Moral Argument for God: Philosophy Forums

Philosophy Forums » Philosophy of Religion » Moral Argument for God » Moral Argument for God

Moral Argument for God

Page: First 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Last

Moral Argument for God

Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 26
Total Posts: 589

Posted 09/20/07 - 07:12 AM:	#351
Tist wrote: Anything that exists is based in existence, else it wouldn't exist. Thus, if objective morality exists, it has some basis in existence. (I should point out that I'm not here to argue whether objective morality exists; rather I'm saying that if it does it is evidence for the existence of God.) But this seems a direct contradiction of what you said earlier: Tist wrote: What is true for the whole is not necessarily true for its components however (confer the fallacy of division). An airplane has the ability to fly, but that does not entail that an individual component can fly by itself (say, a wing without its engine). A pantheist could make the same sort of argument here. Remember that a pantheistic God need not be omnipotent. So while existence may say X should not happen, that need not imply that X won't happen, and it need not imply that some component of the universe won't do so. Existence being the supreme metaphysical reality does not actually entail that everything happening within it it is supposed to happen. So if its possible that morality can exist without having any relation to existence itself, just as an immoral action can exist without having any relation to existence itself, then it is not a necessary truth that "if morality exists, then god must exist." Because afterall, "Existence being the supreme metaphysical reality does not actually entail that everything appening within it is supposed to happen. Great, but that doesn't answer my question. According to standard dictionary definitions, physics studies "matter and energy and their interactions." Does physics indeed study and deal with the physical world as dictionaries and science textbooks suggest? I'm not denying science uses empirical data. However, is it not the purpose of assaying such data to study the physical world? Yes, but the question is, "Is the physical world the real world?" I don't need to answer this question. I can hold my position without any metaphysical claims. If you're question is how we distinguish real knowledge from fake knowledge, we must use logic and reason. But logic and reason empirically don't work to get around things like "our perceptions deceive us." Perhaps it is an illusion that morality exists. Perhaps we say morality exists because we think about it. Essentially, there is no epistemological basis for 'morality as brute fact'. Maybe it is my own inability to fathom logic and reason as a means to know morality that prevents me from seeing this. Is it possible for me to reason without any sensory input? I wouldn't know, I've never not had it. Apart from pure logic and mathematics, we typically can't get ironclad proofs and can't be certain we have properly justified true beliefs. There are certain principles of rationality we go by to obtain knowledge as best we can (e.g. inference to the best explanation). Nonetheless, while such beliefs of reality may be rational to believe (and others irrational), we cannot strictly prove them. So then we can't be certain that either morality exists or that god exists, or that if god exists then morality exists, or that if morality exists then god exists. Great. What a useful discussion. Perhaps, but it would not be physics. You would not be studying or dealing with physical reality at all (which is what physics purports to do). Thus, the branch of science called physics would still be a sham. Actually, you would still being with physical reality, but our conception of what 'reality' is would be wrong. All the physics formulas, laws and theorems would still be true in the "physical" world, its just that the "physical" world would only be the one that we observe, and not the core of reality. Sham? Perhaps to some people. But art is art no matter how its made.

TMB
Assistant Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: May 14, 2007
Total Topics: 21
Total Posts: 296

Posted 09/21/07 - 01:40 AM:	#352
Hi KK, you said, I have to agree with TMB. That "symbolic logic" version of the argument was seriously lacking. No attempt was made to fix it other than claims like, "I've given my argument for that elsewhere." That's a poor reason for leaving something out of a symbolization. Using symbolic logic is certainly not my forte, but the efforts to do so by Tist almost convinced me that he must be a hoax poster, just seeing how long he can keep us strung along trying to have a serious discussion. However I stay in the debate because it is also possible for perceptions to be formed based upon the outcomes you seek. It looks like an a priori position of either God or OM or both, is driving the way the argument has been built. Anything that threatens this needs to be rationalised to return to the original intention. Perspectives like this fascinate me, and are often a good basis to validate reality, however, I am losing interest in covering the same twists and turns ad infinitum. Lets see how Tist avoids this iteration. (I can hardly wait).

Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 903

Posted 09/23/07 - 02:29 PM:	#353
It looks like we'll have to review the issue again, this time in more detail. TMB wrote: The first one is that you have returned to a position that we had different definitions around the symbolic logic, when in fact the process you applied to get there was flawed. It was not the issue with definitions. Please elucidate. The process I applied to "get there" (I assume you're referring to the veracity of my premise of morality commanding behavior) was by definitions. Morality says how we ought to behave, by definition. Morality commands our behavior, by definition. The only way to avoid that conclusion is to use a different definition of "command" than I was using it. You seemed to do so when you said, "I agree that OM defines how we ought to be behave, but this is the not the same as commanding behavior." As I said in post #296, Tisthammerw (in post #296) wrote: For instance, you said "I agree that OM defines how we ought to be behave, but this is the not the same as commanding behavior." If OM says how we ought to behave, then it commands our behavior by definition. "Thou shalt not kill" is a command, regardless if anyone hears it. But if you think otherwise, perhaps we are using different definitions. For me, morality saying how we ought to behave (e.g. "thou shalt not kill") is an instance of a command. To you that was apparently not the case (and thus you seemed to use a different definition). Morality "commands" in the sense that is required for it to have "authority." This was all to justify my premise that if morality exists it has authority. Now I would like to ask you something. In post #242 you have very specifically stated that "I agree with you that morality does have authority." How would you justify the assertion that morality has authority apart from it commanding our behavior? Let's take a look at your objection again: It attempts to command, but it does not and might not succeed. If you refer to your definition of authority the implication is that people do follow the dictates of morality, when clearly many do not, and even among those that do, definitions of moral behavior varies. Notice your definition here (which you incorrectly ascribed to me). Your "definition of authority [has] the implication...that people do follow the dictates of morality, when clearly many do not" and my definition implies no such thing. OM may say how we ought to behave, but that does not imply that people will follow such orders. And just because "many" do not follow moral dictates, this doesn't imply morality is a complete failure, because it is also the case that "many" do follow the dictates of morality. I had two points to the above quoted material: (1) it is not at all clear that morality does not succeed (to at least some degree); there are some generally agreed upon moral principles shared by nearly all cultures. (2) Just because people do not listen or are not even aware of a commanding authority does not mean the authority does not exist (confer my example of the person ignorant of speeding being illegal; he was still under the law's authority).
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 903

Posted 09/23/07 - 02:39 PM:	#354
Kwalish Kid wrote: I have to agree with TMB. That "symbolic logic" version of the argument was seriously lacking. No attempt was made to fix it other than claims like, "I've given my argument for that elsewhere." That's a poor reason for leaving something out of a symbolization. I might agree with that statement unless the individual in question gave very specific post numbers where the justification could be found, and the individual did so because he has repeated those points several times already and did not wish to repeat himself again. Can you tell me why this constitutes a "poor reason"? At what point does it become legitimate for one to refer to previous specific posts for points (as the justification behind a given claim) already made? The symbolic logic post you speak of (post #287) had this material: Tisthammerw (in post #287) wrote: The sixth premise effectively says that "reality (in some general sense) says how we ought to behave" is the only plausible alternative to having objective morality grounded in God. As I explained in post #239 however, this seems to point to God anyway. Justification for premises two through six can be found in post #239 . Justification for the first premise is for another thread, but some reductio ad absurdums justifying that premise can be found near the end of post #221. It's not long so I'll just quote it here. I start with objective morality because for many people (albeit not all) this is an agreed upon starting point. I think most people (albeit not all) believe in moral objectivism. That, and the alternatives seem either incoherent or just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says that being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to wipe out Jewish people is morally right as long as that's what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 903

