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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God

mric
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Posted 07/16/07 - 07:21 AM:	#176
Wosret wrote: That violates the first law of thermodynamics. Link me to something that shows that matter can be created and destroyed then. It's not "my theory" it's a pretty common theory. In fact recently a model of the universe as been contructed that allows the universe to expand and then contract infinately. It requires them to take a guess at the quantity of anti-matter in the universe, if they are right, and it if even to matter, then their model will work. The first law of thermodynamics is about conservation of energy in a closed system. If you want to see an example of matter being destroyed, look up on a sunny day - nuclear reactions represent the destruction of matter and the conversion into energy. However, you shouldn't let that bother you - in principle you are right, if we said "The answer is God" everytime we found a hard problem in science then we would do much less science.

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Posted 07/16/07 - 08:51 AM:	#177
Boethiusman wrote: "My point is that the concept of God cannot be so easilly dismissed... You may indeed find particular theories within the bounds of science convincing, as do I, however the standard model of quantum mechanics and relativity do not comment on the origin of the universe, they describe events within the universe. the term God had context, the context defined my term as an eternal being which is the cause of eternal order. That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. wrote: "If the universe as we know it had a beginning, did it have a cause? I am not convinced that this is an unintelligble question." With great questions, comes great imaginative answers. If you really want to know answers to these questions put down your religious text and start doing the hard work of find it out for yourself... do a little research. But what are you really interested in?
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Boethiusman
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Posted 07/16/07 - 11:12 AM:	#178
My argument is founded on knowledge. We know that science does not explain the origin of the universe as we know it. We do not know based on observation and analysis the sequence of events, or the factors at play, that resulted in the universe as we know it. Hence, the current body of scientific knowledge, as in observations and analysis, cannot be used to dismiss the concept of God. I am not arguing in this thread that God exists, as the subject here is whether the existence of morality implies God exists. I do not think it does. Though I do not argue for the position that the existence of objective morality entails God exists, I will argue against the position that the whole concept of God can simply be dismissed and this forum of religion and everything in it can also. I do not intend to argue beyond simply the idea that we cannot dismiss the concept of God, as this is not the subject of the thread. I was in Cuba for the past six months and just landed in Europe a few weeks ago, I've got a crazy amount of work to do, and I do not have time for the moment to continue my old threads defending my ethical theoligical position, however, you are free to look up my old posts to get an idea. If you have anything to comment, you can continue those threads or make a new thread perhaps entitled Boethiusman is wrong, and I may respond. That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. I do not see the evidence of my evidenceless assertions. The idea that I am anti science I don't think is useful. I worked at the national research council of Canada, and before I observed there that the technical solutions to the worlds problems have already been more or less worked out my career choice was science. However, in the face of the sophistication of the current scientific knowledge, I can only conclude our problems are organizational. Cooperation amongst people is fundamentally a philosophical enterprise, hence the philosophy.

Wosret
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Posted 07/16/07 - 12:37 PM:	#179
mric wrote: The first law of thermodynamics is about conservation of energy in a closed system. If you want to see an example of matter being destroyed, look up on a sunny day - nuclear reactions represent the destruction of matter and the conversion into energy. However, you shouldn't let that bother you - in principle you are right, if we said "The answer is God" everytime we found a hard problem in science then we would do much less science. Nuclear fusion doesn't destroy matter, it converts it to energy.
"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

Boethiusman
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Posted 07/16/07 - 01:09 PM:	#180
By that logic nothing is destroyed, a house is simply converted into rubble, etc. When energy turns into matter, matter is created, when matter turns into photons etc, that matter is destroyed. Unless you propose simply dropping the word destroyed and created from the language.

Wosret
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Posted 07/16/07 - 02:33 PM:	#181
Boethiusman wrote: By that logic nothing is destroyed, a house is simply converted into rubble, etc. When energy turns into matter, matter is created, when matter turns into photons etc, that matter is destroyed. Unless you propose simply dropping the word destroyed and created from the language. The law of thermodymanics states matter and energy. They can be coverted by and form. Also yes, nothing is truely destroyed. Nothing is truely obliterated into nothingness, that I am aware of.
"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

Boethiusman
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Posted 07/17/07 - 10:00 AM:	#182
Though I cannot claim that nothing is truly destroyed (if something ever was truly destroyed, how would we know; not to mention new experiments in quantum mechanics which may suggest the law of conservation of energy can be broken, though perhaps only for a short time), this is not the thread to discuss such matters. However, if nothing is created or destroyed then things have existed eternally. Have things existed eternally in fundamental randomness, or fundamental order. What is your reasoning for dismissing fundamental order? If you do not dismiss fundamental order, what is your reasoning for dismissing the concept of God as responsible for order? Do you withdraw your dismissal of the God concept, or have I misinterpreted your position?

Wosret
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Posted 07/17/07 - 10:41 AM:	#183
Boethiusman wrote: Though I cannot claim that nothing is truly destroyed (if something ever was truly destroyed, how would we know; not to mention new experiments in quantum mechanics which may suggest the law of conservation of energy can be broken, though perhaps only for a short time), this is not the thread to discuss such matters. However, if nothing is created or destroyed then things have existed eternally. Have things existed eternally in fundamental randomness, or fundamental order. What is your reasoning for dismissing fundamental order? If you do not dismiss fundamental order, what is your reasoning for dismissing the concept of God as responsible for order? Do you withdraw your dismissal of the God concept, or have I misinterpreted your position? First off, although I'm not committed to a idea that matter cannot be created or destroyed, that seems to be what we know about it currently. That could very well change. Secondly. Order is what brains do, we order the universe. I don't see any reason to believe that it is actually ordered. The only constant we are aware of is the universal speed limit light achieves while in a vacuum. We look for patterns and put things in order. If there termed out that there was some fundemental order, as you put it. Then I would find that very interesting, and would love to know how that came about. From very simply roots no doubt. Or fundemental randomness as you say, although it seems to jump from black to white. Knowing that both order and chaos exists, suggesting it can only be one or the other seems to be jumping the gun. However if it were the case, then that would also be very interesting, and I've love to know more about it. Of course fundemental order is by no means evidence of god, that is down right absurd . What would god explain? If God was an ordered entity how is God suppose to explain the fundemental order? It simply begs the question of what ordered god? Obviously. You can posit complexity to explain complexity, and you can't posit order to explain order. How does that ever come close to making sense? Besides the fact that the entire concept of god is fundementally flawed, unless, and self-defeating. It is just a down right silly concept. The idea of an intelligent beings that just exists, and is the origin of everything is an extremely silly idea. Everything comes from simple beginnings, and goes too complex, from the very simplest and on. I would be extremely surpized if the origin of all things is anything but the most simplest of all beginnings. However that is even if you assume there was an origin, and, by thinking on temporal terms we assume beginnings, but that doesn't necessarily follow with the universe, because, again, time is dependent on matter to exist. Also, of course things have existed eternally, forever. For as long as time has existed the universe has existed. Quite literally is has existed eternally and forever. From the beginning until the end of time, and since temporal terms don't work outside time, speaking about before or after those points is nonsense.
"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

