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Dunamis
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Posted 03/22/08 - 05:24 PM:	#31
Death Monkey wrote: I don't understand your objection. I know I did not present the causal model. I don't see why it would be necessary for me to do so, since I was just giving an example anyway. Your "example" was supposed to be an example of a "causal description" which previously you had restricted to only descriptions which are on a "causal model". Since such a causal model is missing, your example is near meaningless if it is meant to make your distinction clear, given your restriction as to what is, by your own account, a "causal description. At the very, very best you might be saying something like, "In saying that the fear caused me to jump, this is a causal description because when I would say such a thing I would mean a 'causal model' was employed, but when asked what causal model this was I would not be able to present it". If this is the case, though you might have meant such a description to be a "causal description", you would have been wrong, by your own definition of a "causal description". No, I do not. I think that this just amounts to you and I meaning slightly different things my these terms. When you say that x is y, in an attempt to clarify what y is, the problem is not with the terms, but with the "is". It has been, each time you have tried to provide a clarification of "process" as a description (how for instance a process is a mechanism), the "is" here seems to be functioning exactly as a "confusing the map for the territory" kind of error. Otherwise you are just playing a game of synonymy. To be specific. If you are going to say that "The mechanism of writing poetry is the process of writing poetry" you are playing in interesting game of reference. The way that I read such a declaration is that when someone says, "Teach me the process of writing poetry" what you seem to want to say is that whatever ends up being taught can best be described AS a mechanism, that is within a causal model. If this is your meaning, you indeed would be mistaking the map for the territory, for both descriptions, that of a process of writing (which is not under a causal model) and that of a mechanism (which is under a causal model), ARE BOTH maps, and neither territory. Saying that one is the other is only swapping maps (one of a causal model, one not). If this is not what you are saying, but are attempting to say that when one says "Teach me the process of writing poetry" this is the same thing as saying "Teach me the mechanism of writing poetry", this is ridiculous. The change of word creates a change in meaning. They are not synonymous. In short, saying "The mechanism is the process" strikes me as either patently incorrect, or a "map for the territory" kind of error. Perhaps you can provide a third option (hopefully, more than just "that is the way I like to use the word "mechanism", for when one deviates from common usage, one must have reasons if one is to avoid pure confusion for the sake of confusion). OK. I'm not sure why you seem to want to argue with me about what Davidson's position is, when I already told you that I am not at all familiar with his work. It was, and is, Davidson's position which drew distinctions which showed your take on "causal description" to be insufficient. If you have agreed that it is insufficient (in describing the ways that causal description is usually employed), then indeed there is little else to discuss regarding Davidson, that is, once we have cleared up the nature of your objection to whatever you find too "metaphysical" in his position. You mean you've never heard people say things like "dualism is true", or "multiple ontological substances exist", or "determinism is true", or " completely undetectable things/properties exist"? I hear these sorts of things all the time. First off, "dualism is true" is a mistake category, models cannot be true. But this is a sentence I have very seldom heard. The second is a sentence which may be true or false, and I have no problem with such a sentence as long as rational support can be given, that is as long as making such an assumptions brings certain things into clarity. The third sentence is the same as the first, and I have seldom heard such a sentence. The fourth sentence I have heard but simply laugh at. I didn't say they were being made here. And I would hardly call it "railing". I only even mentioned it becuase you asked. I was not even going to go into this issue here. It is off topic. I took issue with your supposed issue with Davidson. I would like to understand just what sort of metaphysical positions, including assumptions or sentences made, which you object to. As I pointed out, Davidson makes some assumptions which are metaphysical, but which you also seem to find regular in epistemology. I just am not able to track what you find acceptable, and what not. Me:What happens if you take "literally" the proposition, "events in the world cause our beliefs"? And what happens if you take it "metaphorically"? You: In the former case you are making a statement that is only well-defined for models, but attempting to directly apply it to reality. In the latter case you are making a statement about a particular model (which would need to be specified by the context), and then presenting this model as a useful or accurate model of reality, with the understanding that the parts of that model that do not directly correspond to predictions about observations, are only being taken metaphorically. Is part of "reality" the results of arguments, or just scientific observations made with instruments? Is "reality" for you only what is measurable? Is this what you mean by "directly apply it to reality"? Are you "indirectly applying to reality" the principle if such a model leads one to declare that there can be no fixed laws the govern beliefs and physical states? Does one have to take measurements of brain states to pass from "metaphor" to "literal"? Me: Hmmm. Then in your book one can make statements that hold a monist position, such as "There is one world" and hold them to be true, but one cannot say something like "Monism is true"; is that the whole of your resistence to Davidson? You: I guess that depends on what the person means by "there is one world". What would be the instances (of meaning) where such a statement would be allowed to stand? You: It is, in fact, what I would consider to be one of the basic assumptions of most epistemologies. Me:And you do not see such an assumption to be metaphysical? And hence its statement "gibberish"?[ You: Not in the context you have presented, no. So, metaphysical type statements are for you valid if they support epistomological theories? Aren't most metaphysical statements often linked to epistemologies from Descartes on up (or really from Plato forward)? I don't understand the nature of your allowance here. Edited by Dunamis on 03/22/08 - 06:04 PM
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Simple Occam
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Posted 03/23/08 - 05:23 AM:	#32