Posted 09/23/07 - 03:16 PM:	#355
Buddahchuck wrote: What is true for the whole is not necessarily true for its components however (confer the fallacy of division). An airplane has the ability to fly, but that does not entail that an individual component can fly by itself (say, a wing without its engine). A pantheist could make the same sort of argument here. Remember that a pantheistic God need not be omnipotent. So while existence may say X should not happen, that need not imply that X won't happen, and it need not imply that some component of the universe won't do so. Existence being the supreme metaphysical reality does not actually entail that everything happening within it it is supposed to happen. So if its possible that morality can exist without having any relation to existence itself Ah, but I never said that, though I can understand your confusion. Existence normally says what is, not what ought to be. According to the brute fact explanation, the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself (as opposed to a person or culture). Yet morality prescribes our behavior. So existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication. As the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality, existence prescribes our behavior with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). Nonetheless, just because existence says how we ought to behave does not necessarily mean that we will behave that way. Reminder: I am simply describing the brute fact position; I of course believe the metaphysical basis of objective morality is God. However, objective morality as a brute fact inevitably leads to pantheism, which as I described in post #329 this eventually points to God anyway. Note also that I'm not saying that objective moral values constitutes an ironclad 100% proof of God's existence. I am however saying that if objective moral values exist they constitute evidence for God's existence. Great, but that doesn't answer my question. According to standard dictionary definitions, physics studies "matter and energy and their interactions." Does physics indeed study and deal with the physical world as dictionaries and science textbooks suggest? I'm not denying science uses empirical data. However, is it not the purpose of assaying such data to study the physical world? Yes, but the question is, "Is the physical world the real world?" I don't need to answer this question. Perhaps you don't, but my point is that branches of science like physics do assume that the physical world is real. If they don't, something like physics is a sham (for it purports to study the physical world, by definition). Perhaps, but it would not be physics. You would not be studying or dealing with physical reality at all (which is what physics purports to do). Thus, the branch of science called physics would still be a sham. Actually, you would still being with physical reality, but our conception of what 'reality' is would be wrong. Er, perhaps we should review the quote in context of previous remarks. You: For if these truths were knowable they would not be metaphysics, they would just be physics. Me: Would it? Do you, for instance, claim to know that the physical world is real? If so, then you claim to know a metaphysical truth (namely, the rejection of idealism). You: First, I do not claim to know the physical world is real. For me, such a consideration is useless as such knowledge affects nothing of how I interact with the world. Additionally, such knowledge is epistemologically unobtainable. Me: Then so is scientific knowledge. Does not science study the physical world and its workings? Is not physics, for instance, "a science that deals with matter and energy and their interactions"? Wouldn't that by definition presuppose that the physical world is real? You: It could, but not if you are taking the position that metaphysical truths are unknowable. If we are discussing matter and energy and their interactions, we are only discussing the ones about which we observe or hypothesize. Me: But if matter does not exist, we are not observing it or studying it at all and physics is a sham. You: Well, not necessarily. I could describe a scenario in which observe something but it is not the core of reality, but I perceive it as such. Me: Perhaps, but it would not be physics. You would not be studying or dealing with physical reality at all (which is what physics purports to do). Thus, the branch of science called physics would still be a sham. For physics to be "knowable" it would have to assume the metaphysical position of the physical world being real. Otherwise it's a sham. That's what I've been trying to say. If our concept of "reality" is wrong to the extent of the physical world not being real (which would imply e.g. that there is no such thing is matter) than not even truths about physics are knowable (indeed, physics would be a sham). If however truths about physics are knowable, then so is at least some metaphysics. But logic and reason empirically don't work to get around things like "our perceptions deceive us." Quite true, at least if you mean by "working" you mean giving us a 100% ironclad guarantee. Only pure logic (as mathematics) can give us proofs. Even so however, I define knowledge as "properly justified true belief." I believe we can have sufficient rational reason to accept something as true, even apart from certainty. So then we can't be certain that either morality exists or that god exists, or that if god exists then morality exists, or that if morality exists then god exists. For the first and third points: it is true we can't be certain, however I think we can be rational in accepting such claims (just as scientists can be rational in accepting various scientific theories). For instance, I cannot be certain that other people (such as you) exist. But my basis for believing so can be rational. Similarly, I think we can have rational basis for thinking that if morality exists then God exists. As for the second point, "if god exists then morality exists" we can actually be certain about that, at least if we use the right definition of God. The traditional definition of God includes a number of aspects about such a Being, one of them Him being perfectly morally good (omnibenevolence, as it were). If we are operating on such a definition, we can say with certainty that if God exists then so does morality.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Chops
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 19, 2005
Total Topics: 24
Total Posts: 1101

Posted 09/23/07 - 09:05 PM:	#356
Tisthammerw wrote: So existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. Could it not be the other way around? John Leslie has written some very interesting stuff on the notion that it is precisely ethics that have creative force and that, thus, it is existence that conforms to ethical requirements rather than the opposite. I would refer those interested in the examination of said theory to the essay "The theory that the world exists because it should" and "Ethically required existence" (both in the American Philosophical Quarterly) for a discussion of this position from a philosophical perspective. I understand that theologian P. Tillich discusses the matter from a more theological perspective, and even goes so far as to define "God" precisely as the principle that ethical requirements are "creatively powerful". Anyway... just figured it might be an interesting, if unusual, perspective for those engaged in discussions of this sort. Happy reading! Oh and for those of you who might have trouble finding the writing recommended above, short summations of this position are also available in Leslie's "Efforts to Explain All Existence" and "God and Scientific Verifiability". While these go into less detail, they are shorter and somewhat easier to find (on JSTOR for instance).

