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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God

mric
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Posted 06/16/07 - 09:01 AM:	#76
Tisthammerw wrote: Great, but that still doesn't answer the question of how objective moral values are possible. What is the metaphysical basis for objective morality? *What supremely transcendent source of authority says what ought* to be?** Theism provides a straightforward explanation. The best answer for a non-theist would be "reality," but that leads us into the same problem I described earlier (see post #70). Why does a god saying what ought to be, make it what ought to be. What is the connection between the existence of a god and the existence of objective morality? It seems to me that the 'law giver' analogy is deeply misleading. A god could have the power to set laws, communicate them and punish/reward against them. What, in doing that, makes those laws objectively true? Sources of authority saying things doesn't make them true - it is evidence of their truth. Could God have made moral laws otherwise? The fact that the OP cites the evident nature of moral truths is really an indication that he believes they are independent of the existence of God - more like logical truths than ontic ones.

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Posted 06/16/07 - 01:03 PM:	#77
mric wrote: Why does a god saying what ought to be, make it what ought to be. What is the connection between the existence of a god and the existence of objective morality? Because by definition, God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. So if you want objective morality to have a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe, objective morality being grounded in the heart of God is certainly one (and perhaps the only) way to go. Sources of authority saying things doesn't make them true - it is evidence of their truth. What you said would apply to is statements (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4) but what about ought statements? For instance I think my stapler ought to be blue. While I think this is a true statement, its truth is relative. Ethics is another sort of ought-statement, e.g. "You ought not to kill." But how is this objective? Who or what decides what ought to be? Hitler thought he ought to commit genocide, but what makes him wrong? What overrides Hitler’s opinion of what he ought to do? We intuitively recognize there is something in reality that transcends what anyone says or thinks that says such genocides are not the way it ought to be. But what is it? What transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? The fact that the OP cites the evident nature of moral truths is really an indication that he believes they are independent of the existence of God - more like logical truths than ontic ones. What is the "OP"? The problem with morality being like logic is that logic says what is and morality says what ought to be (confer the is-ought problem). So again we have the question: what (transcendent source of authority) says what ought to be? I agree with one thing. Moral truths are (to at least some degree) evident, and one can accept the existence of moral truths without believing in God (an atheist could believe, however mistakenly, that God is not necessary for objective moral values).
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mric
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Posted 06/16/07 - 02:08 PM:	#78
Tisthammerw wrote: Who or what decides what ought to be? Hitler thought he ought to commit genocide, but what makes him wrong? What overrides Hitler’s opinion of what he ought to do? We intuitively recognize there is something in reality that transcends what anyone says or thinks that says such genocides are not the way it ought to be. But what is it? What transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? I don't understand your switch between "what" and "who" here. Beings don't decide what is true, things are true, and beings discover it, or not. Sources of authority could not possibly be the explanation for an "ought" statement being true. You seem to be saying that "You ought to do it because he said so" (or worse, because he thinks so, but hasn't told us) is an acceptable and objective basis for morality if the "he" is a god. That is not remotely obvious. You do have another major problem. If God decreed that Hitler was right, does that make it right? Gods supporting genocide is hardly a novel idea. To be rather more precise, you should perhaps be asking "Hitler thought he ought to commit genocide, but what makes him right or wrong?". Placing morality in the arbitrary state of being externally decided to society (i.e. with God), and with no mechanism to discover it puts us into the odd position of having an objective and fundamentally unknowable ethics. Does that really accord with our instinct? I would suggest that our instinct to recognise morality is strong evidence of the local, social and human nature of morality, rather than it being placed in some external and ineffable being.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/16/07 - 02:56 PM:	#79
mric wrote: Who or what decides what ought to be? Hitler thought he ought to commit genocide, but what makes him wrong? What overrides Hitler’s opinion of what he ought to do? We intuitively recognize there is something in reality that transcends what anyone says or thinks that says such genocides are not the way it ought to be. But what is it? What transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? I don't understand your switch between "what" and "who" here. I was being more general here. Obviously I think the "what" is God, but perhaps you have a different answer. Beings don't decide what is true, things are true, and beings discover it, or not. Sources of authority could not possibly be the explanation for an "ought" statement being true. Then what does? What is it that says what ought to be? You still haven't answered this question. By definition, you are going to require some kind of authority behind morality. By authority I mean "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." Objective moral truths command my behavior; they tell me what I ought to do. So again, what transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do? Where do these moral truths come from? What is the metaphysical basis for objective morality? You seem to be saying that "You ought to do it because he said so" (or worse, because he thinks so, but hasn't told us) is an acceptable and objective basis for morality if the "he" is a god. That is not remotely obvious. By itself, you would be correct. But I have tried to explain this in a little more detail. God by definition is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality. So if objective morality were grounded in the heart of God, that would provide morality with a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe. You do have another major problem. If God decreed that Hitler was right, does that make it right? At first I thought this was a really good argument, but on closer examination it doesn't quite work. Consider this mirror argument: If raping people were a virtue, then raping people is ethical Raping people is not ethical Therefore: virtue ethics is incorrect. Even if virtue ethics is incorrect, the conclusion just does not logically follow. A virtue ethicist would argue that there are no possible circumstances by which raping people would be ethical. Similarly, a theist could argue there are no possible circumstances where God would decree Hitler was right. Why is it that the fallacy of the argument is readily visible here (when applied to virtues) but apparently not so visible when applied to God? One assumption with arguments like these seems to be that if ethics were somehow grounded in God, ethical statements would become arbitrary. But why think this assumption is true? Consider this proposition: perhaps because human persons sometimes make arbitrary decisions, and thus we can conceive a deity doing so as well. But this sort of argument is weak. After all, it is also easy to conceive humans (and deities) making non-arbitrary decisions of what ought to be. And even if we disregard that fact, it is possible (maybe even probable) that if God exists he is not as anthropomorphic as this argument would seem to assume. I would suggest that our instinct to recognise morality is strong evidence of the local, social and human nature of morality In that case, who says what ought to be? Certainly not the individual (e.g. Hitler) or the culture (Nazi Germany). So you're still left with the question at hand: what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be?
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mric
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Posted 06/16/07 - 03:10 PM:	#80
Tisthammerw wrote: Then what does? What is it that says what ought to be? You still haven't answered this question. By definition, you are going to require some kind of authority behind morality. By authority I mean "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." Objective moral truths command my behavior; they tell me what I ought to do. So again, what transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do? Where do these moral truths come from? What is the metaphysical basis for objective morality? I will come back to the rest of the post, but let's just look at this bit. You seem to be confusing the process that causes your moral beliefs with the cause of objective morality. Why do you believe the two are connected? Since people make different moral judgements, you clearly accept that moral beliefs are at least sometimes caused by things other than objective moral truths. Why do you believe that objective moral truths ever cause our moral beliefs? (By the way, what does it mean for a moral truth to be 'objective'?)

