Moral Argument for God: Philosophy Forums

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Moral Argument for God

TMB
Assistant Professor

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Posted 08/02/08 - 03:09 AM:	#801
PMB, you said, Both, I would imagine. You imagine that we are trying to illuminate reality not just for ourselves, but also for others. Why do you think so? I would think that application of logic as well as imagination would give us some idea of how it works. Combined with evidence it could take us nearer to knowing reality. By the way, I did not make it clear to whom I was referring when I said "us." I meant moral philosophers. That is, the subjectivist, the realist, and the nihilist (among others) are all trying -- through argument -- to demonstrate the nature of reality. I would say that argument offers us just the logical model as to what reality could be like. Would you not also apply empricial evidence to support this. If we see our senses as the means to provide perception of reality, combine it with rational capabilty we get better outcomes that just applying rational thought. If we consider that Einstein gave better insight to cosmic reality that prior science, he used thought experiments with logic. I would think that his ability to apply this method was still influenced by what his senses fed to his intellect. Empirical evidence adds further support to his theories. Language is a tool for both formulating and communicating insights. Language can certainly be used in this way, and we certainly want to believe this is its use, but does this mean it is the primary reason for its existence, or could it be incidental, or even sold this way as a social opiate? Look at how unsuccessful language is used on this forum to communicate insights, and how well it serves for people to dogde the arguments of others. If the primary driver was to serve as communication, and this was intended as information transfer, then we would expect the evidence to support this. If it fails on a philosophy forum, what chance does it have in forums that do not have truth seeking as the objective? Logic plays out through language, and so does all philosophy. I agree that logic CAN play out through language, yet the 700 plus posts on this thread show us how inconsistent our logical perception is, even with a single individual, leave alone between the various points offered here. Once again I do not consider philosophy to be only about language. If we remove the label 'philosophy' and consider that it is about 'knowing reality', then clear senses provide us with the most direct source on the nature of reality. My knowledge of hot stoves has come from direct experience, not logical argument. My knowlegde of swimming is certainly helped by philosophical theory, but its only through practical application that I really get it. Are you suggesting we can discover all of reality just through language? Insofar as philosophy can help teach us about (i.e. illuminate) reality, language is an essential element for communicating what has been learned. Then why is it that we have been unsuccessful in doing so? Even between great philosophers there has been major disagreement on the fundamentals. Nietszche fell out with other germanic thinkers on basic points, and I imagine that each of them had distinct viewpoints on issues. (I say this because I have not specifically studied philosophers to see how they differ). On a board like this we can see conflict between all the clubs of subjectivity, objectivity, nihilism etc. I dont see too much illumination happening here. Do you? Presumably, one must know something before he can teach it. However, I have found dialogue between two intellectually honest and philosophically curious people a very useful way of clarifying things for oneself and another simultaneously. I am not suggesting this never happens. I also find these discusions illuminate me, but often not as a result of an agreement of ideas. Sometimes it is the very flaws that I find in others arguments that crystallises my own thinking (this does not say that I have a monopoly on knowing reality, I think only Tist holds this view). Personally, I find your notions of illuminating reality overly rooted in superficial empirical observation. You are going to need to offer me a bit more than this if I am to defend myself. I make no claim to be able to offer an ironclad body of evidence in a couple of posts, perhaps after 700 posts I might do better, but we appear to be no closer to tying up the logic side of things in this time. I am not offering or suggesting that empirical analysis is all that is required. Rational application and logic is also required. Logic can tell us things about reality, and science (a more rigorous sort of empirical inquiry than the observations of a gazelle) can tell us things as well. Science is also logical as well as providing repeatable empiricism, so I would not seperate them into camps of science or logic. The views of the gazelle are in fact borne out by science. While I present it in my words, there is plenty of support for this view. The only thing communication can be reliably said to be about is the transfer of information -- period. Show me the logic that says this should be so. The logic behind my position is not exclusive between information transfer or manipulation. Consider a very original position made by the behaviorist called Niko Tinbergen when describing communication in animals. The example he used was to shake his fist and argue that we all know what this means. However, underlying this is the objective of communicating. It is to affect the behavior of others, ideally to your selfish advantage. Babies do this with crying, in order to get the attention they need, feeding, nappy change whatever, communication is the mechanism, through language, noise, red face etc, all leads to them manipulating parebntal behavior. Its true the message hs gotten through (mostly) in this case, but is the politician trying to give clear information, or just trying to manipulate voters and giving them whatever communication that will achieve this. Does a woman honstly communicate her sex appeal, looks and age by wearing clothes, concealing her flaws, breast implants, makeup. She wants the male to be attracted to her, not for him to see her, warts and all. Men do similar things with status symbols. Its certainly not rocket science, but we neatly seperate it from the realm of communication so we can continue to play games and manipulate others. There should be no assumptions that said information should be accurate or otherwise in the basic definition of the word. Such judgments are not about communication itself, but the ends towards which specific entities employ it. I agree that many will use information as a means to manipulate others, but this exhausts neither the possibilities nor the actualities of communication. Agreed that information and underlying objectives might differ, however we are talking about the underlying objective of communication, and one of its media, that of language. It does not limit the usage of communication, however it does cast a shadow on it, and should be taken into account when considering its application. Communication can be used to propagate accurate information; and for whatever reason, there exists a class of intellectually honest people concerned with figuring out what's true and communicating what they find. Accurate information transfer does not preclude manipulation, as these are not exclusive. I agree that there are people with god intention who attempt to progress knowledge for themselves and others, however they also seek results for themselves in this process. Whether social status, self satisfaction, the underlying driver is to satisfy a need within themselves. The issue arises if they are truly in a position to illuminate even if their intentions are pure. I have no dount pure intention and succes exist, however I do not think this is the rule, but the exception. Are they the most evolutionarily adept? Perhaps not. Does it matter? That depends on what one's goals are. Are there not common goals that we all share. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness might be cliche but do you not think that this is ultimately what we all want? There might even be something more fundamental underlying this, that is even more common to us all. This does not mean evolutionary success by any means. This need to include competition and can only be measured by genetic success. Deception to be evolutionary adaptive needs to be successful. Since this is the case it might be that we have just not plumbed the depth of some deceptions. I do not deny that many people operate as you say, but such modes of operation are not necessary. I don't want to get off topic too much here, but we are social creatures just as much as we are competing entities. As such, I think it does make sense to work cooperatively towards the truth about the world in which we find ourselves. Moreover, while labels can be used to affect people's perceptions, philosophy can be used to peel back the mystifications of such political machinations. So while there are hindrances to the truth in the world, there are also aids to its discovery. This sounds like a position about what we ought to be doing, as opposed to what we are doing. You say these are not necessary and perhaps you are right, but what does this have to do with reality. Perhaps we should work more coperatively, but do we. I understand philosophy to be focussed upon reality, not what might be. "Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" This says that the truth will always out. I see this as rhetoric with no evidence or logic to support this position. The question I ask is if truth does always out and at what point is always? Tere are plenty of people who have died without seeing the truth, does that mean a future generation will reap the truth on their behalf. What posible chance do we have of exposing all duplicity? I also agree with Nietzsche that truth has no objective value. I'm just curious as to what the truth is, and so are a lot of other people. Why does it have no objective value? If I know the truth of the trajectory of a car speeding toward me and my abaility to run, I have a better chance of avoiding its impact. The value for me is survival, perhaps this is not seen as objective value. If not I cannnot see the value in what Nietzsche says if we cannot take a practical view on life. I agree, but I'm not sure what your point is (that is, what you are trying to manipulate me into believing My point is simple. Communication arises from our need to manipulate others to our own ends. Society needs to moderate this in order to manage conflict between individuals, but its a complex balancing act. Are you trying to impugn morality? Well fine, I don't believe in morality anyway. I suppose I am just looking to se how things really are. If this means that morality does or does not exist in an objective way, then that is the way it is. Once again I would be careful about what is implied in the term 'morality'. For me morality/ethics is about how people ought to behave (if we limit it to humans). If it is society that dictates how we ought to behave, then its a relative system, but by definition still morality. If its an external system, then its probably objective, but still morality - ie. how we ought to behave as defined by the guidelines. But the origins of something do not, on their own, discredit it (cf. the genetic fallacy) Agreed, I did not mean to say otherwise. -- though they may offer us grounds to be skeptical and think that further research must be done. Are you then, instead, trying to say that discussion won't (indeed, can't) get us anywhere? No, however if there is more to process of communication and language medium that promotes the discovery of truth lets examine it. Perhaps not all participants in a conversation are intellectually honest, but that does not mean that those who are cannot get somewhere even through conversations with those people. Agreed, however it implies that illumination might only be selfish. It also does not mean that two intellectually honest people cannot productively converse with one another. It has happened many times in my life, and I have been convinced of things I would not have believed before. That it will not happen in every instance is no attack on those instances where it does work. Also agreed, but imagine how far we could go if transparency were total. Imagine our capability in terms of managing global issues, all the possibilities if only we were truly open, and could remove the competitive issues? I do not think this is possible, but it illustrates the comparison. I am not suggesting an end to discourse, or a search for the truth. But if one of these truths is that communications is built on the premise to manipulate as opposed to transfer accurate information, then it should be explored, not ignored. Its not a pleasant thought, and indeed society shies from this idea as it can undermine our comfort zones. Ultimately, I worry you are trying to impugn the practice of philosophy altogether. However, there are plenty of other threads for such discussions, and it would be rather off-topic here. If philosopy is the inquiry into the truth of things, surely this conversation qualifies? If indeed our system of communication is used to create deceit, then this is truth, and as such should be assessed in a philosophical manner. I try not to get stuck with even the label of philosopy, I just want to know how stuff actually works. If this denies me the label of philosopher that seems a small price to pay.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 08/03/08 - 03:22 PM:	#802