Boethiusman
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Posted 07/17/07 - 11:23 AM:	#184
Since no one seems to be discussing the topic of this thread, I will expand my concepts if indeed what I have offered so far is not sufficient to defeat the God concept can be dismissed prima facie position (as in without any actual analysis of the concept, or any actual defeat of any argument defending it). By fundamental order I mean that some things in existence are predictable over all of existence. Our universe for instance we think is fundamentally ordered. We think the laws of physics will hold under any possible configuration of the universe that can develop from the present configuration. If true then something is predictable in at least the rest of existence of the universe, it has order. If there was no fundamental order, being able to predict anything would really only be a coincidence. If there is fundamental order, presumably there is a most powerful force, not potentially subjected to the whim or affect of any other force. As I said, this does not entail this force is the God concept, but as I asked what is your grounds for dismissing the God concept as a candidate, as you seem not to dismiss fundamental order concept. Though the idea of something outside, or before the universe may not be bounded by our temporal space, and makes actually dealing with these concepts difficult, it does not make them unintellible, or nonsense as you say. For instance, as you have interest in science you must have some familiarity with black wholes. Black wholes are a on object posited in current scientific understand which by dfinition information does not escape. Whether this is really true or not, let us assume for the moment it is, as my point stands nonetheless. Since information does not escape the black whole we can know nothing about it. Any theory made aout inside, whithin the event horizon, cannot be verified and is so invalid. It could be anything, perhaps even space unlike our own where stuff has proliferated keeping an equivalent net energy (though their net energy presumably would be more than zero) a new universe as we know it has begun. Though to them it may seem that it is non sense to talk of a time before time, to us it is not. Likewise, though in our time their universe had a beginning, we can know nothing about how their time functions. If our universes where somewhat familiar, what occurs in the equivalent of a day in our time may occur billions of times over in their time. So though talking of things outside of our universe is very strange, and of course nothing much can be determined (only assumptions compared and analysed), it is not nonsense. Nor is it unscientific, what caused, if anything, the universe as we know it to exist if a perfectly ligitimate scientific question. One we may never resolve through observation, but nontheless valid. Eternity the state of affairs if something never didn't exist. If I used the term forever, which perhaps could be interpreted as you say thouhg I'd have to be convinced of it, then please interpret it in the sense above. I hope that the example above shows that it is intellible to talk about events before the happening of our time as we call it.

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Posted 07/17/07 - 12:31 PM:	#185
Boethiusman wrote: Since no one seems to be discussing the topic of this thread, I will expand my concepts if indeed what I have offered so far is not sufficient to defeat the God concept can be dismissed prima facie position (as in without any actual analysis of the concept, or any actual defeat of any argument defending it). By fundamental order I mean that some things in existence are predictable over all of existence. Our universe for instance we think is fundamentally ordered. We think the laws of physics will hold under any possible configuration of the universe that can develop from the present configuration. If true then something is predictable in at least the rest of existence of the universe, it has order. If there was no fundamental order, being able to predict anything would really only be a coincidence. If there is fundamental order, presumably there is a most powerful force, not potentially subjected to the whim or affect of any other force. As I said, this does not entail this force is the God concept, but as I asked what is your grounds for dismissing the God concept as a candidate, as you seem not to dismiss fundamental order concept. Though the idea of something outside, or before the universe may not be bounded by our temporal space, and makes actually dealing with these concepts difficult, it does not make them unintellible, or nonsense as you say. For instance, as you have interest in science you must have some familiarity with black wholes. Black wholes are a on object posited in current scientific understand which by dfinition information does not escape. Whether this is really true or not, let us assume for the moment it is, as my point stands nonetheless. Since information does not escape the black whole we can know nothing about it. Any theory made aout inside, whithin the event horizon, cannot be verified and is so invalid. It could be anything, perhaps even space unlike our own where stuff has proliferated keeping an equivalent net energy (though their net energy presumably would be more than zero) a new universe as we know it has begun. Though to them it may seem that it is non sense to talk of a time before time, to us it is not. Likewise, though in our time their universe had a beginning, we can know nothing about how their time functions. If our universes where somewhat familiar, what occurs in the equivalent of a day in our time may occur billions of times over in their time. So though talking of things outside of our universe is very strange, and of course nothing much can be determined (only assumptions compared and analysed), it is not nonsense. Nor is it unscientific, what caused, if anything, the universe as we know it to exist if a perfectly ligitimate scientific question. One we may never resolve through observation, but nontheless valid. Eternity the state of affairs if something never didn't exist. If I used the term forever, which perhaps could be interpreted as you say thouhg I'd have to be convinced of it, then please interpret it in the sense above. I hope that the example above shows that it is intellible to talk about events before the happening of our time as we call it. You completely ignored almost everything I said, and focused on one thing. You then attempted to equivocate the god hypothesis with asking about the origin of the universe, when one definitely and to no extent must necessitate the other. I agree that what is the answer to the nature of the universe's existence, and even further if there is further (which you just seem to take fro granted that there must be) what is the nature of the existence of all things. Whether it be causal or anything. However you are jumping the gun with saying "God did it." I don't at all think those questions are bad. Also, your black hole analogy is flawed. You posited time inside the black hole, and then talking about how it might be different in our universe as if time is constant and never changing in our universe, when it is not. The time differentiation can occure inside the universe, it doesn't require a blackhole. Theoretically one could completely navagate the universe traveling at 99% the speed of light in about 50 years in their perspective, but it would be billions of years to us. Time is not constant or unchanging it is relative to movement. Your analogy doesn't work unless you are attempting to posit that time existed in another form before the big bang caused our space and time manafold. That's fine, nothing at all supports it, but I'm willing to consider that a possiblity. However, if time in only a product of our time/space manafold and came into existence upon the big bang, which is what I was obviously assuming in my explanation. Then yes, it is complete nonsense to talk about before or after that point. Also, both forever and eternal is correct if you consider now what I've clarified. They both basically mean existing endlessly outside of temporal restraints of being. Since time requires matter to exist, I'd say time couldn't have come first. So I don't see how what I said was flawed or incorrect in anyway. Also this "presumably there is a most powerful force." Is that like tallest person in a room? If so, then I agree. Such a thing obviously must exist. Most perfect, most intelligent and most attractive also must exist. What does that have to do with anything? Also, again, we find and make order. We find patterns and then order those patterns. I find it hard to believe that anything is completely patternless and without any bias. Everything that I know of is swayed by one thing or anything, and that pattern can be seen a deciphered. Using it to predict future events. Perhaps a completely random thing could be simulated or perhaps even exists, but I'm pretty sure most things are subject to the forces of others, which cause biases and patterns, which do not mean they were ordered in a certain way, all because they are predictable.
"I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