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Posted 06/16/07 - 03:39 PM:	#81
mric wrote: I will come back to the rest of the post, but let's just look at this bit. You seem to be confusing the process that causes your moral beliefs with the cause of objective morality. Why do you believe the two are connected? I don't think they are necessarily connected, actually. I was not at all referring to why people believe objective morality exists but how it is possible for objective morality to exist; the metaphysical basis for objective ethics. A moral truth says what we ought to do, so the question stands: if morality is objective, what transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? (By the way, what does it mean for a moral truth to be 'objective'?) Wikipedia provides a good definition of moral objectivism, "the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion."
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swstephe
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Posted 06/16/07 - 07:45 PM:	#82
Tisthammerw wrote: Great, but that still doesn't answer the question of how objective moral values are possible. What is the metaphysical basis for objective morality? What supremely transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? Theism provides a straightforward explanation. The best answer for a non-theist would be "reality," but that leads us into the same problem I described earlier (see post #70). I said "prescribe" because what is normally considered as morality in human affairs seems to be applied predominantly to humans, but wouldn't apply to a deity, (in absence of humans). - Why would an immortal care about killing? - Why would an omnipotent entity care about theft, (or property "ownership"), or restriction of freedoms. - Why would an omniscient entity care about lying? It seems that the vast majority of moral rules apply only to mortal, limited humans, so having it seems more likely that any 'intelligent designer' for morality would be intimately interested in human affairs. If all religions are not in communication with the deity, then the only source for morality is from human sources.
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mric
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Posted 06/17/07 - 12:34 AM:	#83
Tisthammerw wrote: I don't think they are necessarily connected, actually. I was not at all referring to why people believe objective morality exists but how it is possible for objective morality to exist; the metaphysical basis for objective ethics. A moral truth says what we ought to do, so the question stands: if morality is objective, what transcendent source of authority says how people ought to behave? I am not asking whether you believe that objective moral truths or their cause make us believe that morality is objective, rather whether the objective moral truths or their cause make us believe certain things to be moral. By introducing the concept of 'an authority' which 'says' what is morally true you have implied that the creation of moral truth is one of an empowered entity communicating that truth. That seems to be begging the question. I can't think of anything else that is true by virtue of an authority saying it, so why would morality fit that model? How would a God saying something make it true (given that a God could say 1+1=3)? By looking for an authority for morality I believe that you are actually implicitly accepting moral relativism - actions are potentially moral or immoral at different times subject to God's dictate, and there is no rationale for assessing their morality beyond the arbitration of God. Morality then becomes a (hidden) set of dictatorial laws, able to be modified, but without even a framework for enforcement.

