according to that view. Moreover, Nietzsche thought it was a simple empirical fact that men are not equal, and thus any philosophy built upon the denial of such a fact was bound to be in error. And again, with stratification: Nietzsche was not an elitist (indeed, if anything he is an anti-elitist), but he did see a naturally existing stratification within humanity -- the weak and the strong. Moreover, given the psychological tendency for the weak to follow the strong, the leadership of the strong is natural. But among all this talk of what is natural or psychologically compelling, you'll notice that there is nothing about why the strong are morally deserving of authority. The right of the strong to rule exists as a creation of their will or else not at all. Stream of Conscious wrote: This is an overt expression of moral indignation on his part. Ah, I see now where you are becoming confused. There are two senses of "morality" in play in Nietzsche's works: one that he criticizes and one that he accepts. The one he criticizes (called "morality in the pejorative sense," or "MPS" by Brian Leiter) is -- on pain of contradiction -- separable from the one that he embraces. MPS could be characterized, at least in part, by the theses of moral realism: absolutism (which you have identified) and objectivism (in the metaphysical sense, which you have not yet identified). Nietzsche was, of course, quite aware of this surface dissonance and -- having no intention to equivocate -- addresses the issue in Daybreak: [I]n this book faith in morality is withdrawn -- but why? Out of morality! Or what else should we call that which informs it -- and us? That is, especially within philosophy, "moral" and "morality" have as much to do with theories of recommended behavior as they do the specific traditional and realist theories Nietzsche is critiquing. His recommendations, then, are broadly "moral" when we consider this fact -- but it remains the case that they are not moral in the (absolute, objective) sense of moral realism as commonly understood. That there are objective reasons justifying our labeling of a particular action as instrumentally rational is not sufficient to make the action itself objectively moral in the sense here at issue. Indeed, it would not even be sufficient to make it "objective" in the Wittgensteinian sense -- which consists in being publicly recognized and judged (and is thus better termed by way of the public/private dichotomy as opposed to the contextually confusing objective/subjective dichotomy). Instrumental rationality is distinctly subjectivist in metaethical terms: objectivity does not transfer. Stream of Conscious wrote: However, if objective morality only has a shallow meaning of an action being the one and ONLY way to act and there being no other person who could possibly think it immoral when it is moral, and/or no situation being able of changing it to being an immoral action, then, and only then, would he be a disbeliever in objective morality. But what that is is absolute morality. This is a straw man: neither objectivism nor absolutism require everything you have just rolled together. No realist doctrine of morality goes so far as to say that no one could possibly think an action immoral when it is, in fact, moral. The fact of moral disagreement alone would falsify such a view, regardless of the veracity of either the absolutist or the objectivist thesis. Furthermore, as I explained in the last post, absolutism about morality regards actions being categorically moral or immoral no matter the circumstances (as in the "no situation being able of changing it to being an immoral action" part of the above quote). But while objectivism can take the circumstances of an action into account, it is still committed to actions being moral or immoral regardless of anyone's perspective on the situation. That is, even if objectivism allows self-defense as a valid circumstantial reason for someone to kill another person, that validity depends on the feelings of neither the one being killed nor the one doing the killing. Perhaps the one being killed would prefer to continue living or sees the killer's action as wrong, but that is irrelevant to objectivism. Once we start taking perspectives into account, we enter the realm of subjectivism. Stream of Conscious wrote: Absolute morality and objective morality have worked off of each other quite a bit in Philosophy, as if they are one and the same thing, but that's false. Indeed it is, though the conflation of the two has proved tempting for many. For example, look at the quote I responded to immediately above: you yourself padded the definition of absolute morality with extraneous concepts. Stream of Conscious wrote: If it is objectively instrumental to kill someone who is about to kill me, then to Nietzsche there's no reason to say it is only subjectively moral and not objectively moral, especially since (as I showed above) he takes an objective stance about things himself. Again, I do not agree with your contention that Nietzsche takes an objective stance about morality. And also again, objectivity does not transfer. That something is instrumentally rational may be an objective fact, but this does not make the instrumental action objectively moral; similarly, that my wife thinks chocolate is better than vanilla is an objective fact, but this does not make it an objective fact that chocolate really is better than vanilla. Objectivity does not transfer. Stream of Conscious wrote: It's irrelevant that the perpetrator wouldn't like me defending myself: I was the one who was in the right; that is, in Nietzschean philosophy, the one who took the best and most rational recourse for my own good. Read your own sentence again: if someone attacks you and you defend yourself, then you have indeed taken the most rational recourse for your own good. But that doesn't put you "in the right" on some higher level of analysis, according to Nietzsche. You've simply made the decision that was right for you. But perhaps your attacker tried to kill you because if he had not, you would have killed him tomorrow (perhaps you know that he will be vulnerable and planned on taking advantage of that fact). This was his only chance to protect himself. In that case, he has also taken the most rational recourse for his own good by taking a risk in attacking you today on the chance of victory rather than accepting his victimization tomorrow. There is no way, on a Nietzschean framework, to say who is objectively "in the right." Both people have done what was right for them in terms of the most rational actions for their own good. What is left is only an analysis of what actually happened (i.e. who won out). It would require some sort of "might makes right" policy to get objective morality out of this -- and not just that, but also some justification of how might can make something objectively right. But this is not to be found in Nietzsche. Ultimately, I think you are confused about how terminology is used in metaethics. Clarity on this issue, however, will prove quite fruitful in future conversations.
_____________________ "I find that offensive!" -Bender Bending Rodriguez "Remember, Jesus would rather constantly shame gays than let orphans have a family." -Dr. Stephen T. Colbert, DFA