Dunamis wrote: It has been, from the beginning, my point that indeed these are two kinds of explanation, (so by and large I would agree with your statement), but also that each kind of explanation is a "causal description". Not only this, but no one of the two kinds of causal explanation has precedence or priority over the other. Rather, they are inter-related. We do agree pretty well up to this point. But what (other) kind of explanation explains their inter-relations? What other kind of cause explains how our rational conscious (or unconscious) purposes can be so related and attuned to the world of natural causes and effects? I agree that neither takes precedence over the other, so what third set of causes and explanations accounts for the undeniable inter-relation between the nature that causes our beliefs and the reasons we have that evaluate our beliefs (and desires) and cause our rational, moral behaviors? It's especially important that we can answer these questions when our morally responsible behaviors themselves become natural causes that affect our own survival conditions: eg: overpopulation, affecting global climate change, use of WMD's, cloning and so on. In my opinion, here's where we need to compare and evaluateour metaphysical models and decide about the BEST way to map the territory. Both of you and DM seem to think that selecting the best metaphysical model is a subjective process, not to be settled in reference to any shared world of common facts or to be taken literally; in other words, gibberish. To avoid the gibberish we would have to show how true metaphysical beliefs are caused by our sharing of the same natural world and the same reasoning machines (ie neurophysiology) which also contribute to the formation of these metaphysical beliefs. What we would be talking about would be the ontology of belief formation. What kind of thing(s) exists such that parts of it could come to have this relationship to some or all of it's other parts or to the wholeness of all the parts called "knowledge"? My belief about this is that the natural world (not just the "living" parts) evolves the capacity to know itself through reflective subjects like ourselves. To explain fully why this is true requires a rather extended philosophical argument. If the argument were convincing, it would show how a few basic ontological and metaphysical assumptions can provide the best explanation of what appears empirically as the content of our common or shared experience of the world. I suspect thisis already starting to sound like gibberish to you. Lots of things sound like gibberish, if you don't speak the language: techie talk, government-ese, Chin-ese, rap music, and so on. We philosophers of the 21st Century are taught not to speak the language of ontology and metaphysics any more (unless you are feeling poetic, maybe). This habit was learned (caused) during the Renaissance, through the empirical discovery that the qualities of perception were located inside the perceiving subject and not with in natural objects thmeselves. The budding science of optics produced undeniable results that led to the demise of direct or naive realism as a viable way of understanding perception. Thus, critical or representative realism, grounded in empirical discoveries, shifted the locus of our knowledge of the world from the direct intuition of external objects to the apprehension of internal changes within the perceiving subject. The empiricist critique of critical realism, as it was inherited by Locke, came from Berkeley and Hume, showing that if knowlwdge comes from experience and experience is within the subject, then "realism" is a non-empirical, metapphysical belief. Talking about non-empirical substances like the would apart from our perception of it or God, an unobservable being or even the self, other than a collection of ideas... all this starts to sound like gibberish. Causality, morality and even space were also casualities of this turn toward epistemological critiques of metaphysical notions. Some 500 years later, metaphysical talk sounds like gibberish to us. To reference Kuhn again, the current paradigm in western philosophy does not include mataphysical talk, except as an analogy or a sometimes useful way of thinking... certainly not literal truth. To sum up, I'm suggesting to you that an ontological explanation, which identifies ontological causes to explain how our rational, conscious (or unconscious) purposes can be related and attuned to the world of natural causes and effects is possible. This third set of causes and explanations can account for the undeniable inter-relation between the nature that causes our beliefs and the reasons we have that evaluate our beliefs (and desires) and cause our rational, moral behaviors. Further, unless we can discover such an explanation, we cannot explain the inter-relation between the 2 types of explanations (ie, causal and rational) that, we all seem to agree, exists.

Dunamis
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Posted 03/23/08 - 09:24 AM:	#33
Simple Occam wrote: We do agree pretty well up to this point. But what (other) kind of explanation explains their inter-relations? What other kind of cause explains how our rational conscious (or unconscious) purposes can be so related and attuned to the world of natural causes and effects? I agree that neither takes precedence over the other, so what third set of causes and explanations accounts for the undeniable inter-relation between the nature that causes our beliefs and the reasons we have that evaluate our beliefs (and desires) and cause our rational, moral behaviors? It's especially important that we can answer these questions when our morally responsible behaviors themselves become natural causes that affect our own survival conditions: eg: overpopulation, affecting global climate change, use of WMD's, cloning and so on. I do not understand why if there are two kinds of causal descriptions which are inter-related, there is need for a third kind of description to explain it as such. These need only be seen as tools that have arisen, via evolution, for copy with the world/enviroment. This class of concepts works well with certain relations, and this class with others. But, indeed if you do crave such an explanation (and would not be satisified with a never ending series of such required causes), when one has to become distinctly metaphysical, and perhaps talk of Immanent causes. Some have pointed out that Davidson's theory of conceptual dualism bears striking resemblance to Spinoza's theory of the Attributes. In such a perspective, both conceptual apparatus are seen to be immanent to "Substance", but a Substance what is capable of an infinite number of such Attributes (only two of which we use), leaving the possibility for the arising of new conceptual classes (quantum?) as evolution provides. I do agree that there are moral consequences for such observations, hence Spinoza wrote a work called "Ethics". In Davidson though, this simply became reduced to the principle that prescription precedes description, which is itself an ethical mandate of a kind. And yes, I agree that the consciousness of the feedback between moral decisions and our enviroment is at the heart of moral, or I would rather say, ethical, understanding. In my opinion, here's where we need to compare and evaluate our metaphysical models and decide about the BEST way to map the territory. Both of you and DM seem to