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Posted 06/17/07 - 03:41 PM:	#84
swstephe wrote: - Why would an immortal care about killing? - Why would an omnipotent entity care about theft, (or property "ownership"), or restriction of freedoms. - Why would an omniscient entity care about lying? If we're talking about God (and I assume we are) it all follows from who and what God is: the metaphysical basis of ethics. So a better question might be why wouldn't God care about all this? It seems that the vast majority of moral rules apply only to mortal, limited humans So? Suppose I drank a potion that gave me immortality. I would still care about people being murdered. If all religions are not in communication with the deity, then the only source for morality is from human sources. I don't think that logically follows; a deist certainly might disagree with you. One could argue that the general principles of morality are written in the human heart. Nearly all cultures have at least some limitations on killing, violence, and theft. In any case, this is not about why we believe moral values exist but how it's possible for moral values to in fact exist. And if morality came from human sources, we really wouldn't get ethical objectivism. Ethical objectivism says moral truths are not grounded in individuals or cultures. Moral truths transcend humanity; even if the Nazis brainwashed or killed everyone who disagreed with violent anti-Semitism, they would still be ethically wrong.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/17/07 - 04:10 PM:	#85
mric wrote: I am not asking whether you believe that objective moral truths or their cause make us believe that morality is objective, rather whether the objective moral truths or their cause make us believe certain things to be moral. They might, but that is beside the point. I'm arguing that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. By introducing the concept of 'an authority' which 'says' what is morally true you have implied that the creation of moral truth is one of an empowered entity communicating that truth. Technically I'm not. I'm saying objective moral values are grounded in the heart of God. Morality is part of God's nature rather than commands per se. This, of course, does not rule out God communicating moral truths in some fashion. I can't think of anything else that is true by virtue of an authority saying it, so why would morality fit that model? First, let me repeat that morality does not reside in God's commands but in his nature of who and what God is. In any case, why would morality require some sort authority? Pretty much by definition. Ethics is example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave, and objective morality carries with it supreme authority over how people ought to behave. Authority as I said earlier is the "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." So again I ask the question you seem to have avoided, what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? The best non-theist explanation seems to be that reality says what ought to be, but then that leads us to the same problem I mentioned earlier. By looking for an authority for morality I believe that you are actually implicitly accepting moral relativism - actions are potentially moral or immoral at different times subject to God's dictate, and there is no rationale for assessing their morality beyond the arbitration of God. Ethics being grounded in God is no more morally relativistic than utilitarianism or virtue ethics. And who says God wouldn't have some sort of rationale? God might care about the welfare of humanity and that might be his rationale, but you do need some sort of metaphysical basis behind the principle of "one ought to benefit humanity." Otherwise, who or what's to say that a thief is wrong when he puts his own self-interest above others? What transcendent source of authority says benefiting humanity is how people ought to behave? Morality then becomes a (hidden) set of dictatorial laws, able to be modified Why would moral truths be able to be modified? This is often assumed in the thesis of morality being grounded in God but seldom if ever justified (see for instance what I said on this matter in post #79). Edited by Tisthammerw on 06/18/07 - 07:47 PM
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swstephe
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Posted 06/17/07 - 08:52 PM:	#86
Tisthammerw wrote: If we're talking about God (and I assume we are) it all follows from who and what God is: the metaphysical basis of ethics. So a better question might be why wouldn't God care about all this? Imagine a universe where all the inhabitants are immortal. Would it make any sense for those inhabitants to have rules against "killing" when killing would be impossible? There is a strong psychological tendency for humans to assume that non-humans must have similar experiences. A truly immortal entity would not need rules for impossible behavior. Tisthammerw wrote: So? Suppose I drank a potion that gave me immortality. I would still care about people being murdered. You would only care if you had some connection to these mortal humans. This is that psychological tendency again -- to assume that something completely alien must think like a human even though they consist of completely different properties. An immortal metaphysical entity would be so extremely alien to humans, they ought to have no more concern about humans, (and what they do to each other), than humans have toward bacteria. If bacteria had some kind of morality -- it would be more reasonable to assume that they developed it themselves or that they were instructed on morality, (just pretend they are sentient and able to communicate). That's why I say that morality would have to be "proscribed" since an immortal metaphysical entity wouldn't require its own rules about mortal behavior. Since you claim that none of the current religions on the earth are in communication with the metaphysical entity, (God), then all morality could only have arisen from social evolution. On a related note -- lets take the common theological idea that humans have some immortal metaphysical component, (souls or spirits). This would seem to be an idea conduit for moral information -- but it also has the same problem, why should killing having any meaning to an "soul", since there really isn't any death. It seems that killing would only matter to mortals and mortal components, based on human emotions. Tisthammerw wrote: I don't think that logically follows; a deist certainly might disagree with you. One could argue that the general principles of morality are written in the human heart. Nearly all cultures have at least some limitations on killing, violence, and theft. In any case, this is not about why we believe moral values exist but how it's possible for moral values to in fact exist. And if morality came from human sources, we really wouldn't get ethical objectivism. Ethical objectivism says moral truths are not grounded in individuals or cultures. Moral truths transcend humanity; even if the Nazis brainwashed or killed everyone who disagreed with violent anti-Semitism, they would still be ethically wrong. That is where we disagree on the definition. I believe that morality arises from reason and a vested emotional interest. Ethics can be objective because reason, logic and emotional interest can be objectively computed by an outside party.
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Posted 06/17/07 - 09:59 PM:	#87
Original post 1.There is a universal moral law 2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver 3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver Prove that there is a universal moral law. Example The Greeks performed cremation on their dead The Callatians(a tribe of Indians) ate their dead Question where's the universal moral? What we ought to do? Example America have capital punishment Canada do not have capital punishment Question where's the universal moral? What we ought to do? One more question, from animals point of view there is no universal moral law, thus no God?

