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Narrow Mental Content
Internalism, Externalism, and Twin Earth Hypotheses

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dreamweaver
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Posted 05/09/08 - 10:50 AM: Subject: Narrow Mental Content	#1
Externalism is the philosophical hypothesis that mental content or certain of our own psychological states essentially involve a relation to an external environment. Internalism is the generally opposed hypothesis that it does not depend on an individual's environment, but that it rather relies on our intrinsic properties or microstructure. Beliefs that do not depend in this way on the environment are termed “narrow content”. The question is: is ordinary mental content (general beliefs, or even beliefs about natural kinds) narrow or broad? The most popular position held here comes from Putnam and Burge, and from general Putnam-Kripkean views on reference and truth. These suggest that ordinary content is broad, and the primary reason for thinking so can be demonstrated with Putnam's "Twin Earth" example. Consider an Earth setting some time in the early eighteenth century, prior to the discovery of the chemical structure of water. Consider the possible world in which there is a “Twin Earth”, identical to our current Earth in every way except that rather than having water, they have another only ostensibly identical substance of a different chemical composition, “XYZ”. Now also consider Oscar and Twin Oscar, the residents and duplicates of one another on Earth and Twin Earth respectively. The question put forward then, is, when Oscar and Twin Oscar utter the same statement – for example “water is lovely” -- do they refer to the same thing by their words? Putnam says no, as Twin Oscar can only possibly refer to "twater", as there is no water in Twin Earth. Hence his psychological state is different, and hence cognitive content must be relational in some sense. Ignoring for the time-being the nomological impossibility of this experiment (humans consist of water), is this argument successful? In some sense this does not seem to be true. As Segal notes, ordinary language is constantly using counterfactuals -- terms that express a concept, but lack an extension. Not only does Putnam not give an account for why water in the 17th century had the right extension, but it also seems problematic to suggest that empty concepts cannot be meaningful (we use them all the time).
_____________________ Dos moi pou sto kai kino taen gaen. ~ Archimedes

reincarnated
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Posted 05/11/08 - 08:23 AM:	#2
According to Putnam, although Oscar and Twin Oscar are in the same physical mental states (i.e., mental states interpreted in a physicalist way), Oscar points at and therefore means H2O, whereas Twin Oscar points at and therefore means XYZ. Nothing in their heads would "tell" us the difference, that is, allow us to distinguish between these two different meanings. Therefore (according to Putnam) meanings are not in the head. Instead, we rely and depend on the world to give and assign meanings. From this, Putnam concludes that “meanings just ain’t in the head”. I suggest that Putnam is mistaken, and the fallacy in his argument lies in the fact that he confuses two different epistemic perspectives (one perspective which is the one of the less privileged actors Oscar and Twin Oscar on the stage, who know nothing about H2O or XYZ but know only “water”; the other perspective, the more “privileged” perspective, is the one of the stage manager, who knows that some actors have access to H2O, whereas some have access to XYZ), and he assumes that the “meaning” embodied within one perspective must equate precisely to the “meaning” embodied within the other perspective. Meaning derives from understanding and knowledge. If I understand that water comes in two “types” (H2O and XYZ) then of course I must distinguish these two types within my semantics if I am to avoid confusion in meaning. This is the perspective of the privileged observer. However, if I understand only that water is a colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid which at times falls from the sky (and I have no knowledge of the fact that water is either H2O or XYZ), then my “meaning” when I talk of “water” does not embody this difference in types of water, my “meaning” does not distinguish between these two types. This is the perspective (the meaning) of the less privileged observer. In short – if my knowledge and understanding differ from yours, then it is quite possible that the meanings I ascribe to certain words (my semantics) are also different to the meanings you ascribe to the same words (your semantics). It is a mistake, therefore, to assume (as Putnam seems to want to do) that there is some unique “meaning” within words (unique semantics) which is not dependent on subjective knowledge and understanding. When Oscar points at H2O and says “water”, he has no idea that he is pointing to H2O. He knows, and when he utters “water” he means, simply “that colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid which at times falls from the sky”. Similarly, when Twin Oscar points at XYZ and says “water”, he has no idea that he is pointing to XYZ. He knows, and when he utters “water” he means, simply “that colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid which at times falls from the sky”. To Oscar and Twin Oscar, the word “water” means the same thing. Putnam cannot understand this, because he seems to believe there is some underlying absolute semantics which is independent of observer perspective, and he insists on confusing his privileged perspective (his knowledge and understanding that water comes as both H2O and as XYZ) with the more limited perspectives of Oscar and Twin Oscar. Once the relative nature of our epistemology is accepted, the problem is solved, Putnam's claim that meanings just ain't in the head is seen to be misguided, and meanings are once again firmly rooted where they belong - in the head.
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

