Moral Argument for God: Philosophy Forums

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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God

hipskipdip
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Posted 06/26/08 - 05:41 AM:	#776
Tist wrote: " Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority). Absolute. The basis of morality is not relative but absolute; both its existence and its moral truths are stone-cold facts and are independent of any arbitrary moral standards we humans might create. Additionally, as the supreme authority its existence and statements of how we ought to behave are completely unrestrained by any other would-be authorities (as governments). Try as they might have, the Nazis could not budge the fact that their anti-Semitism was immoral. Universally binding. Because of the nature of objective morality, the entity's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes. Infallibly authoritative. The basis of morality also cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority." YES Tist! Let's apply this to all natural laws. For example physics, it's surpreme transcendent authority, absolute, universally binding, and infallibly authoritative when it comes to all things physics. "You sure you're not misinterpreting me? My actual conclusion is "If objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God." How is objective morality not being self-evident make this conclusion circular? I'm doing something like a conditional proof with "objective morality exists" as a sort of conditional proof assumption. Whether objective morality is self-evident doesn't matter. My conclusion does not at all depend on whether objective morality exists, only that if it did it would constitute evidence for the existence of God." I've got to second Buddahchuck here: Buddahchuck wrote: "All of these would be more solid arguments than the one which you are presenting, which if you put it in syllogism format looks something like this: 1) X->Y 2) X=Y 3)-Y->-X 4) X->Y If you want to write some sort of bible, go ahead and go for it." When you end with your premise for a conclusion, that's circularity. Tist wrote: "God makes it true by virtue of what He is: the supreme authority in the universe. Objective morality is an inseparable, irreducible part of God, and one cannot "break it down" further beyond being what He is." A = objective morals B= God AB is inseperable or one identity, so it is actually Q. There was never anything A or B, only Q. Being God and Objective morality are simple attributes of the same thing. So your argument A -> B is shit because there is only Q. Not to mention both of these terms are so broadly defined they're vacuous... AGAIN, Circular and Vacuous... Get it? Got it? Good! I'm going to go along with Buddahchuck, and everytime you repost your terrible argument I'm going post my criticism. Buddahchuck wrote: "Certainly there has to be rules against him posting this same bad argument every time." Is there?!
"What the world calls clever more often is vanity and narrowness." - Goethe, Faust. "I am God! How do I know? Everytime I pray to God I realize that I'm just talking to myself." - The Ruling Class "You may not agree with everything I say, but at the very least, you'll understand that your differing opinion is wrong." -Steven Colbert