My key claim is that if objective morality exists, it is evidence for the existence of God. My key argument (in a nutshell) is that the only plausible, viable explanations for the existence of objective morality are entities with significant Godlike characteristics (e.g. having infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority) if indeed one cannot call such an entity God. My main criticism against atheistic ethical objectivism is the paucity of better explanations. Without God, who or what says how we ought to behave? Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: You said, "What I am saying is that there are more possibilities to the universe option than you let on." I'm not denying there aren't a crap-load of concoctions someone could come up with, I'm saying that the amount of those that are plausible are very few. You said, "The most important thing to keep in mind is that declaring something plausible is different from declaring that you believe it." I agree, but I'm not saying I necessarily believe "the universe says how we ought to behave," I'm saying I could believe it if I were an atheist. "Logic says how we ought to behave" and "morality says how we ought to behave" have at least a superficial air of plausibility, but something like "the atomic weight of hydrogen says how we ought to behave" does not. Some explanations are inherently implausible. That's part of the reason I asked for something more specific than the "properties of the universe [having enough rocks? the atomic weight of hydrogen?] are such that objective morality obtains [existence]." I'm not convinced that you (or anyone else) can provide a specific example of a "property of the universe" that would actually constitute a plausible alternative as to who or what says how we ought to behave. Well, utilitarianism provides a plausible alternative. According to that view, pleasure/happiness is the highest good and the proper goal of human activity. OK, so we ought to pursue pleasure/happiness for humanity. One problem with this is that it inevitably leads us right back to the problem at hand. Imagine I am a bank robber and I rob a bank while getting away with the crime. One might say I'm wrong, since I am defying the principle of benefiting the group. I say, "Why should I care about the group if I can get away with the theft, it makes me happy, and it does not adversely affect me?" One cites the principle "one ought to pleasure/happiness for humanity as a whole," which leads us right back to where we started. What transcendent source of authority says I ought to benefit society? Basing objective morality on another ought-statement gets us nowhere in answering this sort of question. Utilitarianism presents a goal, but it isn't (at least not by itself) a viable alternative because it still leaves unanswered the problem of the foundation of objective morality. What makes the statement "we ought to pursue pleasure/happiness for humanity" true? Who or what says we ought to pursue the goal that utilitarianism lays out for us? You said, "This is due to putative characteristics of pleasure/happiness itself (it is supposedly a necessary good)." But what characteristics make "we ought to pursue pleasure/happiness for humanity" necessarily true? Is it simply the meaning of the terms? It is possible for the meaning of a statement to make its claim necessarily true, but this only holds for analytic statements like "hairless men have no hair." The claim "we ought to pursue pleasure/happiness for humanity," even if true, just isn't an analytic statement. So we're still left with the question of who or what says how we ought to behave. You said, "the properties of the universe are such that objective morality obtains" (presumably, obtains existence). My criticism of this is that it is far too vague to be a viable alternative, and indeed there doesn't seem to be any known specific theories of this alternative that would render such a view plausible. What set of properties of the universe say how we ought to behave? The atomic weight of hydrogen? The amount of granite on planet Earth? Can you think of any specific theory of this viewpoint that is both plausible and viable? Postmodern Beatnik wrote: "the properties of the universe are such that objective morality obtains."....It does not say that some particular property of the universe (such as the atomic weight of hydrogen) grounds moral truths, but rather that the universe provides within its content (which is everything) some means of grounding morality. It may be a combination of things (or even just relations between them) that ultimately yields moral truths. OK, but we still get to the same problem. What set of properties of the universe say how we ought to behave? Is it the combination of the atomic weight of hydrogen and the amount of granite on planet Earth? Can you think of any specific theory of this viewpoint that is both plausible and viable? For sake of brevity I've gotten down to what I think cuts to the heart of the issue (the basis of objective morality) above. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: What I was getting at was that, if there were such a thing as objective morality, it would be a set of rules. That set of objectively moral rules would be "who or what tells us how we ought to behave." The truth-maker(s) for those rules would be the metaphysical basis of morality, but they would not tell us how to behave. Then it seems we've run into a bit of confusion, because I had previously written in this thread (e.g. post #636): Tisthammerw wrote: Note that the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. I am well aware of what you wrote. However, I find this to be another instance of misleading language. Let us take your attempted clarification: Tisthammerw wrote: Think of it this way. Suppose I was a Captain in the army and a Private and I have this conversation. "Captain Tisthammerw, I have here a written order for you. It says thou shalt wash my clothes. I think you should obey this command." "What? Who says I ought to wash your clothes?" "The command sir. It's written right here." Obviously, I am asking what the source of the command is. Indeed. And in that context, it is clear. If, however, one were to ask "how should I behave?" then "the Admiral, sir!" is not a very good answer at all. Instead, a list of rules would be more appropriate. Great, but how was my use of language misleading in the context I was using it, particularly since I described very specifically what the phrase "who or what says how we ought to behave?" means? With all due respect, I don't think I was as misleading as you accused me of being. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: I dropped the naturalistic pantheism dispute because the question as to whether the sovereign reality under discussion would get the label "God" was quibbling. We still end up with an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. How the heck does this stray from my point that "Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics"? Okay, time to play context police. Talking about what you have said since dropping the naturalistic pantheism bit is irrelevant because I was referring to those posts coming before you did so. Prior to giving up that line of argument, your argument was threatening to become a defense of a stronger claim than you expressed willingness to defend. And that is what I said strayed from the point. OK, let's talk about context. The context was this: ========================== Tisthammerw: Please keep in mind what exactly my claim is. I am saying that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God. Objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, absolute, universally binding entity with supreme and infallible moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. My point is that this entity treads suspiciously close to theism, if indeed one cannot call such an entity God. Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics. Postmodern Beatnik: As I noted in the last post, however, you seem to stray from this point at times. Tisthammerw: Where did I stray from this point? Postmodern Beatnik: As mentioned before, the argument that objective morality at least entails naturalistic pantheism and your earlier insistence that naturalistic pantheism is substantively different from atheism are the elements of a stronger, deductive-style argument. Tisthammerw: I dropped the naturalistic pantheism dispute because the question as to whether the sovereign reality under discussion would get the label "God" was quibbling. We still end up with an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. How the heck does this stray from my point that "Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics"? ========================== It looked as though "this point" was referring to "Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics" point, and that pantheism was straying from that point. Note that the idea that the basis of morality being the universe implies pantheism is an argument for that point. Speaking of context, let's take a look at a few other instances: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Er, that's great and all, but what makes them true? I do believe that it is your burden to demonstrate that they could be true and that God could act as a truth-maker for them. It certainly isn't my burden, as I would deny both of those assertions. It was your burden if you claimed that, if objective morality exists, the answer to who or what says how we ought to behave is "morality." Let's look at the context: ========================== Tisthammerw: (Gives the "set S" argument to explain why morality cannot be it's own metaphysical basis) Postmodern Beatnik: To deal briefly with the examples you mention: if objective morality obtains, the reason we should do the actions in set S and not those in set O is because the statements in S would be true and the statements in O would be false. Tisthammerw: Er, that's great and all, but what makes them true? Considering what I said above, this response misses the point. Statements in one sense say how we ought to behave, but who or what "puts forth" these statements to begin with? That's kind of what "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" was all about; identifying the authority behind those ought-statements and identifying morality's metaphysical basis. ========================== It appears you were ignorant of "who or what says how we ought to behave" was looking for a metaphysical basis and that is why you answered as you did, but your response missed what my point was. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Considering what I said above, this response misses the point. Considering what I have said above, you have continued to misunderstand exactly what point I was making. But if your point was simply that "moral statements describe how we ought to behave" then I have never disputed that (nor did I misunderstand that point in the post you responded to), and such a point misses my own in the text you were responding to. Namely, what is the basis for objective morality? More serious however: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: I'm sorry, but that is just not how ethical subjectivism is defined. Subjective ethical relativism says precisely what I claimed; that what a person says is morally right/wrong actually makes it true for that person. I could cite from my college philosophy textbook if you wish, but perhaps this link from the University of Missouri will do. The website will do, and it agrees with me: Ethical subjectivism: An act is morally right iff the person judging the action approves of it. That is, one's personal judgments are the truth-maker for moral statements (thus it is a success theory, but not an objective one). Tisthammerw wrote: If ethical subjectivism were simply the claim that people have differing beliefs of what is right and wrong, it would not be a particularly meaningful metaethical claim. True, but irrelevant. I was saying no such thing. Really? Let's look at what was said in context: ========================== Tisthammerw: Remember though, "subjective" in ethics refers to what a person believes actually makes it true for him (not anyone else). Postmodern Beatnik: Not quite. For one, that's a slogan primarily meant to make subjectivism more accessible to freshman. For another, it's a rather misleading formulation of that slogan. More properly, one would say that subjectivists hold that "x is wrong" means "x is wrong (according) to me" (not "for me") or "x is wrong from my perspective." Tisthammerw: I'm sorry, but that is just not how ethical subjectivism is defined. Subjective ethical relativism says precisely what I claimed; that what a person says is morally right/wrong actually makes it true for that person. I could cite from my college philosophy textbook if you wish, but perhaps this link from the University of Missouri will do. ========================== It looked as though you were claiming that subjectivism says "x is wrong" means "x is wrong from my perspective" and not "x is wrong for me to do." If this is not the meaning you intended to convey, I suggest you make yourself clearer in the future. Indeed, the first sentence of what you said, the "not quite," seemed to suggest from the outset that how I described subjectivism is false in some way. But the quote "Ethical subjectivism: An act is morally right iff [i.e. if and only if] the person judging the action approves of it" is precisely what I described. In context, it looked as though (in your latest remarks) my definition of ethical subjectivism is what you were saying all along, when that didn't appear to be the case at all. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: And if that is true, it is your definition actually seems to stack the deck--by defining it in such a way that guarantees objective morality cannot be based in God. But as we have seen, you have misinterpreted me. The objective/subjective distinction I am employing (which seems to be fundamentally the same as yours, though we seem to disagree over how best to put it) in no way stacks the deck against God. (1) How have I misinterpreted you on this issue? (2) I didn't say your definition of objective morality stacks the deck against God but stacking the deck that objective morality cannot be based in God. If your answer to (1) is the following: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: I wish to reiterate yet again that I am not (and never have been) arguing that "God grounds morality" immediately entails or is equivalent to DCT, nor that you are necessarily committed to DCT (though you may be). But if that is true, in what substantive way could God ground morality? Additionally, whether I'm committed to DCT depends on how you define "divine command theory." In the narrow sense, the answer is no. I think the divine commands ought to be followed due to the nature of God rather than the commands themselves. Tom Morris (a popular philosopher with a Ph.D. in philosophy and religious studies from Yale) likes to call this view "divine nature theory" and evidently distinguishes it from divine command theory. If divine command theory is defined broadly enough to include even this view though, then the answer is yes. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: On my actual definition, however, objectivism is obviously inconsistent with subjectivism, and DCT constitutes a form of subjectivism because what makes something right or wrong is that God approves or disapproves of it. Whether it is "subjective" or "objective" will depend on how you define the terms. Ethical subjectivism says that morality is relative to individual human opinion, whereas objective morality (in the context of the moral argument at least) says that morality is independent of human opinion. God is not human, so he is exempt from the "subjectivism" definition being applied to him and morality being based on him is not subjectivism. Additionally, "subjective" in ethics refers to what a person believes actually makes it true for him (not anyone else). Here's an excerpt from Moral Arguments for the Existence of God from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Robert Adams provides an example of these more sophisticated arguments (Adams 1987, 144-163). His argument may be summarized as follows. Argument IV: 12. Moral facts exist. 13. Moral facts have the properties of being objective and non-natural. 14. The best explanation of there being objective and non-natural moral facts is provided by theism. Therefore the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking theism is true. Premise (13) refers to the fact that rightness and wrongness attaches to actions. These properties are recognized as objective in the sense that they hold or not regardless of human opinion [emphasis mine]. They are non-natural in the sense that “they cannot be stated entirely in the language of physics, chemistry, biology, and human or animal psychology” (Adams 1987, 145). I'd like to make a couple points. (1) It's pretty easy to obtain a definition that stacks the deck against a view you don't like (e.g. defining "miracles" in such a way that makes them logically impossible); and (2) we should be careful about how a term is defined in a given context (e.g. if I debated whether miracles occur, I would use a definition that is not self-contradictory). Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: This would hold true even for the Christian God. After all, what changes about God during the Old and New Testaments? Is it that the Christian God seems harsh in the Old Testament but not in the New Testament? You might want to reread Revelation 14:10-11 if you think that's the case. You might want to re-read my post and note that I bolded the word "consistently." I was very specifically addressing the "consistency" objection in your post. Looking at it in context: ======================================== Postmodern Beatnik: Well, given the dearth of religions that consistently posit an unchanging God, this would once again mean that you are taking objective morality to be evidence for a very specific and non-traditional concept of God (certainly not the standard Christian God, for example, who changes demonstrably between the Old and New Testaments). Tisthammerw: I don't think the idea that God is in some sense changeless is non-traditional (remember, we are talking about a monotheistic Supreme Being God like those of the Abrahamic faiths). This would hold true even for the Christian God. After all, what changes about God during the Old and New Testaments? Is it that the Christian God seems harsh in the Old Testament but not in the New Testament? You might want to reread Revelation 14:10-11 if you think that's the case. ======================================== Thereby leaving the unanswered question as to what changes about God during the Old and New Testaments. Your remark "You might want to re-read my post and note that I bolded the word 'consistently'"--whether it was your intention or not--made it appear as if I had somehow missed the point of consistency you were making. You may not have intended to take my quote out of context or to be misleading, please be more careful in the future. We each have accused the other of being misleading (though I have not AFAIK accused you of doing it intentionally); perhaps we both need to try to find better ways to communicate. Back to your point, "You might want to re-read my post and note that I bolded the word 'consistently.' God is harsh, then he is not. That John tells us he will be harsh again only further proves my point." One might as well say that the laws of physics are not consistent; sometimes things go up (like a rocket) and sometimes things go down (like when I drop a stone on Earth). The laws of physics are being consistent here however, because the laws react differently to different circumstances. It's pretty easy to argue that the same is true for God here. God is harsh when punishing evildoers (in hell) and God is gentle when rewarding the righteous (in heaven). Postmodern Beatnik wrote: To quote the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical." Then it seems we have been victims of the terminology wars. My college philosophy textbook defines "physicalism" in the sense of the philosophy of mind: "the claim that the self is identical to, or the product of, the activities of the body or brain and that there is no nonphysical aspect of a person." The idea that all of reality is totally physical in nature is what my philosophy textbook calls "metaphysical materialism." This source mentions, "There is a lot of confusion in the philosophy of mind literature stemming from a tendency to take physicalism and materialism to be interchangeable." Apparently we are an example of this. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: You again bring up the forensic analogy, so I will again raise my as yet unanswered question: is objective morality "evidence" for the existence of God insofar as it is simply not inconsistent with His existence (as is the case with circumstantial evidence), or is it actually positive evidence in favor of His existence and against other possibilities? I apologize if I haven't answered this question earlier, but my answer is yes. It is evidence against the possibility of atheism. Circumstantial evidence goes beyond being merely not inconsistent with a given view. Otherwise, my avoidance of coffee is circumstantial evidence that O.J. Simpson murdered his wife (since it is not inconsistent with this view). Circumstantial evidence is regarded as some degree of positive support, even if that support is not sufficient to be conclusive. An example would be if the killer is known to have worn a type of rare pair of shoes of which only a few hundred were sold in the United States, and the suspect had such shoes even though he previously denied owning them. This is may not be sufficient evidence to be conclusive, but it is still some positive degree of evidential support. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Earlier, you endorsed "ex nihilo, nihil fit" as an axiom. This suggests the laws of conservation of energy and matter. So how does your battery God create all these worlds and all this energy? Strictly speaking, ex nihilo, nihil fit does not imply the conservation of matter and energy. It does suggest however, that if matter and energy are created, the cause cannot be "nothing." Literal nothingness creating matter and energy would violate ex nihilo nihil fit. If however God created matter, a more accurate Latin description would be ex Deo rather than ex nihilo. Edited by Tisthammerw on 08/05/08 - 04:56 PM
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Buddahchuck
Bodhisatva