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Posted 07/17/07 - 05:39 PM:	#186
Wosret wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: The argument that "God would stop animal predation because its murder" does implicitly assume that animals are moral agents. If animals are not moral agents there would be nothing wrong with animal predation. I never said that. Then perhaps you can explain what you meant by this: Wosret wrote: This whole idea of a moral god is obviously refuted by the nature It was suppose to have created. If God determined murder wrong and bad, there would not be predation in nature, however there is. It kind of sounded like you were arguing "God would stop animal predation because its murder." Else, why did you say, "If God determined murder wrong and bad, there would not be predation in nature"? Why would God not create animal predation then if not because the animals were behaving immorally? What did you mean by this statement? The idea that animals are behaving immorally here presupposes that the animals are moral agents. That need not be the case. There are a lot reasons why. One Judeo-Christian view is that God gave humanity the power to choose its own destiny, but we humans screwed things up and as a result nature reflects our morality, not God's. So? Why is this about what christians think? This is about what theists think (and don't forget the Jews, I implicitly included them in the words you quoted). Jews and Christians are legitimate theists, and there is no reason to exclude their thoughts. You asked why nature wouldn't reflect God's morality. Here's one answer that some theists have proposed. Why do other animals need to suffer and be immoral to a far greater extent than human beings for something our ancestry is supposedly guilty of? Why does industrial pollution affect animal life? Our reckless actions sometimes have consequences we don't want. Note also that you're saying animals are "immoral" but this implicitly assumes they are moral agents. If they are not moral agents, they're behavior is not immoral. If God exists, there would be no evil that does not have a satisfactory explanation for its existence. There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists. Therefore God does not exist. That's an extremely poor form of the problem of evil, and it doesn't at all go like that. It goes exactly like that. Watch what happens here: It goes more like: If god is all-good and all-powerful, then why is there evil is the world? If god wants to but lacks the power to remove the evil, then he is impotent, if he doesn't want to but has the power, then he is menevolent. One big problem: the "then he is menevolent [sic]" part is a complete non sequitur unless you assume the premise "There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." The argument from evil is exactly how I structured it, and faces the same problem I mentioned earlier. Why think the second premise (of my version) is true? Well, perhaps because we don't know of an explanation that covers all the evil we see. But this is simply an argument from ignorance, not real evidence. So in practice the argument from evil is a bit hard to justify. There is no problem justifying anything. Then by all means intellectually justify the second premise (in another thread; this is getting a little off topic). You seem to have assumed it (albeit implicitly) but you haven't justified it. All because you think that evil is always necessary all the time But I don't think that at all. Evil caused by human beings is highly unnecessary, I think. But that sort of thing is a risk when mankind is given the power to choose its own destiny. You may think it's better not to have humanity possess the ability to choose between good and evil as it does now, but that's for another thread. You're right, it isn't a thread about the problem of evil, it is about the morality of God Actually, it's about the argument from morality, i.e. are objective moral values evidence for the existence of God? I accept that people have different moral views. You should accept the same I do. I also accept that people have different views on whether the Earth is flat. But that doesn't mean there isn't an objective truth. As you have said, you don't believe unnecessary evil exists in the world. Actually, I never said that. Just because there is a satisfactory explanation to permit evil does not imply that the evil is necessary. Or you can argue that we simply don't understand the brilliant awesome plan of god If God exists, should we expect to? A comprehended God is not God, after all. God's mind is infinite and ours is finite. So if God exists we can't reasonably expect to understand the "why" behind everything--and perhaps we cannot even reasonably expect to understand the why behind most things. I simply don't see how you could possibly convince any rational person. I don't actually expect to convince anyone here, but if I did I would expect the means to be logic and reason. Tell me something, could you find any actual flaw in the reasoning of my argument? The one that says if objective moral values exist that God probably does too? You can go to post #121 for a recap (838 words), or this web page for a better albeit less concise version of the argument (2337 words as of this post). If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be?
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Posted 07/17/07 - 09:57 PM:	#187
Tisthammerw wrote: "If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be?" Let's say that your argument is deductively valid. That's fine... I would take issue with the validity of your premises. IF objective morals exist (yet to be established) THEN God (probably) does too. Now, this isn't deductive but inductive as you are venturing an answer from your first premise and thus you have either a weak or strong inductive argument... but the "probably" will always follow. So how strong are your premises? Tishammerw wrote: "objective moral values are evidence for God has nothing to do with the existence of a punisher; it has more to do with finding a transcendent source of authority for the commands of objective moral values." What about competing theories with greater explanatory power? (i.e. Natural Selection) Edited by hipskipdip on 07/17/07 - 10:05 PM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