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Posted 06/26/08 - 01:01 PM:	#777
Let's give Tist's argument a more charitable reading, and take out the uncomfortable counterfactual and potentially contentious definitions. I think that the argument's core is represented by: Some people believe that there are some moral truths irrespective of any person, grouping or society's views. For example "The Nazi Holocaust was morally wrong" would, they suggest, be true if everybody (including I suppose the Jews, gypsies and homosexuals involved) in all time believed it to be right and justified. Moral truths aren't like physical truths - they need to have a conscious authority behind them, because they reflect judgements. Since those in this group can't appeal to people/societies for that judgement, given the possibility that they could all be wrong, we need to appeal to something else. Therefore there if you believe that moral truths are independent of any fallible moral agent or agents' judgements, you need to believe there is an infallible moral authority, capable of making moral judgements. The only reasonable candidates for an infallible moral authority, capable of making judgements, are a god or gods. I have tried quite hard to remove the difficult words like 'transcendent', or the apparently circular parts such as 'what makes it so that we really ought to obey moral rules' . Now there are quite a few ways to criticise this argument, but it is not entirely hollow. Perhaps this would be better argument to pull apart.... Just as an aside, note that it also works for people who believe that the rules of cricket are true irrespective of any person, grouping or society's views. If you believe that Kevin Pietersen's switch hit is against the rules of the game irrespective of the views of the MCC, ICB, Wisden, or indeed yourself, then you could follow the same reasoning to believe in an infallible cricketing authority - God.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/26/08 - 07:23 PM:	#778
Buddahchuck wrote: You can't be serious. Certainly there has to be rules against him posting this same bad argument every time. Is the idea that if he puts-it-up enough then somehow our criticisms of his argument will go away? On the contrary, I put it up so I would receive criticisms of it. What happened was hipskipdip didn't address my argument but instead attacked a conclusion I did not adhere to. So, I cleared up the misinterpretation and presented the argument again for his convenience (so he would not have to look up another post). I was just trying to be nice. Sheesh. If it's anybody who should be complaining about rules, it should be me for you repeatedly misrepresenting my position in this thread. I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt here and believe these are all sincere mistakes. But please be more careful, and perhaps try to calm down a little. Emotions can fog up the lens though which we see, even to the extent of not even seeing the opposition accurately (for that reason, I think people can put up a lot of straw men unintentionally). Buddahchuck wrote: Your definitions are broad, so broad you could land an airplane on them. god being "the supreme metaphysical entity" has huge problems even for theists, namely it assumes a very monotheistic religion; it has problems for pantheists. You oversimplified my definition. From post #772: A definition that seems to fit both the pantheistic and traditional monotheistic God is "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." The God of pantheism is a metaphysical entity greater than ourselves; one that ought to be revered or perhaps even worshiped. God is certainly the supreme metaphysical reality in traditional monotheism, and people are obligated to revere and obey Him. It's still a bit vague I admit, but at the time it was the only definition I knew of that fits both naturalistic pantheism and traditional monotheism. And even if this particular definition is vague, it still doesn't really address the guts of the argument. For one thing, even if "the universe says how we ought to behave" would not necessarily constitute pantheism, we still have a transcendent, omnipresent, eternal, universally binding entity with supreme and infallible moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. If anything, it might be better for you to attack the definitions of the attributes I ascribe to the entity that is the basis of morality. Do you have any objections to these attributes? If so what? Incidentally, how about this definition of God? God is an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible and supreme authority over all living beings. Buddahchuck wrote: You don't seem to understand a means/end argument, or what it would mean for morality to be an end. Instead, you concoct this arbitrary notion of objective morality that misses the heart of the philosophical issue, namely that morality can be derived via objective methods. That isn't the heart of the philosophical issue at all. In the context of meta-ethics, "objective morality" is the idea that moral statements are true, valid and binding independently of what humans think, feel, or believe. It's also the sort of definition used in the argument from morality. (Check William Lane Craig for instance.) Buddahchuck wrote: I gave you 10 ways in which morality could be objective, and you merely brush them aside saying "that's not plausible". Again, that's an oversimplification, and in this case a bit of a misrepresentation. For most of them, I gave actual reasons why they wouldn't work and raised various points and questions that you downright ignored (post #731). For crying out loud, one proposal that was supposedly a way that morality could be objective was actually cultural relativism! Maybe your misrepresentation of my responses wasn't intentional, but in that case I recommend you double check what I said before complaining about it. Buddahchuck wrote: Your argument is VERY circular Tist, what little of an argument there is. Please show me where precisely where this circularity arises. You didn't quite do so in your last post. You've said I used vague definitions (the only example of which you gave was an oversimplification of my actual definition), wrote a parody of my argument, but not a whole lot else. It might be more constructive to give clear and specific explanations. Edited by Tisthammerw on 06/27/08 - 05:37 PM. Reason: Proposed new, more specific definition for God
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/26/08 - 07:42 PM:	#779
hipskipdip wrote: Tist wrote: " Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority). Absolute. The basis of morality is not relative but absolute; both its existence and its moral truths are stone-cold facts and are independent of any arbitrary moral standards we humans might create. Additionally, as the supreme authority its existence and statements of how we ought to behave are completely unrestrained by any other would-be authorities (as governments). Try as they might have, the Nazis could not budge the fact that their anti-Semitism was immoral. Universally binding. Because of the nature of objective morality, the entity's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes. Infallibly authoritative. The basis of morality also cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority." YES Tist! Let's apply this to all natural laws. For example physics, it's surpreme transcendent authority, absolute, universally binding, and infallibly authoritative when it comes to all things physics. That really doesn't apply to the laws of physics because those laws are simply descriptions of empirical regularities; they say what is rather than what ought to be. Thus, no authoritative entity is necessary for that. Asking who or what says what ought to be is a perfectly legitimate question in regards to morality, but not applicable in physics. hipskipdip wrote: When you end with your premise for a conclusion, that's circularity. Tist wrote: "God makes it true by virtue of what He is: the supreme authority in the universe. Objective morality is an inseparable, irreducible part of God, and one cannot "break it down" further beyond being what He is." A = objective morals B= God AB is inseperable or one identity, so it is actually Q. There was never anything A or B, only Q. Being God and Objective morality are simple attributes of the same thing. So your argument A -> B is shit because there is only Q. Eh, not quite. You kind of misinterpreted the quote there. The context of the quote was someone asking how God can make moral statements true, and my answer was (in part) that God is the supreme authority in the universe and that He cannot exist without objective morality. Looking at it above, perhaps I could have worded it better. God cannot exist without objective morality was what I meant to convey; if God exists one cannot separate objective morality from God because it is a necessary part of what God is. But I was not at all assuming or meaning to convey that objective morality and God are the necessarily same thing (as if by definition). I wasn't saying that God and morality were a literal identity. Now how about my actual argument? Do you agree or disagree that if objective morality exists the basis of morality would have those characteristics I listed? If you agree that we would end up with a transcendent, absolute, universally binding entity with infallible moral authority, to what extent (if any) would this constitute evidence for the existence of God? If the basis of morality would not be such an entity, why wouldn't the basis of morality have those characteristics I've listed?
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Posted 07/01/08 - 05:05 AM:	#780
Tisthammerw wrote: Can morality be its own metaphysical basis? I realize this was a heading title and not exactly a direct question, but I figured it would be easiest if I headed it off by saying, "No, and that's not what I argued." What I was getting at was that, if there were such a thing as objective morality, it would be a set of rules. That set of objectively moral rules would be "who or what tells us how we ought to behave." The truth-maker(s) for those rules would be the metaphysical basis of morality, but they would not tell us how to behave. They would simply be part of the explanation as to why we should behave that way. To deal briefly with the examples you mention: if objective morality obtains, the reason we should do the actions in set S and not those in set O is because the statements in S would be true and the statements in O would be false. This is not to give any special value to truth -- since both S and O consist of ought statements, it would be trivially true that we ought to heed any statement in S (if "one ought refrain from murder" is true then one ought refrain from murder). As all the statements in O are the opposite of statements in S, we ought not heed any statement in O as there is a true statement in S that prohibits such action. Your example of the Captain, the Lieutenant, and the Admiral follows your re-definition of "authority" into something more in alignment with what I have been saying, so perhaps we are on the same page now. The metaphysical basis of morality would be the truth-maker for moral statements -- not the statements themselves. Objectively true moral statements would tell us how we ought to behave, but those statements would be true in virtue of something other than themselves. Tisthammerw wrote: Hm, that explanation seems to beg the question that I begged the question. I'm not quite sure I get what you mean. The claim that morality is incorporeal entails that it is unavailable to a sufficiently strong physicalist. The thought experiment you use to motivate the claim, however, is one of which said physicalist would not even acknowledge the basic premise. Remove the physical world, remove everything that exists (morality included). One need not even be a radical physicalist to have this problem with the thought experiment. Even those who think that morality or math are not strictly physical could still hold that eliminating everything physical removes everything that exists and the spirits you speak of would have to be replacements, not continuations of themselves in a different form (as in my "replace one world with the other" alteration). The argument "morality is incorporeal because it does not go away if you remove the physical world," then, begs the question against the physicalist because they hold that morality (and everything else) does go away if you remove the physical world. You would need either a different thought experiment or a much more complicated argument to establish the incorporeality of morality. Tisthammerw wrote: But if mathematical truths were abstractions, why would they depend on the physical world at all? Would 2 + 2 fail to equal 4 simply because there was no physical world? It doesn't seem plausible. Analytic statements, almost by definition, are not dependent upon anything in the physical world because those statements are true by virtue of what they mean. It depends on whether or not one wishes to be a realist about numbers. If not, then no problem. If so, however, the physicalist needs to show how numbers are part of the physical universe. The parallel with morality is obvious: if one is to be a realist about morality, one must show it could be part of the universe. A physicalist moral realist, then, would have to show how it could be part of the physical universe (as that is all he acknowledges as existing). So again, simply asserting that morality is incorporeal because it could exist if the physical universe went away begs the question against the physicalist moral realist. A much more complex argument would be required. Tisthammerw wrote: Of course, if you define physicalism in this extreme sense (such that 2 + 2 could not equal 4 without a physical world), then yes I'll grant you that the "if we stripped away everything physical..." scenario more or less begs the question of whether physicalism is true. This just wasn't the sort of radical physicalism I understood you to mean. Your argument does not differentiate between strengths of physicalism. The thought experiment, therefore, should be neutral in regard to them. Still, I don't take it that one must be a radical physicalist (e.g. one who proclaims physicalism to be the only possible ontology) to find the thought experiment question begging. Tisthammerw wrote: (1) Where did I stray from this point? As mentioned before, the argument that objective morality at least entails naturalistic pantheism and your earlier insistence that naturalistic pantheism is substantively different from atheism are the elements of a stronger, deductive-style argument. Insofar as you have disavowed such intentions, the claims are confusing ones to make. Tisthammerw wrote: (2) It depends on what you find "interesting." I think the notion of some transcendent, absolute, universally binding entity with supreme and infallible authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to obey it is very interesting. As hipskipdip said: philosophically interesting. A point so weak that no one would deny it (though it may be initially presented in seemingly interesting, but ultimately misleading, terms) or that its denial makes no difference fails to be interesting in this sense. If the argument winds up boiling down to "hey, isn't it neat that we use similar words in both objective morality discourse and God discourse?" then it seems to be uninteresting in just this way. No real conclusion follows from it. Having disavowed deductive intentions, you cannot be saying that objective morality entails the existence of God. Having disavowed inductive intentions, you cannot be saying that objective morality makes the existence of God more likely than the alternative. What, then, remains to be argued that is philosophically interesting? Tisthammerw wrote: The rules of logic are not authoritative in the sense I was using though. Sure they are. Logic is a normative enterprise, much as morality is -- and this is hardly a controversial point among philosophers. Just as the rules of morality are would tell us how we ought to behave if we are to be morally good, the rules of logic tell us how we ought to reason if we are to be rational creatures. Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Both of these senses are synonymous with "objective." It's similar but not quite identical. In light of the above, I think you might want to reconsider this. Tisthammerw wrote: Saying "there is something in the universe besides God that says how we ought to behave, but I'm not going to tell you what it is" doesn't seem particularly useful here, particularly if you can't think of any viable example. Keep in mind that I don't think anything could successfully underwrite objective morality. I can't give you a viable example because there is no such thing. As such, I am not saying anything like the above attributed paraphrase. What I am saying is that there are more possibilities to the universe option than you let on. It need not be the universe entire that determines how we should behave. It could be properties within that universe. If this is at least prima facie possible, it would still be a version of the universe option yet would clearly not be pantheism. Moreover, this option seems at the very least no worse off than your full-universe option (unless, of course, one has decided in advance to exclude all non-theistic possibilities -- but that would be to beg the question). Tisthammerw wrote: In the context I used it, atheism is traditionally defined as the belief that there is no god or God. Whether this thesis is true will depend on how you define "God," which was kind of my point. This part of the conversation has gone quite beyond where that would be a contextually appropriate definition. Insisting that we stick to it when it is no longer relevant or objecting to a point made beyond it by illicitly returning to it is clearly an invalid philosophical move to make. Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: When you were discussing Kantianism, you referred to it as "implausible." But given the vast number of people who find it "seemingly worthy of belief," that statement could only be true if you were using a different definition. That definition would be non-standard. But do vast numbers of people believing it plausible make it plausible? If everyone thought 2 + 2 = 5 was plausible, would 2 + 2 = 5 then become a plausible statement? There's a lot to like about Kantianism, but if Kant's claim was that "logic/reason says how we ought to behave" then this claim doesn't work, as I explained earlier. Logic and reason can never get us beyond hypothetical imperatives; they cannot create categorical imperatives. Thus, this proposed solution does not seem worthy of belief. The problem with the definition of "plausible" as "seemingly worthy of belief" is that it is a relatively subjective definition (like the term "convincing evidence"). What I find worthy of belief you may not and vice versa. The most important thing to keep in mind is that declaring something plausible is different from declaring that you believe it. For example: both quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity are plausible, yet they are mutually exclusive. We must, therefore, withhold belief from one or both theories until the evidence in favor of each has been reconciled. Yet it is the fact that they are both plausible theories that puts us in a predicament. Were one implausible, their inconsistency would be inconsequential. As such, to say that an idea is "seemingly worthy of belief" is not to say that one believes it. What it is to say is that the idea is not obviously wrong and that it is understandable why someone (or many people) might believe it. That said, the statement 2 + 2 = 5 is obviously wrong. Were we to come across many people who believed it, we would strongly suspect either that they were speaking a different language/had different numerals than we do or that entirely different concepts were behind their assertion of it. (We might think of children as a possible counterexample, but children who get the sum wrong are not asserting that 2 + 2 = 5. Instead, they are guessing because they have not yet mastered the concepts necessary for the answer to be obvious.) Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: I guess I have to ask, once again, how He makes moral statements true. God makes it true by virtue of what He is: the supreme authority in the universe. Objective morality is an inseparable, irreducible part of God, and one cannot "break it down" further beyond being what He is. This is not an answer, or at least not a substantive one. While it may serve as an article of faith, it does no philosophical work. If this is all you can say at this juncture, then -- as hipskipdip has again already pointed out -- your argument is circular. Any version of a moral argument for God relies on the assumption that we can understand what is meant by both "God" and "objective morality" in such a way that the terms do not ineliminably refer to each other. (Or, at the very least, that the term in the antecedent does not ineliminably refer to the term in the consequent.) Tisthammerw wrote: In short, if objective morality is changeless, then so is its metaphysical basis. Given that, is there any reason at all to think that ethics would be susceptible to change if they were grounded in God? Well, given the dearth of religions that consistently posit an unchanging God, this would once again mean that you are taking objective morality to be evidence for a very specific and non-traditional concept of God (certainly not the standard Christian God, for example, who changes demonstrably between the Old and New Testaments). It would also undermine the pantheism argument, since equating God and the universe means that God changes every time the universe changes (which by a conservative estimate occurs on the order of a quadrillion times per nanosecond). Tisthammerw wrote: OK, so your objection is that if ethics were grounded in God then ethical statements would become arbitrary (in the sense that they could have been anything). No. My argument is that if DCT were true, morality would be subjective. It's a conditional argument (something I believe you are familiar with) that I presented not as an objection (though obviously it would function that way if you decided to go down the DCT path), but because you specifically asked me how DCT results in subjectivism. I suppose it is also worth noting that DCT is the most common and obvious way of grounding morality in God, and you have not yet provided a substantive account of any alternative strategy. Tisthammerw wrote: Remember though, "subjective" in ethics refers to what a person believes actually makes it true for him (not anyone else). Not quite. For one, that's a slogan primarily meant to make subjectivism more accessible to freshman. For another, it's a rather misleading formulation of that slogan. More properly, one would say that subjectivists hold that "x is wrong" means "x is wrong (according) to me" (not "for me") or "x is wrong from my perspective." Saying "for him(/me)" is misleading because a subjectivist does not hold that when one says "x is wrong" he means "I shouldn't x" (that is, the speaker isn't making a judgment solely about what he himself should do -- that would be some form of relativism). Rather, the speaker is making a judgment about behavior that simply has subjective truth-conditions. If we wanted to get technical, then, we might say that subjectivism is the view that we can have a success theory in ethics without recourse to moral realism (whereas the two other types of moral anti-realists -- error theorists and non-cognitivists -- typically deny this). Tisthammerw wrote: God being the basis of objective morality makes it true for everyone. It depends. If we are talking about DCT, then what God would be doing is declaring various things moral or immoral by fiat. He is saying, "x is wrong according to me -- and I am God, so you better do it." There's really nothing wrong with this kind of moral philosophy if you are a theist, it's just not a theory of moral objectivism. Whether or not there is an alternative way to make God the basis of morality in a way that underwrites objectivism remains an open question on this thread. Tisthammerw wrote: [R]emember how I defined objective morality though. I defined it as the idea that moral statements are true independently of what any human thinks, feels, or believes. And being the charitable person I am, I have assumed that this was an innocent over-simplification and not a cynical attempt to stack the deck in your favor. Again, objective morality must be mind-independent across the board. Trying to make an exception for God would be a case of the special pleading fallacy. Imagine if I made a coin that said "moral" on one side and "immoral" on the other. If I then flipped that coin while shouting out various actions (e.g. murder, baking cookies, jogging) and recorded the results, I would be left with a set of judgments that could constitute an system of ethics -- but it certainly would not be anything close to what the moral realist is looking for. And yet, how the coin falls certainly doesn't depend on what any human thinks, feels, or believes. Tisthammerw wrote: Second, does God really count as a person in this context? In the context of DCT, which is the only relevant context for this part of the discussion, yes -- God counts as a person. Tisthammerw wrote: Furthermore, objective morality will still require a supreme authority as its basis anyway, regardless of whether we label this authority "God." Insofar as "authority" has been re-defined as "truth-maker," then objective morality would indeed require such a thing. Whether or not that thing is something an atheist could admit into his ontology is the question. Tisthammerw wrote: Is it necessarily the case that a basis for a truth being a person makes that statement subjective? Suppose for instance the truth in question is that Sally has two arms. Is this truth subjective? That truth is not subjective, but the sense in which the basis of that truth is a person is different than the sense of DCT. This is a truth about a person, not one decided/declared by the person. The same thing applies to the case of Sally thinking of the number 4. Sally can affect the truth of the statement "Sally is thinking of the number 4" depending on what number she is thinking of, but she cannot change the fact that when she is thinking about the number 4, she is thinking about the number 4. Tisthammerw wrote: The broad definition of God is the supreme or ultimate reality. You have a good point (since in some logically possible worlds the "ultimate reality" might just be a lifeless rock), but I largely disagree with your latter claim about it being "uninteresting" if the ultimate reality is the basis of morality. Again, philosophically uninteresting. If God is just whatever the supreme/ultimate/basic (it's not really clear what "supreme" or "ultimate" are meant to indicate here -- I have so far assumed they mean "basic" or "fundamental") metaphysical reality of the universe is -- no matter what -- then the statement "God exists" has no philosophical interest. It ceases to mean anything substantive. If the ultimate reality were a lifeless rock, then to call that God would be to do violence to the notion of God. It would be downright foolish to accept any definition that could allow such a possibility (not to mention counterproductive). Tisthammerw wrote: Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Logical possibilities have to be the only limitations if God is to be omnipotent, as logic is the only reasonable limitation on omnipotence. I guess we just might have to agree to disagree on this matter. Omnipotent = all-powerful, i.e. able to do anything. I am willing to temper that definition by disallowing logical impossibilities as counterexamples (though not all theists accept even this "limitation"), but to go any further strains credulity. If God cannot (as opposed to will not) do immoral things, then He is not omnipotent. Tisthammerw wrote: If the only limitations on God are what is logically possible and his nature of what he is (being the basis of objective morality), to the very least it seems close to omnipotence... And coming in second at the Olympics is usually close to coming in first -- but try telling that to the person holding the silver. A miss is as good as a mile, as the saying goes.
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus

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Posted 07/02/08 - 05:44 PM:	#781
Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Can morality be its own metaphysical basis? I realize this was a heading title and not exactly a direct question, but I figured it would be easiest if I headed it off by saying, "No, and that's not what I argued." What I was getting at was that, if there were such a thing as objective morality, it would be a set of rules. That set of objectively moral rules would be "who or what tells us how we ought to behave." The truth-maker(s) for those rules would be the metaphysical basis of morality, but they would not tell us how to behave. Then it seems we've run into a bit of confusion, because I had previously written in this thread (e.g. post #636): Tisthammerw wrote: Note that the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.” Think of it this way. Suppose I was a Captain in the army and a Private and I have this conversation. "Captain Tisthammerw, I have here a written order for you. It says thou shalt wash my clothes. I think you should obey this command." "What? Who says I ought to wash your clothes?" "The command sir. It's written right here." Obviously, I am asking what the source of the command is. It's a similar thing with morality when I ask who or what says how we ought to behave. Morality may have a statement like "thou shalt not steal" but who or what is giving the order here? God? The universe? What? Postmodern Beatnik wrote: To deal briefly with the examples you mention: if objective morality obtains, the reason we should do the actions in set S and not those in set O is because the statements in S would be true and the statements in O would be false. Er, that's great and all, but what makes them true? Considering what I said above, this response misses the point. Statements in one sense say how we ought to behave, but who or what "puts forth" these statements to begin with? That's kind of what "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" was all about; identifying the authority behind those ought-statements and identifying morality's metaphysical basis. Which is exactly why I had this in the post you responded to: Tisthammerw wrote: Why is it that a moral statement can[not] be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true. Any moral statement (e.g. "one should not steal") is simply a claim about what is true. So how can what a statement means make that statement true? It is actually possible for the meaning of a statement's claim to make itself true, and one could indeed argue that what makes a moral statement true is the collective meaning of the claim's terms. Problem is, this sort of thing applies only to analytic statements, and moral statements are seldom if ever analytic. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Hm, that explanation seems to beg the question that I begged the question. I'm not quite sure I get what you mean. The explanation I was referring to was "It begs the question against the physicalist because it assumes their position is false to demonstrate a problem with it." In other words, I'm begging the question because I'm begging the question. In any case, the "suppose we stripped all matter from the universe, and suppose we turned all humans into spirits..." scenario wasn't actually attacking physicalism per se, it was attacking the idea that the metaphysical basis of morality was physical. Physicalism, as is normally defined, is the doctrine that our minds our purely physical with no spiritual or nonphysical component. Physicalism does not strictly imply materialism, though in practice most physicalists are materialists. Although the argument doesn't assume physicalism is false (remember, this is a thought experiment that doesn't claim it could actually happen), the hypothetical scenario does have some problems in that the materialist would reject the possibility of the scenario outright rather than addressing the question at hand. My point: what is it about the physical world that would create moral truths? The atomic weight of hydrogen? Lots of stones? Or would it have to be something more intangible? (Morality is more of an abstract concept after all.) That's kind of what I was getting at, but the rejection of the scenario by fiat (because from one point of view it looks like I am saying "suppose materialism is false…then it would be false"—rather than raising the points I actually intended to bring up) makes the argument somewhat ineffective and obscures the points I meant to raise. In other words, it is a bad argument for someone who is a materialist (or at least a radical materialist who thinks even analytic truths are dependent upon the physical world). So I dropped it and decided to save it only after I produce an argument for the existence of the human soul (which I don't plan to do in this thread quite yet). Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Even those who think that morality or math are not strictly physical could still hold that eliminating everything physical removes everything that exists and the spirits you speak of would have to be replacements, not continuations of themselves in a different form (as in my "replace one world with the other" alteration). Great, but notice I never said they weren't replacements, though I can understand how that confusion might take place. In any case, I've removed it from my argument. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: But if mathematical truths were abstractions, why would they depend on the physical world at all? Would 2 + 2 fail to equal 4 simply because there was no physical world? It doesn't seem plausible. Analytic statements, almost by definition, are not dependent upon anything in the physical world because those statements are true by virtue of what they mean. It depends on whether or not one wishes to be a realist about numbers. If not, then no problem. If so, however, the physicalist needs to show how numbers are part of the physical universe. Seems like a bit of a hard sell given the nature of analytic statements, but then again it seems that there is no belief so absurd that some philosopher will not believe it (ironically, the person I ripped that statement from is an example of just such a philosopher). ========================== Tisthammerw: Please keep in mind what exactly my claim is. I am saying that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God. Objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, absolute, universally binding entity with supreme and infallible moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. My point is that this entity treads suspiciously close to theism, if indeed one cannot call such an entity God. Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics. Postmodern Beatnik: As I noted in the last post, however, you seem to stray from this point at times. Tisthammerw: Where did I stray from this point? Postmodern Beatnik: As mentioned before, the argument that objective morality at least entails naturalistic pantheism and your earlier insistence that naturalistic pantheism is substantively different from atheism are the elements of a stronger, deductive-style argument. ========================== I dropped the naturalistic pantheism dispute because the question as to whether the sovereign reality under discussion would get the label "God" was quibbling. We still end up with an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. How the heck does this stray from my point that "Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics"? Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Having disavowed deductive intentions, you cannot be saying that objective morality entails the existence of God. Having disavowed inductive intentions, you cannot be saying that objective morality makes the existence of God more likely than the alternative. What, then, remains to be argued that is philosophically interesting? I actually do think objective morality makes God's existence more probable; just as circumstantial evidence in a criminal case makes the guilt of the accused more likely. Remember, I claim that if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant Godlike attributes (a claim I think is philosophically interesting), then objective morality is evidence for the existence of God. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: The rules of logic are not authoritative in the sense I was using though. Sure they are. Logic is a normative enterprise, much as morality is -- and this is hardly a controversial point among philosophers. Just as the rules of morality are would tell us how we ought to behave if we are to be morally good, the rules of logic tell us how we ought to reason if we are to be rational creatures. Ah, but those are hypothetical imperatives, not categorical ones--which is the sense of authority I was referring to. Why? First, it seems I should define more precisely what I mean by "ought-statements." An ought-statement is a statement that makes a claim of what ought to be rather than making a claim of what is, e.g. "people should not steal." To recap, my definition of authority is the power to make ought-statements true (as by a command), thus being a specific type of ought-to-be-obeyed aspect. For example, when an Admiral with authority over the entire fleet orders the Captain to turn his ship south, it is the case that the Captain ought to turn his ship south (and he ought to obey the Admiral). Thing is, we have to stretch the meaning of the word "ought" a bit when it comes to hypothetical imperatives. When we say "we ought to reason if we are to be rational creatures" we are really only saying "being logical aids in being rational," which is a claim of what is rather than what ought to be. Hypothetical imperatives are pseudo-ought-statements. Logic makes "is-statements" and can't really make "ought-statements." And recall, I defined authority as the power to make ought-statements true (as by a command). The rules of logic do not contain authority in the sense of how I was using the term. But this is at least partially my fault for not defining "ought-statements" specifically enough. I had assumed its meaning (a statement of what ought to be) would have been sufficiently clear from the examples, but now I realize that it was perhaps too vague. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Saying "there is something in the universe besides God that says how we ought to behave, but I'm not going to tell you what it is" doesn't seem particularly useful here, particularly if you can't think of any viable example. Keep in mind that I don't think anything could successfully underwrite objective morality. I can't give you a viable example because there is no such thing. My point is that you weren't specific enough. I ask, what plausible alternatives are there as to who or what says how we ought to behave? An answer like "something in the universe does it, but I'm not going to tell you what" isn't terribly helpful as a proposed alternative. What is this "something?" A rock? The atomic weight of hydrogen? The proposal is too vague to be useful here. You said, "What I am saying is that there are more possibilities to the universe option than you let on." I'm not denying there aren't a crap-load of concoctions someone could come up with, I'm saying that the amount of those that are plausible are very few. You said, "The most important thing to keep in mind is that declaring something plausible is different from declaring that you believe it." I agree, but I'm not saying I necessarily believe "the universe says how we ought to behave," I'm saying I could believe it if I were an atheist. "Logic says how we ought to behave" and "morality says how we ought to behave" have at least a superficial air of plausibility, but something like "the atomic weight of hydrogen says how we ought to behave" does not. Some explanations are inherently implausible. That's part of the reason I asked for something more specific than the "properties of the universe [having enough rocks? the atomic weight of hydrogen?] are such that objective morality obtains [existence]." I'm not convinced that you (or anyone else) can provide a specific example of a "property of the universe" that would actually constitute a plausible alternative as to who or what says how we ought to behave. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: God makes it true by virtue of what He is: the supreme authority in the universe. Objective morality is an inseparable, irreducible part of God, and one cannot "break it down" further beyond being what He is. This is not an answer, or at least not a substantive one. While it may serve as an article of faith, it does no philosophical work. If this is all you can say at this juncture, then -- as hipskipdip has again already pointed out -- your argument is circular. Any version of a moral argument for God relies on the assumption that we can understand what is meant by both "God" and "objective morality" in such a way that the terms do not ineliminably refer to each other. The idea that God cannot exist without objective morality (i.e. God existing implies objective morality) does not make my argument circular, because my claim is that objective morality is evidence for the existence of God--not the other way around. God, by definition, is the supreme authority in the universe. This doesn't make the argument circular. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Well, given the dearth of religions that consistently posit an unchanging God, this would once again mean that you are taking objective morality to be evidence for a very specific and non-traditional concept of God (certainly not the standard Christian God, for example, who changes demonstrably between the Old and New Testaments). I don't think the idea that God is in some sense changeless is non-traditional (remember, we are talking about a monotheistic Supreme Being God like those of the Abrahamic faiths). This would hold true even for the Christian God. After all, what changes about God during the Old and New Testaments? Is it that the Christian God seems harsh in the Old Testament but not in the New Testament? You might want to reread Revelation 14:10-11 if you think that's the case. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Remember though, "subjective" in ethics refers to what a person believes actually makes it true for him (not anyone else). Not quite. For one, that's a slogan primarily meant to make subjectivism more accessible to freshman. For another, it's a rather misleading formulation of that slogan. More properly, one would say that subjectivists hold that "x is wrong" means "x is wrong (according) to me" (not "for me") or "x is wrong from my perspective." I'm sorry, but that is just not how ethical subjectivism is defined. Subjective ethical relativism says precisely what I claimed; that what a person says is morally right/wrong actually makes it true for that person. I could cite from my college philosophy textbook if you wish, but perhaps this link from the University of Missouri will do. If ethical subjectivism were simply the claim that people have differing beliefs of what is right and wrong, it would not be a particularly meaningful metaethical claim. It is also puzzling why "God says how we ought to behave" would constitute subjectivism (as if subjectivism on your apparent definition would necessarily be inconsistent with moral objectivism). Postmodern Beatnik wrote: And being the charitable person I am, I have assumed that this was an innocent over-simplification and not a cynical attempt to stack the deck in your favor. OK, so it seems that we have a bit of a disagreement as to how to define moral objectivism. I wasn't entirely the originator of that sort of definition by the way. Confer Wikipedia's definition of moral objectivism and note how theists claim God is the basis for objective morality (e.g. William Lane Craig); whereas it would seem to be a logical contradiction on your definition. And if that is true, it is your definition actually seems to stack the deck--by defining it in such a way that guarantees objective morality cannot be based in God. It wasn't as if my definition guaranteed the reverse. Remember, morality that is universally binding to all humans will require some type of supreme authority regardless of whether we label that non-human authority "God." Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Tisthammerw wrote: Is it necessarily the case that a basis for a truth being a person makes that statement subjective? Suppose for instance the truth in question is that Sally has two arms. Is this truth subjective? That truth is not subjective, but the sense in which the basis of that truth is a person is different than the sense of DCT. This is a truth about a person, not one decided/declared by the person. The same thing applies to the case of Sally thinking of the number 4. Sally can affect the truth of the statement "Sally is thinking of the number 4" depending on what number she is thinking of, but she cannot change the fact that when she is thinking about the number 4, she is thinking about the number 4. Then consider this: why can't the same sort of thing hold true for God? God is the supreme authority in the universe, and objective morality necessarily flows from Him like arms on a person (if God exists). William Lane Craig put it this way, "what is good or bad is determined by conformity or lack thereof to His [God's] nature." Remember, I'm not necessarily talking about divine command theory (at least how it is traditionally defined) when I say objective morality is grounded in God. Postmodern Beatnik wrote: Omnipotent = all-powerful, i.e. able to do anything. I am willing to temper that definition by disallowing logical impossibilities as counterexamples (though not all theists accept even this "limitation"), but to go any further strains credulity. In the case of God as the supreme authority, I'm not so sure. Although God might be changeless in some sense in regards to morality and cannot do anything logically impossible, apart from those limitations he has unlimited power to create or manipulate space, time, matter, energy, and the spirit realm. One definition of omnipotence in regards to God is "infinitely powerful." There is no limit to how much energy God could create, how many worlds or universes He could bring about, how complex He could create the universe etc. Perhaps we could use "infinitely powerful" in place of omnipotence? Edited by Tisthammerw on 07/02/08 - 06:09 PM
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Buddahchuck
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Posted 07/02/08 - 10:39 PM:	#782
Tist wrote: My point: what is it about the physical world that would create moral truths? What is it about God that would create moral truths. All you are doing in your argument is saying a) there is a non-physical moral truth maker and b) we call that moral truth maker "God". This brings us no closer to understanding what god, to figuring out what actually is objectively moral, or even in determining that morality is objective to begin with. It's a fundamental assumption that rational moralists are unwilling to take. The only way it becomes viable is if we simply "fiat" faith and disregard rationality. If we were to accept your argument, then you could always refer to this unobservable, non-physical truth maker that makes all your assumptions true. The point is not that you are wrong, it's that it is not a product of reason, rather a product of your assumption of the existence of this non-physical truth maker whose existence demands morality. At the point that we could use this truth maker to justify just about anything, your argument becomes philosophically uninteresting. Of course, this all in how you define "God", if you define it broadly that is. Spaghetti Monster anyone? On a side and long overdo note, the existence of objective morality does offer one possibility concerning the existence of God that has been ignored in this thread. Perhaps God was created [by humans] as a means to give morality some metaphysical authority, and I touched on this point in post #522: Basing morality upon reason presents a problem, one with which PMB is certainly familiar. Reason is not standard. Individuals, applying their great capacity for any array of rationals for committing a certain action are capable of justifying nearly anything. Not to pick the threads of philosophy, but clearly the diversity of what could be called "reasonable" opinions is a clear indication that nearly none of these ideas are with certainty true, in the most cosmic sense of the word. So saying that morality ought to be based on reason only allows for a poor standard for determining what is right and wrong. Eventually, such a concept of morality leads to moral nihilism, for clearly there is no rational solution to the question of what is "right and wrong". (NB given the explanations thus far in this thread, I recognize this may need a bit more justification. But certainly I can be spared the explanation with certain people by accepting the premise "there is no rational justification for moral truths). So, the irrational alternative is authoritarian morals, people believing something for NO reason, or what we have all come to know and love as faith. One of my objections with Tist's argument in this thread was his ascribing of authority with no justification for where that authority originates. When I allow for the "rights and wrongs" to be determined by an authority, and I follow that authority's every word, then there is no better standard that can be found. Perhaps I overstate the issue; the standard of morality is contingent upon the standard of the authority (I can forsee some tyrant whose standards are contradictory, no reference to the current American administration intended....ooops). Anyway, this authority could be anything, from an idol, to a mark on a stone wall, to a strong leader, to, don't ya know, God(s). And we can see the various advantages of having a different authority, but the bottom line is that when we don't question that authority, then the standard is successful (at least as far as the means go). So I would like to say that I really have no vestment in Authoritarian morals, but the great advantage that authoritarianism provides is that standardization for morals that becomes so useful in society. Otherwise, I have been quite tempted to cheerlead for moral nihilism, or some exciting concept of internal morality that plays on the existential nature of a human considering morality. So while I'm not sure that this provides as a "metaphysical mechanism" by which God serves as a basis for morality, but it certainly provides an explanation as to the social necessity for morality. In addition, it provides a means and frame of discussion that allows a topic not entirely unrelated to what we have been discussing thus far. I look forward to a fresh look on this thread. If we grant Tist's notion of objective morality, we can take one of two roads. 1) There actually is a God telling us (through intuition that is quite capable of being undermined by free will) what is right and wrong...or 2) "God" is a concept that was devised as a means of giving authority to otherwise meaningless ought statements, to be a truth maker. Of course, if we follow reason in lieu of faith, then the best road is the latter for it is the most self-evident of the two paths. An important thing to note, however, is that if we are to actually attempt to subscribe to objective morality, we have to accept the existence of "god" without question, so such an option would not be viable. This amounts to what is in my view a very decent explanation of why Tist so vehemently pursues the existence of objective morality along with the existence of God. It also explains why such an argument is rejected by the self-proclaimed rational thinkers on this forum. Edited by Buddahchuck on 07/03/08 - 01:57 PM