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Posted 06/19/07 - 05:30 PM:	#88
This my last post in this thread, and it's just a one-sentence suggestion to Tisthammerw: Read "The Science of Good and Evil" by Michael Shermer, and if he doesn't convince you that 'moral argument for god' is nonsense nobody will. Belolw is the link to its review: http://www.nobeliefs.com/Shermer2.htm

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Posted 06/19/07 - 07:24 PM:	#89
There seems to be one crucial question that is often avoided. Ethics is an example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. For instance, “Thou shalt not kill” simply means “one should not kill.” But how is this truth objective? In determining the source and metaphysical basis for objective moral values, the key question becomes what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? The question has often been avoided so far, and is at the crux of the argument. God is the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality transcending all else. So if you want objective morality to have a metaphysical basis of supreme authority in the universe, objective morality being grounded in the heart of God is certainly one (and perhaps the only) way to go. The problem is that without God (or something very much like him) it is difficult to provide a basis for objective moral values to be possible. What other alternative is there to the key question? The best non-theist alternative seems to be that reality says what ought to be, but then this goes back to the problem I talked about in post #70. swstephe wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: If we're talking about God (and I assume we are) it all follows from who and what God is: the metaphysical basis of ethics. So a better question might be why wouldn't God care about all this? Imagine a universe where all the inhabitants are immortal. Would it make any sense for those inhabitants to have rules against "killing" when killing would be impossible? Against those inhabitants, no. But that doesn't have any clear bearing on the issue at hand. Suppose I drank a potion that gave me immortality. I would still care about people being murdered. So? Suppose I drank a potion that gave me immortality. I would still care about people being murdered. You would only care if you had some connection to these mortal humans. Perhaps, but then one could argue that God has a connection to us humans; we are his creation. The Judeo-Christian religions argue that humanity is "made in the image of God." What that exactly means is perhaps unclear, but that would certainly seem to imply some sort of connection (however ineffable). This is that psychological tendency again -- to assume that something completely alien must think like a human even though they consist of completely different properties. I'm not saying God thinks like me or any other human. On the contrary, God and I disagree on a number of things. Nonetheless, none of this prevents God from being the metaphysical basis of objective moral values, and none of this affects the logic of my argument (e.g. in providing a supremely transcendent source of authority for objective moral values). An immortal metaphysical entity would be so extremely alien to humans, they ought to have no more concern about humans, (and what they do to each other), than humans have toward bacteria. Why think this is true? Humans are intelligent and self-aware, whereas bacteria are not. Humans understand there is right and wrong, bacteria do not. Of course, an immortal entity cannot relate to mortality and ordinarily might not fully understand killing. But this wouldn’t be the case for an omniscient entity, who would know it better than we do ourselves (and perhaps this “connection” is more than any fellow human could hope to have). So it's just not clear that your reasoning would apply to God. Since you claim that none of the current religions on the earth are in communication with the metaphysical entity, (God), then all morality could only have arisen from social evolution. There's another option: God communicates indirectly. There is something called a conscience, after all. And while on the surface there appears to be much variation in cultural morality, the general principles seem constant even if we misapply them. For instance, in virtually all cultures there are at least some limitations on theft and violence. On a related note -- lets take the common theological idea that humans have some immortal metaphysical component, (souls or spirits). This would seem to be an idea conduit for moral information -- but it also has the same problem, why should killing having any meaning to an "soul", since there really isn't any death. On that we can perhaps only speculate, but there are number of possibilities. Perhaps because we humans are "meant" in some way to live on Earth and interact in ways that are not available in the afterlife. I believe that morality arises from reason and a vested emotional interest. It's not clear that this would lead to ethical objectivism though. Hitler had no emotional interest in the Jews. So was he right to slay them all? Ethics can be objective because reason, logic and emotional interest can be objectively computed by an outside party. What if everyone was emotionless? Would objective moral values cease to exist? And even if we disregard all I said above, there is still the question that seems unanswered. Suppose the principle "we ought to care for those we have an emotional interest in" is true. What transcendent source of authority says we ought to do this? We are still back at the original problem again. The is-ought problem remains, and so does my key question at the beginning of this post. Edited by Tisthammerw on 06/19/07 - 07:44 PM
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Posted 06/19/07 - 07:42 PM:	#90
pedja777 wrote: This my last post in this thread, and it's just a one-sentence suggestion to Tisthammerw: Read "The Science of Good and Evil" by Michael Shermer, and if he doesn't convince you that 'moral argument for god' is nonsense nobody will. Belolw is the link to its review: http://www.nobeliefs.com/Shermer2.htm I have an unfortunate backlog of books so there's a good chance I won't read it. A couple of points worth considering from the book review however: In answer to the theist's belief that without religion, one cannot have morality, Shermer answers that humans had morality long before religion Maybe so, but you're still going to need some metaphysical basis for objective moral values. What is it? Religion may not the basis, but perhaps the existence of God is (it is logically possible for God to exist and religions to not exist). The argument isn't that religion is necessary to do good deeds. I don't think it is. Nor is the claim that atheists can't recognize the existence of objective moral values. I think they can. From the book (apparently): The happiness principle states that it is a higher moral principle to always seek happiness with someone else's happiness in mind, and never seek happiness when it leads to someone else's unhappiness. So it ought to be that we seek happiness for all. That's great, but there's still the largely unanswered question of what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? What transcendent source of authority says I ought to follow the happiness principle? Browbeating religion doesn't answer this question, neither does brain chemistry or anthropology.
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mric
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Posted 06/19/07 - 11:04 PM:	#91
Tisthammerw wrote: There seems to be one crucial question that is often avoided. Ethics is an example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. For instance, “Thou shalt not kill” simply means “one should not kill.” But how is this truth objective? In determining the source and metaphysical basis for objective moral values, the key question becomes what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? I repeat my point, I don't understand how a "transcendant source of authority" saying something makes it good. Let us work with a possible situation - there is a God who "grounded in his heart" has the Aztec people as his preferred group of humans, and he "says" that they are obliged to conquer others, sacrifice them on altars and maintain a harsh system of slavery. You appear to be saying that it is a matter of logical necessity that if Quetzlcoatl exists and says that human sacrifice is right, then it is right. This appears to be confusing an order or instruction with moral rectitude. I can see how a God can have rules, might communicate those rules, can punish or reward based on those rules, but I can't see how any of these confers absolute moral rightness. If I discovered that Quetzlcoatl existed, and I was an irrelevance to him (not being Aztec), I am not convinced that I would accept the moral rightness of my subjugation and sacrifice, perhaps followed by eternal non-existence. I am glad to hear that you would.

