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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/21/07 - 10:19 PM:	#201
Thank you for your response, I didn't read your post# 114, so here I address some of those arguments you brought up: Tisthammerw post# 114 wrote: "Moral objectivism by definition implies that moral truths are independent of human thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. There's more to it than that. That's true, but we should see why or how. For example morals could be identified with its formal properties, such as "unity," "balance," "ideal proportion," "uniformity amidst variety," "conformity to the Golden Section," or with its "perfection." post# 114 wrote: "Objective morality by definition carries with it an authority that transcends humanity," I believe the example above does not include a god as its source. post# 114 wrote: "God by definition is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality. So if objective moral values were grounded in the heart of God they would reside within a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe. What I mean by “grounded in the heart of God” is that objective morality is an inseparable part of who and what God is (as the supreme metaphysical reality). " If you wish to have such a definition, but again to connect the two or to define the two in such a way would be an almost tautology. In which case, simple definitions remove any need for deduction or induction. Hmm... I guess if all these elements that are objective morals then share or signify qualities with your definition of god, then you could come to such a conclusion. But ultimately, it's going to be difficult because this definition of god includes him being also the source, and how might we depart ourselves from confounding the definition from its source? wrote: "Objective morality makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority behind its statements. Authority is “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior.” post# 114 wrote: "I am not arguing for divine command theory (whereby morality is based on God's commands as opposed to e.g. his nature)." Edited by hipskipdip on 07/21/07 - 10:58 PM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Wosret
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Posted 07/22/07 - 06:52 AM:	#202
Tisthammerw wrote: This is getting off topic, and eventually I may move this to another thread. But for now... I would think that it would obvious that I was saying that god would not create agents that would pertake in actions he deemed immoral in the first place. Thus my explanation and example you simply ignored. If so, then you completely ignored my explanation. The idea that animals are agents that are behaving immorally presupposes that they are moral agents, which is not necessarily a true assumption. No, it's a statement. But it could be rephrased as a question if you wish. The argument from evil contains the premise, "There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." The problem is that this premise is difficult to justify intellectually. How do we know there is no satisfactory explanation for all the evil we see? Perhaps because we don't know of any. But this is simply an argument from ignorance, not real evidence. So how does one justify this premise? Please, I could no more justify to you that unnecessary killing happens in the world [/quote] Hold on there. The premise isn't that "There exists evil that is unnecessary" but rather "There exists evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." There's a big difference. As I said earlier... Huh? So you think evil is necessary for free will and to keep our humanity or don't you? [/quote] No. However, if we are given the power to choose our own destiny, the ability to choose between good and evil; then the possibility of evil is necessary. That we freely choose evil to come into the world is not necessary at all. The point is “unnecessary evil” is not the same thing as “no satisfactory explanation for evil.” There exists at least some moral evil that the free will theodicy satisfactorily explains—even if such evil does not have necessary existence (people can choose not to do evil). Which doesn't make any sense if god is immoral, now does it? It seems to me that the moral argument for god just takes this for granted, sounds like question begging to me. [/quote] Sounds like logic to me. God by definition is morally good. An entity that is immoral wouldn't be God. Saying that God is good is no more question begging then saying hairless men have no hair. So you're saying that you believe your own incredibly crazy second premise to be true? [/quote] Please tell me what this "incredibly crazy second premise" is and I might be able to answer your question. Then what's the point with the religions? [/quote] Bear in mind this forum is about philosophy of religion, not about religion. But one answer to your question is that we can understand some things about God, even if we can't understand all or even most of them. But the fact that if God exists we could not reasonably expect to understand the "why" behind everything (and perhaps most things) makes it that much more difficult to justify the second premise--which you haven't done yet. Huh? If this is question begging I don't know what is. [/quote] Then you don't know what is. Deductively valid means that the conclusion follows form the premises (and deductively invalid is the opposite: non sequitur). In this case the premise is that objective moral values exist, and the conclusion is that objective morality is evidence for the existence of God. I'm saying if the argument is not valid, where does the reasoning break down? You claimed my argument is "littered with non sequiturs" but can you provide even one specific example? If you can, please do so. [/quote] Do not bother replying if you are just planing to cherry pick my posts apart and ignore almost everything. Not answer any of my questions, not address any of my examples, and repeat things I've already addressed. This is extremely insulting. Respond properly or don't bother at all.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/22/07 - 12:10 PM:	#203
Wosret wrote: Do not bother replying if you are just planing to cherry pick my posts apart and ignore almost everything. Hm? I trimmed some stuff for sake of brevity and addressed much of your post. I had hoped I got to the meat and potatoes of the matter. Is there any specific part you wanted me to address that I have not done so already? Not answer any of my questions You may wish to read my post again, perhaps a little more carefully this time. I answered or at least addressed almost all of your questions. Is there any specific one you wanted me to answer? Incidentally, you are the one who didn't answer any of my questions of my previous post. Your accusation is a wee bit hypocritical. This is extremely insulting. I didn't feel insulted when you didn't answer any of my questions, just disappointed. Edited by Tisthammerw on 07/22/07 - 12:32 PM
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/22/07 - 12:27 PM:	#204
hipskipdip wrote: "Objective morality by definition carries with it an authority that transcends humanity," I believe the example above does not include a god as its source. Your above example is a wee bit vague; "unity" and "balance" and the like. And we still come to the problem of what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be. Unity may indeed be something to achieve for, but then suppose I think we should follow the principle of disunity and anarchy. Who or what says I'm wrong? If my behavior destroys balance, what fundamental reality commands I ought not to behave this way? It seems that somewhere along the line we're going to have to appeal to some supreme metaphysical reality for morality's transcendent source of authority. A non-theist could say that this supreme metaphysical reality is simply the universe/reality/existence that says how we ought to behave. But then we get to the problem I discussed in post post #121. If you wish to have such a definition, but again to connect the two or to define the two in such a way would be an almost tautology. Then so much the better. Tautologies are very deductively valid. In which case, simple definitions remove any need for deduction or induction. Hmm... I guess if all these elements that are objective morals then share or signify qualities with your definition of god, then you could come to such a conclusion. But ultimately, it's going to be difficult because this definition of god includes him being also the source, and how might we depart ourselves from confounding the definition from its source? I'm not sure I follow, but I'll try to answer as best I can. Objective morality exists, but how does it exist? From the definition of morality and God we can reason a source for objective morality's transcendent source of authority. In mathematics and logic we can go from definitions to conclusions. The same sort of thing happens here. We can use reason to deduce the metaphysical source of objective morality from the definitions involved.
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hipskipdip
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Posted 07/22/07 - 02:02 PM:	#205
Tisthammerw wrote: From the definition of morality and God we can reason a source for objective morality's transcendent source of authority. wrote: "Then so much the better. Tautologies are very deductively valid." Why would we accept your definition? Especially if it's designed as a tautology, you've developed nothing... which is frustrating. Stephen Barker, The Elements of Logic: Begging the Question wrote: "If the premises are related to the conclusion in such an intimate way that the speaker and listeners could not have less reason to doubt the premise than they have to doubt the conclusion, then the argument is worthless as a proof, even though the link between premises and conclusion may have the most case-iron rigor". Do you not realize that God is the foundation to your claim that there are objective morals (thus defining objective morals with God)... AND THEN you're saying that these objective morals (defined by your definition of God) are evidence for God. And everyone else here has told you this a thousand times. post# 121 wrote: "Ethics being grounded in the heart of God explains why objective morality has this transcendent authority above human minds. By definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. So if objective moral values were grounded in the heart of God they would reside in a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe. All things considered, God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values." Really, is that what we're doing here? Proving objective morals via God theorums? Or are we proving God with objective moral theorums? You're using terms that have not content or meaning unless you present some. 1=1 okay, whatever... what's 1? I'm sorry if I've simply misunderstood, but I haven't understood anything other than this. Edited by hipskipdip on 07/22/07 - 03:58 PM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/22/07 - 06:57 PM:	#206
hipskipdip wrote: Why would we accept your definition? My definitions of God and moral objectivism fit pretty neatly in the standard sense of the terms. God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. This is pretty standard. Ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs. This is a pretty standard definition of moral objectivism. Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior and have authority behind them, because authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." This definition of authority is also pretty standard. We can apply reason to these definitions to argue that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. Do you not realize that God is the foundation to your claim that there are objective morals (thus defining objective morals with God) If I am understanding you correctly, I don't see how what you say is true. I think God is the metaphysical foundation for objective moral values, but God isn't the foundation to my claim that there are objective moral values. That's not how my argument goes. My argument takes the premise that there are objective moral values (based on the sort of definition I described above) and then reasons from there. "Ethics being grounded in the heart of God explains why objective morality has this transcendent authority above human minds. By definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. So if objective moral values were grounded in the heart of God they would reside in a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe. All things considered, God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values." Really, is that what we're doing here? Proving objective morals via God theorums? Or are we proving God with objective moral theorums? Again, I am going from objective moral values to God, not the other way around. However, I do believe that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. I also think that God and objective morality are inextricably intertwined (metaphysically speaking). You're using terms that have not content or meaning unless you present some. 1=1 okay, whatever... what's 1? Hopefully the terms I defined above will help.
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hipskipdip
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Posted 07/22/07 - 11:17 PM:	#207
wrote: "I think God is the metaphysical foundation for objective moral values, but God isn't the foundation to my claim that there are objective moral values." I'm sorry if this is redundant, but please go over with me how we determine what ethics are universal and which are not and why we're lead to conclude that particular ethics are objective. wrote: "Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior and have authority behind them, because authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." I also do not see the connection on how objective morals command our behavior. What does it mean to say morals are "commanded"? How should such commands be invested with authority? How can we know such an authority exists behind these moral commands? Is god an authority over physical laws too? Does he command such events? In such an example we're talking about an active agent. But let's not get side tracked. First let's define and determine what objective morals are and how they're justified. Then we'll talk about how they interplay with active agents such as god.
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/23/07 - 11:38 AM: Subject: Benedict	#208
First time in a forum! The "reality of absolute moral law" struck me as religious rather than philosophical. I'm a believer but ethics does not belong exclusively to religion. I don't think Adam or Noah or even Abraham (in the beginnig) were ethical (or not) by virtue of religion alone.