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Posted 03/12/08 - 01:07 PM:	#20
keda wrote: What is intellectual conscience? Dedication to the truth despite the lack of any moral requirement to be honest. keda wrote: What does Nietzsche mean with independence? Is Stream of Conscious wrong when he says Nietzsche was determinist? There is some debate as to whether Nietzsche would have been a hard determinist or a compatibilist, but he was certainly not a libertarian in terms of free will. "Independence" here is roughly equivalent to "individuality." That is, one is sufficiently independent if one chooses (e.g. one's values) for oneself, and not because they have been endorsed (or rejected!) by others. keda wrote: So, it is categorical then? Not at all. But it is still an internal critique. Anti-semitism is not "wrong" or "evil" in the way that a moral realist would promote, but rather it is hypocritical (the internal criticism) and a sign of weakness (the external criticism). As such, Nietzsche gives both Nietzscheans and non-Nietzscheans reasons to reject anti-Semitism.
_____________________ "I find that offensive!" -Bender Bending Rodriguez "Remember, Jesus would rather constantly shame gays than let orphans have a family." -Dr. Stephen T. Colbert, DFA

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Posted 03/12/08 - 08:20 PM:	#21
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Ah, I see now where you are becoming confused. There are two senses of "morality" in play in Nietzsche's works: one that he criticizes and one that he accepts. The one he criticizes (called "morality in the pejorative sense," or "MPS" by Brian Leiter) is -- on pain of contradiction -- separable from the one that he embraces. This is very interesting to me. What exactly is this "morality" that he embraces? Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Read your own sentence again: if someone attacks you and you defend yourself, then you have indeed taken the most rational recourse for your own good. But that doesn't put you "in the right" on some higher level of analysis, according to Nietzsche. You've simply made the decision that was right for you. But perhaps your attacker tried to kill you because if he had not, you would have killed him tomorrow (perhaps you know that he will be vulnerable and planned on taking advantage of that fact). This was his only chance to protect himself. In that case, he has also taken the most rational recourse for his own good by taking a risk in attacking you today on the chance of victory rather than accepting his victimization tomorrow. There is no way, on a Nietzschean framework, to say who is objectively "in the right." Both people have done what was right for them in terms of the most rational actions for their own good. What is left is only an analysis of what actually happened (i.e. who won out). It would require some sort of "might makes right" policy to get objective morality out of this -- and not just that, but also some justification of how might can make something objectively right. But this is not to be found in Nietzsche. Well, that's not fair Beatnik, you completely changed the scenario into something else. I agree with you by that scenario, but that's not the one I presented. I'm talking about defending myself against a sudden attacker, not one who is defending himself against what I might do to him tomorrow or the day after. How is it that Nietzsche would have considered killing the man about to kill me in purposeful cold-blood (be it for fun or for my money, etc) only subjectively moral? I don�t understand. It�s clear that I'm objectively in the right, as, like you said, "might makes right" is not to be found in Nietzsche's philosophy. I�m the one defending my life. And isn�t him trying to kill me like that objectively immoral? What about rape? Is that only subjective wickedness too to Nietzsche? I find that a little more than hard to swallow.
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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Posted 03/13/08 - 09:04 AM:	#22
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Dedication to the truth despite the lack of any moral requirement to be honest. Dedication to the truth is to be honest then? There is some debate as to whether Nietzsche would have been a hard determinist or a compatibilist, but he was certainly not a libertarian in terms of free will. Ok, so he is a determinist but it is debatable whether he subscribe to Humean type of free will or not? That is, one is sufficiently independent if one chooses (e.g. one's values) for oneself, and not because they have been endorsed (or rejected!) by others. Nietzsche supports determinism, so does it not then follow that there are particular conditions must be met for Nietzsche to be "independent" and when they are not met, he becomes "dependent"? Let us say I'm a neurochemist, and know how to condition him by means of altering those conditions and will if necessary prevent him to say anything that goes against my ideas of what is moral by making sure those conditions are not met. Does it then not follow that Nietzsche is "dependent"?
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

