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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/01/08 - 07:47 PM:
quote post
#726
Quick recap: in finding the metaphysical basis of objective morality, the key question becomes, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" This question is asking the ultimate authority behind moral statements. And the definition of morality I'm using is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe.

Chops wrote:
Tisthammerw wrote:

  1. Reason. Doesn't work in practice. Reason can never go beyond hypothetical imperatives, i.e. "If X, you should do Y." If you want to benefit society, don't kill or steal. But then why should we benefit society? Reason alone cannot ultimately answer questions like this and so it doesn't work as a real answer to the question at hand.

Here is a possible argument that might be illuminating ... All possible justifications must be justifiable rationally. Therefore the perpetuation of reason itself becomes the ultimate moral imperative. From this we can derrive other imperatives. For instance, to advocate murder is to advocate one's own murder which in turn leads to the suspension (as far as we know) of one's ability to reason and justify. Therefore, the advocacy of murder is irrational.


I'm not quite clear on what you're saying here. "All possible justifications must be justifiable rationally." Yes, I suppose I can agree with that; though I think we ultimately come down to basic beliefs in resolving Agrippa's trilemma as I mentioned in my last post (you don't have to read all of it; just hit Ctrl + F and find "Agrippa"). "Therefore the perpetuation of reason itself becomes the ultimate moral imperative." Eh, that seems like a bit of a leap to me; I don't see the logic that connects it to the previous sentence, but at first blush it sounds like you're talking about Kant's categorical imperative.

As you might already know, Kant had this neat imperative of, "only act according to principles that you rationally desire everyone to follow." We can perhaps use reason to derive prohibitions against stealing and murder based on this imperative, but who or what says we ought to follow this imperative? This is something that reason alone cannot justify. I do not believe there is any logical proof we can appeal to that would actually work. It seems that reason can never get beyond hypothetical imperatives ("If the goal is to get A, then do B"). For instance, you could reasonably say that we ought to follow the Kantian imperative if we ought to make the world a jolly place, but then we'd have to answer the question of who or what says we ought to pursue the goal of a jolly planet. The Kantian imperative—at least by itself—simply does not work here.


Tisthammerw wrote:
Pleasure. This doesn't seem to work as a plausible or valid authority, e.g. sadists. And what if people's pleasures conflict? What if it gives Bob pleasure to kill someone and it gives Joe pleasure to let that person live? In that case it seems like we'd have ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism.


The traditional way around this, I believe, is Utilitarianism.


We kind of get to the same problem I mentioned in the previous text you quoted. Utilitarianism says we ought to benefit society, produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people etc. But who or what says we ought to benefit society? That question remains unanswered.


Morality in itself. Given the definition of "morality" being used here, the answer would be "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave."


Not exactly. Morality in itself would simply refer to the holding of a given moral code as an objective standard in and of itself. If reality itself is somehow oriented towards moral principles (as some among the ancients believed) then acting in accordance with these principles could be and, indeed, had to be an end in itself... Acting morally would be what you are for.


Great, so how does this answer the question of who or what says how we ought to behave? If the answer isn't "morality says how we ought to behave" is it "reality says how we ought to behave"?



Cultural and societal norms. This is also a non-option, because it would lead to cultural relativism, not ethical objectivism.


Not necessarily. If, for instance, one could demonstrate that all cultures held in common certain principles, these principles could then form the sort of standard you seem to be looking for.


But would the cultures be the authority in how we ought to behave or would the authority be trans-cultural? In ethical objectivism, the authority behind morality must be trans-cultural (since objective moral truths are independent of what people think, feel, and believe), which is why I believe "cultural and societal norms" is not a real option. You're going to have to find a basis for morality other than people to answer the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave if ethical objectivism is true?"



Our parents: Using a human authority doesn't work, because ethical objectivism says that ethical truths are independent of what any human thinks, feels, or believes.


And if such appeals to authority are themselves mandated by an objective moral standard?


Then that's great, but remember I'm talking about the ultimate metaphysical foundation of the objective moral standard itself. "Honor thy father and mother" may indeed be a good general moral principle, but that doesn't imply that parents are the ultimate source of morality. The dictates of morality are more authoritative than any human if ethical objectivism is true. Just because a private should obey a sergeant, that doesn't mean there isn't a five star general whose authority is higher. After all, what if parents command their children to steal? (That's probably happened at least once in human history...)
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
jdrw
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Posted 06/02/08 - 05:23 AM:
quote post
#727
Tisthammerw wrote:

Quick recap: in finding the metaphysical basis of objective morality, the key question becomes, "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" This question is asking the ultimate authority behind moral statements. And the definition of morality I'm using is "the system of statements and principles correctly describing how one should and should not to behave" and objective morality is the idea that moral statements are valid, binding, and true regardless of what humans think, feel, and believe.


When you ask your central question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” I do not believe that you are even entertaining the possibility that a “what” of any kind would be an acceptable answer. It seems apparent to me that you believe that the only plausible answer is a "who"--a consciousness, an intentional agent (essentially a God-like agent.) Thus, your question is loaded and misleading. It begs the question of whether or not the existence of Objective Morality is evidence for the existence of God, because it presumes that Objective Morality is possible only if its source is an intentional agent such as God.

You do not really accept the possibility that Objective Morality could exist as a "what" apart from an God-like author, because you construe Objective Morality as necessarily requiring a God-like author.


Cheers.
jd
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
Buddahchuck
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Posted 06/02/08 - 05:00 PM:
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#728
So, again you copy and pasted your point. I think this is like the 12th time, and I even preempted your doing this yet another time in saying "Right, clarification/contextualization is a good reason to copy and paste. Re-explaining the same idea that disregards all the criticisms brought to a certain point because you feel others are "off topic" because they see blatant flaws in your logic, is not a reason to copy and paste."

Tist wrote:

Reason. Doesn't work in practice. Reason can never go beyond hypothetical imperatives, i.e. "If X, you should do Y." If you want to benefit society, don't kill or steal. But then why should we benefit society? Reason alone cannot ultimately answer questions like this and so it doesn't work as a real answer to the question at hand.


Well, I think you would be hard pressed to answer any question without reason and still be justified. I'm not even sure God can tell us "why should we benefit society" without some sort of reason. Short of this, this is a philosophy forum, and while I have made the case several times that objective morality should not be rationally based (though I think your ego has caused you to glance over this fact in my posts), reason still remains a possible basis for objective morality, especially with respect to philosophy. Note that in your given answer, you don't actually respond to the point that reason can be a basis for objective morality, you just ask a question then jump to the conclusion "reason alone cannot ultimately answer questions like this..." Indeed, "Why should we benefit society" is a good question to ask, but the idea behind using hypothetical imperatives (which, by the way, is a separate issue from reason as objective morality) is to allow moral statements to have veracity, which is the true advantage of knowing anything objectively.

And if you still doubt that reason is our best, if not our only, tool for knowing things in an objective way, then I only have to point at your vast attempt to appeal to reason in the little snippet you continue to copy and past every 10 posts. If you did not believe that it is reason that is supposed to lead us to the idea that "if objective morality exists, it is evidence of the existence of God", then I do not know why you use so many words. However, in looking at your reasoning, many people have seen problems and voiced them as such, providing counter-reasons. Point being, that whether you think reason is regressive or not, ultimately it is the only tool we have to reliably justify our beliefs to other people.

And Chops was good enough to point this out. I find it odd that you are referring to Agrippa's trilemma, as you seem to not understand all its parts. And so I will take this space to explain my surprise, as it comes in many forms.

First, Agrippa was one of the classical sceptics, and the end of all sceptical ideologies is the suspension of belief. You, however, are using this sceptical reasoning only to suspend belief of reason, whilst advocating something completely adverse to it. So if we were to accept that reason is infinitely regressive, at best we would suspend our judgement, not immediately revert to these claims of intuition and God. And FYI, the classical sceptics used such reasoning even to indict mathematics and logic.

Second, I've actually had the discussion of the basis reason on this forum before, and while I feel I argued rather vehemently that reason had no basis save for itself, I listened to what the people on this forum said, their justifications, and found what made sense to me. Mentioned to me were the works of Peter Strawson. But what really hit-it-home, so to speak, was the point that reason is justification in the same way that all bachelors are unmarried; it is an analytic truth. So, if you are interested beyond your own writings, you can see what persuaded me of this point here.

And third, you forget the third part of the trilemma, which is why the problem is a tri-lemma, rather than a regular dilemma:

"[A] break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason."

I know you probably think that intuition and God after to take over somewhere, but the nature of the philosophical problem that is actually presented is only a problem because we actually need reason for justification. Intuition is admitted by even Agrippa to not be a reliable form of knowledge, but of course, he was a skeptic, it wouldn't make sense for him to accept intuition.