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Posted 07/24/07 - 01:16 PM:	#209
Tisthammerw wrote: You continue to make this claim, even though I have explained repeatedly and specifically why objective morality requires an authority behind it. Please explain why that argument is unsound before you make this claim again. This is not the first time I have made this request, e.g. post #114: But you have not done so. You have claimed the conclusion is false but have not addressed the evidence. Please do so. Here it is (again). Objective morality makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave (by definition). In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority (by definition) behind its statements. Authority is “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior.” (See definition of 2a of Merriam-Webster's dictionary.) Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior. Additionally, the authority of morality (however it exists) seems supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. So what is morality's transcendent source of authority? Who or what says how we ought to behave? As far as I can tell, all your arguments rest on the confusion of "having authority" with "there being an authority". I don't begin to understand how an authority saying something converts it into a moral "ought". I am sure you accept that we can be mistaken about our understanding of morality (since people disagree about morality this seems indisputable). It sounds entirely coherent that in your world view the entirety of morality could be a simple injunction such as "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines", as a moral truth grounded in the heart of god. Do you really believe that this injunction being grounded in the heart of god is sufficient for it to be the sum of moral truth? Incidentally, my answer, that morality is objective in its foundations in society, does not have this problem. I don't see how; what you're describing seems like it would lead to cultural relativism. What if cultures disagree on what is morally right? Which one is right? What if a culture thinks slavery is morally okay but a few centuries later it changes its mind (e.g. U.S. history)? Is there no moral progress here? Interesting that you should raise the concept of moral progress. I believe this clearly illustrates the difficulty of the god-based concept of moral objectivity. As far as I can see you have no reason to believe that your access to transcendent objective moral truth is any different to that of people 200 years ago who condoned slavery. Since there has been no apparent intervening revelation by God, I don't understand why you would claim your moral yardstick is any better than that of 200 years ago. Yet you claim the ability to recognise moral progress (and thus moral superiority to people who had exactly the same moral base as you). This only makes sense if you place the founation of morality in an accessible, mutable human place - e.g. society. I have explained repeatedly how we can reason various other aspects of God through the aspects of objective morality. Please (again) address my explanation before claiming it doesn't exist. You can find a recap in post #121. Your argument in 121 explains how a pantheistic solution tends towards a theistic one. It doesn't begin to explain why in general a source of authority has any characteristics. By the way, there are a few nits in the argument. For example, my father's example has authority to command my behaviour, wherever and whenever I am, and will continue to do so after his death. This authority does not imply my father's omnipresence or eternality. The truth of the shape of the Earth is a truth that transcends what people think, feel, or believe. Is this is problem? Does it make epistemological objectivism irrational or incorrect? You could say it is made apparent to humans because of sensory perception, but this relies on the intuition that sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. For morality, this problem would exist regardless of what metaethical theory one might adhere to. In any case it doesn't affect the reasoning of the argument. This thread isn’t about why people possess certain moral beliefs; it’s about whether objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. Actually, it might not be as big of a problem as one might think. There are almost always at least some limitations on killing and theft in every single culture known to humanity. The general ideas are there, even if we fallible humans screw things up sometimes. Self-deception, deception of others, wishful thinking and general misuse of free will sometimes skew our perceptions of morality. There are two types of argument going on. The set above are largely disagreements about the truth of the hidden or explicit assumptions in your argument. The most significant is the fleshing out of the other logical conclusions of your position, and the highlighting of the philosophical contortions required to accept them. By placing the objective truth of morality in the heart of God, you end up with the uncomfortable position that we cannot access the truths in the heart of God, and so morality is an essentially hidden subject to humanity. This leads to a practical moral relativism of an extreme form. Of course, you can point out that we have moral intuitions, but given that there are perfectly satisfactory social and psychological explanations of why we have moral intuitions (and indeed because we can point to the fact that no two people seem to have identical moral intuitions), I don't see that you have any reason to connect these moral intuitions to this posited innaccessible objective morality. In order to avoid this position you need to do exactly what you say this thread isn't about, and explain how we have our moral beliefs - how they are connected to this transcendental objective morality. So, either: - you are committed to complete practical moral relativism from your argument, - or you can deduce logically from the bare existence of a transcendent authority to the content of its moral position, and its reason to communicate those with us. By the way, I would be very pleased if you could answer the question I have raised over whether you have any mechanism to identify whether "don't sacrifice foreigners to Quetzlcoatl" is objectively morally right, or is it just a matter of taste?