The_Rational_Animal
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Posted 05/12/08 - 06:58 PM:	#3
The problem with refuting only Putnam's thought experiment is the existence of possibly infinitely many similar thought experiments using different premises but reaching the same conclusion. The conclusion of semantic externalism is reached in Donald Davidson's "Swamp man" and "porcupine/porcupine-or-echidna" thought experiments, as well as Burge's "arthritis/tharthritis" distinction. Cut off the creature's head and two more grow back in its place. reincarnated wrote: I suggest that Putnam is mistaken, and the fallacy in his argument lies in the fact that he confuses two different epistemic perspectives [...] In short – if my knowledge and understanding differ from yours, then it is quite possible that the meanings I ascribe to certain words (my semantics) are also different to the meanings you ascribe to the same words (your semantics). It is a mistake, therefore, to assume that there is some unique meaning within words which is not dependent on subjective knowledge and understanding. Putnam wants to say that the perspective of the "stage manager" is the only relevant perspective. He says that because Oscar and his twin do not have that perspective, they are making up their own meaning, when meaning clearly exists without them and is mostly external to them. Just because they cannot distinguish between "water" and "twater" does not mean that they are the exact same thing in reality. You seem to suggest that the chemical composition of water is irrelevant, that it somehow does not contribute to what it means to be water, when in fact, it has everything to do with what it means to be water. What water is composed of dictates what its physical properties are; "water" is synonymous and is the folk word for "two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to one central oxygen atom". Once this aspect of meaning is acknowledged as being outside of the realm of perception, then Putnam's claim that meaning "aint all in the head" (notice all emphasized) is true: although people can interpret certain phenomenon in their own way and apply semantics to it, there is always some meaning which is objectively true, perceived or not.
_____________________ "Whenever you think you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong." ~Ayn Rand

reincarnated
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Posted 05/12/08 - 07:23 PM:	#4
The_Rational_Animal wrote: The problem with refuting only Putnam's thought experiment is the existence of possibly infinitely many similar thought experiments using different premises but reaching the same conclusion. The conclusion of semantic externalism is reached in Donald Davidson's "Swamp man" and "porcupine/porcupine-or-echidna" thought experiments, as well as Burge's "arthritis/tharthritis" distinction. Cut off the creature's head and two more grow back in its place. Good point. If these other thought experiments are based on significantly different premises/concepts/arguments then they each need to be addressed on their own merits. The_Rational_Animal wrote: Putnam wants to say that the perspective of the "stage manager" is the only relevant perspective. He says that because Oscar and his twin do not have that perspective, they are making up their own meaning, when meaning clearly exists without them and is mostly external to them. Just because they cannot distinguish between "water" and "twater" does not mean that they are the exact same thing in reality. But in the final analysis the only meaning that exists is in the mind of the "meaner". There is no ultimate stage manager (unless one wants to postulate God), and the meanings that each of us carries around in our heads are all subjective, based on our particular epistemic perspective. What is meant by "eaxctly the same thing in reality"? Who gets to decide the criteria for determining whether some X is the same as some Y? Unless X is literally physically identical to Y (in which case the question is trivial) there is no objective criterion for such comparison, and whatever criterion we set is subjective. The_Rational_Animal wrote: You seem to suggest that the chemical composition of water is irrelevant, that it somehow does not contribute to what it means to be water, when in fact, it has everything to do with what it means to be water. What water is composed of dictates what its physical properties are; "water" is synonymous and is the folk word for "two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to one central oxygen atom". Neither Oscar nor Twin Oscar know this - the "meaning" of water for them does not include such concepts. The_Rational_Animal wrote: Once this aspect of meaning is acknowledged as being outside of the realm of perception, then Putnam's claim that meaning "aint all in the head" (notice all emphasized) is true: although people can interpret certain phenomenon in their own way and apply semantics to it, there is always some meaning which is objectively true, perceived or not. Who is to be the judge of whether water is H2O or XYZ? Their is no such thing as an objective meaning. Meaning depends on semantics and definitions of terms, and semantics and definitions are subjective.
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