Pleasure. This doesn't seem to work as a plausible or valid authority, e.g. sadists. And what if people's pleasures conflict? What if it gives Bob pleasure to kill someone and it gives Joe pleasure to let that person live? In that case it seems like we'd have ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism.


Well, while one could certainly make that argument, it is being looked at the wrong way if such an argument is made. Ethical Objectivism is more than less the establishment of an ethical framework. Of course, this framework would need to be objective and not subjective as you describe it. The framework that allows pleasure to be an objective morality is that everyone bases their beliefs off of the same principle. A hedonist would argue, in your case of Bob and Joe, that a person like Bob doesn't truly exist. Rather, by serving his own needs, Bob would see that the pleasure derived from killing a particular person would be negligible when compared with the pleasure he could have from that person still living, or the absence of scorn received from Joe for having killed that person. So it wouldn't necessarily end-up badly. And just the fact that hedonists do exist and actually wind-up being what one might consider good, ethical people is enough to demonstrate at least the faint plausibility of a hedonist ethic.

Again, as Chops was fair to note, Utilitarianism is the more socially justifiable way to get around the trappings of traditional hedonism. And while you may want to try and apply Aggripa's trilemma here (though I think you just doubt the use of rational justification as a whole, and do not adhere to the entire trilemma), one can still imagine a world in which God uses Utilitarianism to justify his action (even if to himself). As is the instance of Free Will and lack of moral knowledge. One might imagine God's reasoning being that it is still better on the whole (i.e. greatest good for the greatest number of people) if free will exists in spite of the blurring of moral knowledge. Though the ideas of hedonism and utilitarianism can stand without God.


# Intuition (Self). The self saying how one ought to behave would be ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism.



You're right. Intuition is subjective. Now in order for there to be a meaningful distinction between ethical subjectivism and your version of ethical objectivism, there would have to be a clear dichotomy in which the tenants of said individual's ethical subjectivists views do NOT align with "objective truth", as you call it. Otherwise, I see no difference between this ethical subjectivism and your ethical objectivism.


Morality in itself. Given the definition of "morality" being used here, the answer would be "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." True, but circular and provides no real foundation. Remember, something says how we ought to behave if morality exists, because "nothing says how we ought to behave" is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior.


Well, again I think you don't quite understand what is being said, and this point has been explained many times in the thread. But as it seems almost as if you decided to read a little Kant (as you seemed fuzzy on Kant when Postmodern Beatnik originally referred to him), the best way to think of this point is as a Categorical Imperative. The point being that morality is an end in itself. If someone says, "Why do you give money to the bums on the street, they're just going to buy more crack..." then one replies saying "It is the simple act of giving that is important." Meaning that giving is an end unto itself. Nobody or nothing says that it ought to be done, other than Giving. In this circumstance, morality is the end. However, if God is telling us how to act, then it is not morality that is the end, it is God. And as Chops pointed out, God may or may not be subjective.

So I find this a good place to point out the arbitrariness of the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave." This is a very presumptuous question, but it is flawed in a very specific way. When how we ought to behave is the predicate of a subject, then immediately the properties of that subject (whether its a tablet, or a rock, a existence itself) are placed into a subjective category. No longer are we considering something objectively, rather, we are considering morality as contingent upon a subject, and thus to ask the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is an improper question to ask within the context of objective morality (which can also be thought of as morality being the object). Also remember that all 12 of these are answers to your question, but the reason you continue to arrive at some god-like metaphysical entity is because you are requiring a subject to dictate morality, rather than having morality be objective.


Necessity (hypothetical imperatives). Hypothetical imperatives don't work because there needs to be justification for the antecedent. For instance, "If the goal is X, then do Y." We have to have some basis for thinking we want to achieve goal X. For instance, if the goal is to benefit society, then rules against stealing and killing make sense. But then who or says we ought to benefit society? And what about hypothetical imperatives that have the opposite goal? "If the goal is to destroy society, remove all rules against stealing and killing." Hypothetical imperatives cannot ultimately tell us what our goal ought to be; it merely shifts from a stated goal to the action to achieve that goal. So this doesn't work.


While I can agree to an extent (remember the commentary on the trilemma above), I would like to point out that this flaw is incurred by your argument as well. Remember, you are trying to prove "If objective morality exists, then it is evidence of the existence of God." In order for that statement to be sufficiently justified, however, you have to prove the antecedent.

Additionally, you are not presenting a solution to this problem. Rather, you are just making God the stated Goal instead of morality (for morality telling us how we ought to behave doesn't make sense to you, right?) So instead of taking an action for the sake of morality, we are taking that action for God's sake.


Cultural and societal norms. This is also a non-option, because it would lead to cultural relativism, not ethical objectivism.


So I would have replied much like Chops did, but then you said:


But would the cultures be the authority in how we ought to behave or would the authority be trans-cultural? In ethical objectivism, the authority behind morality must be trans-cultural (since objective moral truths are independent of what people think, feel, and believe), which is why I believe "cultural and societal norms" is not a real option. You're going to have to find a basis for morality other than people to answer the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave if ethical objectivism is true?"


Yet I do not feel this really changes much. If the objective truth is that morality is dictated by cultural and societal norms, this is still ethical objectivism of a sort. But to make it appealing to you, let say that God's decision for human morality is that humans decide their own morality, and this is consistent with so many differing ethical codes all coming from the same god. So while we still know morality subjectively, it is objective in the sense that it coincides with what you call "objective truth". Perhaps the "objective truth" is that morality is subjective.

But I know you don't like this answer because you are looking for a moral standard. I just wanted to point out that it is not necessarily the case that the "objective truth" of morality is standard. A good example of the Bible is the commandment, "thou shalt not kill", yet I imagine you would not find it immoral to kill another man in self-defense.


# Our parents: Using a human authority doesn't work, because ethical objectivism says that ethical truths are independent of what any human thinks, feels, or believes.
# Conditioning. This is an extremely vague answer, so I can only guess at what you mean. If you mean human beliefs brought about by the environment or society, then this doesn't work because it is still relying on human beliefs to determine what ought to be.


With these two I was introducing the idea of nature and nurture. Perhaps the parents part may be based on human beliefs (though human beliefs started somewhere, presumably in a state of nature), but certainly you've read the jungle book, and you can imagine somebody like Mowgli who was raised in nature, developing his ideas of what is "right and wrong" from the environment in which he grew meaning that the necessities of life dictate his morality. Likewise one could say that certain moral predispositions are merely the result of neuro-chemical phenomena. Both of these ideas could certainly be constructed in a way that would be objective. Note that this sort of morality would not be reliant on human beliefs, but they would require interaction with the human psyche. And they are also quite plausible. Though I think you probably don't find them plausible because they do not require a God in order for morality to be objective.


Flipping a coin. Correct me if I'm wrong, but this was the scenario in which you asked a question regarding morality and one flips a coin to decide between possible answers (e.g. "If heads, the answer is this; if tails, the answer is that."). This is simply not a plausible basis for objective morality.


Note that you don't actually answer this; you just assert that it's not plausible. I'm beginning to think that "not plausible" for you just simply means "I don't like it." And while I may find that an acceptable answer, it certainly isn't a justified answer.

Tist wrote:

sovereign


This is probably the only word that actually sounds like theism, and I fail to see where you gain this idea of sovereign from anything you've said. I think you use it just because it sounds "Lordly". But I would like to point-out that words like "Sovereign" and "Sanctified" and "Holy" are really just ways of describing something as an end in itself, and you need to have it mean something else because you can't allow "Sovereign" or "Sanctified" to relate to morality itself, but rather it needs to relate to God.


Many of these are not logically possible inasmuch as we're operating under the conditional proof that ethical objectivism is true ("If objective morality exists and..."). Second, remember I was originally looking for plausible alternatives, and I claim that the only plausible alternative is "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave." Mount Kilimanjaro saying how we ought to behave is logically possible, but not plausible.


While you can perhaps consider all of my above points subjective, it is only because you are choosing to conceive of them that way. This is basically what a strawman argument is. You are conceiving of a way in which these points could be considered subjective and dismissing them off-hand, whereas the way in which they are presented, you should be giving each of these points the benefit of the doubt, and trying to find a way in which they could be objective. This is why you have received comments that you are being rather disingenuous. It almost seems a deliberate effort on your part to characterize the points as irrelevant, but it should be realized that this is your doing, not that of the people who are responding to you.


Mount Kilimanjaro saying how we ought to behave is logically possible, but not plausible.


While I agree that this is not exactly plausible, it is on equal par with what you are proposing. I have asked on several occasions "how" can we know this objective morality of which you are speaking, and saying it comes from "God" or Mount Kilimanjaro bears very nearly the same significance (not the same meaning, though if you said "Mount Olympus" it may). Again, you notion of plausibility seems very much rooted in you desire to push forth your idea in spite of rationality, which is not surprising considering your belief that reason is inherently circular.