mric
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Posted 07/17/07 - 10:09 PM:	#188
Tisthammerw wrote: I don't actually expect to convince anyone here, but if I did I would expect the means to be logic and reason. Tell me something, could you find any actual flaw in the reasoning of my argument? The one that says if objective moral values exist that God probably does too? You can go to post #121 for a recap (838 words), or this web page for a better albeit less concise version of the argument (2337 words as of this post). If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be? The problems with the argument are: 1. Morality doesn't need a transcendent source of authority to be objective (your assumption that it does is partially begging the question). Indeed, I do not see how such an authority is sufficient, let alone necessary. You still haven't explained how an entity saying something makes it morally right. You appear to be mistaking "ought" with "ordered to". 2. You have defined "objective" too strongly. Taken as "not subjective from a personal perspective", then society and custom are sufficient to explain morality's objectivity. By defining objective as "independent of anything human" you are leading people who may agree with a narrower definition of objective into a potentially false conclusion. 3. You have not explained how the characteristic of being "a transcendent source of authority" is remotely connected to any of the other properties of a god - I don't see how there being "transcendent source of authority" implies anything about its characteristics. 4. By placing morality's base in a transcendent source you have created a problem in explaining how the content of moral rules is made apparent to humans. In its strongest form, this problem leads you to a strong form of moral relativism, since you are claiming there is no local yardstick to assess moral claims other than your personal intuition. If an Aztec says that sacrificing foreigners accords with his moral intuition, and you say it doesn't accord with yours, you seem also to be in the position of saying that there is no way of humans resolving this disagreement because morality is objective! 5. Your reliance on intuition is a problem. The difference between the intuition that the external world exists and the intuition that morality is objective is that many people do not share the second intuition (indeed, I doubt anyone other than a philosopher would claim it - many religious people do this the other way round, and start with God to get moral objectivity). It clearly isn't a Kantian Anschauung necessary to structure our understanding of the world.

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Posted 07/17/07 - 11:48 PM:	#189
However you are jumping the gun with saying "God did it." Please read my position. I did not make such a statement. My position here is that the concept of God cannot be dismissed without any real argument or refutation. I am not arguing here that God exists or does not exist, as this thread is about whether objective morals would entail Gods existence which I have already offered my views on. If you want to discuss something else, then do so in another thread, else why have this organization structure at all? Now complete rigidity is not what I am calling for, but in this case we have plenty of threads on the existence of God and the ideas you wish to discuss. If you post them in such threads or make a new thread I may or may not respond. However, continuously misinterpreting my position is not preductive.,