The_Rational_Animal
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Posted 05/12/08 - 07:48 PM:	#5
reincarnated wrote: But in the final analysis the only meaning that exists is in the mind of the "meaner". There is no ultimate stage manager (unless one wants to postulate God), and the meanings that each of us carries around in our heads are all subjective, based on our particular epistemic perspective. If there is no "stage manager", why do you bring up such a perspective? reincarnated wrote: What is meant by "exactly the same thing in reality"? Who gets to decide the criteria for determining whether some X is the same as some Y? Unless X is literally physically identical to Y (in which case the question is trivial) there is no objective criterion for such comparison, and whatever criterion we set is subjective. The distinction between "water" and "twater" stands based on the fact that they are not the same, no matter what the perceiver perceives. Things, by their nature, can be the same and have the same properties. A is A, water is water. Water is H2O. Water is XYZ; no wait, no it's not. The term "water" was coined before its properties beyond just being a "colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid which at times falls from the sky", before its atomic structure was discovered. This atomic structure is a property of water, it is the essence of water (that which makes water water), nothing can be water except what is in reality "two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to one central oxygen atom". reincarnated wrote: Neither Oscar nor Twin Oscar know this - the "meaning" of water for them does not include such concepts. If they ran simple analytical tests in a lab, it would soon be apparent that "twater" is not "water". Oscar could add a nonmetalic oxide to a sample of "twater" and a sample of "water", run a pH test, and the pH of the two solutions would be different. Water would form an acid and "twater" would not. XYZ will not release a hydrogen atom because all it has is XYZ. Thus, the meaning of the two would be distinguished scientifically and conceptually for both men, that one is water and one is not (even though they may disagree about which one is and which one is not, "water", but it is obvious that according to the definition of water, that which formed an acid is the water.) reincarnated wrote: Who is to be the judge of whether water is H2O or XYZ? Their is no such thing as an objective meaning. Meaning depends on semantics and definitions of terms, and semantics and definitions are subjective. Luckily for consistency, the meaning of water is objective. Otherwise, like I said before, I could cover myself in "water" (which is actually gasoline) and thinking it to have the properties of water, attempt to display my subjective meaning of what is "water". This is possible if all water means to me semantically is that it is (1) not viscous, (2) clear, and (3) liquid at room temperature. But, well, are definitions subjective? Last I checked there were things called dictionaries, which give definitions of words used in any given language. If these definitons are mere guidelines, then "that man is pregnant!" Sentences can be grammatically correct, yet semantically crap. If you think semantics are wholly subjective, then find me a pregnant man (and I mean a real man, not a woman with a sex change operation). Edited by The_Rational_Animal on 05/12/08 - 07:54 PM
_____________________ "Whenever you think you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong." ~Ayn Rand

reincarnated
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Posted 05/13/08 - 04:00 AM:	#6
The_Rational_Animal wrote: If there is no "stage manager", why do you bring up such a perspective? I didn’t say there is no stage manager, I said there is no ultimate stage manager. The perspective of any stage manager we care to stipulate will still be a privileged (subjective) perspective. There is no ultimate perspective from “nowhere”. The_Rational_Animal wrote: can be water except what is in reality "two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to one central oxygen atom". All we can ever make reference to in our semantics, our meanings, is whatever is accessible to us epistemically. We can never know the true nature of things, we can never know ontic reality. How do you know that all water is the same? How do you know that there is not some unknown difference between water in the northern hemisphere and the southern hemisphere which science has so far not detected? If it turns out that there is a difference, would that automatically mean that English people and Australians mean different things when they both speak of water? Of course not. Ontology is not relevant to semantic meaning, only epistemology counts. The_Rational_Animal wrote: If they ran simple analytical tests in a lab, it would soon be apparent that "twater" is not "water". They cannot run such tests – remember that this thought experiment predates such scientific advances. That was one thing that Putnam stipulated. Recall Putnam’s premise : “we set the date of our thought experiment to be in the year 1750, when the residents of Earth and Twin Earth would have no means of knowing that the liquids they called ‘water’ were H2O and XYZ respectively. The experience of people on Earth with water, and that of those on Twin Earth with XYZ would therefore be identical.” The_Rational_Animal wrote: are definitions subjective? Last I checked there were things called dictionaries, which give definitions of words used in any given language. If these definitons are mere guidelines, then "that man is pregnant!" Sentences can be grammatically correct, yet semantically crap. If you think semantics are wholly subjective, then find me a pregnant man (and I mean a real man, not a woman with a sex change operation). “Subjective” does not mean “mere guidelines”. How do you suppose that words acquire their meanings in the first place? Is there some objective law of nature which dictates such meanings? Or is it simply the case that words acquire their meanings from the ways they are used in a language? If the latter, then meaning supervenes on usage, and usage depends very much on how people use the words – ie subjectivity. Don’t you suppose they also have dictionaries on 1750 Twin Earth? And what do you think the entry for water would say in that dictionary? Why would it differ from the entry in the 1750 Earth dictionary? Now tell me again that definitions are objective……
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