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Posted 06/19/07 - 11:59 PM:	#92
Tisthammerw wrote: There seems to be one crucial question that is often avoided. Ethics is an example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. For instance, “Thou shalt not kill” simply means “one should not kill.” But how is this truth objective? In determining the source and metaphysical basis for objective moral values, the key question becomes what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? In order to show a metaphysical source, you need to show a metaphysical interface. I already brought up the communication between the transcedent source and humanity through religious revelation, and how its variability shows that no such communication exists. It is your turn to show how metaphysical can communicate to physical, (the "written on the heart" thing), but I'll point to that in the end. Tisthammerw wrote: Against those inhabitants, no. But that doesn't have any clear bearing on the issue at hand. Suppose I drank a potion that gave me immortality. I would still care about people being murdered. It is difficult to project yourself into the position of an immortal. It is an argument to emotion. I suspect that if it were real, the results might be different than what a human might naturally think. Consider that you might be considered to be guilty of virtual murder of everyone you do not share the potion with -- since they will die, slowly of course, as a direct result of your inaction. In that sense, all immortal beings are immoral for allowing death of mortals when it is possible to avoid that, (but that gets into the problem of evil). If a transcendent immortal with the ability to prevent evil exists, and doesn't prevent evil, then they are immoral by our standards -- if they are our authority, then why isn't what we consider "moral" consistent? Tisthammerw wrote: Perhaps, but then one could argue that God has a connection to us humans; we are his creation. The Judeo-Christian religions argue that humanity is "made in the image of God." What that exactly means is perhaps unclear, but that would certainly seem to imply some sort of connection (however ineffable). I'm avoiding current theology because I think it ends up being internally inconsistent. Killing true believers is justified since it transports them into a better existence. Believers ought to steal from unbelievers since the only ownership of property possible is to their deity -- and it is all temporary anyway. Tisthammerw wrote: I'm not saying God thinks like me or any other human. On the contrary, God and I disagree on a number of things. Nonetheless, none of this prevents God from being the metaphysical basis of objective moral values, and none of this affects the logic of my argument (e.g. in providing a supremely transcendent source of authority for objective moral values). It is your task to show that God is the only possible authority, and how that authority transmits morality to you. If there is a murder scene, and there are two suspects, you can't prove one person is guilty unless you can completely discount the other. The other suspect in this situation, (objective morality), is human psychology and social evolution. Tisthammerw wrote: Why think this is true? Humans are intelligent and self-aware, whereas bacteria are not. Humans understand there is right and wrong, bacteria do not. Of course, an immortal entity cannot relate to mortality and ordinarily might not fully understand killing. But this wouldn’t be the case for an omniscient entity, who would know it better than we do ourselves (and perhaps this “connection” is more than any fellow human could hope to have). So it's just not clear that your reasoning would apply to God. People form emotional attachments to smart animals -- even ones who are not reliably self-aware. I'm saying that a transcendent metaphysical entity would have so little in common with our physical forms to really care what our physical forms do to each other. A metaphysical entity should only be concerned with metaphysical morality. Killing and stealing would be virtually irrelevant. Tisthammerw wrote: There's another option: God communicates indirectly. There is something called a conscience, after all. And while on the surface there appears to be much variation in cultural morality, the general principles seem constant even if we misapply them. For instance, in virtually all cultures there are at least some limitations on theft and violence. Consciousness gets suspicious. How do we tell the difference between thoughts that originate from us and thoughts that originate from outside us? Emotional concern over living and property is something we share with animals without consciousness, so the evidence points at it arising from the inner brains. But to differentiate conscious brains from animal brains, you might want to look at the ventromedial prefrontal cortex -- people who have brain injury in this area tend to inhibit their ability to make "moral" decisions. This area contains the connection between emotional attachements and decision making (modelling consequences of decisions and rating a projected emotional relation). For example, there was a recent study which asked the question -- enemy soldiers are looking for you and a group of people, a child is crying and the crying will eventually attract the attention of the enemy soldiers, probably resulting in everyone's death. Is it moral to kill the child in order to save everyone else's life? It is difficult for normal people to answer, (the emotional resistance to killing a child), but much easier for someone with damage to the prefrontal cortex who can clearly see the logic of sacrificing one life to save many. Tisthammerw wrote: It's not clear that this would lead to ethical objectivism though. Hitler had no emotional interest in the Jews. So was he right to slay them all? Hitler, or at least Germany, was emotionally motivated by nationalism, economy and the perception that Jews, homosexuals and communists were a threat (a strong negative emotional attachment), to those things, due to misinformation and propaganda. There were a lot of people who thought they were doing the right thing -- just like there are people today that allow immoral acts, thinking they are doing the right thing, without analyzing whether they are being manipulated through misinformation and exploited emotional attachments. Every "terrorist" thinks they are doing the right thing, from the information they received. But all these instances are pointing toward relative morality due to differing levels of correct information and detachment. Tisthammerw wrote: What if everyone was emotionless? Would objective moral values cease to exist? I think so. Reason can give no motivation to do anything. It can only direct sequences and relationships between objects to reach a conclusion, and the consequences would all be weighed equally. Tisthammerw wrote: And even if we disregard all I said above, there is still the question that seems unanswered. Suppose the principle "we ought to care for those we have an emotional interest in" is true. What transcendent source of authority says we ought to do this? We are still back at the original problem again. The is-ought problem remains, and so does my key question at the beginning of this post. My argument is that it is reason and emotions of the normal human mind, working alone, which dictates what each individual "ought" to do. You need to provide evidence of a "second gunman". I propose the following criteria: 1) show the communication from the source of authority to the resulting morality 2) show an instance of someone lacking the source of authority that significantly changes their ability to moralize. I've shown (1) by claiming that emotions and reason can result in morality, (especially incorrect morality). I've shown (2) that the destruction of a region of the brain that connects regions heavily used by emotion and reason will result in a lack of what we consider normal moral decision. I am also saying that this emotional attachment to a particular set of actions is partially shaped from society, culture and personal experiences and partially from instincts (similar to animal behavior). Some links: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somatic_markers_hypo... http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~mnkylab/publications/...
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Posted 06/20/07 - 05:40 PM:

#93

mric wrote:

I repeat my point, I don't understand how a "transcendant source of authority" saying something makes it good.

First, let me repeat my position that morality does not come from God's commands but God's nature. Second, you are going to require some kind of authority behind objective morality by definition. By authority I mean "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." Objective moral truths command my behavior; they tell me what I ought to do. So again, what transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do?

Let us work with a possible situation - there is a God who "grounded in his heart" has the Aztec people as his preferred group of humans, and he "says" that they are obliged to conquer others, sacrifice them on altars and maintain a harsh system of slavery. You appear to be saying that it is a matter of logical necessity that if Quetzlcoatl exists and says that human sacrifice is right, then it is right.

Remember we’re not taking about any old god but the God: the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality.

And if you'll recall I have already dealt with this argument before (or at least one similar to it) and you haven't responded to my rebuttal. For this argument, here is my rebuttal in a nutshell: you're argument assumes that such a scenario is possible. At first this might seem like a reasonable assumption, but let's look at it closer. The argument you're proposing sounds a bit like

It is possible for God to command human sacrifice, and if he did human sacrifice would be ethical.
Human sacrifice cannot possibly be ethical.
Therefore: God cannot be the metaphysical basis for morality.

But notice you can apply the same sort of reasoning with virtue ethics:

It is possible for raping people to be a virtue, and if it were raping people would be ethical.
Raping people cannot possibly be ethical.
Therefore: virtue ethics is incorrect.

A virtue ethicist would immediately deny the first premise. If premise #2 is true, why on Earth should we believe that premise #1 is true? The same question holds for the argument against morality being grounded in God, and such a question is usually left unanswered in these sorts of arguments. One assumption with arguments like these seems to be that if ethics were somehow grounded in God, ethical statements would become arbitrary.

But why think this assumption is true? Consider this proposition: perhaps because human persons sometimes make arbitrary decisions, and thus we can conceive a deity doing so as well. But this sort of argument is weak. After all, it is also easy to conceive humans (and deities) making non-arbitrary decisions of what ought to be. And even if we disregard that fact, it is possible (maybe even probable) that if God exists he is not as anthropomorphic as this argument would seem to assume.

Given these considerations, why else think it is possible God to command human sacrifice? Perhaps because it is logically possible for God to command human sacrifice. God commanding human sacrifice does not violate any laws of logic (e.g. it does not lead to a self-contradiction). But then again, human sacrifice being a virtue does not violate any logical laws either. This is because pure logic simply doesn’t have anything to say about what ought to be, only about what is (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4). And just because something is logically possible does not mean it is metaphysically possible (i.e. that it could happen in some possible world). Both the theist and the virtue ethicist could say that the first premise is metaphysically impossible. In any case, trying to say that both premises #1 and #2 are true leads into serious problems of justification.