Could you explain (3) please? Are you saying if there is some metaphysical entity that says how we ought to behave, the world will turn into some dystopian nightmare?


I would not be so slanted as to call all of these a "dystopian nightmare". For example, in Brave New World, Mustafa Mond presents a very rational case for objective morality and the need for society to be controlled through such beliefs. It just so happens that our society believes in free thought; so it seems a dystopia, and that probably was Aldous Huxley's point in writing the novel. However, the justification of a belief in objective morality is the same justification offered by George Orwell or Stalin or Hitler in the need for them to create a societal standard. Hitler even said that his morality comes from God. My only point is that typically such beliefs are indicative and a condition of a fascist society where nothing is questioned and rules are in place for the sake of some grand, arbitrary entity like God.


Then perhaps you can explain this part to me, which was the very purpose of my asking you what your definition was of "regular wrong:"


Well, as I pointed out before. What is wrong, is wrong for a reason. And this could be a description of morality in which case, morality is based on reason. However, you seem to be talking about morality as if it is some "sanctified" thing, sanctified by the heart of God. So apparently, thinking that something is "regular wrong" in the sense of rational is less "plausible" than believing that something is wrong just because...God!

And so in saying that there is no rational difference between "regular wrong" and "morally wrong", I could see that you could not quite grasp this concept. Hence my reply: "You're really dense, you know that? If I tell you that wrong is wrong whether it is morally or "regular wrong", then there's not so much to explain."


No, not always. Whether intuition is in opposition to reason depends on which definition you choose. Obviously, you chose the definition in which intuition is opposed to reason whereas I have not. Some definitions of intuition from Merriam-Webster:

2 a : immediate apprehension or cognition b : knowledge or conviction gained by intuition c : the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference


You're really playing with the definition of "intuition" a LOT. Not to mention you don't really seem to know what all the definitions in a dictionary are for. First, "immediate apprehension or cognition" is not inclusive of reason. Reason is a thought process by which something is justified that does not include "immediate". Second, your understanding of analytic truths as being the result of reason is a bit skewed. If you had payed attention to the Quine essay, you would see that these truths are not intuited or reasoned. I could grab a thesaurus and just spit out tons of analytic statements, but none of them would have a unique or enlightening truth behind them that is suddenly granted by my intuition or vindicated by my reason. All intuitions are immediate cognitions is an analytically true statement, but there is no unique meaning in such a statement as it is basically a definition. The fact that you want to argue the infinite regress of reason implies that you don't really understand the analytical truth of the statement all justifications are reasons and objective, which just goes to show that not all analytical truths are intuitive (as you seem to not immediately apprehend this idea).


I believe the best solution to the problem is the existence of properly basic beliefs which (at least in practice) are obtained by certain types of intuition (remember, I'm defining "intuition" broadly enough to include the perception of logic existing). An example of this would, I think, be a person perceiving an analytic truth.



And thus the crux of the trilemma, that you have to solve it with an unjustified belief.


And behold, you did not answer the question whether gravity would be true for this person just because he doesn't perceive gravity. Yes, I'm sure you have other contentions, but you did not answer the question at hand. "Yes" or "no" would have answered the question. Claiming that your contention "is that it is not objective (or rational) knowledge if this guy believes in gravity (or morality) for no other reason than intuition (meaning no perception)" does not answer the question. Regardless of whether intuitions can be rational in some cases, would it not be true that gravity would be true for this fellow who fell off a cliff?


Ah, but I did address the issue. The "truth" for this guy is different for epistemic reasons. If this guy is not even aware that he died from falling of the cliff, then how could he possibly acknowledge its truth? Here you are again being disingenuous in not considering my argument. While to the person that just saw this guy fall from a cliff, gravity is an epistemic truth (he has good reason to believe in gravity), the guy that fell and had no clue that he was falling would have no epistemic justification for believing in gravity. Hence the original answer, "if a tree falls in the woods, does it make a sound?" Your answer was a simple "Yes, now answer the question", and yet you failed to grasp the concept of epistemic knowledge. How do you know that the tree made a sound in that one instance? You just assume it makes a sound, yet you have no reason to back it up. These are the unsound epistemic judgements of which philosophers are wary.


Again, you dodged the question. It's all well and good to speak of mathematics as a human construct, but would it be the case that 2 + 2 = 5 is true for this fellow, simply because he believes it? (Note: he is using the same definitions of 2, 5, + and = that mathematicians use)


And I again, you are ignoring my response. You are asking a very irrelevant question to the epistemological point I am presenting. It is akin to my saying, "Answer yes or no. Why do stars shine?" And again, you are bringing up very deep issues that can be considered on many levels. But we can't merely boil down the Theory of Knowledge of the Philosophy of Mathematics into a yes or no question without overlooking some pretty huge holes. But again, I suspect you do this because you think reasoning is circular and have taken to not really justifying your beliefs (though you attempt to do so through intuition).


It sounded as if you were claiming something entirely different from what you just described.


For the confusion, I apologize. But then again, you are the one who has consistently tried to twist the words around to be able to dismiss the others' arguments. Maybe this is my fault and I am just a naturally vague person, or maybe we just don't communicate so well between the two of us. As far as the reason goes, I'm epistemologically uncertain, but I do have my suspicions...


However, they don't work very well in the contexts of "objective truth" and "subjective truth." In those contexts your definition is rather unorthodox. Whether "objective truth" is nonsensical will depend on the definition you use, and the definitions I used are pretty conventional. Remember, I ripped off a university website and Merriam-Webster dictionary.


I can see that. Apparently you missed the part in which I contextualize the definitions I am using as they pertain to the field of epistemology. I felt that since we are talking about how things are known, it is important to have distinctive definitions that do not conflate two meanings of the word "objective". I even typed a nice long post about why it is necessary to contextualize such a definition and why such a definition would not be found in Merriam-Webster. Short of reproducing the explanation yet again, as I have attempted to do over the past several posts, I feel that it would behoove the entire thread to re-evaluate the use of the term "objective" as there is a difference between what we know and the reality of things.


No, that's exactly what noncognitivism does. Noncognitivism says that allegedly moral statements are simply personal expressions of what someone likes or dislikes.


You act as if there is only one non-cognitivist and that it's goal is to strip moral statements of their meaning. This is a gross mischaracterization of the philosophy.

Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy wrote:

Non-cognitivists deny neither that moral sentences are meaningful nor that they are generally used by speakers in meaningful ways. Thus different sorts of non-cognitivist couple their negative theses with various positive claims about the meanings of moral sentences and about the states of mind that they express. It is the diversity of positive proposals that generates the different varieties of non-cognitivism. Emotivists suggest that moral sentences express or evoke non-cognitive attitudes towards various objects without asserting that the speaker has those attitudes. Norm-expressivists suggest (roughly) that the states of mind expressed by moral sentences are attitudes of acceptance of various norms or rules governing conduct and emotion, perhaps coupled with a judgement that the objects or action under discussion comports with those norms. Prescriptivists suggest that these sentences are a species of prescription or command, and may or may not offer an account of the state of mind such judgments express.


The issue is far more complicated than moral statements being equivalent to a matter of taste. And the fact that you are trying to reduce their work to "chocolate over vanilla" demonstrates that your presentation of non-cognivitism is a strawman.


I will freely admit that I can't (if I am understanding this challenge correctly). I could of course justify a moral statement in regards to other moral statements (as a person having certain individual rights to justify prohibitions against murder) but ultimately I face a problem like Agrippa's trilemma here.


Okay, then we can both agree that there is no moral statement that is true beyond the mere assertion that it is true. Notions of "objective truth" concerning morality, aside, the only truth that we can know concerning morality comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives, or irrational assertions.

Tist wrote:

I believe that analytic statements are true by virtue of the meanings (as of the words) involved. Quine doesn't give a particularly solid reason for abandoning this conception of an analytic truth, however (he says certain concepts are elusive or unclear, but little else). If you think I have misread him, please explain his argument against the existence of entities called meanings.


As you were so well to point-out, Quine has fairly lengthy explanation of the triviality of analytical truth, and for me to recount the entire argument solely so that you can assert your beliefs is a bit much. Instead, I thought it best if you read the article so that we are on the same page. Your reluctance to do so, seems a little indicative to me that you do not want to face any well-reasoned criticism of your belief that these things are true analytically (which you have recently used several times to justify your use of intuitive knowledge as a means of discerning "objective truths").

So considering that I am citing a quote with much reasoning and actually requires the reading of the whole article in order to understand what is being said completely, I will post this:

Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism wrote:

It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extra-linguistic fact. The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would be false if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would also be false if the word 'killed' happened rather to have the sense of 'begat.' Hence the temptation to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statement simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.