TMB
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Posted 07/03/08 - 03:10 PM:	#783
Buddachuck, you said, On a side and long overdo note, the existence of objective morality does offer one possibility concerning the existence of God that has been ignored in this thread. Perhaps God was created [by humans] as a means to give morality some metaphysical authority, and I touched on this point in post #522: and If we grant Tist's notion of objective morality, we can take one of two roads. 1) There actually is a God telling us (through intuition that is quite capable of being undermined by free will) what is right and wrong...or 2) "God" is a concept that was devised as a means of giving authority to otherwise meaningless ought statements, to be a truth maker. Of course, if we follow reason in lieu of faith, then the best road is the latter for it is the most self-evident of the two paths. An important thing to note, however, is that if we are to actually attempt to subscribe to objective morality, we have to accept the existence of "god" without question, so such an option would not be viable. This amounts to what is in my view a very decent explanation of why Tist so vehemently pursues the existence of objective morality along with the existence of God. It also explains why such an argument is rejected by the self-proclaimed rational thinkers on this forum. The other possibility is that both 1) and 2) exist. The 'creation' of a greater power that allows the imposition of absolute power makes a lot of sense, and the fact that over the ages man has worshipped multiple gods, one god in various guises, the sun and moon indicates that there is a real need to belive there is something greater than us. Its posible this invention occured to answer our existential anxieties. As obvious as this fact is (except apparently to Tist) does not mean that there is not something greater than us, in whatever form. While there is no direct evidence to suggest anything like this does exist, man is very far from understanding our world. Even if we accept that string theory might reconcile quantum physics and relativity, we are nowhere near explaining how a singularity can exist at a point when space and time do not, and that there might be nothing before this. Even the genesis of life theories, although feasible have a long way to go. Perhaps we are just limited by our lack of vision as we have so often through history and we will resolve these mysteries, but it is still not evidence that there is NO greater being than ourselves. I would say that as a concept, we clearly manufacture gods as well as concepts like objective morality, but the existence of these creations does not negate the possibility of some kind of spagetti monster also existing (perhaps a pasta king?)