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Posted 06/20/07 - 07:05 PM:	#94
In the interests of space I'll try to trim down to the main points. If there are any specific questions you'd like answered, feel free to say so. swstephe wrote: There seems to be one crucial question that is often avoided. Ethics is an example of something that says what ought to be. Specifically, it makes certain commands and statements of how people ought to behave. For instance, “Thou shalt not kill” simply means “one should not kill.” But how is this truth objective? In determining the source and metaphysical basis for objective moral values, the key question becomes what transcendent source of authority says what ought to be? In order to show a metaphysical source, you need to show a metaphysical interface. I already brought up the communication between the transcedent source and humanity through religious revelation How objective morality exists is independent of how it is communicated. There are a number of possibilities on how this could be done. If morality can be reached through reason applied to vested emotional interest, then God could give us such things to figure it out. In any case, for sake of argument suppose knowing what moral truths are is metaphysically impossible (including this example I described above). If objective morality is real, you are still going to require some transcendent source of authority behind statements of how people ought to behave. There would still have to be some answer to the question I gave. I'm not saying God thinks like me or any other human. On the contrary, God and I disagree on a number of things. Nonetheless, none of this prevents God from being the metaphysical basis of objective moral values, and none of this affects the logic of my argument (e.g. in providing a supremely transcendent source of authority for objective moral values). It is your task to show that God is the only possible authority Actually, it is only my task to show that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. In any case, I've given an argument that morality requires some type of God. You haven't really addressed some very crucial parts of that argument (e.g. providing an alternate answer to the question at hand). Now let's examine your proposed metaphysical basis: I believe that morality arises from reason and a vested emotional interest. This seems to have problems, which I replied with that remark about Hitler (which we'll get to very briefly). It's not clear that this would lead to ethical objectivism though. Hitler had no emotional interest in the Jews. So was he right to slay them all? Hitler, or at least Germany, was emotionally motivated by nationalism, economy and the perception that Jews, homosexuals and communists were a threat (a strong negative emotional attachment), to those things, due to misinformation and propaganda. All of that is true, but it doesn't answer the question. If morality is grounded in "reason and a vested emotional interest" what happens in situations like these when there is no vested emotional interest in what seems to be a moral agent? What becomes the grounds for morality then? Or would the Holocaust become morally right in such a culture? What if everyone was emotionless? Would objective moral values cease to exist? I think so. Then please keep in mind that your position is not moral objectivism. Moral objectivism says that moral truths are independent of human opinions, feelings and beliefs (confer this source for instance). Incidentally, would it be morally right for a sociopath who feels no relevant emotion whatsoever to commit murder? I propose the following criteria: 1) show the communication from the source of authority to the resulting morality 2) show an instance of someone lacking the source of authority that significantly changes their ability to moralize. I've shown (1) by claiming that emotions and reason can result in morality, (especially incorrect morality). We should bear in mind the genetic fallacy. Similarly, just because a person believes a truth because of X does not mean that X is the metaphysical basis of the belief's veracity. For example, suppose a person reads a book that tells her the Earth is round. Nonetheless, reading the book does not cause the Earth to be round, even if not reading it means the objective truth of the Earth's shape is not communicated to her. The metaphysical basis for this objective truth is something entirely different from her book.. I've shown (2) that the destruction of a region of the brain that connects regions heavily used by emotion and reason will result in a lack of what we consider normal moral decision. A person in a coma will have a complete lack of reasoning to know the Earth is round. Nonetheless, that does not imply that this truth is dependent on the human brain. In short, it's not at all clear that the metaphysical basis for an objective truth must meet your two criteria. Some links: I suppose I'll provide one of my own then. The Argument from Morality: objective moral values as evidence for the existence of God
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Posted 06/20/07 - 11:04 PM:	#95
Tisthammerw wrote: First, let me repeat my position that morality does not come from God's commands but God's nature. Second, you are going to require some kind of authority behind objective morality by definition. By authority I mean "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." Objective moral truths command my behavior; they tell me what I ought to do. So again, what transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do? I disagree with your definition. I do not accept that 'an authority' is either sufficient or necessary to make something morally true or objective. Morality is not based on power to influence or command. Please explain why you believe it is - this seems to be a confusion between legal and ethical. I am afraid repeating this assertion each time does not make it any more true. Tisthammerw wrote: Remember we’re not taking about any old god but the God: the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality. And if you'll recall I have already dealt with this argument before (or at least one similar to it) and you haven't responded to my rebuttal. For this argument, here is my rebuttal in a nutshell: you're argument assumes that such a scenario is possible. At first this might seem like a reasonable assumption, but let's look at it closer. The argument you're proposing sounds a bit like It is possible for God to command human sacrifice, and if he did human sacrifice would be ethical. Human sacrifice cannot possibly be ethical. Therefore: God cannot be the metaphysical basis for morality. But notice you can apply the same sort of reasoning with virtue ethics: It is possible for raping people to be a virtue, and if it were raping people would be ethical. Raping people cannot possibly be ethical. Therefore: virtue ethics is incorrect. A virtue ethicist would immediately deny the first premise. If premise #2 is true, why on Earth should we believe that premise #1 is true? The same question holds for the argument against morality being grounded in God, and such a question is usually left unanswered in these sorts of arguments. One assumption with arguments like these seems to be that if ethics were somehow grounded in God, ethical statements would become arbitrary. But why think this assumption is true? Consider this proposition: perhaps because human persons sometimes make arbitrary decisions, and thus we can conceive a deity doing so as well. But this sort of argument is weak. After all, it is also easy to conceive humans (and deities) making non-arbitrary decisions of what ought to be. And even if we disregard that fact, it is possible (maybe even probable) that if God exists he is not as anthropomorphic as this argument would seem to assume. Given these considerations, why else think it is possible God to command human sacrifice? Perhaps because it is logically possible for God to command human sacrifice. God commanding human sacrifice does not violate any laws of logic (e.g. it does not lead to a self-contradiction). But then again, human sacrifice being a virtue does not violate any logical laws either. This is because pure logic simply doesn’t have anything to say about what ought to be, only about what is (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4). And just because something is logically possible does not mean it is metaphysically possible (i.e. that it could happen in some possible world). Both the theist and the virtue ethicist could say that the first premise is metaphysically impossible. In any case, trying to say that both premises #1 and #2 are true leads into serious problems of justification. So I can summarise your argument as saying that you have an insight into what is morally possible for God - i.e. some external, objective, non-God based mechanism for assessing morality, and this allows you to identify what moral laws are metaphysically possible. This is not from God's revelation (or you would be in a circular argument), and so you are claiming there is an atheistic objective moral base. Hmm, seems like that contradicts the point of this thread. By the way, there is nothing unusual in a religion claiming there is a preferred race (or species) with special rights.