Not only is this pertinent to the topic at hand (as you are trying to say that the self-evidence of analyticity is comparative to the self-evidence of factual truths), it also points out that people often use justifications of analytic statements as dogmatic ways around true reason.

Tist wrote:

It does not presume physicalism. Physicalism, according to my college philosophy textbook, is "the theory that human beings can be explained completely and adequately in terms of their physical or material components." Perhaps you meant realism?


Saying that our eyes accurately perceive the "objective physical world" is an assumption of physicalism. While physicalism may presume realism, saying that we can accurately determine the truth of the physical world via our sense is physicalism. However, it's not as if your entire argument presumes physicalism, just your mentioning that our eyes accurately perceive physical things. And while i know you are particularly into God and may see physicalism as adverse to your complete view, you should know that the two are not entirely inconsistent:

SEP wrote:

Imagine a necessary being -- that is, a being which exists in all possible worlds -- which is essentially nonphysical. (Some theists believe that God provides an example of such a being.) If such a non-physical being exists, it is natural to suppose that physicalism is false. But if physicalism is defined according to (2), the existence of such a being is compatible with physicalism. For consider: if the actual world is wholly physical, apart from the necessary non-physical being, any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter. Since the non-physical being exists in all possible worlds, it exists at all worlds which are minimal physical duplicates of the actual world.


Tist wrote:

Rather than "coincidentally match" our perceptions might have some link to objective reality ("subjective" and "objective" on my definitions). I of course do not believe that all intuitions are subjective (on your definition of "subjective").


Aside from not providing a viable way in which "intuition" can inform us of non-physical truths, you are saying more than an eye has "some link to objective reality". You are asserting what something might be like then saying its the only plausible thing. However, empirically our sense data are far more reliable than our intuitions, and one might even argue that it is reliance on intuition (as opposed to reason) that defines The Dark Ages. Otherwise, and this is very important to note because prior to this thread I would have argued quite the opposite, you are jumping to conclusions concerning our intuitions as they relate to the reality/truth/existence of morality. Just because we may have physical do-dads that connect us with physical reality (which we have good reason to believe) does not mean that we have moral do-dads that connect us with moral reality. It is this link that's missing in your argument.


Tist wrote:

Reason is itself something that is intuitively perceived, however (think of an alternate solution to Agrippa's trilemma if you wish to refute this statement).


I think I described your problems with Agrippa's trilemma fairly accurately above. Now while you may have an obscenely broad definition of intuition (that goes beyond immediate apprehension or cognition), reason still remains our most reliable way of gaining accurate knowledge about the world around us, and it is this exact reason that Agrippa's trilemma is a problem, for without reason we are left to guess which of our intuitions is correct and which ones are not. Otherwise, you are merely asserting that reason functions through intuition, and I have nothing in the way of justification to believe you. If you read the thread (NB it's a short pertinent thread that you may even wish to post in), you will see, not my solution to the problem being presented, but rather an array of people who were kind enough to explain things to me and direct me toward some enlightening reading.

Tist wrote:

Fine, but if imperfect moral knowledge is not something that shouldn't exist, why on Earth did you claim that God would prevent it from happening?


I didn't. Your conception of God told you that he must prevent it from happening, and that you needed to explain it away. My position is that the human lack of moral knowledge is only evidence that there is no Objective Morality (at least not coming from God).


(1) this was assumed without justification


So you do not see any reason why we would need to be able to know of Objective Moral Truths if they were created by God for us to follow?


2) A counterexample: God gave humanity free will, including the power of self-deception, and thus end up not knowing (by their own free will) what the correct moral action is.


Weak counterexample. All this could possibly establish is that it is more important for us to have free will (including the power of self-deception) than it is for us to act morally.

I can provide a counter-counterexample: God gave us corporeal desires to lure our free will into immoral acts.
This provides for a rather sadistic God who sets all the rewards at committing morally atrocious acts.


What defense? The fact that this is what the metaethical beliefs really do say is a pretty important and relevant point and bears repeating if you accuse me of making a straw man of those positions.


As I stated above, you are only assuming the weakest possible position of these metaethical beliefs. You ignored what I said about nobody actually being a cultural relativist except when they are speaking about philosophy. You insist that non-cognitivism is limited to "matters of taste". You acknowledge the similarities between following moral intuitions and ethical subjectivism; yet you deny the legitimacy of one whilst accepting the other. Only to continue asserting without justification:


Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to kill Jews is morally right if that's what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.


as if I'm not well aware (even by my own quoting of this exact same paragraph) of what your position is.


Do not conflate cultural relativism with sociological relativism. Sociological relativism is the observation that cultures differ in what they believe is morally right. Cultural relativism goes one step further and says that a culture believing something morally right actually makes it right for that culture. I didn't just make this up. This comes from one of my college philosophy books which I can cite for you if you'd like. Cultural relativism really does imply the absurdity I described.


No doubt there are some people that argue that what other cultures believe is morally right, but you are excluding the entire reasoning behind such a belief. But the truth is that you invented the distinction between sociological relativism and cultural relativism (as they are essentially the ideology). Give me a reference that notes the distinction between sociological and cultural relativism. I'll give you mine:

SEP wrote:

Moral relativism has the unusual distinction — both within philosophy and outside it — of being attributed to others, almost always as a criticism, far more often than it is explicitly professed by anyone. Nonetheless, moral relativism is a standard topic in metaethics, and there are contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it: The most prominent are Gilbert Harman and David B. Wong. The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to some group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should tolerate them.


Proving my points that (1) Nobody actually adheres to cultural relativism (2) there are no absolute moral truths and (3) it is a socio-ethical view of morality. None of which do you take into account; instead, you expect cultural relativism to hold-up some standard of morality which it doesn't profess to do.


Similarly, our method of knowing what morality is may be imperfect, but that does not imply that moral truths change.


You really have the audacity to compare established and proven fields of thought like reason and mathematics with the highly controversial and never definitive field of morality? They are completely dissimilar, and your incessant attempt to connect justified fields with one you wish to base on faith (reason is not based on the intuition/faith you would have it be) only goes to show your reluctance to critically consider others' positions.


Ethical subjectivism says that what a person believes is morally right actually makes it right for him or her--a position I do not at all share. I am thus not an ethical subjectivist.


So does this mean that you think that your morality is right for everyone?

You are presenting ethical subjectivism as if it is some form of individualistic relativism. It certainly can come in many forms with many justifications, but I would say that anyone who bases morality on their own beliefs is an ethical subjectivist. Correct me if I am wrong (as you have not discussed so much your take on morality as you have hypotheticals), but morality for you is very much linked to your idea of God being the ultimate purveyor of morality for all of existence. This doesn't sound so independent of human thoughts, feelings or beliefs to me.


It indirectly establishes a moral standard, by saying what a person believes is morally right actually makes it right for that person. Hence, the absurdity I mentioned really is implied by ethical subjectivism. It is not a straw man.


Wrong. It is a field of thought. A label for an idea. Saying that there are no moral standards is a far cry from saying that there is a moral standard to believe that whatever anyone says is indeed ethical. Like I said, it's more like cultural relativism in this respect. If you think I am wrong, point me to some literature that says contrary. You will not find such. Rather, you will find ethical subjectivists saying things like:

Villanova University wrote:

Ethical subjectivism, then, extends what individuals and groups perceive to be true into assertions concerning what is in fact true. This body of ethical theory does so because ethical subjectivists believe that no ideal or uniquely correct resolution to ethical disagreements exist. For ethical subjectivists, there are no objectively true ethical principles and, thus, there is no absolute standard



Tist wrote:

Noncognitivism in its bare definition


Right off, not trying to encompass the entire idea of non cognitivism, but rather focusing on an individual, sparsely defended concept.


A noncognitivist might say that, but noncognitivism itself doesn't. Remember, it says that allegedly moral statements are outbursts of personal feelings; and so hypothetical imperatives don't matter much when a person doesn't feel they are correct. Actually, noncognitivism says moral right and wrong do not exist at all, and if this is true then there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust.


So while your textbook, which no doubt you have been scouring, does not explicitly talk about hypothetical imperatives, that does not mean that non-cognitivists do not use hypothetical imperatives to make moral claims.

SEP wrote:

Thus some non-cognitivists hope to explain logical relations by using the secondary descriptive component in the meanings of moral terms postulated by some versions of non-cognitivism...In embedded contexts, this secondary component becomes the semantic value of the embedded moral expression. ‘If lying is wrong, then he will lie,’ has an antecedent whose embedded content is the same as a statement predicating the property on which the speakers moral disapproval supervenes.


I know you desperately want to be able to put your finger down on non-cognitivism, but if you are not arguing against the version that directly conflicts with your ideology then you are doing nothing but strawmanning the argument, attacking the weaker irrelevant argument rather than the one that is more pertinent.