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Posted 07/18/07 - 02:20 AM:	#190
Tisthammerw wrote: Then perhaps you can explain what you meant by this: It kind of sounded like you were arguing "God would stop animal predation because its murder." Else, why did you say, "If God determined murder wrong and bad, there would not be predation in nature"? Why would God not create animal predation then if not because the animals were behaving immorally? What did you mean by this statement? The idea that animals are behaving immorally here presupposes that the animals are moral agents. That need not be the case. I would think that it would obvious that I was saying that god would not create agents that would pertake in actions he deemed immoral in the first place. Thus my explanation and example you simply ignored. Tisthammerw wrote: This is about what theists think (and don't forget the Jews, I implicitly included them in the words you quoted). Jews and Christians are legitimate theists, and there is no reason to exclude their thoughts. You asked why nature wouldn't reflect God's morality. Here's one answer that some theists have proposed. It's an extremely bad answer, and just goes to show god as cruel and unjust. And attempts to blame the victims. Tisthammerw wrote: Why does industrial pollution affect animal life? Our reckless actions sometimes have consequences we don't want. Note also that you're saying animals are "immoral" but this implicitly assumes they are moral agents. If they are not moral agents, they're behavior is not immoral. Because we made it. This is a complete non sequitur, stop trying to sell the "it's all our fault" thing. I'm not buying. It does not assume animals are moral, either address my example or stop saying that. You always simply refuse to address anything or give up what you're saying. I've clearly stated what I meant. If you are a moral agent, creating creatures that act immorally in your perspective is immmoral. Tisthammerw wrote: It goes exactly like that. Watch what happens here: One big problem: the "then he is menevolent [sic]" part is a complete non sequitur unless you assume the premise "There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." The argument from evil is exactly how I structured it, and faces the same problem I mentioned earlier. This is not a question. It is one you are making out of it. It resupposes your aweful christian explanation for it. The problem of evil predates christianity. Also, like I said, it is you that have to justify that all evil is always necessary. What you're not understanding is you are chocking most evils up to free will, whoever this presupposes that evil is necessary for free will to exist, thus you ARE saying that ALL evil is necessary ALL the time. Tisthammerw wrote: Why think the second premise (of my version) is true? Well, perhaps because we don't know of an explanation that covers all the evil we see. But this is simply an argument from ignorance, not real evidence. So in practice the argument from evil is a bit hard to justify. I told you, I find it incredibly aweful and completely undefendable to suggest that ALL evil is necessary ALL the time. You should justified that horrible claim. All the problem of evil must presuppose is that evil exists, which is does. Tisthammerw wrote: Then by all means intellectually justify the second premise (in another thread; this is getting a little off topic). You seem to have assumed it (albeit implicitly) but you haven't justified it. Please, I could no more justify to you that unnecessary killing happens in the world if you take the position that somehow all killing is necessary. However, since you are claiming something that is completely off the wall, you should justify that. Like I said, all because YOU think that it is always necessary, does not come close to meaning everyone else must. Tisthammerw wrote: But I don't think that at all. Evil caused by human beings is highly unnecessary, I think. But that sort of thing is a risk when mankind is given the power to choose its own destiny. You may think it's better not to have humanity possess the ability to choose between good and evil as it does now, but that's for another thread. Huh? So you think evil is necessary for free will and to keep our humanity or don't you? If you do, then you think all evil is necessary if you don't think unnecessary evil exists and that should prove your rediculous second premise for you. Tisthammerw wrote: Actually, it's about the argument from morality, i.e. are objective moral values evidence for the existence of God? Which doesn't make any sense if god is immoral, now does it? It seems to me that the moral argument for god just takes this for granted, sounds like question begging to me. Tisthammerw wrote: I do. I also accept that people have different views on whether the Earth is flat. But that doesn't mean there isn't an objective truth. Ok, back that up now. Give me evidence for objective moral truths. Otherwise I could say my favorite hockey team is the best in the world and that is as much a fact as it is that the world is round. It's a rather vacuous example without backing, don't you think? Tisthammerw wrote: Actually, I never said that. Just because there is a satisfactory explanation to permit evil does not imply that the evil is necessary. So you're saying that you believe your own incredibly crazy second premise to be true? What with all the flip flopping back and forth. You seem to be attempting to take both sides, there not existing unecessary evil so you can reject the problem of evil, and there existing unecessary evil so you don't seem intirely crazy. Tisthammerw wrote: If God exists, should we expect to? A comprehended God is not God, after all. God's mind is infinite and ours is finite. So if God exists we can't reasonably expect to understand the "why" behind everything--and perhaps we cannot even reasonably expect to understand the why behind most things. Then what's the point with the religions? Should be just drop an incoherent and inexplicable idea and move on? Why the fixation. I'd be very happy if everyone just said, "ah, why bother, lets just get one with our live and wait to see what happens." However you don't, so you must think that you can have some idea of what gods wants from you...or are you saying you can no what gods wants, but it doesn't have to make a lick of sense? That kind of mind set seems awefully easy to corrupt and manipulate. Tisthammerw wrote: I don't actually expect to convince anyone here, but if I did I would expect the means to be logic and reason. Tell me something, could you find any actual flaw in the reasoning of my argument? The one that says if objective moral values exist that God probably does too? You can go to post #121 for a recap (838 words), or this web page for a better albeit less concise version of the argument (2337 words as of this post). Your argument is littered with non sequiturs and question begging, everyone has been telling you this. You just seem to be ignoring it. Lets say, if olympus exists, probably Zues does too. Now you can name any mountain Olympus, that doesn't make Zues exist, and even if someday the real Olympus is discovered, that also wouldn't necesssarily mean Zues exists. That premise is a complete non sequitur. Tisthammerw wrote: If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be? Huh? If this is question begging I don't know what is. Also it misplaces the roll of an authority, authorities don't make things true, they are suppose to just be the best authority on what is true. Completely ignoring the question begging, give me an example of an authority that makes something objectively true. Edited by Wosret on 07/18/07 - 02:36 AM
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Mariner
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Posted 07/19/07 - 04:40 PM:	#191
mric wrote: Are inclinations caused (for instance, by God)? I don't know. But this does not affect their ontological status as not-determined, not-random phenomena. Unless you take 'caused' to be synonymous with 'determined' -- but then, you're begging the question. Of course, in a thread about morality, it shouldn't be necessary to establish that determined vs. random is a false dichotomy -- any moral judgment presupposes that the phenomenon is neither determined nor random. We punish killers because we assume that their behavior is neither determined nor random. Etc. Embracing this radical determined vs. random dichotomy means abolishing moral judgments. Is this what you are proposing? If so, then in so far as they are part of a deterministic causal chain. If not, are inclinations random, or somehow mystically causa sui? You can't escape your regress just by introducing the phrase 'inclination'. On the contrary, you can't escape the moral diagnosis that an inclination is neither determined nor random by pointing out that I don't know where inclinations come from. It's not as if you have the answer to that question, after all . If (or, more emphatically, if and only if) you can provide a deterministic (or a random) explanation for a murder, then you can dismiss inclinations as relevant events. It is interesting that you place morality and the pursuit of God as a necessary part of free will. Odd, given that a significant number of free will decisions appear to be amoral decisions. Please explain how my (predictable, free will) choice of jam over Marmite as spread on my toast this morning was an attempt to reach God. You choose jam over Marmite (I have no idea of what that is, by the way) because it gives you more pleasure. (assumption). Pleasure is good (premise -- with the caveat that this does not mean that pleasure is synonymous to goodness. That 'is' over there is not establishing identity, it is pointing out a trait. Perhaps it would be better to state that pleasure is 'one among many goods'). God is Goodness (another tricky 'is' -- perhaps the best way to explain this one is the scholastics 'Being and Goodness are interchangeable'). The conclusion follows from the two premises. If you're interested in this, there's nothing better than St. Thomas Aquinas' tour de force in the Summa: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2002.htm *** hipskipdip wrote: Are morals worldly "facts" or are they value judgments? The question is loaded. Please define what you mean by these two alternatives. I find it rather obvious that a value jugment is a fact (what else can it be? It is instantiated in someone's mind, just as any kind of judgment. "Jor got angry" is a fact, and "Joe thinks you are wrong" is also a fact). There is one fact that must be explained -- people make moral evaluations. By saying that these are 'value judgments', you haven't explained the fact. It's incoherent to make a "subject-object" distinction when dealing with values. Very much so. Which is why I never make one. (Are we coming to an agreement? This is pretty much one of my main points, and one reason why I said that the mric-Tisthammerw discussion was a dead end). Values are not subjective since we do not impose them on the world. I don't think this follows. Is 'imposing X on the world' the criterion for saying that X is subjective? As futile as the subjective-objective distinction is, when it becomes a disjunction, in which people say 'not objective, therefore subjective' (or vice-versa), it becomes positively misleading. Values are subjective because they vary according to the subject. (As far as I know, this is pretty much the objective definition of 'subjective). And they are also objective because they are, indeed, imposed by ourselves on the world. This is the reason why we can say to someone 'you're wrong' (in a moral sense), even though the person disagrees with us. If we did not impose them on the world (in this case, on our antagonist), this condemnation wouldn't make sense. We're left with two very simple forms of value: 1) Species-specific: An organims values what it needs to live and flourish. 2) Culture-specific: A group of people value what they need to live and flourish. But morality is neither one of those. It goes against the survival of the species in many instances (e.g. celibacy), and it goes against the prevailing culture in almost all instances. To be moral is to be alone. The best example is provided by the OT prophets, but we can always think of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., if we don't want to inject 'religious' thinkers into the discussion. (Even though the disjunction 'religious vs. not-religious' is just as flawed as the subjective-objective one). Were the values of Socrates species-specific or culture-specific? No, but we can recognize how it is important and how it achieves it's true value, not some heavily laden Christian philosophy with a categorical imperative or goal, i.e. "God." What is 'it' in this sentence? This 'heavily laden Christian philosophy' is far older than Christianity, by the way.
"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal "The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years