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Posted 07/24/07 - 02:08 PM:	#210
If a common moral law exists then that necessitates a Moral Law Giver,God. Or maybe a comon moral exist because we comonly share the same interests that we want to protect in our relations with others? Because we are comonly human beings? Or maybe it's a god, whatever fits your intelligence.

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Posted 07/27/07 - 03:58 AM:	#211
Hi Tist, your arguments are desgined to be self fulfilling. You say My definitions of God and moral objectivism fit pretty neatly in the standard sense of the terms. God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. This is pretty standard. Ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs. This is a pretty standard definition of moral objectivism. Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior and have authority behind them, because authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." This definition of authority is also pretty standard. We can apply reason to these definitions to argue that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. With this approach because you base the succeeding conclusions on the assumptions you have made upfront, you can never be incorrect, unless you step outside of your bubble and are required to prove your base assumptions. This you have offered an attempt, except inherent in this you still return to your own base assumptions However, I do believe that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Setting up an all powerful entity is of course always going to address anything that we find difficult to control or understand - ie. our subjective/objective reality, this is why the presence of a God appeals so much. It is the ultimate go-to figure for controlling our destiny. Anything that has gaps based upon reason and logic can always be addressed by something defined as all things to all men. This does not mean it is a valid answer to the puzzles of existence. I can only imagine that in your attempts to come to terms with existential anxieties like possible oblivion, lack of control over the path, etc, you find comfort in a logical system that blocks out any light of real knowledge, and a belief in an all powerful God. Why dont you simply accept a faith that needs no validation? Edited by TMB on 07/27/07 - 04:19 AM