think that selecting the best metaphysical model is a subjective process, not to be settled in reference to any shared world of common facts or to be taken literally; in other words, gibberish. To avoid the gibberish we would have to show how true metaphysical beliefs are caused by our sharing of the same natural world and the same reasoning machines (ie neurophysiology) which also contribute to the formation of these metaphysical beliefs. I completely agree. But such a process of agreement I think cannot, in principle, be FOUNDED, but can only be negotiated through interaction. I agree that this is something that needs to be done (if at all one is to talk about metaphysics in a meaningful way), but can only be done as process toward concensus. That is, the holder of specific metaphysical beliefs has to demonstrate, through argument, description, but also through lived interaction, the "sense" of seeing the world in that way. This "sense" I believe, can only be ultimately experienced, and not proven, (though proving goes a long way towards the experience). What it comes down to is, I believe, is the communication of values such that others feel them as effective and revealing. What we would be talking about would be the ontology of belief formation. What kind of thing(s) exists such that parts of it could come to have this relationship to some or all of it's other parts or to the wholeness of all the parts called "knowledge"? My belief about this is that the natural world (not just the "living" parts) evolves the capacity to know itself through reflective subjects like ourselves. I agree with this. Rorty makes the rather interesting point that epistomology is part of a fundamental ontological distinction, which separates out "knowing" from "being" (and thus makes the project of epistomology seem relevant, i.e. how do we connect our knowing to the world). Once we realize that the project is no longer how to connect knowledge with being, and understand knowing to be and expression of being, the category of epistemology collapses. One of the results of such a collapse is that what "knowing" is collapses too, into a plethora of phenomena which then can be independently set against criteria. Whether a bacteria knows becomes a function of what it can do. To explain fully why this is true requires a rather extended philosophical argument. If the argument were convincing, it would show how a few basic ontological and metaphysical assumptions can provide the best explanation of what appears empirically as the content of our common or shared experience of the world. I suspect thisis already starting to sound like gibberish to you. It doesn't sound like gibberish to me. I think that there are very valid arguments for seeing the world as immanently conscious, in such a way that the idea of what consciousness is undergoes a radical change, a change into a much more powerful concept (i.e. is able to describe a greater variety of phenomena and differences which would otherwise go undescribed). The empiricist critique of critical realism, as it was inherited by Locke, came from Berkeley and Hume, showing that if knowlwdge comes from experience and experience is within the subject, then "realism" is a non-empirical, metapphysical belief. Talking about non-empirical substances like the would apart from our perception of it or God, an unobservable being or even the self, other than a collection of ideas... all this starts to sound like gibberish. I believe that Realism is a metaphysical position, made manifest in a theory of epistemology. Causality, morality and even space were also casualities of this turn toward epistemological critiques of metaphysical notions. Some 500 years later, metaphysical talk sounds like gibberish to us. To reference Kuhn again, the current paradigm in western philosophy does not include mataphysical talk, except as an analogy or a sometimes useful way of thinking... certainly not literal truth. I think, for instance, a critic of metaphysical talk, Wittgenstein, had important points to be made. There is a kind of "gibberishness" what often accompanies metaphysical talk, and it is important to distinguish between statements that can be empirically confirmed, and those that seem to circulate upon themselves. What Wittgenstein did not talk about (and certainly not the Positivists), is that the production of their circular statements are not just pure nonsense because they are not empirical statements. They are part of the rational and collective re-imaginings which allow empirical statements to hold together. Often when they are simply assumed as a back-logic of our observations, they then become as Wittgenstein called "grammatical". But what one can do, in philosophy, is call attention to these kinds of assumptions, and examine them, critiquing them and inviting them to change. The end result is not that one switches out one set of gibberish statements for another set, but the conditions for observation can change. And if they change (though none of the statements can be proven directly by observations) different observations, a sensitivity to different differences, come into being. That is to say, the critique of metaphysics I think is a good thing. But such a critique lead to a certain repression of metaphysical assumptions. Such assumptions then just became the blind and obvious of "just how things are". To sum up, I'm suggesting to you that an ontological explanation, which identifies ontological causes to explain how our rational, conscious (or unconscious) purposes can be related and attuned to the world of natural causes and effects is possible. I agree with this. Not only possible, but I think desirable. This third set of causes and explanations can account for the undeniable inter-relation between the nature that causes our beliefs and the reasons we have that evaluate our beliefs (and desires) and cause our rational, moral behaviors. Further, unless we can discover such an explanation, we cannot explain the inter-relation between the 2 types of explanations (ie, causal and rational) that, we all seem to agree, exists. I don't know what "undeniable" is here. One can certainly say that given certain assumptions that seem to make very good sense, it might be hard to deny, but deniability is a major product of historical development. I can see how humanity can be better served by certain kinds of arguments, but this is an argument of persuasion and shared values, and not one ultimately of logic (no matter how rational the project). "Undeniable" always seems to me to be a homogenating claim, "If you were exactly like me, you would not ever be able to deny this". The consequences of such an assertion are made more clear when seen in this way. It is, I would say, much better to think of arguments as tools, tools designed for specific projects and specific values. That way, the projects or the values can be critiqued. "Yes, that is a very interesting to do, but I don't think it should be done" which is distinct from, "I agree that is a worth aim, but I think that there is a better way of doing it" which is distinct from "That sounds a pretty good thing to work towards, but not at the cost of not doing x or not doing y". "Undeniabilty" seem to foreclose the critique available at the level of value and project.