And amidst all this I still want to mention:


Ethical Objectivism- I figure that if you are going to say that your characterizations of these beliefs is absolutely the strongest position that a cultural relativist, an ethical subjectivist and an ethical non-cognitivist would argue, then I should present the "strongest" position of Ethical Objectivism:

Moral standards are necessary. God is the only one capable of giving such moral standards, but God's voice is far too magnificent for human ears to behold, so he has placed his words into the mouths of his truest believers that only speak God's most necessary and heart based truths. Those speakers are and have been: Adolf Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, Otto Van Bismark, Julius Caesar, Osama Bin Laden, Pope Urban II, Ferdinand II, Timothy McVey, Ted Kazenski, Michael Jackson, Peter Jackson, and Mel Gibson to name a few.

the reality/truth/existence of morality according to Ethical Objectivism is that all those who do not believe Tisthammerw's code of ethics are immoral and do not deserve to live in society.


Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 06/03/08 - 10:27 AM. Reason: HTTP --> WSN
Tisthammerw
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Posted 06/04/08 - 03:47 PM:
quote post
#729
jdrw wrote:

When you ask your central question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” I do not believe that you are even entertaining the possibility that a “what” of any kind would be an acceptable answer. It seems apparent to me that you believe that the only plausible answer is a "who"--a consciousness, an intentional agent (essentially a God-like agent.) Thus, your question is loaded and misleading. It begs the question of whether or not the existence of Objective Morality is evidence for the existence of God, because it presumes that Objective Morality is possible only if its source is an intentional agent such as God.


I'm afraid you've misrepresented my position here. I did (repeatedly) point to a "what" that I found acceptable: namely, the universe/reality/existence saying how we ought to behave. I have repeatedly and very specifically said that this alternative was plausible.

For the record, I do not accuse you of intentionally distorting my position. Misconstruals and logical missteps often happen naturally in emotionally heated topics (and religion--even philosophy of religion--is no exception). Still, given how I've repeatedly made statements regarding a specific "what" being a plausible answer, this particular misconstrual is somewhat puzzling.

Incidentally, how is "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" a loaded question?
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
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Joined: Mar 18, 2004
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Posted 06/04/08 - 07:51 PM:
quote post
#730
The discussion is getting rather lengthy, even after I've trimmed some stuff to get to the main points.
For the sake of some order, I've separated the rest of my post into sections:

  1. Preface: on copy-and-paste
  2. Argument from morality: Who or what says how we ought to behave?
  3. Logic and epistemology
  4. Ethics




Preface: on copy-and-paste
===========================================

So, again you copy and pasted your point. I think this is like the 12th time, and I even preempted your doing this yet another time in saying "Right, clarification/contextualization is a good reason to copy and paste. Re-explaining the same idea that disregards all the criticisms brought to a certain point because you feel others are "off topic" because they see blatant flaws in your logic, is not a reason to copy and paste."


Part of the reason I copy-and-paste is because you give a response that doesn't give any real evidence against it, or you raise an argument that one of my previous remarks already deals with, or you ignore the point or question entirely. I'll give some specific examples in this post.

Notably, we each believe the other to be ignoring criticisms. My point of view: one of the reasons I sometimes repeat points is precisely because your arguments ignore them. And frequently your responses do not actually address my points (I'll give some specific examples shortly). The upshot is that when I repeat a point to serve as a rebuttal to one of your arguments, frustrations rise on both sides.


Argument from morality: Who or what says how we ought to behave?
====================================================================

The question: if objective morality exists without God, who or what says how we ought to behave? (I claim the only plausible alternative is the universe/reality/existence, which leads to pantheism, but we can ignore that for now.)

I apologize if I have misunderstood something, but seeing how most of these answers where somewhat vague (in most cases only a single word) I've had to make my best educated guess. The following were some proposed possibilities to the question:

Reason
Buddahchuck wrote:

Tist wrote:

Doesn't work in practice. Reason can never go beyond hypothetical imperatives, i.e. "If X, you should do Y." If you want to benefit society, don't kill or steal. But then why should we benefit society? Reason alone cannot ultimately answer questions like this and so it doesn't work as a real answer to the question at hand.

Well, I think you would be hard pressed to answer any question without reason and still be justified.


OK, but that still doesn't address my point here. The justification capabilities of reason have limits. Reason can be used to justify hypothetical imperatives ("If you want A, do B") but not categorical imperatives ("Do B"), which is precisely what is needed here. If you think I'm wrong, try to use reason to justify a categorical imperative (without using hypothetical imperatives of course, else it wouldn't be a categorical imperative). It would be nice if there were some logical proof of what moral principles we ought to follow, but it just doesn't exist. We have to start with some basic beliefs (such as Kant's categorical imperative) before reason can be useful in deriving moral principles.


Pleasure

Pleasure. This doesn't seem to work as a plausible or valid authority, e.g. sadists. And what if people's pleasures conflict? What if it gives Bob pleasure to kill someone and it gives Joe pleasure to let that person live? In that case it seems like we'd have ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism.


Well, while one could certainly make that argument, it is being looked at the wrong way if such an argument is made. Ethical Objectivism is more than less the establishment of an ethical framework. Of course, this framework would need to be objective and not subjective as you describe it. The framework that allows pleasure to be an objective morality is that everyone bases their beliefs off of the same principle. A hedonist would argue, in your case of Bob and Joe, that a person like Bob doesn't truly exist. Rather, by serving his own needs, Bob would see that the pleasure derived from killing a particular person would be negligible when compared with the pleasure he could have from that person still living, or the absence of scorn received from Joe for having killed that person. So it wouldn't necessarily end-up badly.


That still doesn't address some points I made here. What if people's pleasures conflict? Who is right? If they are both right, it seems more like subjectivism instead of ethical objectivism. And the principle does not at all seem to be plausible if sadists exist (and they do). People like Bob really do exist; he would not have been the first murderer in human history after all.


Intuition
You're right. Intuition is subjective. Now in order for there to be a meaningful distinction between ethical subjectivism and your version of ethical objectivism, there would have to be a clear dichotomy in which the tenants of said individual's ethical subjectivists views do NOT align with "objective truth", as you call it. Otherwise, I see no difference between this ethical subjectivism and your ethical objectivism.


I have explained this before. There is a difference between the method of knowing a fact and the fact itself. The difference is that personal intuition is the ultimate authority that actually makes a fact true rather than revealing it. Our eyes may perceive an objective physical world (to e.g. perceive that the Earth is round rather than flat when flying around the planet in a spaceship), but the eyes don't make the reality true (e.g. if the person was wearing virtual reality glasses to show him a round Earth; the shape of the Earth exists independently of whether it is perceived).


Morality in itself

Morality in itself. Given the definition of "morality" being used here, the answer would be "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." True, but circular and provides no real foundation. Remember, something says how we ought to behave if morality exists, because "nothing says how we ought to behave" is tantamount to saying there are no rules of behavior.

Well, again I think you don't quite understand what is being said, and this point has been explained many times in the thread. But as it seems almost as if you decided to read a little Kant (as you seemed fuzzy on Kant when Postmodern Beatnik originally referred to him), the best way to think of this point is as a Categorical Imperative. The point being that morality is an end in itself. If someone says, "Why do you give money to the bums on the street, they're just going to buy more crack..." then one replies saying "It is the simple act of giving that is important." Meaning that giving is an end unto itself. Nobody or nothing says that it ought to be done, other than Giving.


You still haven't really addressed the problem of circularity I mentioned with "Morality itself says how we ought to behave." Morality is a certain set of values, norms and principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do (for example, the principle of Giving). Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S (or at least statements that contradict set S). An example of a norm in set O would be the principle of Taking.

Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow a principle of set S (as Giving) over a principle of set O? One could cite the statement of set S (e.g. Giving); it supports itself. But the antithesis statement of set O supports itself equally as well (e.g. Taking), and so circular arguments get us nowhere. The same sort of thing applies if were to take the sets as a whole. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O).

We could of course say that set S is different because set S by definition has the "correct" statements (if moral values exist); i.e. the moral values of set S actually exist and morality is the one whose statements are based in reality. But if this is the crucially distinguishing feature, then this is just the same thing as saying that the basis for moral values existing is reality/existence itself.


Cultural and societal norms.

But would the cultures be the authority in how we ought to behave or would the authority be trans-cultural? In ethical objectivism, the authority behind morality must be trans-cultural (since objective moral truths are independent of what people think, feel, and believe), which is why I believe "cultural and societal norms" is not a real option. You're going to have to find a basis for morality other than people to answer the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave if ethical objectivism is true?"