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Posted 08/03/08 - 11:03 PM:	#803
forgive me for being dull, but what the hell is a metaphysical basis. Certainly I understand what metaphysics is (And I'm not sure any metaphysical claim can be proven true), and I know what a basis is, but is it not true that by assuming that objective morality exists, we are already assuming something that would be much like a metaphysical basis? It seems like Tist keeps asking the question, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?", and the consistent response is If objective morality exists, then it is its own basis. Tist seems to outright reject this notion as being vague or circular. I think the problem is, in this particular circumstance as there are many problems, we don't know what the hell metaphysical basis is supposed to mean. It's very convenient language for Tist, because he likes talking about God, but that doesn't mean we, or Tist, has any clue of what is meant by metaphysical basis. I would also argue that this is the case with many ambiguous buzz words like spiritual or soul or even supernatural. We kind of just use these words in an attempt to discuss things we have no clear picture of. All my life people have talked about these thing, but can anyone define what a soul is really? And this confusion is true of all metaphysical language, especially theistic language. "God" always just seemed a label for the unknown cause of existence. Certainly this unknown cause of existence has been given many different characteristics, benevolence being almost as interesting as malevolence, but I've never heard anyone describe a clear picture. Often I hear the claim that "God's glory is so great that it is beyond human conception.", but this is as ambiguous as any of the other metaphysical buzz words we use. In fact, it's full of them. Can we really get a clear idea of human conception, much less glory, and then quantifiable glory that extends beyond the imperceivable limits of human conception. It's all vaguery, and as such, is completely unfit to be considered logical or rational or anything of the sort. Tist is fond of making it seem like his arguments are related to mathematics some how, but we have a pretty clear conception of numbers and what they represent, and when we don't, we get confused. So how about actually explaining these vague terms like "metaphysical basis" before trying to determine if morality (which may well be another ambiguous buzz word) even has a metaphysical basis. Why don't we consider the metaphysical basis of a chair, or even a thought. These things seem more readily accessible than some postulated concept of morality (especially objective morality) that may not even exist.