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Death Monkey
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Posted 03/23/08 - 10:28 AM:	#34
Dunamis, I am not going to debate the whole "mechanism vs process" thing, or the issue of what should or should not be called a "causal model" any more. There is simply no point. You have made it quite clear that you think my choice of terms was inappropriate and/or misleading. You mean you've never heard people say things like "dualism is true", or "multiple ontological substances exist", or "determinism is true", or " completely undetectable things/properties exist"? I hear these sorts of things all the time. First off, "dualism is true" is a mistake category, models cannot be true. I agree. That is exactly my point. But this is a sentence I have very seldom heard. I wish I could say the same thing, but I cannot. The second is a sentence which may be true or false, and I have no problem with such a sentence as long as rational support can be given, that is as long as making such an assumptions brings certain things into clarity. I do not see how it can be true or false. What is the difference between it being true and it being false? If one cannot specify what that difference would be in a non-circular way, then no meaning can be assigned to the statement. Every attempt I have ever seen to specify what the difference is, has either been circular (if it's true, then multiple ontological substances exist...), or been a category mistake (the difference is specified to be that it is true if the "true model" is one from a particular class of model). The third sentence is the same as the first, and I have seldom heard such a sentence. I have also heard many people make this claim. Usually in attempt to somehow discredit quantum mechanics. The fourth sentence I have heard but simply laugh at. I would laugh at it too, but unfortunately many people take it quite seriously. Is part of "reality" the results of arguments, or just scientific observations made with instruments? Is "reality" for you only what is measurable? Is this what you mean by "directly apply it to reality"? What I mean by "directly apply it to reality" is just what you have agreed is a category mistake. Namely claiming either that the model is reality, or that the model is "true", or the application of statements which are only well-defined in the context of models, to reality. Are you "indirectly applying to reality" the principle if such a model leads one to declare that there can be no fixed laws the govern beliefs and physical states? I don't understand the question. You: I guess that depends on what the person means by "there is one world". What would be the instances (of meaning) where such a statement would be allowed to stand? Well, for example, if "world" is simply defined to be "everything that is real", then it would be simply a toutology. So, metaphysical type statements are for you valid if they support epistomological theories? Aren't most metaphysical statements often linked to epistemologies from Descartes on up (or really from Plato forward)? I don't understand the nature of your allowance here. I did not think that such statements would be considered to be metaphysical, but instead epistemological. I am no expert in philosophical terminology, though. If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them. My problem is with the types of claims I mentioned before. Namely those that are actually category mistakes. You seem to agree that (at least some of) these claims are category mistakes. If you also regard the types of claims that I characterized as being either metaphorical or epistemological, as being metaphysical, then suffice it to say that it is not this type of metaphysics that I have a problem with. DM
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Dunamis
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Posted 03/23/08 - 10:57 AM:	#35
Death Monkey wrote: I do not see how it can be true or false. What is the difference between it being true and it being false? If one cannot specify what that difference would be in a non-circular way, then no meaning can be assigned to the statement. Because true and false are not estabished solely in correspondence terms, but also in terms of coherence. It is a mistake to think that the only truths are completely empirical truths or completely analytic truths (as the Positivists might have dreamed). Indeed, the "circularity" which you want to avoid is the circularity which conditions how coherence works, a number of (or as Quine said, a web of...) interlocking beliefs. Rather than being a weakness, circularity is the strength. So, such statements would be called true of false due to the coherence they provide for beliefs, some of which are empirical beliefs. Every attempt I have ever seen to specify what the difference is, has either been circular (if it's true, then multiple ontological substances exist...), or been a category mistake (the difference is specified to be that it is true if the "true model" is one from a particular class of model). Circularity is a only a problem if you are looking for foundations. The nature of beliefs is that their process of justification is indeed circular, that is, self-referential. I have also heard many people make this claim. Usually in attempt to somehow discredit quantum mechanics. There would be a difference between saying "determinism is true" and saying, "All events are determined". I thought you were pointing out this difference. I would laugh at it too, but unfortunately many people take it quite seriously. In previous posts I have tried to point out the reason why they take it seriously, they are taking the wrong route in trying to preserve some important aspects which are lost in certain descriptions. But really, an undetectable property is pretty silly. What I mean by "directly apply it to reality" is just what you have agreed is a category mistake. Namely claiming either that the model is reality, or that the model is "true", or the application of statements which are only well-defined in the context of models, to reality. Then, it would seem that your use of "literal model" is a category mistake as well, if you assume that literal models are "the reality". Me:What would be the instances (of meaning) where such a statement would be allowed to stand? You: Well, for example, if "world" is simply defined to be "everything that is real", then it would be simply a toutology. That would depend on how you define "real" wouldn't it? It is exactly in the questioning and defining of such a term that such statements get made. I did not think that such statements would be considered to be metaphysical, but instead epistemological. How could the statement "There is one world" be epistemological? Do you take this for an empirical statement of observation? It is a metaphysical assumption of some kinds of epistemologies. I am no expert in philosophical terminology, though. If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them. My problem is with the types of claims I mentioned before. Namely those that are actually category mistakes. You seem to agree that (at least some of) these claims are category mistakes. To claim that model is true is a category mistake, for models are not true, sentences are, but to claim that a sentence that accords with that model is true is not such a mistake. You seem to have a problem not only with the category mistake, but with the sentences whcih accord with model. But you also seem to say that if such statements are basic assumpions of epistemologies then they are alright by you. Because nearly every systematic metaphyisical statment I know of operates in conjunction with an epistemology, you seem to have cleared every statement you object to. Descartes for instance thought that assuming that there were two kinds of Substance was fundamental to knowing things about the world, then it would fall under your "If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them." Do you not see that Descartes was establishing premises of an epistemology?