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Posted 07/28/07 - 03:36 PM:	#212
hipskipdip wrote: I'm sorry if this is redundant, but please go over with me how we determine what ethics are universal and which are not and why we're lead to conclude that particular ethics are objective. This goes beyond the scope of the thread. I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. It is not my intention to argue whether objective morality exists (that is a topic for another thread). But to answer your question, we know objective moral values exist for the same reason we know that our senses and memory our at least sometimes reliable. It's something we intuitively recognize. "Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior and have authority behind them, because authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." I also do not see the connection on how objective morals command our behavior. First, let's recognize that objective ethical statements do command our behavior. The ethical principle "we should not torture people for fun" commands us not to torture people for fun. How objective morality commands this with supreme authority over what anyone says, thinks, and feels is the question at hand. I believe the answer to this is that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God. First let's define and determine what objective morals are and how they're justified. I'll do the former (the latter is a topic for another thread). By ethics being objective it is meant that ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs.
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Posted 07/28/07 - 04:19 PM:	#213
mric wrote: As far as I can tell, all your arguments rest on the confusion of "having authority" with "there being an authority". Both are important. It is clear that if objective morality exists, it carries with it a supreme authority behind it. The question is, how? What transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? I don't begin to understand how an authority saying something converts it into a moral "ought". As I have said very specifically several times before, I am not talking about divine command theory. But let's ignore that for the moment. If objective morality does not have its metaphysical basis in God, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? It sounds entirely coherent that in your world view the entirety of morality could be a simple injunction such as "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines", as a moral truth grounded in the heart of god. I don't see why. Would care to explain and justify this claim? Why exactly would it be coherent? At least, why is it more coherent here than any other metaethical theory? One could criticize virtues being a basis of ethics on the grounds that "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines" is a coherent view under virtue ethics. But it isn't clear why. Incidentally, my answer, that morality is objective in its foundations in society, does not have this problem. May I ask why? Why is it that "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines" sounds entirely coherent in God-based morality but not society-based morality? For that matter, why on Earth should we accept is is coherent in God-based morality in the first place any more than e.g. virtue ethics? The idea that morality is objective "in its foundations in society" would seem to sound more like cultural relativism--not ethical objectivism at all. What if cultures disagree on what is morally right? Which one is right? What if a culture thinks slavery is morally okay but a few centuries later it changes its mind (e.g. U.S. history)? Is there no moral progress here? If there is no moral progress, this again does not sound like ethical objectivism. Remember that moral objectivism is defined as ethical truths being independent of human thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. This seems to strongly suggest that the foundation of objective morality is not in human societies. Now on to the next point, You have not explained how the characteristic of being "a transcendent source of authority" is remotely connected to any of the other properties of a god Even though I have... I have explained repeatedly how we can reason various other aspects of God through the aspects of objective morality. Please (again) address my explanation before claiming it doesn't exist. You can find a recap in post #121. Your argument in 121 explains how a pantheistic solution tends towards a theistic one. It doesn't begin to explain why in general a source of authority has any characteristics. It does however very specifically explain why morality's transcendent source of authority has a number of characteristics associated with God, including being transcendent, omnipresent, and eternal. Yet you said, You have not explained how the characteristic of being "a transcendent source of authority" is remotely connected to any of the other properties of a god Again, I ask you to please address the reasoning behind my explanation before claiming it doesn't exist. By the way, there are a few nits in the argument. For example, my father's example has authority to command my behaviour, wherever and whenever I am Your argument is not all that bad (and I thank you for finally addressing the reasoning of my argument, particularly in such a way that does not ignore what I've been saying), but I don't think it works entirely well. For instance, if your father is not alive, he is not around to make commands. And he obviously could not make any commands before he was born. The authority of objective morality however seems eternal and omnipresent; continuously commanding human behavior whenever and wherever you might be. The authority of objective morality is much different from human authority; for one thing there is no specific region where the pantheistic God is confined (since God is equated with the universe/reality/existence after all). By placing the objective truth of morality in the heart of God, you end up with the uncomfortable position that we cannot access the truths in the heart of God This does not logically follow. Quick counterexample: moral truths can be intuitively recognized on some level. Moral truths need not be hidden at all simply because of its God-based metaphysical basis. Of course, you can point out that we have moral intuitions, but given that there are perfectly satisfactory social and psychological explanations of why we have moral intuitions But sociology and psychology cannot have any explanation for why objective moral values exist. I could argue that the reason people's moral beliefs differ because of deception, self-deception, wishful thinking and other misuses of free will etc. but this is not the point. The question is how objective moral values can exist--not why we believe in them. You could argue that sociology and psychology explains why we believe in morality, but even if true it does not address the reasoning of my argument. It doesn't answer the question, for example, what morality's transcendent source of authority is. Do you believe my argument is deductively valid? If not, where does the reasoning break down? So far you have a tendency to avoid discussing the logical and deductive validity of the argument. If objective morality does not have its basis in God then what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? I would really like you to answer this question. And I would really like it if you addressed the actual reasoning of the argument. By the way, I would be very pleased if you could answer the question I have raised over whether you have any mechanism to identify whether "don't sacrifice foreigners to Quetzlcoatl" is objectively morally right Methinks its roughly the same sort of mechanism you have to identify that your memory and senses are at least sometimes reliable. Your memory and senses are not always reliable, but sometimes they are. Similarly, sometimes our beliefs of morality are correct. Edited by Tisthammerw on 07/28/07 - 05:36 PM
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Posted 07/28/07 - 04:36 PM:	#214
TMB wrote: Hi Tist, your arguments are desgined to be self fulfilling. You say My definitions of God and moral objectivism fit pretty neatly in the standard sense of the terms. God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. This is pretty standard. Ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs. This is a pretty standard definition of moral objectivism. Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior and have authority behind them, because authority is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." This definition of authority is also pretty standard. We can apply reason to these definitions to argue that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. With this approach because you base the succeeding conclusions on the assumptions you have made upfront Assumptions? These are merely definitions. If we rejected every argument that depended on definitions, we'd have to throw out all logic and mathematics. However, I do believe that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Setting up an all powerful entity is of course always going to address anything that we find difficult to control or understand - ie. our subjective/objective reality, this is why the presence of a God appeals so much. It is the ultimate go-to figure for controlling our destiny. Anything that has gaps based upon reason and logic can always be addressed by something defined as all things to all men. Yes, the old god-of-the-gaps argument. But that sort of argument isn't particularly compelling if you don't have a better explanation. For instance, I could claim that archaeologists are using a "scribe-of-the-gaps" fallacy, using a scribe to plug a gap in something we don't have an explanation for. But if there is no better explanation available, appealing to artificial intervention isn't necessarily the most irrational thing to do. The god-of-the-gaps argument seems to ask us to take a shortcut around rational principles (e.g. the inference to the best explanation) and avoid rational deliberation. Similarly, do you have a better explanation available? If objective morality does not have its basis in God, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? Can you break apart the actual reasoning of the argument? Why dont you simply accept a faith that needs no validation? I'm not convinced that's the most rational path to take. Besides, it seems to make little sense to ignore the evidence for God's existence.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/28/07 - 07:26 PM:	#215
Tisthammerw wrote: "I'll do the former (the latter is a topic for another thread). By ethics being objective it is meant that ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs." This is undoubtably a circular argument and therefore Objective Morals do not support God. wrote: "I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God." And I replaced your circular argument with one that is founded not on god, but on forms, the perfection of forms. Therefore, we project our intuitive sense of tasteful morals from the imperfect world into a perfect form. From this rubric or perfected blueprint we derive our morals, which subsequently turn out to be less than perfect, as they're derivitive of perfection. This isn't a command, but were we can reference our moral behavior. The problem with this though, is that it is simply a matter of projected opinion or taste. Just like there is no one perfect painting, there is no perfect moral system (although we might imagine that such a thing could exist). It's a phantasm of our imagination. But nevertheless this is an alternative to your theory and never once references god. Edited by hipskipdip on 07/28/07 - 11:51 PM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/28/07 - 10:32 PM:	#216
Tisthammerw, Your description of Objective Morals only refers to God and does not contribute to the determination of a truth-condition; i.e. God.
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