hipskipdip
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Posted 07/20/07 - 12:09 AM:	#192
To Clarify: The value of these morals, in this aesthetic phenomenon, derives its value through its application or function. A function can be defined in terms of its entire input-output structure. What are these structures? wrote: We're left with two very simple forms of value: 1) Species-specific: An organims values what it needs to live and flourish. 2) Culture-specific: A group of people value what they need to live and flourish. Mariner wrote: "Were the values of Socrates species-specific or culture-specific? " The idea is that you can take (1) and (2) and add them together and get a third concept as the aggregated sum. Two inputs are added together as inputs and a third new number or sum is the output, in this case the concept of morality. I would say that there were many things that made up the various inputs which then became a defining point for Socrates; a self portrait of the conceptual moral Socrates. A third, I think could be added, and that's of the personal experience, a sort of off-shoot from the two mentioned above, that all interplay in one's definition of moral value. But this shouldn't detract from one's cultural experience, the moral is only a representation of the parts. There are many cultural experiences which define one's "menetic" (extragenetic) predisposition, characterized and modified by its environment. a) Simple geography can be a determinate of one's societal structure and belief systems. b) People all around the world have similar experiences which affirm their culturally imbued practices; whether it be political, artistic, or religious. By similar experiences: I mean there are a set of practices which reenforce the cultural practices and belief systems which are shared (the practices) with other cultures. For example a Christian monk, a Hindu monk, and a Buddhist monk all have similar practices that give them affirming experiences of their cultural/religious beliefs or practices. The point here is that it comes from within and without, and neither explanations (subjective or objective) adequately encompass the full spectrum... so it seems to me at 1:30 AM, heh. Some how, I want to say it's a process and a function. It's only as objective as we are human, and it's only as subjective as you are you and I am me. Edited by hipskipdip on 07/20/07 - 01:03 AM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

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Posted 07/20/07 - 09:12 AM:	#193
wrote: No, but we can recognize how the subject of morality is important and how it achieves it's true value, not some heavily laden Christian philosophy with a categorical imperative or goal, i.e. "God." Mariner wrote: "What is 'it' in this sentence? This 'heavily laden Christian philosophy' is far older than Christianity, by the way." How so? "heavily laden Christian philosophy - with/and- a categorical imperative or goal, i.e. "God." I've come to understand you can't have one without the other. Christian philosphy, like a shoe, doesn't lace up or function without God, and yet the Christian philosophy is the support link or basis for God. So although those are two separate conditions, they're unable to support themselves without the other. We could transform this sentence to say: {(N philosophy) -and- (God)} are necessary for each other, and therefore we have a circular argument. We could also say the same for morality: {(M morality) -and- (God)}. They're required conditions for each other. I think you're, instead, placing the emphasis on inclinations: emotions, desires, and impulses; but if I've understood even impartially, you're misusing the word inclinations to mean something other than emotions, desires, and impulses. I'm going to venture a little. You're looking for something that leads to God's morality correct? But wouldn't the defining value of morality still be in God? Is it possible to have morality without a god giving it a value? Edited by hipskipdip on 07/20/07 - 09:19 AM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

mric
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Posted 07/20/07 - 12:35 PM:	#194
Mariner wrote: I don't know. But this does not affect their ontological status as not-determined, not-random phenomena. Unless you take 'caused' to be synonymous with 'determined' -- but then, you're begging the question. Do 'inclinations' have a sufficient cause, and are their characteristics defined by that cause? If not, are they causa sui? Otherwise, I am completely at sea as to what you mean by caused, non-determined, non-random events. What exactly is the difference between having a sufficient causal chain and being determined? You have completely lost me. Let's imagine that 'caused' and 'determined' are not equivalent, and try your moral position with the word 'caused' instead. "Joe murdered Fred because of his inclinations. [His inclinations were entirely caused by external causes, possibly including God.] Therefore he showed free will and is to blame." Please explain why this is more satisfying as a state of affairs than the use of the word 'determined'. The compatibilist position is not to be caught in this particular dilemma. To show free will, to make free choices, is to be unconstrained by particular types of constraint in that circumstance. It is a contextual, complex concept, and doesn't need to involve any odd new ontological creations such as mystical 'inclinations'. If you choose scrambled rather than fried eggs, the lack of someone threatening you, the absence of prior hypnotic suggestion etc. are sufficient for us to describe the activity as a free choice. The clue is in the word 'free'. It describes an absence (of constraint or compulsion), not the existence of some strange additional causal structure.