jdrw
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Posted 05/13/08 - 12:14 PM:	#7
reincarnated and The Rational Animal: First, let me say that I agree wholeheartedly with reincarnated’s post #2. Secondly let me say that I am haunted by the thought that I am entirely missing Putnam’s point of view (as well as Davidson’s Swamp Man, I guess.) The Rational Animal wrote: If there is no "stage manager", why do you bring up such a perspective? The point is that Putnam’s position is that of a stage manager whose perspective is different from either Earth Oscar or Twin Oscar, and it is priveleged in that it knows something from that position that neither of the Oscars can know. Putnam can observe and conceive and mean what he says about the issue only from this stage manager position, but what he says cannot be conceived or meant or said from either of the Oscar’s perspectives. Putnam in that stage manager position can differentiate the two waters because he is aware of the two different predicates about the molecular composition (one is H2O and the other is XYZ.) What Putnam and company are saying when they claim that the two Oscars are not talking about the same thing is that the external referent of the word water as conceived and meant by Earth Oscar can be known to have a different predicate regarding its molecular composition than the external referent of the word water as conceived and meant by Twin Oscar. Putnam and company can discriminate the two waters only because of their additional knowledge about the differing molecular composition of the referents. But since the issue as presented states that everything else about the two different waters is the same, then there is no consequence of the differing molecular compositions, and this difference, then, would be entirely irrelevant in every interaction with those different waters. In short, to the Oscars and to everyone else on Real Earth and on Twin Earth the difference would not make a difference. The differing molecular composition can make a difference only to someone who is able to tell the difference, and the only difference it can make even to them is as a way to discriminate the two waters. Nothing else about the perceivable behavior of the two waters differentiates them or is different despite the differing molecular composition. What is Putnam’s point? Does anyone really deny that the predicates that we ascribe to external things are a function of our perceptual interactions with those external things? Does anyone believe that our conception of an external thing exhausts the possible attributes that are ascribable to that thing? Does anyone believe that everybody is aware of exactly the same predicates about any given external thing? What am I missing? The Rational Animal wrote: The distinction between "water" and "twater" stands based on the fact that they are not the same, no matter what the perceiver perceives. Things, by their nature, can be the same and have the same properties. A is A, water is water. Water is H2O. Water is XYZ; no wait, no it's not. The term "water" was coined before its properties beyond just being a "colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid which at times falls from the sky", before its atomic structure was discovered. This atomic structure is a property of water, it is the essence of water (that which makes water water), nothing can be water except what is in reality "two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to one central oxygen atom". But whether water is conceived by someone to be H2O or not is part of what that person means or doesn’t mean when he talks about water. When you and I talk about water, part of what we mean is that one of it’s properties is that it is molecules of H2O. Not everyone knows that water is H2O, and therefore when they talk about water they cannot possibly mean that it is H2O. Furthermore, there are an indeterminate number of other properties of water that I, for one, have no knowledge or awareness of. and therefore which are not part of what I mean when I talk about water. And I suspect that no one actually knows all the possible attributes that can be ascribed to water. Just because some people are able to interact with the external referent stuff and determine additional attributes does not imply that the word everyone else uses to refer to that stuff means all those additional attributes. Words don’t mean things, people do. What any given person means by a word such as water is whatever it is that comprises that person’s conception of what the external referent is like. And our conception of what the external referent is like is the particular cluster of predicates that we believe are ascribable to that referent. However, the predicates that we believe to be ascribable do not exhaust all the possible predicates that could be ascribed to that referent. There are virtually always other predicates of which we are unaware, or which we ignore as irrelevant to our purposes. What allows us to use a word with some degree of mutual understanding is that speakers of a given language agree (more or less) on a certain cluster of predicates that are ascribable to the referent of that word. Such a cluster of defining predicates that we more or less mutually agree on is what a dictionary provides. When we learn new words we learn what predicates do and do not apply. Commonly our understanding of how a word is used by everyone else is massaged and shaped a little by others as we attempt to use that word. And what is being done in that process is the learner's construction and reconstruction of the defining cluster of predicates. For example, a child who learns “doggie” may at first misuse it to refer to cats and horses and goats and sheep. But via feedback from others, the child learns which predicates are and are not included in the cluster that comprise the defining predicates of “doggie.” Cheers. jd
_____________________ OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.

reincarnated
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Posted 05/13/08 - 06:36 PM:	#8
jdrw wrote: The differing molecular composition can make a difference only to someone who is able to tell the difference, and the only difference it can make even to them is as a way to discriminate the two waters. Nothing else about the perceivable behavior of the two waters differentiates them or is different despite the differing molecular composition. What any given person means by a word such as water is whatever it is that comprises that person’s conception of what the external referent is like. You said it much better than I ever could. I guess this is what I was trying to get at by my comment that meaning derives from epistemology (what we know or can know about the world), and not from ontology (the way the world really is). Hence meaning is inherently subjective.
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

jdrw
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Posted 05/14/08 - 08:01 AM:	#9
reincarnated wrote: I guess this is what I was trying to get at by my comment that meaning derives from epistemology (what we know or can know about the world), and not from ontology (the way the world really is). Yes, I agree. This is a very poignant way of putting the issue. Hence meaning is inherently subjective. I think it's important to keep in mind that meaning, especially as expressed in language, also is inter-subjective--constructed in interaction with the stuff of the world AND with other people. Cheers. jd
_____________________ OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.

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