TMB
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Posted 08/04/08 - 12:57 AM:	#804
Buddah, you are concerned with the use of language to obfuscate rather than illuminate. This is part of the discussion I have been having with PM Beatnik. Tist has no intention of lifting the lid from semantics because this might expose reality, and his hidden agenda. While it is certainly possible be does believe what he says, language still serves to manipulate the perceptions of other and provide escape routes for Tists argument. While Tist might be an extreme, he is by no means unique. Common agreement on all the words we use is not possible, even people who have the same fundamental agendas, argue exact meanings. Given our very capable mind, and an extraordinarily comprehensive system of language, the only possible answer to all the confusion, is that we do not seek the truth for others. We seek advantage from others, and the truth for ourselves to achieve this.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 08/05/08 - 06:51 PM: Subject: Elucidation	#805
Vilification? TMB wrote: This is part of the discussion I have been having with PM Beatnik. Tist has no intention of lifting the lid from semantics because this might expose reality, and his hidden agenda. Yeesh, a little quick to vilify are we? What "hidden agenda" do you think I have? In any case, I've explained the semantics as best as my limited explanatory skills have allowed. I admit my skills may be limited, but I've seen a lot of people (including philosophers) do worse. And let's not forget that some definitions are inherently difficult to define. On that note I'll recap some definitions I've been using. Morality is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe. An "ought-statement" is a statement that makes a claim of what ought to be rather than making a claim of what is, e.g. "people should not steal." Metaphysical basis Buddahchuck wrote: forgive me for being dull, but what the hell is a metaphysical basis. I'll assume that was a question rather than a statement. I kind of explained this before, but since that is buried somewhere in the hundreds of posts I'm not sure I can blame you for asking this question. Basically, the metaphysical basis of morality is the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"; i.e. the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. If for instance the foundation of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the metaphysical basis of morality. Buddahchuck wrote: It seems like Tist keeps asking the question, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?", and the consistent response is If objective morality exists, then it is its own basis. Tist seems to outright reject this notion as being vague or circular. I don't know if it's been the consistent response (I've actually had a number of different responses) but I do believe people have brought it up on more than one occasion in this thread. Morality as its own basis (at least with the definition I've been using) is indeed circular. After all, what is morality? A certain set of statements and principles describing how we ought to behave. So when we say "Morality says how we ought to behave," we are really saying how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality. It's a rule of thumb in rationality to frown upon circular reasoning. One could say that morality is an exception to this rule, so perhaps it's best to provide some justification why circular reasoning does not work here. Recall that morality is a certain set of principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do. Anything immoral violates something in set S. An example of a moral value set S might contain is "one should not torture infants for fun." Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S (or at least statements that contradict set S). An example of a statement in set O might be "one should torture infants for fun." Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow a principle of set S over a principle of set O? One could cite the statement of set S; it supports itself. But the antithesis statement of set O supports itself equally as well, and so circular arguments get us nowhere. The same sort of thing applies if were to take the sets as a whole. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O). Why is it that a moral statement cannot be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true. Any moral statement (e.g. "one should not steal") is simply a claim about what is true. So how can what a statement means make that statement true? It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make that claim true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Morality therefore cannot be its own metaphysical basis. Off topic Buddahchuck wrote: All my life people have talked about these thing, but can anyone define what a soul is really? I think so. I define "soul" as "the incorporeal basis of oneself." Rather than a person's consciousness being based in physical matter (as the brain) metaphysical dualism holds that it is based in this kind of incorporeal essence.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Buddahchuck
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Posted 08/05/08 - 09:29 PM:	#806
Basically, the metaphysical basis of morality is the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"; i.e. the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. If for instance the foundation of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the metaphysical basis of morality. Like I said, you haven't really made it any clearer what a "metaphysical basis" is. All I see above is that you replaced the words "who or what" with some concept. This does not bring me any closer to understanding what a "metaphysical basis" is. If I said "Trees (Chairs, Nails, Squirrels etc.) say how we ought to behave," does that fit within your scheme of what consists of a "metaphysical basis"? Additionally, you don't elucidate what a metaphysical basis is independent of morality. What is the metaphysical basis of war (love, Alpha Centauri, existence etc.)? Morality as its own basis (at least with the definition I've been using) is indeed circular. After all, what is morality? A certain set of statements and principles describing how we ought to behave. So when we say "Morality says how we ought to behave," we are really saying how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality. It's a rule of thumb in rationality to frown upon circular reasoning. One could say that morality is an exception to this rule, so perhaps it's best to provide some justification why circular reasoning does not work here. Recall that morality is a certain set of principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do. Anything immoral violates something in set S. An example of a moral value set S might contain is "one should not torture infants for fun." Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S (or at least statements that contradict set S). An example of a statement in set O might be "one should torture infants for fun." Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow a principle of set S over a principle of set O? One could cite the statement of set S; it supports itself. But the antithesis statement of set O supports itself equally as well, and so circular arguments get us nowhere. The same sort of thing applies if were to take the sets as a whole. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O). Why is it that a moral statement cannot be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true. Any moral statement (e.g. "one should not steal") is simply a claim about what is true. So how can what a statement means make that statement true? It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make that claim true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Morality therefore cannot be its own metaphysical basis. I would like to point out one thing: the statement "Morality is how we ought to behave" is an analytic statement. If we are to follow a Kantian model and use analytic statements in an attempt to gain a fundamental knowledge of a thing, and that thing is morality, then we start with this statement (NB this is only for the sake of argument, as I would not tend to rely on analytic statements to make such a claim). As I understand it (and apparently you think I misunderstand a majority of your posts, so keep me in check), your main point is an answer to the question: If objective morality exists, who or what says how we ought to behave?[i] What I need in order to have your point make sense is for you to explain how we get from the statement [i]Morality is how we ought to behave to your answer for this question, God. Every time you point-out the circularity of the argument saying "Morality says how we ought to behave", you are making a few mistakes: 1) "Morality says how we ought to behave" can be taken as an analytic statement having the same meaning as "Morality is how we ought to behave". 2) God or "the Supreme metaphysical being" (a definition that could just as easily mean "the 'metaphysical basis of everything'") seems to be nothing more than a homunculus for morality. Instead of saying "How we ought to behave is how we ought to behave" (another analytically true statement), you are only changing the "metaphysical basis" to "the Supreme Metaphysical Being says how we ought to behave", which (a) does not have the same truth value as an analytic statement and (b) does not bring us any closer to understanding "how we ought to behave" than would simply saying "Morality is how we ought to behave." 3) By saying that "the Supreme Metaphysical Being" (or the "metaphysical basis" of everything) is the "metaphysical basis" of morality, you are incurring the same sort circularity flaw as saying "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" is circular. This same problem would occur if we said "existence is the "metaphysical basis" of morality." Saying that existence is the cause of something existing is a non-progressive statement that does not advance the dialog any more than your examples of Set S and Set O. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O). 4) You forget that the flaw of circularity consists in arguments. "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" is merely a statement whose truth value is at stake. Even if its circular, its not wrong; even if its non-progressive, its as true as "The Supreme metaphysical being (iow: the thing that makes everything true) makes particular objective ought statements. Now, I know you have a tendency to misinterpret arguments, so let me clear-up a few things before you start on your tirade. All we know about "God", as you describe it, is that it has a heart (which is apparently objective morality, though I am inclined to think your conception of this heart is more metaphorical and ambiguous than anything), and it is "The Supreme Metaphysical Being", which apparently means the entity by which all things exist, and that it is the truth-maker for moral statements. Aside from commenting that there is no clear answer as to how this entity makes things true, everything that is true, is only true by its existence (if we extend the idea). So, we are left with the notion that "the same thing that makes everything true is the same thing that makes morality true, and no philosophically interesting claim being made. It is hardly a revelation to say existence exists, truth is true, or that how we ought to behave is how we ought to behave. You act as if your conception of God adds so much more to what is being said, when really, it is virtually the same thing. I very much suspect that your agreement (or probable disagreement) will depend on how you elucidate what a metaphysical basis is. I think so. I define "soul" as "the incorporeal basis of oneself." Rather than a person's consciousness being based in physical matter (as the brain) metaphysical dualism holds that it is based in this kind of incorporeal essence. 1) Still no idea what "the incorporeal basis of oneself" is supposed to be. 2) I'm not a metaphysical dualist. 3) I have no experience (and hence evidence) of my incorporeal self, and therefore find it specious to assume that one exists. 4) You have not added anything to my conception of what a soul is, you have only recited the same rhetoric I've always heard about the soul 5) You did not address the point that all metaphysical language is exceedingly obscure descriptions of things we know nothing about. 6) Your definition ignores thousands of years of philosophical work concerning the soul and what constitutes it by identifying the soul and the mind as the same entity. ...and I thought I was out of this thread...