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Posted 07/21/07 - 05:50 AM:	#195
hipskipdip wrote: "If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be?" Let's say that your argument is deductively valid. That's fine... I would take issue with the validity of your premises. IF objective morals exist (yet to be established) THEN God (probably) does too. Now, this isn't deductive but inductive as you are venturing an answer from your first premise and thus you have either a weak or strong inductive argument... No, it's still a deductive argument. An inductive argument is collected from observations and generalized into a conclusion. There is no generalization going on here; it's a deductive argument (if objective moral values exist, then…) based on reason and definitions but little (if any) empirical data. A deductive argument's conclusion doesn't have to be a certainty; it can be a probability too (e.g. in certain mathematical problems, where the calculations are essentially deductive arguments). "objective moral values are evidence for God has nothing to do with the existence of a punisher; it has more to do with finding a transcendent source of authority for the commands of objective moral values." What about competing theories with greater explanatory power? (i.e. Natural Selection) I know of no other competing theory that better explains the existence of objective moral values. Natural selection might explain why people believe in moral values, but it does not explain the moral values themselves. A person might believe water evaporates because she reads it in a book. However, the existence of the book does not explain why water evaporates. The explanation for why the belief exists is not necessarily the explanation for why the belief is true. Indeed, natural selection does not even address the question of whether moral values even exist.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

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Posted 07/21/07 - 11:46 AM:	#196
Tisthammerw wrote: "No, it's still a deductive argument." My mistake. wrote: "I know of no other competing theory that better explains the existence of objective moral values." Could this argument be abductive (and also a logical fallacy (affirming the consequent)? Or do you feel that objective morality would necessarily follow? wrote: "Natural selection might explain why people believe in moral values, but it does not explain the moral values themselves." You don't think moral values only take on meaning and explanation within a human context? Let me try and get this, your basic argument is this: IF Objective Morals THEN God. What makes morals objective? I don't understand how they're objective or even subjective for that matter, and how would a transcendent being necessarily follow? I've read your argument, but there's little on how these definition are necessarily so. Edited by hipskipdip on 07/21/07 - 01:49 PM
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