mric
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Posted 07/29/07 - 12:18 AM:	#217
Tisthammerw wrote: Both are important. It is clear that if objective morality exists, it carries with it a supreme authority behind it. The question is, how? What transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? No transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do. Why do you imagine there has to be one saying something? You haven't proven this very first step, one of the half-dozen deductive failures in the argument you present. As I have said very specifically several times before, I am not talking about divine command theory. But let's ignore that for the moment. If objective morality does not have its metaphysical basis in God, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? No transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do. I don't see why. Would care to explain and justify this claim? Why exactly would it be coherent? At least, why is it more coherent here than any other metaethical theory? One could criticize virtues being a basis of ethics on the grounds that "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines" is a coherent view under virtue ethics. But it isn't clear why. Since you have provided no logical constraint on the nature of morality beyond its being "grounded in the heart of God" it is apparently entirely coherent for morality to have any content whatsoever. May I ask why? Why is it that "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines" sounds entirely coherent in God-based morality but not society-based morality? For that matter, why on Earth should we accept is is coherent in God-based morality in the first place any more than e.g. virtue ethics? (Please stop referring to virtue ethics - what has it got to do with the discussion? I don't care that a moral position to which I don't adhere is as incoherent as theological morality) The idea that morality is objective "in its foundations in society" would seem to sound more like cultural relativism--not ethical objectivism at all. What if cultures disagree on what is morally right? Which one is right? What if a culture thinks slavery is morally okay but a few centuries later it changes its mind (e.g. U.S. history)? Is there no moral progress here? If there is no moral progress, this again does not sound like ethical objectivism. Remember that moral objectivism is defined as ethical truths being independent of human thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. This seems to strongly suggest that the foundation of objective morality is not in human societies. All the questions you raise are reasonable challenges. Unfortunately, your approach to god-based objectivism doesn't answer them, since the only accessible moral yardstick you are able to provide is intuition. Your moral objectivity has no generative or deductive power to assess one culture as morally right, but not another, since it has no externally accessible base. By the way, the answer to them is that morality is objective at a personal level, but also mutable. Fortunately, religions typically also accept this (viz. new covenants). Could you address the material argument from my previous post around your ability to identify and recognise moral progress? Please explain what additional insight you have to morality over that of people two hundred years ago, given that you have no access to moral dictates other than intuition. It does however very specifically explain why morality's transcendent source of authority has a number of characteristics associated with God, including being transcendent, omnipresent, and eternal. I have made no assumption that morality has a universal, transcendent source of authority. Your argument is attacking a strawman - that of someone who says that the universe as a whole provides a moral base. I am placing that in society, clearly not transcendent, omnipresent and eternal. Read the structure of your original post, it clearly is explicitly addressed to the pantheist. Your argument is not all that bad (and I thank you for finally addressing the reasoning of my argument, particularly in such a way that does not ignore what I've been saying), but I don't think it works entirely well. For instance, if your father is not alive, he is not around to make commands. And he obviously could not make any commands before he was born. The authority of objective morality however seems eternal and omnipresent; continuously commanding human behavior whenever and wherever you might be. The authority of objective morality is much different from human authority; for one thing there is no specific region where the pantheistic God is confined (since God is equated with the universe/reality/existence after all). See above - I have made no pantheistic assumption. This does not logically follow. Quick counterexample: moral truths can be intuitively recognized on some level. Moral truths need not be hidden at all simply because of its God-based metaphysical basis. But sociology and psychology cannot have any explanation for why objective moral values exist. I could argue that the reason people's moral beliefs differ because of deception, self-deception, wishful thinking and other misuses of free will etc. but this is not the point. The question is how objective moral values can exist--not why we believe in them. You could argue that sociology and psychology explains why we believe in morality, but even if true it does not address the reasoning of my argument. It doesn't answer the question, for example, what morality's transcendent source of authority is. I agree that psychology and sociology don't explain what morality's transcendent source of authority is. They explain, however, why we find our intuitions so persuasive, and where those intuitions might come from. They therefore run against your hidden assumption that morality is objective and largely aligned to your personal moral intuitions because those intuitions are a representation of that objective truth. Your personal moral intuitions (and those of everyone else, including the Aztecs) have an identifiable causal base apparently independent of God. This is what allows in the problem you have with the moral relativism implied by your argument. Do you believe my argument is deductively valid? If not, where does the reasoning break down? So far you have a tendency to avoid discussing the logical and deductive validity of the argument. If objective morality does not have its basis in God then what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? I would really like you to answer this question. And I would really like it if you addressed the actual reasoning of the argument. Arguments with complex terms such as 'morality', 'transcendent', 'God', 'Universal' etc. are unlikely to be simply deductively valid or invalid, since each of these terms packs a huge load of background implication, assumption and theory. My suggestion is that your argument has no power to persuade unless one has already made a large set of assumptions that are already effectively agreeing to the existence of transcendent universal authorities. Even then, it does not imply anything about the moral nature of that authority, as it might as well be Quetzlcoatl as Jesus - again, an uncomfortable conclusion that picks out some issues in the base assumptions. Edited by mric on 07/29/07 - 12:44 AM

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/29/07 - 02:28 PM:	#218
hipskipdip wrote: "I'll do the former (the latter is a topic for another thread). By ethics being objective it is meant that ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs." This is undoubtably a circular argument and therefore Objective Morals do not support God. I think this might require some justification. How is my argument circular? What you quoted isn't even the argument; it's just the working definition. And I replaced your circular argument with one that is founded not on god, but on forms, the perfection of forms. Therefore, we project our intuitive sense of tasteful morals from the imperfect world into a perfect form. This still leaves open as to what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be if we're talking about objective moral values. Who decides what is "perfect"? A selfish person might say that a "perfect" world is one where he is wealthy and powerful--and to heck with everyone else. A sadist might have an even worse vision of a "perfect" world. So again, if morality is objective and not simply a matter of personal taste, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? The problem with this though, is that it is simply a matter of projected opinion or taste. Well, yes that is a very serious--even fatal--problem. Ethical objectivism implies that morality is not a matter of personal taste. But nevertheless this is an alternative to your theory and never once references god. It is not a genuine alternative however since I have been referring to objective moral values (which is, after all, what the argument from morality is all about). Can you provide an alternative metaphysical basis for objective moral values? hipskipdip wrote: Tisthammerw, Your description of Objective Morals only refers to God and does not contribute to the determination of a truth-condition; i.e. God. I'm not sure that's true. Remember, I am claiming that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Theism explains how and why objective morality is possible. Atheism does not. Additionally, given post #121, objective morality does seem to point to some kind of God. Edited by Tisthammerw on 07/29/07 - 02:32 PM
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