TMB
Assistant Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: May 14, 2007
Total Topics: 21
Total Posts: 296

Posted 09/24/07 - 03:07 PM:	#357
Please elucidate. The process I applied to "get there" (I assume you're referring to the veracity of my premise of morality commanding behavior) was by definitions. Tist, this joke is wearing a bit thin. If you are going to play the fool, at least give us something that resembles a rational position. To suggest that the symbolic argument was a disagreement around definitions wont get you any laughs at all.

Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 16, 2006
Total Topics: 26
Total Posts: 589

Posted 09/24/07 - 03:53 PM:	#358
Tist wrote: Ah, but I never said that, though I can understand your confusion. Existence normally says what is, not what ought to be. According to the brute fact explanation, the sole metaphysical basis for moral values existing is simply existence itself (as opposed to a person or culture). Yet morality prescribes our behavior. So existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. The prescriptive nature of morality permits this otherwise bizarre implication. As the sole metaphysical basis of objective morality, existence prescribes our behavior with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority). I think I have a grasp on the brute fact morality position, but it still seems like BS. If Hitler was a one-time authority, then perhaps your point would be taken well, but history has shown that Hitler-type (though Hitler's name is loaded now) are consistently leaders. Napoleon III, Peter the Great, Alexander the Great, Pericles, Ramses, Julius Caesar, Octavian, Theodorus Rex. All of these people could be said to be Hitler-type people in that they had great amibtions and stopped at nothing to acheive these ambitions. Even in nature, it is the Lion who dominates the kill and the vulture who picks the scraps. I do not see how existence can tell us that these things, namely great ambition and disregard for societal standards, are both necessary for dominance and immoral at the same time. Let's not forget that as "crazed" as we might think Hitler was, he did obtain the authority to act as he did by adhering to the rules of existence, for if he did not adhere to such rules then he could not have obtained such authority. Nonetheless, just because existence says how we ought to behave does not necessarily mean that we will behave that way. Then morality is not a Brute fact. [quote[ I am simply describing the brute fact position; I of course believe the metaphysical basis of objective morality is God. However, objective morality as a brute fact inevitably leads to pantheism, which as I described in post #329 this eventually points to God anyway. Note also that I'm not saying that objective moral values constitutes an ironclad 100% proof of God's existence. I am however saying that if objective moral values exist they constitute evidence for God's existence. [/quote] I think everyone knows that this is what you are arguing, but they seem to be disagreeing that morality is a brute fact, making your position moot. Speaking in symbolic logic where A=morality as brute fact and B is the existence of God (which you define via pantheism as existence itself), your argument is: if objective moral values exist they constitute evidence for God's existence. A-->B You a Everyone is saying: -A I'm just trying to make sure that you understand that the conversation has progressed way past a simple understanding of your argument, so you do not need to keep explaining A-->B. In fact, one might argue that by saying something like "God's existence" you are confusing the issue, because you are defining god as existence (pantheism); so, this phrase is the same as saying "Existence's existence", but what does it mean for something to possess itself? For physics to be "knowable" it would have to assume the metaphysical position of the physical world being real. Is mathematics "real"? Yet you say its knowable. Physics is the study of observable data. Being humans, we observe the physical world. Sure, some may say that the physical world is real, and that may be their metaphysical assumption. But this is not necessarily the case; the physical world does not have to be "reality" in the metaphysical sense in which we are speaking anymore than mathematics does. What mathematical proofs would we have if we did not have physics upon which to base it? Though physics fits into that broad category of applied mathematics, it is still true that mathematics wouldn't exist without physics. In the same way, logic would not exist without anything to apply it to. It just so happens that in the case of physics, the world is the observable world. Thus, when I say that if these truths were knowable, I mean that they would be observable truths and would fall under the category of physics. Morality is not an observable truth. God is not an observable truth (unless you define god as existence, which is a different can of worms). I think we can be rational in accepting such claims (just as scientists can be rational in accepting various scientific theories). But certainly you don't recommend rationalizing, right? I mean, if we use logic to justify unfalsifiable claims, then to what level are we really taking this? I'm not an atheist, but I know that their idea of accepting a rational claim would look down on your relating the obtaining of observable, scientific data to making metaphysical assumptions like those above. It seems that your are rationalizing, among other things. You are starting with your conclusion and making the assumptions necessary to justify that conclusion. While such a practice maybe rational, it is that type of rational that is justified by science. the right definition of God. And i can prove the existence of gnomes if we use the "right definition" of gnome. In talking about pantheism, however, the question comes down to, "For what purpose should I accept the definition of God as being part of existence?" I just want you to know, that I am not absolutely opposed to what you are trying to say, but only that you need to be more clear with what you are explaining because otherwise it will not amount to a compelling argument, and this is why you are getting these criticisms from TMB and Kwalish. I mean, it does sound like BS to be fair.

Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 903

Posted 09/29/07 - 07:13 AM:	#359
TMB wrote: Using symbolic logic is certainly not my forte, but the efforts to do so by Tist almost convinced me that he must be a hoax poster, just seeing how long he can keep us strung along trying to have a serious discussion. Methinks I have better grounds to argue this then you do. Consider this example: TMB wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Please elucidate. The process I applied to "get there" (I assume you're referring to the veracity of my premise of morality commanding behavior) was by definitions. Tist, this joke is wearing a bit thin. If you are going to play the fool, at least give us something that resembles a rational position. To suggest that the symbolic argument was a disagreement around definitions wont get you any laughs at all. If you don't believe me, please take a look at posts #296 and #354. I clearly said I was justifying my "morality commands our behavior" via by definition of the terms involved. If objective morality exists, it says (by definition) how we ought to behave with statements like "thou shalt not kill" correct? Under the definition of "command" I was using, this is an instance of command. So morality commands our behavior by definition. The only way to get around this was to use different definitions. And this clearly seemed to be the case as I explained in post #354. Before you say that the issue wasn't about definitions (again) can you please address the evidence that would seem to strongly argue otherwise? (You can find it in post #354.) One more question. I was arguing that morality "commands" in the sense that is required for it to have "authority." Yet you yourself (in post #242) have very specifically stated that "I agree with you that morality does have authority." How would you justify the assertion that morality has authority apart from it commanding our behavior?
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
Professor

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 18, 2004
Location: Minnesota
Total Topics: 6
Total Posts: 903

Posted 09/29/07 - 07:32 AM:	#360
Chops wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: So existence itself says how we ought to behave, and does so with authority. Could it not be the other way around? John Leslie has written some very interesting stuff on the notion that it is precisely ethics that have creative force and that, thus, it is existence that conforms to ethical requirements rather than the opposite. This point was raised before, but it's a good one so for the moment I won't mind addressing it again. I've been claiming that the correct interpretation of the "brute fact" position is this: the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "reality." An alternate way to look at it is "Morality says how we ought to behave." The basis of moral values existing is the moral values themselves. But what is morality? A certain set of principles of how we ought to behave. So when we say morality says how we ought to behave, we are really saying how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and does not (I think) provide any real foundation for morality. It's a rule of thumb in rationality to frown upon circular reasoning. One could say that morality is an exception to this rule, so perhaps it’s best to provide some justification why circular reasoning is not acceptable here. What is morality? Morality is a certain set of values, norms and principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do. Anything immoral violates something in set S. An example of a moral value set S might contain is “one should not torture infants for fun.” Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S. An example of a norm in set O might be “one should torture infants for fun.” Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow set S over set O? One could cite set S; it supports itself. But the antithesis set O supports itself equally as well, and so circular arguments get us nowhere. We could of course say that set S is different because set S is by definition the "correct" one (if moral values exist); i.e. it's the one that's real, whose values actually exist and is based in reality. But if this is the crucially distinguishing feature, then this is just the same thing as saying that the basis for moral values existing is reality/existence itself; that it is reality in some general sense that says how we ought to behave (if there is no specific component of reality that does so). Remember, something is based in existence if and only if it exists. The best interpretation of the "brute fact" position seems to be that the only basis for moral values existing is existence itself. I would refer those interested in the examination of said theory to the essay "The theory that the world exists because it should" and "Ethically required existence" (both in the American Philosophical Quarterly) for a discussion of this position from a philosophical perspective....Oh and for those of you who might have trouble finding the writing recommended above, short summations of this position are also available in Leslie's "Efforts to Explain All Existence" and "God and Scientific Verifiability". While these go into less detail, they are shorter and somewhat easier to find (on JSTOR for instance). Alas, I've been busy and might not get a chance to read them (note my somewhat long break between today's posts and the last time I participated here). But they sound interesting. I might peruse the last two.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Page: First 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Last

You don't have permission to post.

Please login or register.