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/10/08 - 04:06 AM:	#784
Buddahchuck wrote: All you are doing in your argument is saying a) there is a non-physical moral truth maker and b) we call that moral truth maker "God". There seems to be some confusion as to what my argument actually says. I'll re-introduce it here for your convenience (and anyone else's who wants to know what my argument is). The argument from morality My central claim: if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. First let's define some terms. Morality is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe. An "ought-statement" is a statement that makes a claim of what ought to be rather than making a claim of what is, e.g. "people should not steal." A hypothetical imperative is a statement of the form, "If the goal is A, then do B" and says what to do to help achieve a goal; e.g. "If you want to benefit society, have laws against stealing." A categorical imperative takes the form of "Do A" and says what to do without an if-clause; e.g. "Have laws against stealing" and "Treat others with respect." In the context being used here, authority is the power to instill categorical imperatives with an ought-to-be-obeyed quality. For instance, if an Admiral has authority over the entire fleet and tells the Captain "Turn your ship south," then the Captain ought to obey the "Turn your ship south" statement. Suppose also however that this order is conveyed via a Lieutenant because the Lieutenant is the communications officer of that ship. The Captain ought to obey the Lieutenant when she repeats the Admiral's order, but the real authority lies with the Admiral rather than the Lieutenant (since the Admiral is the real source of both the command and the command's ought-to-be-obeyed quality). And if the Admiral and the Captain openly disagree over what the Lieutenant should do and give the Lieutenant conflicting orders, the Lieutenant ought to obey the Admiral because the Admiral is the higher authority. Broadly defined, God is the ultimate sovereign reality; i.e. an entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. I think the concept of objective moral values requires some type of God, some type of ultimate sovereign reality (whether it be pantheism, deism, or whatever). The problem comes when we try to find a metaphysical basis of objective morality. If there are objective moral laws of obligations and prohibitions, who or what gives these laws? Without God (or something like Him), who or what says how we ought to behave? Suppose for instance the answer to this question was "nothing." Yet if there is literally nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." So it seems that some type of sovereign metaphysical reality is needed. Let X be the basis of objective morality. Whoever or whatever it is that says how we ought to behave, this X must possess the following characteristics: Supremely transcendent authority. It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but X (the basis of objective morality) must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality ought to be obeyed over the orders of any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people's behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. So the basis of objective morality not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supremely transcendent authority (transcending e.g. Hitler's authority). Absolute. Goes along with the objective nature of morality. X is not relative but absolute; both its existence and its moral truths are independent of any arbitrary moral standards we humans might create. Additionally, as the supreme authority its existence and statements of how we ought to behave are completely unrestrained by any other would-be authorities (as governments). Try as they might have, the Nazis could not budge the fact that their anti-Semitism was immoral. Universally binding. Again, goes along with the nature of objective morality. X's authority must be universally binding in that it applies to everyone (e.g. all peoples in all governments) regardless of who, when, and where we are and regardless of what any human thinks, feels, and believes. Infallibly authoritative. The basis of objective morality cannot be mistaken on what is morally right (else it would not be the basis of morality when it says what is moral), so it says how we ought to behave with infallible moral authority. So, objective morality implies the existence of something transcendent, absolute, and universally binding with infallible and supreme moral authority in saying how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to always obey it. This X certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism. Buddahchuck wrote: At the point that we could use this truth maker to justify just about anything, your argument becomes philosophically uninteresting. None of which would change the fact that the basis of objective morality looks suspiciously Godlike (e.g. having infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority). My argument is not simply that we "call" the basis of objective morality God, but that this sovereign metaphysical entity would have to possess significant Godlike attributes. Hence, I argue that objective morality (if it existed) would constitute evidence for the existence of God. Incidentally, I am only using God to justify moral ought-statements (since God is the supreme authority in the universe). Sure, one could use God as an inappropriate explanation, but that could be done with just about anything. Perhaps meteors not only have caused the extinction of the dinosaurs but also killed of the dodo bird, created the Grand Canyon, and now triggers hurricanes somehow. Even though meteors could be used to "justify just about anything" that shouldn't make us ignore the evidence for the things that meteors do justify. A similar thing holds true for theism: it shouldn't allow us to ignore that objective morality (if it exists) is evidence for the existence of God, since some type of infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority is needed here. Buddahchuck wrote: The point is not that you are wrong, it's that it is not a product of reason, rather a product of your assumption of the existence of this non-physical truth maker whose existence demands morality. I don't assume a non-physical truth-maker from the outset. Rather, I conditionally assume (i.e. assume for the sake of argument) that objective morality exists and then inquire what its metaphysical basis is. If objective morality exists, something has to say how we ought to behave--whether this "truth maker" is God, the universe, or something else. It seems you think my conclusion is not the product of reason. But if it isn't, where exactly does the reasoning break down? Do you dispute, for instance, that the basis of objective morality would have the characteristics I've listed? If so which ones? Do you have a plausible alternative basis of objective morality (one that the atheist would be willing to accept)? If so what?
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Buddahchuck
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Posted 07/11/08 - 02:54 PM:	#785
Your argument is well understood Tist. If you recall, I listed 12 ways that objective morality could exist without deference to an authority called God. The way in which I would have you look at the matter is to examine what can the idea of God not justify? Surely everything that exists is based in existence, and thus theists point to the obscure prime mover of this thing we call existence, and pantheists make the deity and existence identical. Just as we can justify the existence of objective hummus, assume there is an objective hummus, and use its existence as "evidence" of the existence of God, we can do so with objective morality. Your line of thought isn't unique to morality. So try answering a few questions: 1) What is an example of objective morality? Note that I don't want a definition of objective morality, I want to know what you think, specifically, constitutes something that is objectively moral. 2) How would we gain objective knowledge of this morality of which you speak (through science? through prayer?)? Note that the answer to this would require an objective means that is beyond doubt. 3) What distinguishes a theistic view of morality and a non-theistic, authoritarian view of morality where we simply do something because it is right, not because it has a specific metaphysical basis? 4) Given the two scenarios I gave in my previous post (and the third from TMB), why should we not apply Occam's Razor to the problem at hand? Is it more likely that some mystic, all-powerful, omnibenevolent creator demands that certain acts are moral, or that morality is really this flippant thing without some unquestionable authority, created by man, backing it? The latter, aside from being more simple, seems to explain the cross-cultural use of deities to affirm moral principles. The former seems a vastly unclear and unjustifiable premise. Remember that I could mock your argument everypost whether I am talking about some "objective" way in which computers are made, animals rule the planet, or how one constructs an argument. Every "objective truth" I explicate could point to God if I assume it exists, and this is where the reasoning of your argument breaks down, for you do not go beyond morality to see what else your argument implies.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 07/15/08 - 07:35 PM:	#786
Buddahchuck wrote: Your argument is well understood Tist. If you recall, I listed 12 ways that objective morality could exist without deference to an authority called God. If you'll recall, I rebutted every one of them. For crying out loud, one of the supposed "ways" was actually cultural relativism! Buddahchuck wrote: The way in which I would have you look at the matter is to examine what can the idea of God not justify? The question really doesn't change the fact that the basis of objective morality looks suspiciously Godlike (e.g. having infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority). I'm sure one can use meteors to justify anything; meteors cause hurricanes somehow, I'm coughing because miniature meteors infest my lungs etc. But even though meteors could be used to justify just about anything that shouldn't make us ignore the evidence for the things that meteors do justify. My point is that even if an objection like this had some validity (e.g. one really could use God to justify anything) it doesn't affect the veracity of the argument's premises or conclusion. It would probably be more productive to attack the reasoning in a more direct manner. Do you dispute, for instance, that the basis of objective morality would have the characteristics I've listed? If so which ones? Do you have a viable, plausible alternative basis of objective morality (one that the atheist would be willing to accept)? If so what? (Remember, I already rebutted your 12 proposed alternatives.) Buddahchuck wrote: 1) What is an example of objective morality? Note that I don't want a definition of objective morality, I want to know what you think, specifically, constitutes something that is objectively moral. I'm not sure I understand the question. Are you asking for a behavioral example? If so I would say the moral prohibition to not kill Jews for the purposes of ethnic cleansing would constitute an example. Buddahchuck wrote: 2) How would we gain objective knowledge of this morality of which you speak (through science? through prayer?)? Note that the answer to this would require an objective means that is beyond doubt. There is a difference between moral ontology and moral epistemology. Moral ontology is about the reality of the moral truths themselves (their foundation, whether they hold true independently of what humans think etc.) and moral epistemology is about how we know what those truths are. Whether a statement is objectively true is different from knowing it through "objective" evidence. For instance, the fact that I am self-aware is something that I subjectively perceive (no one else can directly perceive my own consciousness, hence the problem of other minds), but it is also an objective truth (I possess consciousness independently of whether others perceive it). Similarly, the existence of objective moral truths does not imply that one must be able to know it via objective evidence. Moral objectivism says morals are objective in the sense of moral ontology rather than moral epistemology. I believe certain basic moral truths are intuitively perceived; similar to how we have an intuition that are sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. Such basic moral truths might include Kant's categorical imperative, and from there on we can use reason to derive the rest. It should be noted again however, that there is a difference between moral ontology and moral epistemology, and we should be careful about conflating the two. Buddahchuck wrote: 3) What distinguishes a theistic view of morality and a non-theistic, authoritarian view of morality where we simply do something because it is right, not because it has a specific metaphysical basis? Objective morality requires some metaphysical basis if it exists. Something has to say how we ought to behave, whether that something is reason, the universe, God, or whatever. The answer to your question will depend on what alternate metaphysical basis you have in mind. Buddahchuck wrote: 4) Given the two scenarios I gave in my previous post (and the third from TMB), why should we not apply Occam's Razor to the problem at hand? Is it more likely that some mystic, all-powerful, omnibenevolent creator demands that certain acts are moral, or that morality is really this flippant thing without some unquestionable authority, created by man, backing it? The latter is inconsistent with the notion of objective morality, so the answer is no--at least if we know that objective morality exists. The idea that all of reality is in my mind (solipsism) is simpler than a hugely complex universe with innumerable entities behaving in sophisticated mathematical patterns, but it is not necessarily rational. If we take it as a given that objective morality exists (which is what I do as a sort of conditional proof assumption, "If objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God"), the idea that morality is man-made is not a viable option.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Postmodern Beatnik
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Posted 07/22/08 - 08:27 AM:

#787

Tisthammerw wrote:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
What I was getting at was that, if there were such a thing as objective morality, it would be a set of rules. That set of objectively moral rules would be "who or what tells us how we ought to behave." The truth-maker(s) for those rules would be the metaphysical basis of morality, but they would not tell us how to behave.

Then it seems we've run into a bit of confusion, because I had previously written in this thread (e.g. post #636):

Tisthammerw wrote:
Note that the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis.

I am well aware of what you wrote. However, I find this to be another instance of misleading language. Let us take your attempted clarification:

Tisthammerw wrote:
Think of it this way. Suppose I was a Captain in the army and a Private and I have this conversation.

"Captain Tisthammerw, I have here a written order for you. It says thou shalt wash my clothes. I think you should obey this command."
"What? Who says I ought to wash your clothes?"
"The command sir. It's written right here."

Obviously, I am asking what the source of the command is.

Indeed. And in that context, it is clear. If, however, one were to ask "how should I behave?" then "the Admiral, sir!" is not a very good answer at all. Instead, a list of rules would be more appropriate. And that list, assuming it was a list of true moral commands, would be a "what" that said how you ought to behave. As such, it would be better to more explicitly separate the questions of "how ought we behave?" or "which actions are moral and which immoral?" and "what grounds morality?" or "what are the truth-makers for moral statements?"

Tisthammerw wrote:
Er, that's great and all, but what makes them true?

I do believe that it is your burden to demonstrate that they could be true and that God could act as a truth-maker for them. It certainly isn't my burden, as I would deny both of those assertions.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Considering what I said above, this response misses the point.

Considering what I have said above, you have continued to misunderstand exactly what point I was making.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Statements in one sense say how we ought to behave, but who or what "puts forth" these statements to begin with? That's kind of what "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" was all about; identifying the authority behind those ought-statements and identifying morality's metaphysical basis. Which is exactly why I had this in the post you responded to:

Tisthammerw wrote:
Why is it that a moral statement can[not] be its own metaphysical basis? When inquiring what the metaphysical basis is for a moral statement, we are basically asking what makes it true.

But the inclusion of this passage (and the parts I clipped) is precisely what suggests that you did not understand at all what I was getting at. And that is why, after clarifying, I did not respond to it.

Tisthammerw wrote:
The explanation I was referring to was "It begs the question against the physicalist because it assumes their position is false to demonstrate a problem with it." In other words, I'm begging the question because I'm begging the question.

That's rather misleading. You asked how you were begging the question. I made a statement of what begging the question is and then showed how you did so. That you only quoted the first part is no attack on the part you omitted. So yes, you begged the question because you begged the question (this is true, even if unhelpful) -- but I also explained how you begged the question: your argument is not detailed enough to prevent the physicalist from simply rejecting it out of hand (for being based on premises he wouldn't accept).

Tisthammerw wrote:
In any case, the "suppose we stripped all matter from the universe, and suppose we turned all humans into spirits..." scenario wasn't actually attacking physicalism per se, it was attacking the idea that the metaphysical basis of morality was physical.

But your entire argument attacks the physicalist moral realist. Starting with premises that they won't accept, then, begs the question.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Physicalism, as is normally defined, is the doctrine that our minds [are] purely physical with no spiritual or nonphysical component.

To quote the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical." It is a metaphysical position (though sometimes it is put in epistemological terms as "all facts are physical facts" or "all facts supervene on physical facts"). What you are referring to is simply a corollary of physicalism that is relevant to the philosophy of mind (which is where the issue remains most relevant).

Tisthammerw wrote:
Physicalism does not strictly imply materialism, though in practice most physicalists are materialists.

Contextually speaking, "physicalism" and "materialism" are synonymous. The former has become preferable to the latter because "materialism" can also mean something very different in ethics and philosophy of religion (i.e. a preoccupation with material goods and/or the view that the accumulation of such goods is a worthy end).

Tisthammerw wrote:
My point: what is it about the physical world that would create moral truths? The atomic weight of hydrogen? Lots of stones? Or would it have to be something more intangible?

It might be something (slightly) more intangible, but that does not mean that it would not supervene on the physical world and thus be a physical truth. And quite frankly, that seems to block the inference that you are trying to make with the thought experiment (though this does not mean your point could not be established another way).

Tisthammerw wrote:
In other words, it is a bad argument for someone who is a materialist (or at least a radical materialist who thinks even analytic truths are dependent upon the physical world).

Which is all I was getting at. But since thought experiments should be neutral towards anything not being taking for granted, this undermines the thought experiment.

Tisthammerw wrote:
So I dropped it and decided to save it only after I produce an argument for the existence of the human soul (which I don't plan to do in this thread quite yet).

I would rather think that (the existence of a human soul) would be a topic for another thread. If you need the soul for your argument, you're not really making a moral argument for God.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Seems like a bit of a hard sell given the nature of analytic statements, but then again it seems that there is no belief so absurd that some philosopher will not believe it (ironically, the person I ripped that statement from is an example of just such a philosopher).

I don't find Cicero to be particularly absurd, but I agree with the sentiment. nod

Tisthammerw wrote:
I dropped the naturalistic pantheism dispute because the question as to whether the sovereign reality under discussion would get the label "God" was quibbling. We still end up with an eternal, omnipresent entity with infallible, universally binding, and supreme authority. How the heck does this stray from my point that "Objective morality implies a sovereign metaphysical entity with significant Godlike characteristics"?

Okay, time to play context police. Talking about what you have said since dropping the naturalistic pantheism bit is irrelevant because I was referring to those posts coming before you did so. Prior to giving up that line of argument, your argument was threatening to become a defense of a stronger claim than you expressed willingness to defend. And that is what I said strayed from the point. Furthermore, every time you clarify the claim that you're really making, I start to worry that it is too weak to be philosophically interesting. Again, if "God-like characteristics" amounts to no more than "being talked about in similar language to God" then this seems like something barely worth defending. That they are both things that have been treated in similar ways and with similar reverence does not make them ontologically related.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I actually do think objective morality makes God's existence more probable; just as circumstantial evidence in a criminal case makes the guilt of the accused more likely. Remember, I claim that if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant Godlike attributes (a claim I think is philosophically interesting), then objective morality is evidence for the existence of God.