Yet I do not feel this really changes much. If the objective truth is that morality is dictated by cultural and societal norms, this is still ethical objectivism of a sort. But to make it appealing to you, let say that God's decision for human morality is that humans decide their own morality, and this is consistent with so many differing ethical codes all coming from the same god.


But in that circumstance, the ultimate authority would not be the culture, but rather God. Remember, the question was looking for the ultimate authority behind morality. It is logically possible for some trans-cultural authority to say we ought to follow what the culture says, but for this to be real ethical objectivism the authority must transcend human culture. Otherwise it's just cultural relativism.


Our parents, Conditioning
With these two I was introducing the idea of nature and nurture. Perhaps the parents part may be based on human beliefs (though human beliefs started somewhere, presumably in a state of nature), but certainly you've read the jungle book, and you can imagine somebody like Mowgli who was raised in nature, developing his ideas of what is "right and wrong" from the environment in which he grew meaning that the necessities of life dictate his morality. Likewise one could say that certain moral predispositions are merely the result of neuro-chemical phenomena. Both of these ideas could certainly be constructed in a way that would be objective.


You might want to specify how. Certainly, chemical reactions outside our control are an objective truth, but in the end it is still our beliefs that supposedly dictate how we ought to behave. The environment is nothing more than the mechanism that would make subjective moral truths. What happens, for instance, when nature produces two people with conflicting moral beliefs? Who is right?

And now apart form a proposed answer to the question, we come to...

On the legitimacy of the question
So I find this a good place to point out the arbitrariness of the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave." This is a very presumptuous question, but it is flawed in a very specific way. When how we ought to behave is the predicate of a subject, then immediately the properties of that subject (whether its a tablet, or a rock, a existence itself) are placed into a subjective category. No longer are we considering something objectively, rather, we are considering morality as contingent upon a subject, and thus to ask the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is an improper question to ask within the context of objective morality (which can also be thought of as morality being the object). Also remember that all 12 of these are answers to your question, but the reason you continue to arrive at some god-like metaphysical entity is because you are requiring a subject to dictate morality, rather than having morality be objective.


This is at best a fallacy of equivocation in moving from "subject" (in the English sense) to "subjective" (in the epistemological sense, denoting relative truth). Consider the sentence "The Earth is round." "The Earth" is the subject and "is round" is the predicate (of a subject). But that does not imply that the property of the subject (the shape of the Earth in this case) becomes a subjective truth. And simply because something has a metaphysical basis for why it is true, it does not imply that the truth of the matter is subjective. Remember, the question is simply seeking a metaphysical basis for morality, not necessarily a literal mouth and voice.

Also, the above objection does not address the problem of "nothing says how we ought to behave" that I have repeatedly mentioned (note: I repeat the point because you have not addressed it here, and it needs to be addressed in this sort of objection). If literally nothing says how we ought to behave, then nothing says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with "nothing says how we ought to behave" is that it is tantamount to saying "there are no rules of behavior." It seems that if moral truths exist, they must at least be based in reality and existence, if nothing else. So "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is still an apropos question, even if the answer is simply "reality/existence."





"Tist" wrote:

sovereign


This is probably the only word that actually sounds like theism, and I fail to see where you gain this idea of sovereign from anything you've said.


Actually, I borrowed the term from jdrw, who first started using the term "sovereign" in regards to the basis of morality.


And so in saying that there is no rational difference between "regular wrong" and "morally wrong", I could see that you could not quite grasp this concept. Hence my reply: "You're really dense, you know that? If I tell you that wrong is wrong whether it is morally or "regular wrong", then there's not so much to explain."


It's just this insult seemed rather inappropriate considering that you yourself previously said, "So because I think the Holocaust is just regular wrong, and not morally wrong, then I'm warped." This statement kind of suggested that you thought there was some apposite difference between the two.


Logic and Epistemology
=============================

Agrippa's trilemma

First, Agrippa was one of the classical sceptics, and the end of all sceptical ideologies is the suspension of belief. You, however, are using this sceptical reasoning only to suspend belief of reason, whilst advocating something completely adverse to it. So if we were to accept that reason is infinitely regressive, at best we would suspend our judgement, not immediately revert to these claims of intuition and God.


First, it's a bit of a straw man to say that I'm advocating something completely adverse to reason. The definition of intuition I'm using is "immediate apprehension or cognition" e.g. how the truth of an analytic statement is immediately apprehended by the mind. This type of mental apprehension is not at all adverse to reason. Part of my point was that an infinite regress is infeasible. Additionally, a complete suspension of judgment is impractical. Obviously we do carry beliefs, and I think basic beliefs (a belief terminus to where our justification is based upon) that are more or less intuitively perceived (as e.g. analytic truths) are the correct solution to the problem. If you have another solution, by all means share it.

Second, I've actually had the discussion of the basis reason on this forum before, and while I feel I argued rather vehemently that reason had no basis save for itself, I listened to what the people on this forum said, their justifications, and found what made sense to me. Mentioned to me were the works of Peter Strawson. But what really hit-it-home, so to speak, was the point that reason is justification in the same way that all bachelors are unmarried; it is an analytic truth. So, if you are interested beyond your own writings, you can see what persuaded me of this point here.


Great, so what's your justification that's it's an analytic truth? Or is this an example of a truth that is just immediately apprehended by the mind? If so, it seems to fit in with my solution.

And third, you forget the third part of the trilemma, which is why the problem is a tri-lemma, rather than a regular dilemma


You might want to count again. I'll copy-and-paste a section from the post you were responding to (note: I am doing this because you seemed to miss a point; confer the preface above).

Tisthammerw wrote:

Suppose one is trying to find ultimate justification for a logical belief B. Once could justify B by appealing to belief C ("I believe B is true because C is true"). But for this justification to work we must have adequate grounds for accepting C. In other words, the justification for belief B (i.e. C) will itself require justification, and that justification will require justification, and so forth. The quest for ultimate justification for a belief yields three possible outcomes (borrowed somewhat from Agrippa's trilemma).

  1. Keep coming up with new beliefs to justify the previous beliefs (B <- C <- D...), i.e. embark on an infinite regress
  2. Appeal to a belief already mentioned (e.g. B <- C <- B), i.e. use circular reasoning.
  3. Appeal to an allegedly self-evident or basic belief.

I believe the best solution to the problem is the existence of properly basic beliefs which (at least in practice) are obtained by certain types of intuition (remember, I'm defining "intuition" broadly enough to include the perception of logic existing). An example of this would, I think, be a person perceiving an analytic truth.


A "basic belief" is a belief terminus which is not further justified (the belief that analytic statements are true might be one example).


You're really playing with the definition of "intuition" a LOT. Not to mention you don't really seem to know what all the definitions in a dictionary are for. First, "immediate apprehension or cognition" is not inclusive of reason. Reason is a thought process by which something is justified that does not include "immediate".


Reason requires certain axioms to function however. Think back to the Münchhausen trilemma. What's your solution if not the third one? (Remember, basing your terminus on an analytic truth kind of fits in with my solution.)



It sounded as if you were claiming something entirely different from what you just described.


For the confusion, I apologize. But then again, you are the one who has consistently tried to twist the words around to be able to dismiss the others' arguments.


Come again? This is a direct quote, "if it's perceived through inutivite [sic] perceptions, it's subjective. Even logic? Yes, even logic. Even Math? Yes, even math. How can this be? Well, if a subject doesn't intuitively perceive these laws of logic and math, then those laws aren't exactly true for him, now are they?" I didn't twist any words here. It really looked as if you were saying that truth was relative as a result of different perceptions.



I can see that. Apparently you missed the part in which I contextualize the definitions I am using as they pertain to the field of epistemology.


I can see that. Apparently you missed the part in which I contextualize the definitions I am using as they pertain to the field of epistemology.


I saw that; the problem is that even in the field of epistemology, subjective truth refers to truth that is relative to the individual, and objective truth is truth that is not relative. Remember that philosophy link I cited earlier?



Tist wrote:
I believe that analytic statements are true by virtue of the meanings (as of the words) involved. Quine doesn't give a particularly solid reason for abandoning this conception of an analytic truth, however (he says certain concepts are elusive or unclear, but little else). If you think I have misread him, please explain his argument against the existence of entities called meanings.


As you were so well to point-out, Quine has fairly lengthy explanation of the triviality of analytical truth, and for me to recount the entire argument solely so that you can assert your beliefs is a bit much.


I wasn't asking you to recount the entire article, just the part about his argument against the existence of entities called meanings. Quine's article takes it from a number of different angles. My own belief regarding analytic truths is "a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings," which is similar to one of the definitions he proffered. But in section 1 "BACKGROUND FOR ANALYTICITY" he said, "The description of analyticity as truth by virtue of meanings started us off in pursuit of a concept of meaning. But now we have abandoned the thought of any special realm of entities called meanings." He does this in the section 1, not later on. It was this part of what he said that I was criticizing.