Tisthammerw
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Posted 08/06/08 - 06:08 PM:	#807
Buddahchuck wrote: As I understand it (and apparently you think I misunderstand a majority of your posts, so keep me in check), your main point is an answer to the question: If objective morality exists, who or what says how we ought to behave?[i] What I need in order to have your point make sense is for you to explain how we get from the statement [i]Morality is how we ought to behave to your answer for this question, God. I have already explained this, but I'll re-introduce it here for your convenience (and anyone else's who wants to know what my argument is). The argument from morality My central claim: if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. First let's define the terms I will use. Morality is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe. An "ought-statement" is a statement that makes a claim of what ought to be rather than making a claim of what is, e.g. "people should not steal." A hypothetical imperative is a statement of the form, "If the goal is A, then do B" and says what to do to help achieve a goal; e.g. "If you want to benefit society, have laws against stealing." A categorical imperative takes the form of "Do A" and says what to do without an if-clause; e.g. "Have laws against stealing" and "Treat others with respect." (Note that this definition is very similar Kant's but not necessarily completely identical with it.) In the context being used here, authority is the power to instill categorical imperatives with an ought-to-be-obeyed quality. For instance, if an Admiral has authority over the entire fleet and tells the Captain "Turn your ship south," then the Captain ought to obey the "Turn your ship south" statement. Suppose also however that this order is conveyed via a Lieutenant because the Lieutenant is the communications officer of that ship. The Captain ought to obey the Lieutenant when she repeats the Admiral's order, but the real authority lies with the Admiral rather than the Lieutenant (since the Admiral is the real source of both the command and the command's ought-to-be-obeyed quality). And if the Admiral and the Captain openly disagree over what the Lieutenant should do and give the Lieutenant conflicting orders, the Lieutenant ought to obey the Admiral because the Admiral is the higher authority. Broadly defined, God is the supreme or ultimate reality. More specifically for our purposes, God is the ultimate sovereign reality; i.e. an entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. I think the concept of objective moral values requires some type of God, some type of ultimate sovereign reality (whether it be pantheism, deism, or whatever). The problem comes when we try to find a metaphysical basis of objective morality. If there are objective moral laws of behavioral obligations and prohibitions, who or what gives these laws? Without God (or something like Him), who or what says how we ought to behave? Suppose for instance the answer to this question was "nothing." Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." So it seems that some type of sovereign metaphysical reality is needed. Let X be the basis of objective morality. Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, this X must possess the following characteristics: Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but X (the basis of objective morality) must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority). Absolute. Goes along with the objective nature of morality. X is not relative but absolute; both its existence and its moral truths are independent of any arbitrary moral standards we humans might create. Additionally, as the supreme authority its existence and statements of how we ought to behave are completely unrestrained by any other would-be authorities (as governments). Try as they might have, the Nazis could not budge the fact that their anti-Semitism was immoral. Universally binding. Again, goes along with the nature of objective morality. X's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes. Infallibly authoritative. The basis of objective morality cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority. So, objective morality implies the existence of something transcendent, absolute, and universally binding with infallible and supreme moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. This X certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism. Buddahchuck wrote: Basically, the metaphysical basis of morality is the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"; i.e. the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. If for instance the foundation of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the metaphysical basis of morality. Like I said, you haven't really made it any clearer what a "metaphysical basis" is. All I see above is that you replaced the words "who or what" with some concept. That might have been all you saw, but it wasn't all I wrote. I'll bold the parts of the post that you may have missed. Tisthammerw wrote: Basically, the metaphysical basis of morality is the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"; i.e. the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. If for instance the foundation of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the metaphysical basis of morality. .... When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true I was particularly hoping the last sentence and the example of mathematics would make the idea clear. Buddahchuck wrote: Morality as its own basis (at least with the definition I've been using) is indeed circular. After all, what is morality? A certain set of statements and principles describing how we ought to behave. So when we say "Morality says how we ought to behave," we are really saying how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality. It's a rule of thumb in rationality to frown upon circular reasoning. One could say that morality is an exception to this rule, so perhaps it's best to provide some justification why circular reasoning does not work here. Recall that morality is a certain set of principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do. Anything immoral violates something in set S. An example of a moral value set S might contain is "one should not torture infants for fun." Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S (or at least statements that contradict set S). An example of a statement in set O might be "one should torture infants for fun." Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow a principle of set S over a principle of set O? One could cite the statement of set S; it supports itself. But the antithesis statement of set O supports itself equally as well, and so circular arguments get us nowhere. The same sort of thing applies if were to take the sets as a whole. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O). Why is it that a moral statement cannot be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true. Any moral statement (e.g. "one should not steal") is simply a claim about what is true. So how can what a statement means make that statement true? It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make that claim true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Morality therefore cannot be its own metaphysical basis. I would like to point out one thing: the statement "Morality is how we ought to behave" is an analytic statement. If we are to follow a Kantian model and use analytic statements in an attempt to gain a fundamental knowledge of a thing, and that thing is morality, then we start with this statement (NB this is only for the sake of argument, as I would not tend to rely on analytic statements to make such a claim). Every time you point-out the circularity of the argument saying "Morality says how we ought to behave", you are making a few mistakes: 1) "Morality says how we ought to behave" can be taken as an analytic statement having the same meaning as "Morality is how we ought to behave". .... 4) You forget that the flaw of circularity consists in arguments. "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" is merely a statement whose truth value is at stake. Even if its circular, its not wrong; I'm afraid I'm going to have to repeat myself (please don't take this as an insult; it's just that you seemed to miss a few points). Suppose that "Morality says how we ought to behave" is indeed be true and an analytic statement (I actually disagree with the latter claim, but we can assume it is true for the sake of argument). Unfortunately all this is irrelevant to my objection. When we say "Morality says how we ought to behave," we are really saying how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality. This is why it is an unsatisfactory answer. Even if "morality says how we ought to behave" is an analytic truth, the moral statements themselves are not analytic. To quote what I said earlier: Tisthammerw wrote: Why is it that a moral statement cannot be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true. Any moral statement (e.g. "one should not steal") is simply a claim about what is true. So how can what a statement means make that statement true? It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make that claim true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Morality therefore cannot be its own metaphysical basis. Buddahchuck wrote: 2) God or "the Supreme metaphysical being" (a definition that could just as easily mean "the 'metaphysical basis of everything'") seems to be nothing more than a homunculus for morality. Instead of saying "How we ought to behave is how we ought to behave" (another analytically true statement), you are only changing the "metaphysical basis" to "the Supreme Metaphysical Being says how we ought to behave", which (a) does not have the same truth value as an analytic statement and (b) does not bring us any closer to understanding "how we ought to behave" than would simply saying "Morality is how we ought to behave." The fact that God being the basis of morality does not bring us closer to what these moral statements actually are is irrelevant. After all, I'm saying that God provides an answer for moral ontology (which explores e.g. the foundation of morality), not moral epistemology (which explores e.g. how we find out what those moral statements are). "God says how we ought to behave" is not analytic statement (as far as I know), but this is irrelevant; many true statements are not analytic and I never said that my central claim was an analytic truth. In any case, the criticism that it is not analytic statement is not problematic at all for my premises or my conclusion that "If objective morality exists, it is evidence for the existence of God." There's still the matter of the only plausible explanations of objective morality having significant Godlike characteristics, for instance. Buddahchuck wrote: 3) By saying that "the Supreme Metaphysical Being" (or the "metaphysical basis" of everything) is the "metaphysical basis" of morality, you are incurring the same sort circularity flaw as saying "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" is circular. This same problem would occur if we said "existence is the "metaphysical basis" of morality." May I ask where this circularity exists? You may see think "existence" and "God" is a non-progressive answer to the question of what the metaphysical basis of morality is, but why think this is true? Do you have any better alternatives for the metaphysical basis of morality? (Remember that morality as its own basis doesn't quite work for reasons I explained earlier.) Remember, my objection was that "morality says how we ought to behave" has the type of circularity that prevents from providing any real metaphysical basis for morality. If on the other hand the moral statements themselves were "circular" in the sense that their truths logically followed from their definitions (as "hairless men have no hair" would) I would have no objection. Buddahchuck wrote: All we know about "God", as you describe it, is that it has a heart (which is apparently objective morality, though I am inclined to think your conception of this heart is more metaphorical and ambiguous than anything), and it is "The Supreme Metaphysical Being", which apparently means the entity by which all things exist, and that it is the truth-maker for moral statements. Aside from commenting that there is no clear answer as to how this entity makes things true, everything that is true, is only true by its existence (if we extend the idea). First, I would like to point out that God is the supreme authority in the universe and would thus (by definition) have the right to say how we ought to behave. The nature of God as the supreme authority and divine command theory explains why moral ought-statements are true. The divine commands themselves result from the nature of God as the paradigm of goodness; God is what Plato called "The Good." God is by nature loving, which is why He gives the divine command to love thy neighbor. If you want further detail than this as to the metaphysical mechanics of how this all works, I'm afraid I don't have much. But before you claim this is sufficient reason to reject the notion that morality is based in God, I should point out that there appears to be no better explanation for the existence of objective morality. And if God is the best explanation for the existence of objective morality, then objective morality would constitute evidence for the existence of God.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Maloy
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Posted 08/06/08 - 06:24 PM:	#808
As there are so many posts here, I'm going to address the O/P before looking at the rest. I don't believe in "absolute" good or evil. Figure may as well state that off the hop. My disagreeing with you is in no way meant as insulting. Benedict wrote: In my opinion one of the most convincing arguments for God is that of the existence of moral law. When a small child is ditched in line he somehow knows that "that's not fair!" Why is that? The answer is best given in the reality of the absolute moral law. I'd say it's because it's learned. The child who cut in front doesn't have an ingrained sense of fairness, right? If a common moral law exists then that necessitates a Moral Law Giver,God. That's a big if. One looks at the Holocaust and concludes that the Germans' actions were "atrocious" and "evil". One what? Nazi? Hitler thought (so it would seem) that a cleansing would be good for humankind so that right there says there is no "absolute good" for an absolute must be "absolutely" objective, meaning all agree on This might beg the question "Why is killing evil?". The question is best answered by assuming something was able to write this law on our hearts with intentions to leading us to an even greater moral perfection. Once again that something is God. If we're assuming, the question isn't answered though. The Argument is best summed up in the following: 1.There is a universal moral law 2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver 3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver 1. If there was a universal moral law, all would be bound to it. 2. Such a moral law would would imply a lack of trial and error on our part in the realm of ethics. 3. Things just "are" and are given values as we see fit. There is still the question of evil. If there is such a law then why aren't murders and rapists bound by it? The answer is that they are or at least they were. People aren't born killers. People make decisions that lead to habits that lead to lifestyles. You learn from experience and by being taught. Alot of killers have mental problems and don't have a sense of what is right and wrong. Even many pedophiles believe they are doing what they do in the name of love. They show no remorse. I once saw an interview with Jeffrey Dahmer while he was in prison. The interviewer asked him to describe how he came to do the monstrous things he did. Jeffrey answered by saying that he basically had to battle his conscience to commit that first rape and murder. After that it became less of a moral issue each time he did it. However, after the fact Dahmer went on to say he became aware of the atrocity of his actions through contemplation of his acts well after he committed them. In essence, even if one is able to shrug off his conscience for a few moments it still comes back to haunt him once he's had time to think about it. He was a nutjob for sure. But again, not all killers and rapists feel remorse. On the other end of the spectrum, we see moral law coming to perfection in the lives of saints and the like. They have demonstrated that when we follow our conscience it ultimately leads to the Almighty and then to moral perfection in God. This manifests itself in acts of extreme self-sacrifice and selflessness in order to help others with no ulterior motives whatsoever. Not all of these fine folks have a belief in God. Look at Buddha. Edited by Maloy on 08/06/08 - 07:12 PM. Reason: righting a wrong
In the infinite library, there are no two identical books. -- The library of Babel.