TMB
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Posted 07/29/07 - 03:11 PM:	#219
Hi Tist, you say, Assumptions? These are merely definitions. If we rejected every argument that depended on definitions, we'd have to throw out all logic and mathematics. You are using words to avoid meaning. You might called them assumed definitions, defined assumptions, it makes little difference what name you use, the mechanism is still the same. You have defined your own model and used it to prove what it already has built in to the starting points you define and then argue that it proves something external. I am not sure how this means throwing out logic. Logic is based upon inference, causatio, evidence etc. That you have decided to define a whole bunch of characteristics without requiring causation and evidence is the end of logic. Descriptions are required so that we agree and understand what it is we are addressing, however your approach is to define values that have not yet been validated. Yes, the old god-of-the-gaps argument. This is NOT a god of the gaps argument. applying an inappropriate label like this just creates a tangent. An all encompassing answer is always going to be the best because in this case it has been defined as being all powerful, knowing etc, and therefore cannot possibly fail to deliver. I am not interested in 'gaps', it is the principle of making the assumption of 'omni' that creates the logical issue. But that sort of argument isn't particularly compelling if you don't have a better explanation. For instance, I could claim that archaeologists are using a "scribe-of-the-gaps" fallacy, using a scribe to plug a gap in something we don't have an explanation for. But if there is no better explanation available, appealing to artificial intervention isn't necessarily the most irrational thing to do. The god-of-the-gaps argument seems to ask us to take a shortcut around rational principles (e.g. the inference to the best explanation) and avoid rational deliberation. This is not the debate. If we begin with the assumption of an omni-being it has no difficulty explaining any phenomena, if you are short on evidence, rteturn to the base and assumption because, by definition, it contains all the answers. This is also not about finding 'better' explanations. If there are unexplained phenomena, of what use is an explanation that has no logical foundation but we cannot think of anything better. In this case perhaps the solution is to acknowledge that we do not know and work from first principles. The argument about other mechanisms from which objective morality could arise is a quite separate argument. Similarly, do you have a better explanation available? If objective morality does not have its basis in God, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? Can you break apart the actual reasoning of the argument? I do not understand why you assume an objective morality even exists or is possible to define. Why do you think a system of authority needs to be transcendent, unless you consider a governmentor parent to be transcendent. I have no issue with arguning the case to a relative morality that has no need or reference to a God. Once again, this argument can be carried separately to any discussion about the existence (or not) of a God. You exaplin why you begin the discussion with an objective morality and the need for something transcendent and I will gladly outline an argument for my case. I'm not convinced that's the most rational path to take. Besides, it seems to make little sense to ignore the evidence for God's existence. Faith is something that does require no rational support, that is how we have described the process by which we bring about systems like religion. This does not necessarily negate a God or a divinity, just that using our approach of intuitive and factual validation of reality, we cannnot offer concrete evidence (as we attempt with other systems like science) to support our propositions. By saying that a faith based path is not rational is correct by definition. Did you see any irony in your statement?