You again bring up the forensic analogy, so I will again raise my as yet unanswered question: is objective morality "evidence" for the existence of God insofar as it is simply not inconsistent with His existence (as is the case with circumstantial evidence), or is it actually positive evidence in favor of His existence and against other possibilities? Earlier, I gave the example of the blonds, the brunettes, and the redheads. The problem was that the evidence we had that a brunette committed the crime was equally applicable to Lacey, Linda, and Lulu. So if objective morality is evidence that God exists in the same way that evidence that the criminal was brunette is evidence that Lacey committed the crime, this may be fine as far as it goes. That is, the existence of God and the existence of objective morality are not inconsistent with one another (just as the criminal being a brunette and the criminal being Lacey are not inconsistent). But this leaves us quite some distance from proving that Lacey is the criminal or that God exists (and is the basis of morality).

Another question is whether you think the existence of objective morality would just be evidence in favor of God's existence, or whether you think it would make the existence of God more likely than the non-existence of God. If it is the latter, then you have been trying to make an inductive argument all along.

As to whether or not it is philosophically interesting that the basis of objective morality might have "God-like" characteristics, I again must ask whether or not this is just a matter of linguistic convergence. That moral and theistic discourse occasionally involve the same words is hardly a novel or fecund observation.

Tisthammerw wrote:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Just as the rules of morality would tell us how we ought to behave if we are to be morally good, the rules of logic tell us how we ought to reason if we are to be rational creatures.

Ah, but those are hypothetical imperatives, not categorical ones...

When one says "we must follow the rules of logic if we are to be rational," one is appealing to a definitional relation. One who is rational reasons according to logic; one who does not reason according to logic is not rational. Similarly, "one ought to behave according to the dictates of morality if we are to be morally good" says that one who is morally good follows the dictates of morality and one who does not follow the dictates of morality is not morally good. If this relation constitutes a hypothetical imperative, then there are no categorical ones. Hypothetical imperatives, however, usually follow the formula "if one wants (to be) x, then one ought to y" and not "if one is to be x, then one must y." After all, one can still be described as irrational regardless of whether or not one wants to be rational (that is, the definitional relation holds even when the hypothetical imperative is irrelevant due to a failure of the antecedent).

Tisthammerw wrote:
You said, "What I am saying is that there are more possibilities to the universe option than you let on." I'm not denying there aren't a crap-load of concoctions someone could come up with, I'm saying that the amount of those that are plausible are very few. You said, "The most important thing to keep in mind is that declaring something plausible is different from declaring that you believe it." I agree, but I'm not saying I necessarily believe "the universe says how we ought to behave," I'm saying I could believe it if I were an atheist. "Logic says how we ought to behave" and "morality says how we ought to behave" have at least a superficial air of plausibility, but something like "the atomic weight of hydrogen says how we ought to behave" does not. Some explanations are inherently implausible. That's part of the reason I asked for something more specific than the "properties of the universe [having enough rocks? the atomic weight of hydrogen?] are such that objective morality obtains [existence]." I'm not convinced that you (or anyone else) can provide a specific example of a "property of the universe" that would actually constitute a plausible alternative as to who or what says how we ought to behave.

Well, utilitarianism provides a plausible alternative. According to that view, pleasure/happiness is the highest good and the proper goal of human activity. This is due to putative characteristics of pleasure/happiness itself (it is supposedly a necessary good). Now, you might think that happiness is not a property of the universe as you have been thinking of such a thing. Insofar as the universe is the totality of existence, however, everything is a property thereof. But even if that does not satisfy, it should be pointed out that this is the reason for the particular formulation "the properties of the universe are such that objective morality obtains."

Metaethical definitions and statements, as much as possible, need to avoid favoring any particular view of normative ethics, and this formulation is equally applicable to Kantianism and Utilitarianism (as well as other theories). It does not say that some particular property of the universe (such as the atomic weight of hydrogen) grounds moral truths, but rather that the universe provides within its content (which is everything) some means of grounding morality. It may be a combination of things (or even just relations between them) that ultimately yields moral truths. This may seem rather bland, but the original point of the formulation was precisely that blandness. Your argument has employed overly vivid language to suggest that the moral realist is committed to something surprising (i.e. God), but deflating the rhetoric shows that this is simply not the case (at least not for the reasons you have given).

Tisthammerw wrote:
The idea that God cannot exist without objective morality (i.e. God existing implies objective morality) does not make my argument circular, because my claim is that objective morality is evidence for the existence of God--not the other way around. God, by definition, is the supreme authority in the universe.

First, we need to ask if your definition means "if there is a God, he is the supreme authority" or "if there is a supreme authority, then it is God." The second is problematic in that it runs afoul of the a posteriori definition issue that I raised earlier (that is, if one is willing to define God as whatever fulfills a certain role no matter what, it ceases to be a philosophically interesting concept). The former is fine insofar as it is merely citing a condition for being God. But it is also problematic insofar as we have not yet answered the question of just what this authority consists in. That is, we have not yet found an answer to how God's authority could be objective.

Second, I do not think you have understood my objection. I am not complaining that G -> O makes your argument circular (and it certainly does not). The problem is this statement:

Tisthammerw wrote:
Objective morality is an inseparable, irreducible part of God, and one cannot "break it [objective morality] down" further beyond being what He is.

If your answer to how God could ground objective morality is that objective morality just is God, then you are begging the question. You have not given a conception of objective morality that does not ineliminably refer to God. Or, alternatively, you could be saying "objective morality, whatever it consists in no matter what, is God" -- thus running afoul of the a posteriori definition problem.

Either way, you have not given a substantive response to the question of how God grounds objective morality.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I don't think the idea that God is in some sense changeless is non-traditional...

Calling God changeless and presenting him as such are two different things, and there are a few religions that manage the latter. Still, I think the tradition is a bit hazier than you think (more below).

Tisthammerw wrote:
This would hold true even for the Christian God. After all, what changes about God during the Old and New Testaments? Is it that the Christian God seems harsh in the Old Testament but not in the New Testament? You might want to reread Revelation 14:10-11 if you think that's the case.

You might want to re-read my post and note that I bolded the word "consistently." God is harsh, then he is not. That John tells us he will be harsh again only further proves my point. Besides, it is not at all radical to view God as changing. Entire theologies are based on the change that God undergoes by taking human form through Jesus. But the tradition goes further back than that. When Moses asks for God's name in Exodus, God replies "Ehyeh asher ehyeh." The phrase is often translated as "I am that I am," but Hebrew tenses are not as precise as those in English. It could also mean (and has long been understood as) "I will be what I will be." This "name" of God represents God as being eternal, but also dynamic.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I'm sorry, but that is just not how ethical subjectivism is defined. Subjective ethical relativism says precisely what I claimed; that what a person says is morally right/wrong actually makes it true for that person. I could cite from my college philosophy textbook if you wish, but perhaps this link from the University of Missouri will do.

The website will do, and it agrees with me:

Ethical subjectivism: An act is morally right iff the person judging the action approves of it.

That is, one's personal judgments are the truth-maker for moral statements (thus it is a success theory, but not an objective one).

Tisthammerw wrote:
If ethical subjectivism were simply the claim that people have differing beliefs of what is right and wrong, it would not be a particularly meaningful metaethical claim.

True, but irrelevant. I was saying no such thing. Indeed, we already covered this material some time ago. You called this "sociological relativism" and I called it "cultural relativism." Since neither of us called it "subjectivism," it should have been quite clear that this sort of thesis is not what I was describing in the passage currently in question.

Tisthammerw wrote:
It is also puzzling why "God says how we ought to behave" would constitute subjectivism (as if subjectivism on your apparent definition would necessarily be inconsistent with moral objectivism).

Assuming that by "[my] apparent definition" you mean your misinterpretation, sociological/cultural relativism is not inconsistent with moral objectivism (some people may just be ignorant of moral truths). On my actual definition, however, objectivism is obviously inconsistent with subjectivism, and DCT constitutes a form of subjectivism because what makes something right or wrong is that God approves or disapproves of it.

I wish to reiterate yet again that I am not (and never have been) arguing that "God grounds morality" immediately entails or is equivalent to DCT, nor that you are necessarily committed to DCT (though you may be). I simply mentioned that DCT is a common way of grounding morality of God, noted that it is a form of subjectivism, and explained how so at your request.

Tisthammerw wrote:
OK, so it seems that we have a bit of a disagreement as to how to define moral objectivism. I wasn't entirely the originator of that sort of definition by the way. Confer Wikipedia's definition of moral objectivism and note how theists claim God is the basis for objective morality (e.g. William Lane Craig); whereas it would seem to be a logical contradiction on your definition.

The Wikipedia definition of moral objectivism is terrible, and those of us on the WikiProject Philosophy Ethics Task Force have had it on our list for quite some time. As noted on Objectivity (philosophy):

Objectivity is both an important and notoriously difficult concept to pin down in philosophy. While there is no universally accepted articulation of objectivity, a proposition is