What I find a bit much is linking to a lengthy article without even telling me what point of mine it is supposed to be addressing, and expecting me to respond to the said lengthy article when I don't have the time to do a full critique of that article.

Incidentally, I have read the entire article, but the substance of actual justification in Quine's article seems (to me) rather weak, almost nonexistent. As a specific example, note what he said about meanings. If you think I'm wrong, go ahead and explain his justification on that point here. My reluctance to read the entire thing was this reason: one example of a wild goose chase I've seen is someone, rather than typing a rebuttal to my point in the post, links to some web article that is thousands of words long, and after me wasting time reading it the article turns out not to deliver. A simple insistence that "It's in there; trust me, but I'm not going to bother telling you what it is here" will not go over very well with me. It has all the odor of a wild goose chase, particularly if I already read the article and didn't find what I was looking for.

Incidentally, I don't suppose you will post Quine's elusive justification for the point I mentioned here?


Ethics
=================

Additionally, you are not presenting a solution to this problem. Rather, you are just making God the stated Goal instead of morality (for morality telling us how we ought to behave doesn't make sense to you, right?) So instead of taking an action for the sake of morality, we are taking that action for God's sake.


It might depend on how you define morality. Jdrw had this, I think, really nice insight in post #677:

jdrw wrote:

The name for the Moral Realist’s really existing metaphysical entity is “Objective Morality” but they construe this name as referring to something, as referring to some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force, and it is this transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave.


If this is how one defines objective morality, then God is objective morality and you are taking an action for sake of morality. If you use my definition of morality (which simply refers to the set of statements themselves of how we ought to behave), the answer is somewhat less clear, but I think in this case God is simply the entity that allows objective morality to be possible, and one can still take an action for morality's sake (e.g. moral atheists).


Ethical subjectivism, noncognitivism, and cultural relativism

Quick recap on my argument against these three concepts: Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what one's culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says an individual trying to exterminate the Jews is morally right if that's what the individual believes. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.

Why have I copied and pasted certain things on this issue? (1) You have offered no evidence that the metaethical beliefs aren't defined the way I have been using them; and (2) you have offered no evidence that the implications don't logically follow from these beliefs. You've said that I "just copy and paste as if you are correct and I made no defense." To which I replied, "what defense?" You've made responses like "Cultural relativism...would equally say that it is morally right to be peaceful and charitable to all things in the world if that's what the culture believes." Which, although true, doesn't really address the problem at all. Cultural relativism still generates the implication I mentioned.

To be fair, I probably should have done my part for (1) but I didn't think that the definitions I was using would be so controversial (a number of times you accused me of presenting a straw man). So I'll cite a source by grabbing one of my college philosophy textbooks.

In page 9 of Ethics for Life (second edition), the author writes "noncognitive theories, such emotivism, claim that there are no moral truths and that moral statements are neither true nor false but simply expressions or outbursts of feelings." Under noncognitivism, allegedly moral statements are just expressions of personal feelings of what a person likes or dislikes. Sure, a noncognitivist can use hypothetical imperatives and all that, but at the end of the day noncognitivism says there are no moral truths and we still get the implication I mentioned.

Page 79 of that textbook says regarding ethical subjectivism,

my college textbook wrote:
Also, do not confuse it [ethical subjectivism] with the obviously true and therefore trivial statement that "whatever a person believes is right for him or her is what that person believes is right from him or her." Subjectivism goes beyond this by claiming that sincerely believing or feeling that something is right makes it right (or true) for that person.


And so, we still get the implication I mentioned. In your previous post, you yourself quoted a source you said was "Villanova University" that said, "Ethical subjectivism, then, extends what individuals and groups perceive to be true into assertions concerning what is in fact true."

The same textbook defines cultural relativism this way on page 105:

my college textbook wrote:
Like ethical subjectivism, cultural relativism looks to people for standards of right and wrong. Subjectivists claim that individuals create their own moral standards, cultural relativists argue that moral standards and values are derived from groups of people or cultures. Public opinion, rather than private opinion, determines what is right and wrong.


If that is true, then we get the implication I mentioned regarding bigotry. Page 107 says something similar, "if another culture values intolerance, then according to cultural relativists, that is the moral value that members of that culture are morally bound to follow." Now on to something you said:

Buddahchuck wrote:
But the truth is that you invented the distinction between sociological relativism and cultural relativism (as they are essentially the ideology). Give me a reference that notes the distinction between sociological and cultural relativism.


Okay. The same college textbook makes the following distinction on page 110:

my college textbook wrote:
Cultural relativism is not the same as sociological relativism. Cultural relativism is a theory of philosophical ethics. As such, it is concerned with what ought to be. Sociological relativism, in contrast, is a theory in descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics aims to discover and describe the moral beliefs of a given society. Sociological relativism is simply the observation that there is disagreement among cultures regarding moral values.


Contrary to your assumption, I did not invent the distinction. Remember, the context here is philosophical ethics. If you want a quick link corroboration, check out here (hit Ctrl + F and search for "sociological relativism"). I also found a companion website to another ethics textbook, and in the glossary section has this to say about sociological relativism: "The view that different cultures have different ethical and cultural systems. Sociological relativism is not an ethical theory, but an empirical claim." Care to guess how it defines cultural relativism?
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Posted 06/05/08 - 05:42 AM:
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#731
Tisthammerw wrote:

I'm afraid you've misrepresented my position here. I did (repeatedly) point to a "what" that I found acceptable: namely, the universe/reality/existence saying how we ought to behave. I have repeatedly and very specifically said that this alternative was plausible.

For the record, I do not accuse you of intentionally distorting my position. Misconstruals and logical missteps often happen naturally in emotionally heated topics (and religion--even philosophy of religion--is no exception). Still, given how I've repeatedly made statements regarding a specific "what" being a plausible answer, this particular misconstrual is somewhat puzzling.


But haven’t you insisted that the universe/reality/existence as you construed it in this argument was essentially so God-like that for all moral purposes it is equivalent to being God? Thus such a “what” is essentially a “who”—and guess Who this what/who Really Is?



Incidentally, how is "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" a loaded question?


Sorry, I meant the term in a loose, informal sense, and wasn’t even thinking of the strict sense of the term. “Loaded Questions” even in the strict sense are closely related to “Begging the Question”, which I did mean in a strict sense. If, as it seems to me, you really believed that a “what” is not really plausible, and only a “who” is plausible, then this would be a presupposition smuggled into the question.

Note also, that my challenge that you were begging the question or that the question was misleading does not imply deliberate deceptiveness on your part. My point was that it seems to me that your conceptualization and reasoning was such that you are not really entertaining the possibility of a “what” unless it is essentially equivalent to a “who” such as God. My challenge is analysis of your reasoning with no implied attribution of intent or motivation or deliberate deceptiveness of any kind.


Cheers.
jd
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
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Posted 06/05/08 - 09:01 AM:
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#732
Tisthammerw's unnamed textbook wrote:
Cultural relativism is not the same as sociological relativism. Cultural relativism is a theory of philosophical ethics. As such, it is concerned with what ought to be. Sociological relativism, in contrast, is a theory in descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics aims to discover and describe the moral beliefs of a given society. Sociological relativism is simply the observation that there is disagreement among cultures regarding moral values.
That's an interesting way of naming the distinction, but it is also an odd one. In philosophy, "cultural relativism" (CR) typically denotes the fact of moral disagreement between cultures and "moral relativism" -- or more properly, "metaethical moral relativism" (MMR) -- denotes the view that moral statements are true when they are endorsed by the relevant moral culture. Moreover, this terminological distinction comes from the work of anthropologists (who were the first social scientists to promote both CR and MMR).
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Posted 06/05/08 - 04:01 PM:
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#733
PMB, you said this in response to Tist


Tisthammerw's unnamed textbook wrote:
Cultural relativism is not the same as sociological relativism. Cultural relativism is a theory of philosophical ethics. As such, it is concerned with what ought to be. Sociological relativism, in contrast, is a theory in descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics aims to discover and describe the moral beliefs of a given society. Sociological relativism is simply the observation that there is disagreement among cultures regarding moral values.

That's an interesting way of naming the distinction, but it is also an odd one. In philosophy, "cultural relativism" (CR) typically denotes the fact of moral disagreement between cultures and "moral relativism" -- or more properly, "metaethical moral relativism" (MMR) -- denotes the view that moral statements are true when they are endorsed by the relevant moral culture. Moreover, this terminological distinction comes from the work of anthropologists (who were the first social scientists to promote both CR and MMR).


To me this indicates an approach that is designed to become confusing. To review existing systems, whose exact definition and origin are unclear, avoids the basic process of observing the world and defining it in basic terms. This would avoid bogging down in the baggage of the various systems.