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Posted 03/13/08 - 09:16 AM:	#23
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Not at all. But it is still an internal critique. Anti-semitism is not "wrong" or "evil" in the way that a moral realist would promote, but rather it is hypocritical (the internal criticism) and a sign of weakness (the external criticism). As such, Nietzsche gives both Nietzscheans and non-Nietzscheans reasons to reject anti-Semitism. Could you elaborate more on this external/internal criticism distinction? Are you saying that Nietzsche gives Nietzscheans and non-Nietsscheans different reasons for rejecting it?
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

keda
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Posted 03/13/08 - 09:51 AM:	#24
Stream of Conscious wrote: And if Europe had taken the advice of Nietzsche's that I already told you about in chapter seven of Beyond Good and Evil it would have never happened in the first place, because anti-Semites would have been thrown out decades earlier. He despised the conviction of the anti-Semites and their hatred and persecution of the Jews in 19th Century Germany and saw much worse up ahead, so I can only imagine what he would have thought of all that atrocity. Especially since in Daybreak he hoped that Jews, with all their intelligence, skill and hard work, would eventually dominate all of Europe, politically and in commerce, to enrich it, as he considered them to be the jewel of Europe (and don't worry, he spends quite a bit of time in showing why, so that's not mere opinion either). And in Human, All Too Human he claimed them to be the redeemers and cleansers of Europe from the sickness which was the Middle Ages. I happen to be aware Nietszsche was against anti-semitism, but can you not sort out the rhetoric and point me to an actual argument he made against anti-semitism? Well, let me tell you, I'm really at a loss as to why in post #7 you claimed Nietzsche wouldn't think the Holocaust was wrong. But I addressed how wrong that claim was in my reply (post #8), and now again. I never really claimed he didn't think it was wrong - I'm just pointing out what is required of him, that it would not just be an opinion. I need some clarification here. What's being stated in a hypothetical form? Who's being hypothetical here? I've based everything I've told you on his writings. From post #12 keda wrote: one should oppose antisemitism - if one's end is X Again: there's no such thing as a philosopher who doesn't have an opinion. It should be expected that a philosopher has something else than opinions as well. What matters is being able to back the opinion up with scholarly analysis (that is, facts and keen observation) which turn the opinion into philosophy. Nietzsche offered the reader more than enough of that. That would be by a very loose definition of philosophy.
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan

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Posted 03/13/08 - 11:55 AM:	#25
keda wrote: I happen to be aware Nietszsche was against anti-semitism, but can you not sort out the rhetoric and point me to an actual argument he made against anti-semitism? Well, I gave you arguments from Human, All Too Human and Daybreak, I'm not going to go through his entire catalogue. Besides those, though, off the top of my head, I'd say definitely read On the Genealogy of Morals and The Antichrist, there are some polemics against anti-Semites there. keda wrote: one should oppose antisemitism - if one's end is X Yes, and those ends terrified him. That's the point. The elimination of Jews in Europe would leave it more impoverished than ever. But, no, he didn't feel the need to expressly come out and say things that are basic to us from childhood like why "killing is bad" and "hurting people is wrong." He wasn't writing to little children. keda wrote: It should be expected that a philosopher has something else than opinions as well. Oh, no doubt! keda wrote: That would be by a very loose definition of philosophy. No, it would be by the works of philosophers in the world of academia and what makes their works philosophical in nature, especially the philosophers since the Enlightenment. But what to you would be the most solid definition of Philosophy then? Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 03/13/08 - 02:51 PM. Reason: removed response to deleted.
_____________________ "The reason our institutions, (and) our traditional religions are all crumbling is because THEY'RE NO LONGER RELEVANT!" - Bill Hicks "Compulsion to lie - in that I detect every predestined theologian." - Nietzsche "It has served us well, this myth of Christ." - Pope Leo X

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