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Posted 06/21/07 - 05:56 AM:	#96
Tisthammerw wrote: But notice you can apply the same sort of reasoning with virtue ethics: It is possible for raping people to be a virtue, and if it were raping people would be ethical. Raping people cannot possibly be ethical. Therefore: virtue ethics is incorrect. These are non sequitor premises. It takes the format of 1) If B then A 2) A is false 3) So B is falss. Which doesn't follow.
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Posted 06/22/07 - 11:27 PM:	#97
So, let's summarise. First there is the decision to believe in objective moral standards. Doing so is the premise of this thread. You can believe in them because you believe God has defined them, but that wouldn't mean that they provide any evidence for the existence of God - the argument would be circular. Or you can believe in them for some other reason (which would need to be differentiated from the reasons to believe that morality is socially or personally based, and so would exclude observations of partial moral consistency among people or societies). If you believe in objective morality because there is a philosophical way of showing that morality is objective without begging the question of god, then the existence of objective morality does not constitute evidence of the existence of god. If you believe in objective morality because 'you just do', then don't expect anyone to find an argument based on this hunch persuasive. Are there any other options?

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Posted 06/23/07 - 08:27 AM:	#98
mric wrote: First, let me repeat my position that morality does not come from God's commands but God's nature. Second, you are going to require some kind of authority behind objective morality by definition. By authority I mean "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." Objective moral truths command my behavior; they tell me what I ought to do. So again, what transcendent source of authority says what people ought to do? I disagree with your definition. Which definition? Authority? If so, please bear in mind I got that definition from the dictionary (definition 2a). Authority is indeed the "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." I do not accept that 'an authority' is either sufficient or necessary to make something morally true or objective. Morality is not based on power to influence or command. But is it not the case that morality does have the power to command behavior? Does not morality say how we should behave? It seems clear that objective morality does have supreme authority behind it. For one thing, moral objectivism says that ethical truths are independent of human thinking. Second, ethical statements as "we should not torture people for fun" do indeed command our behavior. The question is, how does morality contain its authority behind these statements? What is the metaphysical basis of ethics? Ethics being grounded in the heart of God explains why objective morality has this transcendent authority above human minds. In contrast, atheism doesn't much offer us in the way of providing a basis for objective morality to be possible. So I can summarise your argument as saying that you have an insight into what is morally possible for God - i.e. some external, objective, non-God based mechanism for assessing morality Not at all. I'm saying that if human sacrifice cannot possibly be ethical, then God (the basis of ethics) cannot command human sacrifice. I don't know that my mechanism for assessing morality wasn't given by God. On the contrary, I think God is ultimately responsible for my knowledge that human sacrifice is morally wrong (I believe he is the reason my conscience exists). By the way, there is nothing unusual in a religion claiming there is a preferred race (or species) with special rights. I agree, but we're not talking about religion here. We're talking about God. (There is a difference between X and what people believe about X). You can believe in them [objective moral values] because you believe God has defined them, Eh, sort of. I do not believe in divine command theory. However, I do believe God is the basis of objective morality. but that wouldn't mean that they provide any evidence for the existence of God -the argument would be circular. If I argued my point as you described (God defines morality, therefore God is the basis of morality) then yes my argument would be circular. However, I did not make the argument you described. I justified my assertion "God is the best explanation for objective moral values" using an entirely different argument. Are there any other options? Absolutely, and I have provided some in this thread. See this post for instance (post #70). I’ve explained why it is true by definition that objective morality carries with it supreme authority behind it. So how does morality contain this authority? What is the metaphysical basis of objective moral values?
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Posted 06/23/07 - 08:36 AM:	#99
Wosret wrote: It takes the format of 1) If B then A 2) A is false 3) So B is falss. Which doesn't follow. Actually it does. The structure of what you described is modus tollens, a valid inferential form (see here).
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Posted 06/23/07 - 09:42 AM:	#100
Tisthammerw wrote: Actually it does. The structure of what you described is modus tollens, a valid inferential form (see here). That is clearly not the format I described. If A then B Not B Then not A Is clearly not the same as I'll give some examples A Modus tellen would be. If I'm in tokyo, then I'm in japan I'm not in japan Then I'm not in tokyo However what I said didn't follow was. If I'm in tokyo, then I'm in in japan I'm not in tokyo there for, I'm not in japan.
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