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Death Monkey
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Posted 03/23/08 - 01:48 PM:	#36
Dunamis, I do not see how it can be true or false. What is the difference between it being true and it being false? If one cannot specify what that difference would be in a non-circular way, then no meaning can be assigned to the statement. Because true and false are not estabished solely in correspondence terms, but also in terms of coherence. It is a mistake to think that the only truths are completely empirical truths or completely analytic truths (as the Positivists might have dreamed). Indeed, the "circularity" which you want to avoid is the circularity which conditions how coherence works, a number of (or as Quine said, a web of...) interlocking beliefs. Rather than being a weakness, circularity is the strength. So, such statements would be called true of false due to the coherence they provide for beliefs, some of which are empirical beliefs. I don't see how that refutes my point. I am talking about the meaning of a statement here, not the coherency of some concept or belief. If somebody tells me "X exists", but cannot explain how this state of affairs differs from X not existing, then their statement conveys no information to me. Maybe what they are trying to convey to me is somehow coherent and meaningful to them, but they would not be successfully conveying that with their statement. Every attempt I have ever seen to specify what the difference is, has either been circular (if it's true, then multiple ontological substances exist...), or been a category mistake (the difference is specified to be that it is true if the "true model" is one from a particular class of model). Circularity is a only a problem if you are looking for foundations. The nature of beliefs is that their process of justification is indeed circular, that is, self-referential. What I am looking for is the meaning of the statement. If I already have in mind what the difference between X existing and it not existing is, then I don't need anybody to specify it for me. But if I honestly do not know what they mean when they say that it exists, then no information is going to be conveyed by their statement that it does, unless they can explain to me what they mean. I have also heard many people make this claim. Usually in attempt to somehow discredit quantum mechanics. There would be a difference between saying "determinism is true" and saying, "All events are determined". I thought you were pointing out this difference. I'm not sure what you are suggesting the difference is, unless you are implicitely interpreting the latter to be a statement about a model, but not the former. What I mean by "directly apply it to reality" is just what you have agreed is a category mistake. Namely claiming either that the model is reality, or that the model is "true", or the application of statements which are only well-defined in the context of models, to reality. Then, it would seem that your use of "literal model" is a category mistake as well, if you assume that literal models are "the reality". I don't follow you. What I am saying is that no model is reality. That would depend on how you define "real" wouldn't it? It is exactly in the questioning and defining of such a term that such statements get made. I agree. That is exactly where I am coming from. When people try to explain to me what they mean by claims like "dualism is true", or "reality is deterministic", or "undetectable properties/entities exist", their explanations have always ended up boiling down to category mistakes (at best), and blatent self-contradictions in many cases. I did not think that such statements would be considered to be metaphysical, but instead epistemological. How could the statement "There is one world" be epistemological? As with any statement, it is an issue of context. If the context is epistemological, such as is the case when it is presented as a premise of an epistemology, then that seems to me to be an epistemological usage of the statement. Do you take this for an empirical statement of observation? It is a metaphysical assumption of some kinds of epistemologies OK. If you say it is metaphysical, I see no point in debating the issue. Like I said, it is not the type of metaphysical claim that I have a problem with. After all, you have already specified that it is being made in the context of being a way of thinking about and formulating models of our experiences, rather than as being the claim that some model is somehow "true". As I said before, I have no problem with this sort of thing. I am no expert in philosophical terminology, though. If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them. My problem is with the types of claims I mentioned before. Namely those that are actually category mistakes. You seem to agree that (at least some of) these claims are category mistakes. To claim that model is true is a category mistake, for models are not true, sentences are, but to claim that a sentence that accords with that model is true is not such a mistake. Sure, but then you are making a statement about the model, not a statement about reality. You seem to have a problem not only with the category mistake, but with the sentences whcih accord with model. Not at all. I make truth statements about models all the time. But you also seem to say that if such statements are basic assumpions of epistemologies then they are alright by you. Hang on. How could a statement about a model be a premise of an epistemology? I am not following you here. The premises of an epistemology need to be statements about reality. This rules out any statements that are only well-defined for models, such as the claim of being deterministic, or the claim of something existing which is not detectable. Because nearly every systematic metaphyisical statment I know of operates in conjunction with an epistemology, you seem to have cleared every statement you object to. Descartes for instance thought that assuming that there were two kinds of Substance was fundamental to knowing things about the world, then it would fall under your "If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them." I did not say that any statement you choose to take as a premise for some epistemology suddenly becomes meaningful. I said that the specific characterization of "there is one world" that you presented, is meaningful. The example of there being more than one type of substance is a good one. What does this actually mean? If it means that observable phenomena can be devided into two epistemic categories (for example, one that can be understood empirically, and one that cannot), then that is meaningful, but also (in my opinion) completely epistemological. But my understanding is that Descartes meant much more than that. That he is claiming that these two "substances" differ in some fundamental way, over and above any empirically detectable differences there may be. Now, maybe I have misunderstood, but if so, then just about every dualist I have ever spoked to has apperantly misunderstood in the same way. DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

Dunamis
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Posted 03/24/08 - 08:38 AM:	#37