Tist always reverts to "who or what decides how we ought to behave", then instead of observing the world about us disappears into CR, or MMR, and we all begin chasing our tails again. Its a good exercise in the appearance of truth seeking, but it does not seem to work
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Posted 06/05/08 - 04:58 PM:
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#734
I'm sorry, but I'm not quite understanding your point. Which approach is designed to be confusing?

Cultural relativism is the label given to observable differences in moral beliefs among cultures. Metaethical moral relativism is an anti-realist metaethical theory which states that the truth-makers for moral statements such as "skewering babies with pikes is wrong" are the cultures within which those statements are made. That seems pretty clear to me.

Then again, you said "approach" rather than "labels," so perhaps you are critiquing the actions of the social scientists who record the moral beliefs of various cultures? I'm not quite so sure what is confusing about that, but even if it were it seems the possible scientific advances it might yield would make it worth untangling whatever mental knots it might weave.

Or are you suggesting that Tisthammerw's focus on terminology is just a means of changing the subject, and that my responding amounts to playing along (thus extending the conversation pointlessly)? That might be an accurate assessment; but then again, long threads are bound to deviate. And when they do, I think it's best for the lurkers if oddities are explained.

Again, please forgive me if I have completely missed your meaning altogether.
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Posted 06/05/08 - 05:57 PM:
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#735
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

Tisthammerw's unnamed textbook wrote:

Cultural relativism is not the same as sociological relativism. Cultural relativism is a theory of philosophical ethics. As such, it is concerned with what ought to be. Sociological relativism, in contrast, is a theory in descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics aims to discover and describe the moral beliefs of a given society. Sociological relativism is simply the observation that there is disagreement among cultures regarding moral values.

That's an interesting way of naming the distinction, but it is also an odd one. In philosophy, "cultural relativism" (CR) typically denotes the fact of moral disagreement between cultures and "moral relativism" -- or more properly, "metaethical moral relativism" (MMR) -- denotes the view that moral statements are true when they are endorsed by the relevant moral culture.


First, it's a bit of a misrepresentation to attribute the quote to "Tisthammerw's unnamed textbook" considering that I did specifically name it in my last post. Second, is it odd? I did find it in one of my college philosophy textbooks after all, and it very specifically said that CR is not what you described, almost as if supposing so was a common confusion. And apparently I found another philosophy textbook that did the same (the companion website to the textbook had a glossary section) and a link from a university, as mentioned in my previous post. Or perhaps there isn't a standard name for the metaethical belief and individual authors chose their own terms (a little browsing on my part found three different terms for it).
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Posted 06/05/08 - 07:33 PM:
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#736
jdrw wrote:

But haven’t you insisted that the universe/reality/existence as you construed it in this argument was essentially so God-like that for all moral purposes it is equivalent to being God? Thus such a “what” is essentially a “who”—and guess Who this what/who Really Is?


Yes and no. If the universe never began to exist, then it is eternal, and the universe is (trivially) omnipresent. Moreover, we seem to agree that objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force, and it is this transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. I argued that if the universe is this entity this would lead to some form of pantheism. After all, the idea that there is some transcendent, eternal, and omnipresent sovereign metaphysical entity possessing supreme and universally binding moral authority in saying how we ought to behave certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism.

But here's the tricky part: is the pantheistic God a who or a what? Recall that I specifically (and repeatedly) said that a pantheistic God does not require consciousness. So while I think I reasonably established that we get some type of pantheistic God, I'm not convinced I've firmly established a consciousness as the basis for morality with this alternative (it would be nice if I could, but I concede my limitation here). What do you think? Would such a pantheistic God possess consciousness? What would be your arguments for/against it?

In any case, my conclusion from all this is that if the only plausible alternative for the existence of objective moral values is nonetheless an entity with significant God-like characteristics, then objective moral values (if they exist) constitute evidence for the existence of God.


If, as it seems to me, you really believed that a “what” is not really plausible, and only a “who” is plausible, then this would be a presupposition smuggled into the question.


Even if it were true that I presupposed that a "what" is not really plausible, the question itself doesn't contain that presupposition. It only says "who or what" and says nothing about which one (if any) is implausible. There are of course some "whats" that I do find implausible, but typically I give some type of reason why I believe that is the case (e.g. I argued that "morality says how we ought to behave" ends up being circular and provides no real foundation).
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Posted 06/06/08 - 12:17 AM:
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#737

Hi PMB, you said,






I'm sorry, but I'm not quite understanding your point. Which approach is designed to be confusing?


My point was contrasting an approach that looks at observable facts when trying to answer Tists fundamental question without building it into a system or trying to shoewhorn facts into a pre-existing model. What Tist appears to try and do is take any specifc observations and try to assign them to an existing system - eg. CR. He then looks as possible/probable flaws in this system and so manages to discard observed facts. As you point out below.

Cultural relativism is the label given to observable differences in moral beliefs among cultures. Metaethical moral relativism is an anti-realist metaethical theory which states that the truth-makers for moral statements such as "skewering babies with pikes is wrong" are the cultures within which those statements are made. That seems pretty clear to me.


I agree that this is clear, but the argument is not specifically about CR or MMR merits as a system, but "who or what commands how we ought to behave". Although both systems puport to explain this, it still draws us into a debate about the merits of large, complex, much debated systems. Its a debate that allows us not to see the wood for the trees.

Then again, you said "approach" rather than "labels," so perhaps you are critiquing the actions of the social scientists who record the moral beliefs of various cultures? I'm not quite so sure what is confusing about that, but even if it were it seems the possible scientific advances it might yield would make it worth untangling whatever mental knots it might weave.


Once again, I do not see the merit of working through a system like this, on a forum. The to and fro approach then becomes a debate about a system that might not reflect the observable facts. If the intention of the debate is indeed to validate if CR is a valid system or not, this is a different argument.

Or are you suggesting that Tisthammerw's focus on terminology is just a means of changing the subject, and that my responding amounts to playing along (thus extending the conversation pointlessly)? That might be an accurate assessment; but then again, long threads are bound to deviate. And when they do, I think it's best for the lurkers if oddities are explained.


My main issue wih Tists argument is that it appears to be an a priori argument. Tist does not appear to be open to anything that undermines the existence of objective morality, and possibly a God. In doing so he will need to find ways to avoid this flaw. I am not suggesting this is being done consciously. Another mechanism to avoid evaluating directly observable facts is try address any answers in terms of a pre-existing system. Effectively it might be done by taking an observed fact, dropping it into a system (like CR), then you find a whole bunch of flaws with CR and throw out the baby with the bathwater.

This process appears to be almost emergent in human communications (not sure about the animals). We tend to need some way to categorise and generalise things, so that we do not have to examine the facts from scratch, and most facts we get 2nd hand anyway. When you cap this with the fact that we are not actually seeking the truth but some way to extend our control over outcomes that affect us, and you end with the usual confusion.

The basic question is not too difficult "who or what commands how we ought to behave" can easily be built from the ground up. There will be many cause and effect chains that might ultimately lead to some end point, but we never get the chance to do this. The argument always becomes circular as we lose track or try and return it to the a priori.
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Posted 06/06/08 - 04:40 AM:
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#738
Tisthammerw wrote:
First, it's a bit of a misrepresentation to attribute the quote to "Tisthammerw's unnamed textbook" considering that I did specifically name it in my last post.
My fault. I didn't catch the citation because I didn't read the entire post and all of the actual quotes are cited as "my textbook."

Tisthammerw wrote:
Second, is it odd? I did find it in one of my college philosophy textbooks after all...
You'll find a lot of odd things in college philosophy textbooks. wink

By "odd," I simply meant that it is not the set of terms I am most familiar with vis-a-vis my colleagues and the literature. Then again, we must always keep in mind that individual philosophers writing textbooks often don't separate themselves from the politics of terminology wars and will use their preferred set as if it were standard in the hopes of making it standard. Sayre-McCord, for instance, continues to employ his minimal model of metaethics despite everyone else having moved on (or returned to) the robust model. In the end, it's mostly about which terminological set is most popular (though we might hope that popularity would be contingent upon clarity and usefulness).
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Posted 06/06/08 - 05:32 AM:
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#739
TMB

Thank you for your clarification. You are quite correct that it is not worth working out the various systems of cultural belief on this thread or these forums. That is the work of anthropologists. I was only endorsing the usefulness of such a practice generally, not for specific use here.

As for Tisthammerw's argument, my understanding is that he is arguing the following: if objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God. Since we are trying to find out what follows from "objective morality exists," there is no need to offer evidence that would undermine the proposition on this thread. The discussions of MMR, then, seem aimed at the following point: if a given metaphysical framework entails or can only support MMR then it is irrelevant insofar as it does not belong to the type of world we are concerned with here. But yo