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Posted 07/21/07 - 01:25 PM:	#197
Mariner wrote: "But morality is neither one of those. It goes against the survival of the species in many instances (e.g. celibacy), and it goes against the prevailing culture in almost all instances. To be moral is to be alone. The best example is provided by the OT prophets, but we can always think of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., if we don't want to inject 'religious' thinkers into the discussion." Let me take another crack at this. I want to argue that morals aren't justifiable because they're values and not facts. Morality is purely an aesthetic phenomenon, and so there's no rules on what is right or wrong. That's to say, aesthetic judgements are independent of rules. On the other hand I'm arguing something entirely different: it's another thing to question whether morals can be lawlike generalizations (furnished by psychology or sociology), to which our aesthetic judgement conform. This way we're able to give causal, empirical explanations for our aesthetic preferences. I found in a book by A. C. Grayling 6 reasons why there are an absences of aesthetic rules. Sebastian Gardner, Philosophy 1: a guide through the subject wrote: "(1) the absence of aesthetic generalizations that we can all rationally agree on; (2) the unjustifiability, in cases of aestetic disagreement, of asking another person to relinquish his or her aestetic judgement on the grounds that is conflicts with some aestetic rule; (3) the logical impossibility of translating whatever inductive truths about aesthetic prefereces may exist into aesthetic rules; (4) the irrelevance of rules to the engendering of aesthetic responses, and their consequent epistemological redundancy; (5) the highly circumscribed role of conformity to rules in the creation of works of art; (6) the highly limited application of the notion of consistency in the aestetic sphere. In most of these contexts, comparisons with moral judgments are illuminating. And so they are.
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/21/07 - 04:20 PM:	#198
mric wrote: The problems with the argument are: 1. Morality doesn't need a transcendent source of authority to be objective (your assumption that it does is partially begging the question). Indeed, I do not see how such an authority is sufficient, let alone necessary. You continue to make this claim, even though I have explained repeatedly and specifically why objective morality requires an authority behind it. Please explain why that argument is unsound before you make this claim again. This is not the first time I have made this request, e.g. post #114: Tisthammerw wrote: If objective morality exists it carries with it a transcendent authority. I have justified this premise repeatedly. If you think my justification doesn't work, feel free to attack the reasoning behind it. But you have not done so. You have claimed the conclusion is false but have not addressed the evidence. Please do so. Here it is (again). Objective morality makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave (by definition). In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority (by definition) behind its statements. Authority is “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior.” (See definition of 2a of Merriam-Webster's dictionary.) Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior. Additionally, the authority of morality (however it exists) seems supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. So what is morality's transcendent source of authority? Who or what says how we ought to behave? 2. You have defined "objective" too strongly. Taken as "not subjective from a personal perspective", then society and custom are sufficient to explain morality's objectivity. I don't see how; what you're describing seems like it would lead to cultural relativism. What if cultures disagree on what is morally right? Which one is right? What if a culture thinks slavery is morally okay but a few centuries later it changes its mind (e.g. U.S. history)? Is there no moral progress here? 3. You have not explained how the characteristic of being "a transcendent source of authority" is remotely connected to any of the other properties of a god I have explained repeatedly how we can reason various other aspects of God through the aspects of objective morality. Please (again) address my explanation before claiming it doesn't exist. You can find a recap in post #121. 4. By placing morality's base in a transcendent source you have created a problem in explaining how the content of moral rules is made apparent to humans. The truth of the shape of the Earth is a truth that transcends what people think, feel, or believe. Is this is problem? Does it make epistemological objectivism irrational or incorrect? You could say it is made apparent to humans because of sensory perception, but this relies on the intuition that sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. For morality, this problem would exist regardless of what metaethical theory one might adhere to. In any case it doesn't affect the reasoning of the argument. This thread isn’t about why people possess certain moral beliefs; it’s about whether objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. Actually, it might not be as big of a problem as one might think. There are almost always at least some limitations on killing and theft in every single culture known to humanity. The general ideas are there, even if we fallible humans screw things up sometimes. Self-deception, deception of others, wishful thinking and general misuse of free will sometimes skew our perceptions of morality. 5. Your reliance on intuition is a problem. The difference between the intuition that the external world exists and the intuition that morality is objective is that many people do not share the second intuition Many other people also doubt the external world is real (e.g. solipsists). Does this make belief in an external world any else rational? Probably not. Besides, I don’t think popularity is relevant, especially since the alternatives to ethical objectivism seem either incoherent or just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that’s what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to exterminate the Jewish people is morally right as long as that is what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. I don’t care how big the minority is of people who adhere to any of these metaethical beliefs because of bad intuition (or something else). They’re just not rational. In any case, all of this is beside the point. This thread is isn’t about why people possess certain metaethical beliefs. Please address the reasoning of my arguments, e.g. my explanation as to why objective morality requires a transcendent authority (if you believe it doesn’t) and my reasoning regarding the aspects of God that we can infer from the aspects of objective morality. To the very least, please don’t pretend my arguments for such things don’t exist.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/21/07 - 05:55 PM:	#199
hipskipdip wrote: "I know of no other competing theory that better explains the existence of objective moral values." Could this argument be abductive (and also a logical fallacy (affirming the consequent)? It's an inference to the best explanation. My position is that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. "Natural selection might explain why people believe in moral values, but it does not explain the moral values themselves." You don't think moral values only take on meaning and explanation within a human context? Not entirely, no, because who decides how people ought to behave? Let me try and get this, your basic argument is this: IF Objective Morals THEN God. Slightly more accurately: if objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God. What makes morals objective? I don't understand how they're objective or even subjective for that matter, and how would a transcendent being necessarily follow? I've read your argument, but there's little on how these definition are necessarily so. Hm? What part of the paragraph(s) was unclear to you? One of the purposes of me being here is to refine my argument and find ways to explain it more clearly. I’ll try again. Objective morality makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. In doing so, objective morality somehow possesses authority behind its statements. Authority is “power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior.” Objective ethical statements such as “We should not torture people for fun” do indeed command our behavior. Additionally, the authority of morality (however it exists) seems supreme; it transcends what anyone (e.g. Hitler) thinks about how people ought to behave. All of this raises some questions on morality’s source and metaphysical basis. Given that there are certain commands (ethical ones) that have an authority transcending what humanity says, thinks, and feels; how is this possible? What is morality's transcendent source of authority? If morality is not dependent on what people think, then what fundamental reality says how we ought to behave? Or perhaps it is better to combine the last two questions. If morality is not dependent on what people think, what transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? Theism provides an explanation for all this. Morality’s transcendent source of authority is the heart of God. By definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. So if objective moral values were grounded in the heart of God they would reside in a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe. On this view, it is within God (e.g. his nature and essence of what he is) where objective morality commands our behavior and is how morality has its transcendent authority. But if God is not the metaphysical basis for objective ethics, what is? What transcendent source of authority says how we ought to behave? The best non-theist answer seems to be reality. It is reality that says what ought to be and how people ought to behave. But then we get into the problems I discussed in post post #121.
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Posted 07/21/07 - 06:33 PM:	#200
This is getting off topic, and eventually I may move this to another thread. But for now... Wosret wrote: .... Why would God not create animal predation then if not because the animals were behaving immorally? What did you mean by this statement? .... I would think that it would obvious that I was saying that god would not create agents that would pertake in actions he deemed immoral in the first place. Thus my explanation and example you simply ignored. If so, then you completely ignored my explanation. The idea that animals are agents that are behaving immorally presupposes that they are moral agents, which is not necessarily a true assumption. Tisthammerw wrote: .... One big problem: the "then he is menevolent [sic]" part is a complete non sequitur unless you assume the premise "There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." The argument from evil is exactly how I structured it, and faces the same problem I mentioned earlier. This is not a question. No, it's a statement. But it could be rephrased as a question if you wish. The argument from evil contains the premise, "There is evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." The problem is that this premise is difficult to justify intellectually. How do we know there is no satisfactory explanation for all the evil we see? Perhaps because we don't know of any. But this is simply an argument from ignorance, not real evidence. So how does one justify this premise? Then by all means intellectually justify the second premise (in another thread; this is getting a little off topic). You seem to have assumed it (albeit implicitly) but you haven't justified it. Please, I could no more justify to you that unnecessary killing happens in the world Hold on there. The premise isn't that "There exists evil that is unnecessary" but rather "There exists evil for which no satisfactory explanation exists." There's a big difference. As I said earlier... Evil caused by human beings is highly unnecessary, I think. But that sort of thing is a risk when mankind is given the power to choose its own destiny. You may think it's better not to have humanity possess the ability to choose between good and evil as it does now, but that's for another thread. Huh? So you think evil is necessary for free will and to keep our humanity or don't you? No. However, if we are given the power to choose our own destiny, the ability to choose between good and evil; then the possibility of evil is necessary. That we freely choose evil to come into the world is not necessary at all. The point is “unnecessary evil” is not the same thing as “no satisfactory explanation for evil.” There exists at least some moral evil that the free will theodicy satisfactorily explains—even if such evil does not have necessary existence (people can choose not to do evil). Actually, it's about the argument from morality, i.e. are objective moral values evidence for the existence of God? Which doesn't make any sense if god is immoral, now does it? It seems to me that the moral argument for god just takes this for granted, sounds like question begging to me. Sounds like logic to me. God by definition is morally good. An entity that is immoral wouldn't be God. Saying that God is good is no more question begging then saying hairless men have no hair. Actually, I never said that. Just because there is a satisfactory explanation to permit evil does not imply that the evil is necessary. So you're saying that you believe your own incredibly crazy second premise to be true? Please tell me what this "incredibly crazy second premise" is and I might be able to answer your question. If God exists, should we expect to [understand his plan]? A comprehended God is not God, after all. God's mind is infinite and ours is finite. So if God exists we can't reasonably expect to understand the "why" behind everything--and perhaps we cannot even reasonably expect to understand the why behind most things. Then what's the point with the religions? Bear in mind this forum is about philosophy of religion, not about religion. But one answer to your question is that we can understand some things about God, even if we can't understand all or even most of them. But the fact that if God exists we could not reasonably expect to understand the "why" behind everything (and perhaps most things) makes it that much more difficult to justify the second premise--which you haven't done yet. If the argument is not deductively valid, where does the reasoning break down? And what would morality's transcendent source of authority be? Huh? If this is question begging I don't know what is. Then you don't know what is. Deductively valid means that the conclusion follows form the premises (and deductively invalid is the opposite: non sequitur). In this case the premise is that objective moral values exist, and the conclusion is that objective morality is evidence for the existence of God. I'm saying if the argument is not valid, where does the reasoning break down? You claimed my argument is "littered with non sequiturs" but can you provide even one specific example? If you can, please do so.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

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