Death Monkey wrote: I don't see how that refutes my point. I am talking about the meaning of a statement here, not the coherency of some concept or belief. If somebody tells me "X exists", but cannot explain how this state of affairs differs from X not existing, then their statement conveys no information to me. Well, this is a loose way of talking about "exists". While I would agree by and large with the pragmatic point that a distinction that does not make a difference in practice is not a distinction at all, argument and explanation is a practice. If I tell you "Beliefs exist." There can be wide ranging debate about whether the truth of such a statement makes a difference in practice at all. The difference it does make (and the difference that some of the statements you may object to make) is that certain descriptions become more cohesive and coherent under its assumption. There are consequencs to the truth or falsity of such statements, they just are not immediate empirical consequences (one does not try to measure something with an instrument only to find that it "does not exist"). What I am looking for is the meaning of the statement. The meaning of such a statement is found in its use. Its use, in such cases, is to provide the assumptions necessary to make description the most coherent. If I already have in mind what the difference between X existing and it not existing is, then I don't need anybody to specify it for me. But if I honestly do not know what they mean when they say that it exists, then no information is going to be conveyed by their statement that it does, unless they can explain to me what they mean. I agree in the wide sense. Me:There would be a difference between saying "determinism is true" and saying, "All events are determined". I thought you were pointing out this difference. You: I'm not sure what you are suggesting the difference is, unless you are implicitely interpreting the latter to be a statement about a model, but not the former. The first cannot be "true" because models cannot be true. I agree. That is exactly where I am coming from. When people try to explain to me what they mean by claims like "dualism is true", or "reality is deterministic", or "undetectable properties/entities exist", their explanations have always ended up boiling down to category mistakes (at best), and blatent self-contradictions in many cases. And this is exactly the problem I have with you when you talk about your "processes", such as your "the mechanism is the process" claim (which you no longer want to discuss). Me:How could the statement "There is one world" be epistemological? You:As with any statement, it is an issue of context. If the context is epistemological, such as is the case when it is presented as a premise of an epistemology, then that seems to me to be an epistemological usage of the statement. That would merely be the metaphysical assumption employed by an epistemology. OK. If you say it is metaphysical, I see no point in debating the issue. Like I said, it is not the type of metaphysical claim that I have a problem with. After all, you have already specified that it is being made in the context of being a way of thinking about and formulating models of our experiences, rather than as being the claim that some model is somehow "true". As I said before, I have no problem with this sort of thing. Not all epistemological acts are "modeling acts". Most of them are simply descriptions that have to measured against criteria. If I say, "That flower is red" I am not "formulating a model" of my experience. If I say "All such flowers are red" I am not formulating models. Metaphysical assumptions come into play underwriting certain kinds of descriptions and the possiblity of sharing them with others. If you are willing to let go of "formulating models of our experiences" as the sole epistemological pursuit, then we are in agreement. Unfortunately this would undermine your beef with metaphysical statements, since all metaphysical statements are meant exactly as this, to support descriptions and explanations of the world. Not at all. I make truth statements about models all the time. So you have no problem with the kind of statement, "All events are determined"? Hang on. How could a statement about a model be a premise of an epistemology? I am not following you here. The premises of an epistemology need to be statements about reality. This rules out any statements that are only well-defined for models, such as the claim of being deterministic, or the claim of something existing which is not detectable. It depends what you mean by "model". One can say that someone is operating under a "deterministic model" of the universe, and thus statements such as "all events are determined" would be actually about such a model. But such a person may very well claim that they are about the universe. I have no idea what your criteria is for "well-defined" model. Not all descriptions are models. If for instance we are looking to understand the nature of beliefs, as a concept, I'm not sure what model would be employed if we were to assert that such things are "causal concepts". Whether such an assertion is "detectable" is for me to misunderstand what description is. I did not say that any statement you choose to take as a premise for some epistemology suddenly becomes meaningful. I said that the specific characterization of "there is one world" that you presented, is meaningful. Once you allow certain metaphysical statements in a particular role, you must allow ALL such statements for that role (that is, the role itself cannot be the basis of exclusion). You have to come up with new criteria for the exclusion of metaphysical statements. The idea that you could include a metaphysical statement because it has a role in epistemology seems silly to me, since all metaphysical statements historically have had such a role. There has been a fundamental relationship between metaphysics and epistemology . The example of there being more than one type of substance is a good one. What does this actually mean? If it means that observable phenomena can be devided into two epistemic categories (for example, one that can be understood empirically, and one that cannot), then that is meaningful, but also (in my opinion) completely epistemological. It cannot be completely epistemological, since it includes an ontological assertion, that there exists two types of substance. But my understanding is that Descartes meant much more than that. That he is claiming that these two "substances" differ in some fundamental way, over and above any empirically detectable differences there may be. Yes. And this difference is a difference in effect, supposed to account for the very possibility of knowing anything at all. The metaphysical distinction is meant to ground the very possibility of describing anything accurately. Now, maybe I have misunderstood, but if so, then just about every dualist I have ever spoked to has apperantly misunderstood in the same way. Or, you have misunderstood nearly every dualist you have ever spoken to (to which I imagine every dualist you've spoken to might agree, since you disagree with them). You seem to imagine that one can discuss epistemology in a way that utterly devoid of metaphysics (while assuming metaphysical assertions as part of the effort), while the dualist is owning up to the assumption that is being ignored. To argue about what can be known, in most frameworks of epistemological argument, is also to argue about what there is, because epistemology has developed into connecting what is known to what is. Edited by Dunamis on 03/24/08 - 08:45 AM
Tractatus theologico-politicus [is a] work forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil and issued with the knowledge of Mynheer Jan de Witt. - Church Council of Amsterdam If no man ever thinks alone, then we might say that to know really is to think ever less by oneself - Balibar

Death Monkey
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Posted 03/25/08 - 05:04 AM:	#38