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/29/07 - 03:11 PM:	#220
mric wrote: Both are important. It is clear that if objective morality exists, it carries with it a supreme authority behind it. The question is, how? What transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? No transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do. Why do you imagine there has to be one saying something? You haven't proven this very first step I have repeatedly and very specifically explained why morality has to have some kind of authority behind it. Again, please address the evidence before claiming it doesn't exist. Ethics makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority behind its statements (by definition). Authority is “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior.” Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior. Additionally, the authority of objective morality (however it exists) is supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. But if objective morality exists, what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? No transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do. But if that is true, then objective morality does not exist (see above). I don't see why. Would care to explain and justify this claim? Why exactly would it be coherent? At least, why is it more coherent here than any other metaethical theory? One could criticize virtues being a basis of ethics on the grounds that "penguins shouldn't tapdance in submarines" is a coherent view under virtue ethics. But it isn't clear why. Since you have provided no logical constraint on the nature of morality beyond its being "grounded in the heart of God" it is apparently entirely coherent for morality to have any content whatsoever. I'm not sure that logically follows, at least if we're doing strict logical constraints. For instance, raping people being a virtue does not violate the law of noncontradiction. However, that does not imply that the concept is coherent and that therefore virtue ethics is false. Your moral objectivity has no generative or deductive power to assess one culture as morally right All the argument demonstrates is that the existence of God at least allows objective morality to be possible and says nothing about how we know what is morally right. The theory of evolution does not address the origins of life, but that doesn't mean its a bad theory. By the way, the answer to them is that morality is objective at a personal level, but also mutable. Then this really doesn't sound like moral objectivism at all. Morality being relative to the person is ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism. It does however very specifically explain why morality's transcendent source of authority has a number of characteristics associated with God, including being transcendent, omnipresent, and eternal. I have made no assumption that morality has a universal, transcendent source of authority. I never said you did, but I have argued that morality does need a universal, transcendent source of authority (essentially by definition) if we are talking about moral objectivism. And the best non-theist explanation that "reality says what ought to be" still points to some type of God that suspiciously has a number of the characteristics associated with theism. The problem appears to be that the alternatives you are presenting are not at all moral objectivism, e.g. having morality's basis be society. Do you believe my argument is deductively valid? If not, where does the reasoning break down? So far you have a tendency to avoid discussing the logical and deductive validity of the argument. If objective morality does not have its basis in God then what transcendent source of authority says what we ought to do? I would really like you to answer this question. And I would really like it if you addressed the actual reasoning of the argument. Arguments with complex terms such as 'morality', 'transcendent', 'God', 'Universal' etc. are unlikely to be simply deductively valid or invalid, since each of these terms packs a huge load of background implication, assumption and theory. I don't see how it's an unusually large set of assumptions apart from the definitions being used. For instance; the primary basis is to accept to moral objectivism as I defined the term (which fits pretty neatly with the standard definition). Can you think of anything else? In any case your response seems to avoid the matter at hand, at least without further elucidation. For instance, can you think of any assumption my argument makes that would prevent it from being deductively valid?
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/29/07 - 05:04 PM:	#221
TMB wrote: Assumptions? These are merely definitions. If we rejected every argument that depended on definitions, we'd have to throw out all logic and mathematics. You are using words to avoid meaning. But I very specifically described the meaning of those words in the text you quoted (back in post #211). So what on Earth do you mean that I am "using words to avoid meaning"? Descriptions are required so that we agree and understand what it is we are addressing, however your approach is to define values that have not yet been validated. What do you mean "validated"? My definition of moral objectivism, for instance, isn't exactly bizarre. And remember what I am arguing: if objective moral values exist (as I defined them) then they are evidence for the existence of God. Yes, the old god-of-the-gaps argument. This is NOT a god of the gaps argument. "...this is why the presence of a God appeals so much. It is the ultimate go-to figure for controlling our destiny. Anything that has gaps based upon reason and logic can always be addressed by something defined as all things to all men." Can you understand why this sounded like god-of-the-gaps? An all encompassing answer is always going to be the best because in this case it has been defined as being all powerful, knowing etc, and therefore cannot possibly fail to deliver. I don't mean "best" in that sense. "Inference to the best explanation" usually refers to rationality, not mere capability. This is also not about finding 'better' explanations. If there are unexplained phenomena, of what use is an explanation that has no logical foundation but we cannot think of anything better. But I do think we have rational foundation for thinking that if objective moral values exist then they are evidence for the existence of God (e.g. supplying a supremely transcendent source of authority for objective morality to be possible). I do not understand why you assume an objective morality even exists or is possible to define. I provided a definition for moral objectivism. Why do I assume objective morality exists? I suspect for the same reason you assume that your senses and memory are at least sometimes reliable. In any case this is somewhat beside the point. I am not here to argue whether objective morality exists. I am here to claim that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. Why do you think a system of authority needs to be transcendent I think the authority for objective morality needs to be transcendent if it is to exist. First, objective morality commands our behavior (e.g. "don't torture people for fun") and authority by definition is "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." The authority of morality (however it exists) seems supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. Were it otherwise, it would not be moral objectivism (i.e. that ethical truths are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs). You exaplin why you begin the discussion with an objective morality and the need for something transcendent and I will gladly outline an argument for my case. Okay, I'll give it a shot. I start with objective morality because for many people (albeit not all) this is an agreed upon starting point. I think most people (albeit not all) believe in moral objectivism. That, and the alternatives seem either incoherent or just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says that being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to wipe out Jewish people is morally right as long as that's what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. As for objective morality requiring something transcendent, see above for my explanation. Faith is something that does require no rational support In that case, I have no faith in God, and neither do a number of other theists (some theists are evidentialists).
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/29/07 - 05:08 PM:	#222
Tisthammerw wrote: "I am claiming that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Theism explains how and why objective morality is possible." Oh no way, because you have yet to do that without appealing to god. wrote: "How is my argument circular?" Please read the following: "In logic, begging the question has traditionally described a type of logical fallacy, petitio principii, in which the conclusion of an argument is implicitly or explicitly assumed in one of the premises." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question -and- "Circular cause and consequence is a logical fallacy where the consequence of the phenomenon is claimed to be its root cause. This is also known as the the chicken or the egg fallacy." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_cause_and_c... wrote: "This still leaves open as to what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be if we're talking about objective moral values." Oh, it leaves it open eh? Well, I guess ya better fill it in! The ought is the perfect form which just is. This form doesn't exist, it's just out there that we all "intuitively" know; such as, "killing babies is bad." People are disgusted when their taste or intuitive sense of morality is offended (based of this perfect form of morality). There is NO COMMAND. wrote: "Ethical objectivism implies that morality is not a matter of personal taste." The argument of "perfect" forms is that this already exists, and is something we receive, not something comprised of personal taste. Our actions (based off our perceiving the ideal moral form) are personal. wrote: "I have argued that morality does need a universal, transcendent source of authority (essentially by definition) if we are talking about moral objectivism." Simply because you can imagine a god doesn't entail that it exists, it's a matter of reality cooresponding with our idea; it is not a matter of what the content of our idea is.
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/29/07 - 05:43 PM:	#223
hipskipdip wrote: "I am claiming that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. Theism explains how and why objective morality is possible." Oh no way, because you have yet to do that without appealing to god. I think you may need to explain yourself a little more clearly here, because at first blush what you say doesn't seem to make much sense. It is true I have not explained why objective moral values are possible without appealing to God, but isn't that the point considering what I'm arguing? I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. Of course I'm going to be appealing to God. To say that one cannot believe in objective moral values without appealing to God only strengthens the deductive validity of my argument. "How is my argument circular?" Please read the following: "In logic, begging the question has traditionally described a type of logical fallacy, petitio principii, in which the conclusion of an argument is implicitly or explicitly assumed in one of the premises." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question -and- "Circular cause and consequence is a logical fallacy where the consequence of the phenomenon is claimed to be its root cause. This is also known as the the chicken or the egg fallacy." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_cause_and_c... Uh, that's nice and all, but would you mind explaining clearly and specifically why my argument fits these definitions? "Ethical objectivism implies that morality is not a matter of personal taste." The argument of "perfect" forms is that this already exists, and is something we receive, not something comprised of personal taste. Our actions (based off our perceiving the ideal moral form) are personal. You said, "The problem with this though, is that it is simply a matter of projected opinion or taste." Okay, so apparently you meant the exact opposite of what this statement seemed to imply. But let's ignore that for the moment. Previously you said, For example morals could be identified with its formal properties, such as "unity," "balance," "ideal proportion," "uniformity amidst variety," "conformity to the Golden Section," or with its "perfection." Your above example is a wee bit vague; "unity" and "balance" and the like. And we still come to the problem of what transcendent source of authority says this is what ought to be. Unity may indeed be something to achieve for, but then suppose I think we should follow the opposite forms: disunity and anarchy. Who or what says I'm wrong? If my behavior destroys balance, what fundamental reality says I ought not to behave this way? This is an important and seemingly unanswered question. Because if there is literally nothing in reality that says we should follow one form over another, "forms" as the metaphysical basis for objective morality collapses on itself. The best non-theist "brute fact" explanation is that reality says what forms to follow. But then we go back to the same problem I mentioned earlier (e.g. in post #121). "I have argued that morality does need a universal, transcendent source of authority (essentially by definition) if we are talking about moral objectivism." Simply because you can imagine a god doesn't entail that it exists I agree, but I never made anything close to that claim in the text you quoted. I more or less echoing that (1) If objective morality exists is carries with it a supremely transcendent authority behind it and (2) the metaphysical basis of objective morality is a source for this authority, i.e. who or what commands our behavior? After all, if objective morality has literally no source and no metaphysical basis, then there is literally nothing that says e.g. Hitler was wrong when he thought he should slaughter millions of Jews. Edited by Tisthammerw on 07/29/07 - 05:54 PM
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/30/07 - 08:58 AM:	#224
Tisthammerw wrote: "Uh, that's nice and all, but would you mind explaining clearly and specifically why my argument fits these definitions? " I think I'm confusing even myself, so if you'll forgive me, I'm going to try and start over a bit. I was too hasty and I guess I was having trouble getting over the fact that we're taking objective morals for granted. wrote: "(1) If objective morality exists is carries with it a supremely transcendent authority behind it and (2) the metaphysical basis of objective morality is a source for this authority, i.e. who or what commands our behavior? After all, if objective morality has literally no source and no metaphysical basis, then there is literally nothing that says e.g. Hitler was wrong when he thought he should slaughter millions of Jews." We're assuming that objective morals exist. Let's assume that your argument is something like this: 1) Objective morals have authority. 2) If they have authority, there must be a reliable motive for human beings to be moral. 3) No such motive could exist, unless there was an omniscient, omnipresent, wholly just agent to attach sanctions to behavior under moral norms. 4) There is a God. Authority is the answer in this case to an absence of moral motivation. My argument(s): A) Objective morals contain a perfect good. B) If they contain a perfect good, then people have a choice to protect and promote the perfect good or not. C) The perfect good, being perfectly good, obligates people to follow the perfect good for its own sake. -or- D) Moral facts exist. E) Moral facts have the properties of being objective and non-natural. F) The best explanation of there being objective and non-natural moral facts is provided by Perfect Forms. G) Therefore the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking Perfect Forms is true. The point is that the definition of objective morals can take on a definition in which it is intrinsic or intradependent. Since these morals exist, it's one's own responsibility to one self and others to strive for the perfect good, and thereby are bound in their duty to uphold these moral laws or perfect forms. To do what isn't good is threateing to others and to the perfect form itself. The perfect form instructs us on what is perfectly good and therefore we are obligated to follow the perfect good for our own sake, and the sake that it is good in and of itself. An important distinction could be made here, and that is that the perfect form needn't be monist, but could have a plurality based on different circumstances or levels of application. Of course, you'd want to be careful not to run into contradition. wrote: "You said, "The problem with this though, is that it is simply a matter of projected opinion or taste." Okay, so apparently you meant the exact opposite of what this statement seemed to imply. But let's ignore that for the moment." You'll have to forgive me, I've been slow to adopting this argument. Earlier I was still thinking that objective morals needed to be defined. In fact the argument here is that they need to be either communicated or enforced. I'm saying that they're apparent and intrinsic so that neither of the alternative choices are "better" explanations. Appealing to God is a worse explanations because it depends on an absent agent. While you could remove this agent as a source of authority in so much that human are bound to each other through this morality. Humans are moral agents and therefore completely capable of obtaining such objective morals intuitively. It's also important that these morals are obtainable in themselves. In Christianity, it's understood that perfect moral behavior is only obtained through gods "divine grace." Therefore, god is necessary. But there is no such definition in our objective morals. We don't need an exterior agent to hold the terms, the terms are already there as objective morals. H) It is rationally and morally necessary to attain the perfect good (happiness arising out of complete virtue). I) What we are obliged to attain, it must be possible for us to attain. J) Attaining the perfect good is only possible if natural order and causality are part of an overarching moral order and causality. Kant would posit a fourth (K) that causality is link with God. Today we know that such first mover arguments have been refuted. The difficulty in this argument for me is that I don't believe a word of it. I do believe this explanation is better than divine command arguments, since it removes some trans-human agent. I also think it's better in the sense that responsibility doesn't rely on exterior agents, but on humanities shoulders itself. If we want to see a change, it's our efforts that bear responsibility and the consequent. wrote: "Unity may indeed be something to achieve for, but then suppose I think we should follow the opposite forms: disunity and anarchy. Who or what says I'm wrong? If my behavior destroys balance, what fundamental reality says I ought not to behave this way? This is an important and seemingly unanswered question. Because if there is literally nothing in reality that says we should follow one form over another, "forms" as the metaphysical basis for objective morality collapses on itself." "We're not debating here if objective morality exists." If objective morality is apprehended, then it is apparent that all things opposed to the perfect good are degrees less than the perfect good. This comes intuitive to everyone. We're simply not talking about a basis, we're talking about a big old omniscient omnipresent bearded police man or judge. I'm saying that the authority is received directly by people's intuitive sense of the perfect good, and when that taste or sense is offended, then judgment comes from fellow humans on the basis of the perfect good. I'm simply accepting that objective morality is accepted intuitively, because I'm not familiar with a better explanation of how people understand objective morality via God. Since both of these arguments share the same problem, I take it for granted that I needn't explain. Edited by hipskipdip on 07/30/07 - 09:35 AM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