Maloy
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Posted 08/06/08 - 07:20 PM:	#809
Tisthammerw wrote: Basically, the metaphysical basis of morality is the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"; i.e. the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. If for instance the foundation of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is "Mathematics says how we ought to behave" and mathematics would be the metaphysical basis of morality. This I think I like. "Mathematics says how we ought to behave". If all = one, compassion would be the most logical path to ethics. "Everybody's everything" -- Carlos Santana
In the infinite library, there are no two identical books. -- The library of Babel.

TMB
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Posted 08/07/08 - 04:09 AM:	#810
Tist said, Yeesh, a little quick to vilify are we? What "hidden agenda" do you think I have? Perhaps it was a bit harsh to state that your agenda is hidden. While you have not directly acknowledged your a priori position that a God does exist, you are unable to conceal it as your driver to try and use a logically unsupportable position of OM, that will lead you back to your belief in a God. In any case, I've explained the semantics as best as my limited explanatory skills have allowed. I admit my skills may be limited, but I've seen a lot of people (including philosophers) do worse. And let's not forget that some definitions are inherently difficult to define. Its not the defintions, or even the inconsistency to support your argument, but rather the circular logic you apply within the defintions to ensure you end up back with your basic assumption - that God does exist and it can be logically proven through the mechanism of asuming OM exists. On that note I'll recap some definitions I've been using. Morality is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe. While your definition of OM is a efinition it also becomes an unprovable assumption that it does exist as a brute fact, and this is how you are incorrectly using it. You even try and 'prove' it by saying if it were anything else it would be absurd. And since you are supporting this as your subjective opinion, its ironic that you are placing OM as something regardless of human opinions - excepting yours when it comes to judgement of the absurd. That surely IS absurd.

TMB
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Posted 08/07/08 - 04:17 AM:	#811
Tist said, Yeesh, a little quick to vilify are we? What "hidden agenda" do you think I have? Perhaps it was a bit harsh to state that your agenda is hidden. While you have not directly acknowledged your a priori position that a God does exist, you are unable to conceal it as your driver to try and use a logically unsupportable position of OM, that will lead you back to your belief in a God. In any case, I've explained the semantics as best as my limited explanatory skills have allowed. I admit my skills may be limited, but I've seen a lot of people (including philosophers) do worse. And let's not forget that some definitions are inherently difficult to define. Its not the defintions, or even the inconsistency to support your argument, but rather the circular logic you apply within the defintions to ensure you end up back with your basic assumption - that God does exist and it can be logically proven through the mechanism of asuming OM exists. On that note I'll recap some definitions I've been using. Morality is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe. While your definition of OM is a efinition it also becomes an unprovable assumption that it does exist as a brute fact, and this is how you are incorrectly using it. You even try and 'prove' it by saying if it were anything else it would be absurd. And since you are supporting this as your subjective opinion, its ironic that you are placing OM as something regardless of human opinions - excepting yours when it comes to judgement of the absurd. That surely IS absurd.

jbji
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Posted 08/07/08 - 07:39 AM: Subject: 'finding proof' - a mental self-deception?	#812
Benedict wrote: In my opinion one of the most convincing arguments for God is that of the existence of moral law. When a small child is ditched in line he somehow knows that "that's not fair!" Why is that? The answer is best given in the reality of the absolute moral law. If a common moral law exists then that necessitates a Moral Law Giver,God. One looks at the Holocaust and concludes that the Germans' actions were "atrocious" and "evil". This might beg the question "Why is killing evil?". The question is best answered by assuming something was able to write this law on our hearts with intentions to leading us to an even greater moral perfection. Once again that something is God. . The mind can conclude/prove anything it wants. Do you -want- to prove the existence of God? You give the child complaining that he's been ditched, as example og God's 'moral law'' This is the label your mind has chosen to place on it. Another, might say that his saying that is due to the 'law' of being born with a selfish ego, like all other humans. You also say that 'God has written this law in our hearts'. If so, it seems that the job has not been done quite effectively; all you have to do to witness the proof of this is, to turn on the TV's latest news... which bloodshed is due to X's 'moral law' versus Y's, and all done moreover in Gods name. I am not saying that there is, or there is no God. It just seems to me, that the 'god' we humans usually speak of, is the one man has created in his own image... for various reasons, such as fear and a vague feeling that one is actually nothing... meaning not a thing, but which 'no-thingness' cannot be discovered in its fullness, because the mind is already occupied with worshipping its own creation, and defending it via various explanations and other mentations... a process of thinking, with no basis in the truth of actuality. The actuality of God, the Immensity, the ground of being, source of existence, could be discovered when the 'me' with its imaginative thought, is not. The event, as I described in my post "A meeting with the Eternal", points to this. Regards, jb. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/J-Krishnamurti_andLife/