Dunamis, Not all epistemological acts are "modeling acts". Most of them are simply descriptions that have to measured against criteria. If I say, "That flower is red" I am not "formulating a model" of my experience. If I say "All such flowers are red" I am not formulating models. I would say that both of these claims are made in the context of models you have already formulated. Metaphysical assumptions come into play underwriting certain kinds of descriptions and the possiblity of sharing them with others. If you are willing to let go of "formulating models of our experiences" as the sole epistemological pursuit, then we are in agreement. Unfortunately this would undermine your beef with metaphysical statements, since all metaphysical statements are meant exactly as this, to support descriptions and explanations of the world. But not all metaphysical statements do so coherently. People make category mistakes and/or propose incoherent claims all the time. My beef is with exactly this sort of thing. Apperantly you include much more when you say "metaphysical" than I had in mind. That's fine with me. So you have no problem with the kind of statement, "All events are determined"? Obviously that depends on what kind of statement it is. Out of context, I cannot possibly say one way or the other. I have certainly heard that statement being made in contexts where is is nonsensical. I have also heard it made in contexts where it is ok. Hang on. How could a statement about a model be a premise of an epistemology? I am not following you here. The premises of an epistemology need to be statements about reality. This rules out any statements that are only well-defined for models, such as the claim of being deterministic, or the claim of something existing which is not detectable. It depends what you mean by "model". I just mean an abstract construct that somebody makes up. One can say that someone is operating under a "deterministic model" of the universe, and thus statements such as "all events are determined" would be actually about such a model. In that case they would just be saying that the model of the universe they use is a deterministic one, which I have no problem with. But such a person may very well claim that they are about the universe. And therein lies the problem. There is a difference between saying "my model of the universe is a deterministic one", and "the universe is deterministic". A person could just mean the former when they say the latter, but generally they do not. Indeed, I very commonly encounter people who insist that there must be something wrong with Quantum Mechanics because they are certain that the Universe (not just some particular model of it) is deterministic, and that therefore any non-deterministic model must be wrong. You seem to agree that the latter of these statements would be category mistakes. I would also say that the former of them is as well, because the term "deterministic" is only well-defined for models. I have no idea what your criteria is for "well-defined" model. I have not said anything about a "well-defined model". I mentioned that a term may only be well-defined in the context of a model. For example, I know what it means to say that a model is deterministic. I do not know what it means to say that the Universe is deterministic. The only coherent interpretation of such a statement I can think of would be to say that a deterministic model is somehow the best one, but then there need to be some criteria by which it qualifies as being the best. Not all descriptions are models. If for instance we are looking to understand the nature of beliefs, as a concept, I'm not sure what model would be employed if we were to assert that such things are "causal concepts". It seems to me that whatever definition you then present for what you mean by a "causal concept" would be specifying the model. Whether such an assertion is "detectable" is for me to misunderstand what description is. I do not understand what you mean by an assertion being detectable. I was talking about the difference between two states of affairs being detectable. If one wants to claim that there is a difference between something existing and it not existing, then they need to be able to specify what that difference is. If the difference is not detectable, then I do not think that it is possible to coherently specify what the difference is. I think that any attempt to do so ends up being a category mistake. Once you allow certain metaphysical statements in a particular role, you must allow ALL such statements for that role (that is, the role itself cannot be the basis of exclusion). You have to come up with new criteria for the exclusion of metaphysical statements. I already stated the criteria. Statements which are incoherent, self-contradictory, or category mistakes, should be excluded. These are the only statements that I am objecting to. The example of there being more than one type of substance is a good one. What does this actually mean? If it means that observable phenomena can be devided into two epistemic categories (for example, one that can be understood empirically, and one that cannot), then that is meaningful, but also (in my opinion) completely epistemological. It cannot be completely epistemological, since it includes an ontological assertion, that there exists two types of substance. The whole point of my above example was that in this case no claim is being made that they are actually ontologically distinct substances. As soon as that claim is made, one has to be able to specify how this state of affairs would be different from one in which they were not ontologically distinct, but instead only epistemologically distinct (in that one cannot be understood empirically). But I don't think it is possible to specify what that difference would be outside of the context of a model. I can coherently talk about monistic and dualistic models, but as soon as I try to say that the world is monistic or dualistic, I have to be able to specify what I mean. And if it is my intention for this to mean anything more than that I have simply chosen to work with a monistic or dualistic model, then I run into a major problem. But my understanding is that Descartes meant much more than that. That he is claiming that these two "substances" differ in some fundamental way, over and above any empirically detectable differences there may be. Yes. And this difference is a difference in effect, supposed to account for the very possibility of knowing anything at all. The metaphysical distinction is meant to ground the very possibility of describing anything accurately. I do not follow. If the difference between his dualism and a monism is supposed to be that under monism it would be impossible to know anything, then that is a detectable difference between the two possibilities. So it is not a difference over and above any detectable differences. Or, you have misunderstood nearly every dualist you have ever spoken to (to which I imagine every dualist you've spoken to might agree, since you disagree with them). I very much doubt it. I have had this very discussion about the distinction between models and reality, and the issue of it being a category mistake to claim that a model is true, or that it is nonsensical to talk about non-detectable things existing, with a number of dualists. They did not respond as you have at all. On the contrary, the typical response has been for them to insist that there must be undetectable things/properties, and that it is perfectly meaningful to talk about things like dualism being true, or determinism being false, in a sense other than to simply say that they are using a non-deterministic dualistic model to talk about the world. You seem to imagine that one can discuss epistemology in a way that utterly devoid of metaphysics (while assuming metaphysical assertions as part of the effort), while the dualist is owning up to the assumption that is being ignored. Not at all. If you say that assumptions of epistemology are metaphysical, then that's fine with me. That just isn't what I was talking about. To argue about what can be known, in most frameworks of epistemological argument, is also to argue about what there is, because epistemology has developed into connecting what is known to what is. Sure. That is not what I have a problem with. DM Edited by Death Monkey on 03/25/08 - 05:44 AM