TMB
Assistant Professor

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Joined: May 14, 2007
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Posted 07/31/07 - 01:12 AM:

#225

Hi Tist, you say,

But I very specifically described the meaning of those words in the text you quoted (back in post #211). So what on Earth do you mean that I am "using words to avoid meaning"?

I meant this specifically in reference to your response that you had not made any assumptions, only definitions. By this I meant that your definitions themselves are assumptions. By using a word like ‘definition’ instead of ‘assumption’ you avoid the limitations that assumptions bring. This is what I meant that you are playing with words in order to avoid this.

What do you mean "validated"? My definition of moral objectivism, for instance, isn't exactly bizarre. And remember what I am arguing: if objective moral values exist (as I defined them) then they are evidence for the existence of God.

I am not sure that I have found you definition of objective morality, so here is what I took off of your website

By ethics being objective it is meant that ethical truths (e.g. torturing infants for fun is wrong, the Holocaust is morally wrong) are independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs.

You have made an assertion, however I cannot see how it is supported, either by logic or evidence. How do you know that a view on the Holocaust as being right or wrong is independent of human feelings, feeling and beliefs, unless you have some entity that is independent of humans and has verified the case? At the moment you have offered a human opinion, thus rendering your own definition non-objective, by your own definitions. Unless you were able to establish a transcendent being to take an objective position, how can you do this?

I also think that one is able to examine what we describe as morality and work out if it is objective or not, without reference to a divinity.

Can you understand why this sounded like god-of-the-gaps?

No I cannot. The gotg model is when detail is lacking at a specific level. My point is at a level deeper than this. If you define up front that something has all the answers, in theory there can be no gaps. I am not criticising the gaps, just the underlying premise that builds the model.

mean "best" in that sense. "Inference to the best explanation" usually refers to rationality, not mere capability.

The best explanation requires evidence to back it up. Rationality has underlying requirements. If we make the assumption that moral objectivity exists, therefore a God also exists, it then DOES become rational to say that an omni God is now able to do such and such. However, it does not mean that the underlying assumptions are rational or valid. You have used rational in a narrow context, and avoided looking at it from outside of your model.

But I do think we have rational foundation for thinking that if objective moral values exist then they are evidence for the existence of God (e.g. supplying a supremely transcendent source of authority for objective morality to be possible).

You have returned to the original assumption of objective morality to prove your case, but where is the case for objective morality? If we assume a God exists then it is rational to conclude a whole bunch of things, but the real challenge is validating the underlying basis. I get the impression you have drawn up a definition, and then moved forward without trying to prove its validity.

I provided a definition for moral objectivism. Why do I assume objective morality exists? I suspect for the same reason you assume that your senses and memory are at least sometimes reliable. In any case this is somewhat beside the point. I am not here to argue whether objective morality exists. I am here to claim that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God.

By providing such a definition, this rests upon your assumptions. I do not think your parallel is valid. My senses and memory are quite subjective, and I have no way of validating their reliability even with external sources. However I think it is less confusing to stay on the point you want to argue, less time on detours.

Why are you not here to argue a case for the assumption of objective morality you have made? Your entire argument rests upon this premise and now you want to avoid discussion on it. What is achieved with such a discussion?

I think the authority for objective morality needs to be transcende