Buddahchuck
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Posted 08/07/08 - 08:29 PM:	#813
And again Tist, I very much understand your point, but you seem to have missed a greater part of the argument I was making. Tist wrote: That might have been all you saw, but it wasn't all I wrote. I'll bold the parts of the post that you may have missed. You never addressed what constitutes a metaphysical basis on its own. I'm objecting to the idea of "metaphysical basis" as you never explain what constitutes a metaphysical basis. Hence objections like: I wrote: "If I said "Trees (Chairs, Nails, Squirrels etc.) say how we ought to behave," does that fit within your scheme of what consists of a "metaphysical basis"?Additionally, you don't elucidate what a metaphysical basis is independent of morality. What is the metaphysical basis of war (love, Alpha Centauri, existence etc.)?" and "I very much suspect that your agreement (or probable disagreement) will depend on how you elucidate what a metaphysical basis is. But you never say what a metaphysical basis is. You do say: tist wrote: the foundation of morality and the source of moral ought-statements. My objection, however, is that we have no clear idea of morality in general, much less what sort of foundation it might have. The most obvious answer to the source of moral ought-statements is human culture, but that is not under the label of objective morality, so that conclusion is unreachable to you because of your base assumptions. When we talk about "metaphysical" foundations for things, we really just use language to talk about things we have no clue about, and that is the argument that you have not responded to. I was particularly hoping the last sentence and the example of mathematics would make the idea clear. Actually, it was the last sentence that inspired: I wrote: All I see above is that you replaced the words "who or what" with some concept. It doesn't elucidate anything concerning what a metaphysical basis is, and this needs to be done in order for us to understand the example of mathematics. Is mathematics even capable of being a "metaphysical basis" of things. If so, do things like Love, Hedonism, Entropy constitute something that might be a metaphysical basis, or could we stretch it to say that Trees, chairs, paper are all metaphysical bases as well? You seem to have a clear idea of what you are talking about, but you certainly aren't saying anything that directly addresses this argument. And then you try to respond to my argument saying that if "morality says how we ought to behave" is an analytic truth (i.e. all statements concerning how we ought to behave are comprise morality), then moral statements themselves are not analytic. And you even post your comment saying: Tist wrote: It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make that claim true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Morality therefore cannot be its own metaphysical basis. But the objection is that if objective morality exists and morality says how we ought to behave then moral statements are analytic truths because those objective moral statements are what morality actually means. If I take the statement "One ought-not rape" to be an objective moral truth then to act morally literally means that I do not rape, for "ought-not raping" is part of the definition of objective morality. Apparently, however, you do not believe that morality is objective, for if that were the case, then you would embrace the idea that morality actually means that we should not do these things that defy objective moral truth. Rather, you put morality in the hands of a subjective entity like "god" that chooses what is moral and what is not. Of course, I don't expect you to understand such an argument; after 800 posts, I expect you to respond with your same language and say that I am misunderstanding your argument and that God is not a conscious entity that chooses what morality is, and also note that "objective" according to your definition is independent of what humans think feel and believe. The fact that God being the basis of morality does not bring us closer to what these moral statements actually are is irrelevant. After all, I'm saying that God provides an answer for moral ontology (which explores e.g. the foundation of morality), not moral epistemology (which explores e.g. how we find out what those moral statements are). And in saying that God is merely a homunculus for morality, I am saying that you are only adding another entity to the moral ontology and not progressing the argument at all. If you think the argument I provided to which you were attempting a response comments on moral epistemology, then you clearly have no place in this discussion. I very clearly said: I wrote: Instead of saying "How we ought to behave is how we ought to behave" (another analytically true statement), you are only changing the "metaphysical basis" to "the Supreme Metaphysical Being says how we ought to behave", which (a) does not have the same truth value as an analytic statement and (b) does not bring us any closer to understanding "how we ought to behave" than would simply saying "Morality is how we ought to behave." Tist wrote: May I ask where this circularity exists? You may see think "existence" and "God" is a non-progressive answer to the question of what the metaphysical basis of morality is, but why think this is true? Right after the part of the quote you cut-off: I wrote: Saying that existence is the cause of something existing is a non-progressive statement that does not advance the dialog any more than your examples of Set S and Set O. In case you missed it the second time, the argument is that "existence exists" is circular in the same way as "morality is moral". If I ask what the reason something exists is, and your answer is that it was made by the thing that makes existence, then that is a circular answer (NB this pertains to your conception of "god" being the creator of all things, and then saying that if things exist, they are evidence for God). So when you ask "if morality exists, why does it exist?" and we answer, "it just exists", that should be satisfactory. By requiring that something makes it exist, and then call that something the maker of all existence, you are not adding any meaningful, logical explanation to the thing trying to be explained. Most people have commented that you are only begging the question (another way of saying that your argument is circular, as I explained above). We have asked "Why does god make morality?", and your answer as been, "that's just what god is". I don't know how many different ways this idea can be explained before you understand it. If on the other hand the moral statements themselves were "circular" in the sense that their truths logically followed from their definitions (as "hairless men have no hair" would) I would have no objection. You're right, moral statements could only be circular if there were a such thing as objective morality, and to not kill, rape or steal was actually what it means to be moral. First, I would like to point out that God is the supreme authority in the universe and would thus (by definition) have the right to say how we ought to behave. You only assume that "God" is the "supreme authority in the universe", but as I have pointed out, such an assumption is hardly unique and is merely circular because you do not suggest "God is the supreme authority in the universe" for considering its truth, but rather more of a definition of what "god" is. Defining God as "the supreme authority in the universe" only makes the claim "God says how we ought to behave" translate to "the supreme authority in the universe says how we ought to behave" which has very little difference from saying "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" or "the thing that says how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Its all just cryptic metaphysical jargon. And you only prove this further by saying: Tist wrote: The nature of God as the supreme authority and divine command theory explains why moral ought-statements are true. The divine commands themselves result from the nature of God as the paradigm of goodness; God is what Plato called "The Good." God is by nature loving, which is why He gives the divine command to love thy neighbor. Tist wrote: If you want further detail than this as to the metaphysical mechanics of how this all works, I'm afraid I don't have much. I am well aware of that. That's why metaphysics is an insignificant consideration. But before you claim this is sufficient reason to reject the notion that morality is based in God But my claim is not rejecting the notion that morality is based in God, I am claiming a) it has no meaning if we accept that morality is based in God b) morality doesn't need a metaphysical basis (unless of course you limit discussions of morality to solely objective morality) c) the traditional idea of "God" is not necessary for objective morality to exist. I am not making any positive claims on what the "metaphysical basis" of morality is, however, you are. I have no burden except to prove that your claim is not necessarily true. I should point out that there appears to be no better explanation for the existence of objective morality. But virtually everyone who disagrees with you, disagrees that objective morality exists, and thus they don't really care to explain why objective morality existence. Additionally, I think the argument I just presented proves that your explanation for the existence of objective morality isn't "better". And if God is the best explanation for the existence of objective morality, then objective morality would constitute evidence for the existence of God. The circular translation: And if existence is the best explanation for the existence of objective morality, then objective morality would constitute evidence for existence.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 08/09/08 - 12:22 PM:

#814

The metaphysical basis of objective morality
Who or what says how we ought to behave?

Buddahchuck wrote:
So when you ask "if morality exists, why does it exist?" and we answer, "it just exists", that should be satisfactory.

It's not, at least not by itself. We need a clearer answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" The best interpretation to the brute fact position ("morality just exists") seems to be that the basis of morality is the universe/reality/existence in some general sense; the universe or existence itself is what says how we ought to behave. Like God (note that in post #778 I defined God as "an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible and supreme authority over all living beings"), this works as a satisfactory stopping point. But there are a few problems. If the universe never began to exist (having no creator) then it is eternal, and the universe is trivially omnipresent. The basis of morality, as I argued earlier, must have infallible and supreme authority. So if we make reality/existence as our basis, we have an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible and supreme authority in saying how we ought to behave. Even if we can't call this entity God, the problem of course is that this nonetheless supports my claim that the only plausible, viable explanations for objective morality are entities with significant Godlike characteristics--and that objective morality (if it exists) is evidence for God's existence.

Buddahchuck wrote:
And then you try to respond to my argument saying that if "morality says how we ought to behave" is an analytic truth (i.e. all statements concerning how we ought to behave are comprise morality), then moral statements themselves are not analytic.

Uh, no. I said that even if "morality says how we ought to behave" is an analytic statement (true by definition), the moral statements themselves are not. With that misconstrual cleared up (I hope), we proceed with this:

Buddahchuck wrote:
But the objection is that if objective morality exists and morality says how we ought to behave then moral statements are analytic truths because those objective moral statements are what morality actually means. If I take the statement "One ought-not rape" to be an objective moral truth then to act morally literally means that I do not rape, for "ought-not raping" is part of the definition of objective morality.

Not quite. Remember how I defined morality: the set of principles and statements that correctly describe how one should and should not behave. The statement "one ought not to rape," though a true statement, is not part of the definition of morality. As an analogy, the Earth is round, but the Earth being round is not part of the definition of the word "round." The Earth is simply an instantiation of the concept of "roundness" and whether the Earth is round cannot be ascertained simply by definition of the word "round." Similarly, the statement "one ought not to commit rape" is true and an instantiation of morality, but its truthfulness cannot be ascertained simply by the definition of morality or the definitions of the words that the statement "one ought not to rape" uses. It seems evident that "one ought not to rape" is not an analytic truth; i.e. it is not true simply by definition, as "hairless men have no hair" is. "One ought not to rape" is true statement just like "the Earth is round," but the basis of their truthfulness is not analytic. The claim that moral statements are analytic truths therefore does not work.

With that discarded as a basis of morality, what plausible and viable explanations do we have left? The universe/reality/existence is the only one that seems to be both plausible and viable, and if that alternative doesn't end up being God (an omnipresent entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority that everyone ought to obey) it comes awfully close. God may very well be the best explanation for the existence of objective morality.

Buddahchuck wrote:

I should point out that there appears to be no better explanation for the existence of objective morality [than God].

But virtually everyone who disagrees with you, disagrees that objective morality exists, and thus they don't really care to explain why objective morality [exists]

Perhaps not, but remember my central claim: if objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God. And if God would be the best explanation for the existence of objective morality, then objective morality (if it exists) would indeed constitute evidence for the existence of God.

I've put the ones that seem to have more substance above because it more directly addresses my positions, e.g. my claim that the only plausible, viable explanations are entities with Godlike characteristics. Some objections do not address this point at all, nor do they address the idea that this point logically leads to the conclusion (that if objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God).

With all due respect Buddahchuck, some of your objections seem a bit strained and vague. To illustrate that point...

Buddahchuck wrote:
And again Tist, I very much understand your point, but you seem to have missed a greater part of the argument I was making.

In which case I suggest you please make yourself a bit clearer. Consider for instance this exchange:

Buddahchuck wrote:

The fact that God being the basis of morality does not bring us closer to what these moral statements actually are is irrelevant. After all, I'm saying that God provides an answer for moral on