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astaire1
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Posted 03/25/08 - 05:54 AM:	#39
DeathMonkey wrote: Dunamis wrote: So you have no problem with the kind of statement, "All events are determined"? Obviously that depends on what kind of statement it is. Out of context, I cannot possibly say one way or the other. I have certainly heard that statement being made in contexts where is is nonsensical. I have also heard it made in contexts where it is ok. From what I understand DeathMonkey's position to be: Nonsensical => All events are determined, which means determinism is true. Ok Context => All events are determined, assuming a determinisic model. I'm wondering if Dunamis' example is intended to mean: Although it can't be known whether determism is true, it is known that all events are determined. DeathMonkey wrote: Dunamis wrote: To claim that model is true is a category mistake, for models are not true, sentences are, but to claim that a sentence that accords with that model is true is not such a mistake. Sure, but then you are making a statement about the model, not a statement about reality. I'm not 100% clear that there is agreement here or I haven't understood what is being agreed on. To me it sounds like DeathMonkey is saying that we are authorized to make truth claims about models whereas Dunamis seems to be saying we are authorized to make truth claims about reality. On the other hand, I do hear agreement that models cannot be true. As far as I can tell, models are described by groups of claims. Dunamis wrote: Descartes for instance thought that assuming that there were two kinds of Substance was fundamental to knowing things about the world, then it would fall under your "If the premises of an epistemology qualify as being "metaphysical", then I certainly have no problem with them." Perhaps this has already been clarified, but what I am hearing from DeathMonkey is that he doesn't want to be wasting his time doing the type of metaphyics that would claim that monism or dualism is true. On the other hand, if the premises of an epistemology fall under the definition of metaphysics they are not to be rejected on that basis alone. - - - - - I'm wondering if it can be easily stated why models cannot be true. I'm also wondering where Dunamis and DeathMonkey stand on the possibility of models being false. TI'm asking, is the statement "cannot be true" meant to imply "neither true nor false" or is it meant to imply "can be false but cannot be true" a la Popper? (If its the latter, then I already understand why a model cannot be true). -Astaire Edited by astaire1 on 03/25/08 - 06:49 AM
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Death Monkey
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Posted 03/25/08 - 08:45 AM:	#40
astaire1, I'm not 100% clear that there is agreement here or I haven't understood what is being agreed on. To me it sounds like DeathMonkey is saying that we are authorized to make truth claims about models whereas Dunamis seems to be saying we are authorized to make truth claims about reality. Not exactly. We can make truth claims about both models and reality. In fact, epistemology itself seems to work by constructing models, and then formulating what we 'know' about reality in terms of how well those models are in agreement with our observations of reality. What I was saying is that not all truth claims make sense for reality. If a truth claim is only well-defined for a particular type of model, then it only makes sense for that type of model. It does not make sense for other types of models, or for any other context for which it has not been properly defined (such as reality). On the other hand, I do hear agreement that models cannot be true. As far as I can tell, models are described by groups of claims. I would say that a model is an abstract construct. It is something you make up. Models are, of course, described by groups of claims (namely claims about the model), but not every group of claims would actually be a model. Perhaps this has already been clarified, but what I am hearing from DeathMonkey is that he doesn't want to be wasting his time doing the type of metaphyics that would claim that monism or dualism is true. On the other hand, if the premises of an epistemology fall under the definition of metaphysics they are not to be rejected on that basis alone. Sort of. It's not just that I don't want to waste my time on it. I think that it is nonsense to begin with. As far as I can tell, Dunamis seems to generally agree with this. He just does not seem to think that these types of claims that I am saying are nonsensical, are actually made by anybody. I find this to be a rather surprising thing for him to say, but I strongly suspect that there is still some significant miscomunication going on here. I'm wondering if it can be easily stated why models cannot be true. As Dunamis said, only a claim can be true. So what claim, specifically, is claimed to be true when one says something like "monism is true"? If one just meant that under monism, the collection of claims that constitute monism are true claims, then this is trivial. It would be like saying "set theory is true", when what you mean is the trivial fact that, under set theory, the axioms of set theory are true. Usually what one means is that the claims about the model (which are true under the model), are true claims about reality. That is where we run into trouble. Generally those claims are not even defined outside of the context of the model (or some class of models). So they cannot meaningfully be applied to reality. A more careful meaning for it is to say that the model accurately describes reality in some way. For example, I could say that Newtonian mechanics is true (or false), and by this mean simply that this model accurately describes (or fails to accurately describe) reality. This kind of usage is meaningful as long as the manner in which we are claiming it describes reality is clearly specified. That is where we typically run into trouble. It is no problem to say, for example, that a model accurately predicts what we will observe under various conditions. But when the model makes claims that do not have any implications on what we expect to observe, then in what sense can we say that these claims accurately describe reality? This goes back to my point before about needing to be able to specify what the difference is between the claim being true or it being false. If the claim is just a claim about the model, this is usually no problem. If the claim is about reality, then one must be able to specify how reality would be different if the claim were true than if it were false. If one cannot specify what that difference would be, then they are not conveying any actual information when they say that the claim is true or false. The statement is, quite literally, meaningless. I'm also wondering where Dunamis and DeathMonkey stand on the possibility of models being false. TI'm asking, is the statement "cannot be true" meant to imply "neither true nor false" or is it meant to imply "can be false but cannot be true" a la Popper? (If its the latter, then I already understand why a model cannot be true). What I mean is that it is neither true nor false. Truth values cannot be meaningfully assigned. DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

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