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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Buddahchuck
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Posted 04/27/08 - 02:13 PM:
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#701
jdrw wrote:

What is your strategy here—if nonsense is repeated often enough eventually it will be true?

I addressed this cut and paste of yours one hundred posts ago in post 597.


This happens a lot with his arguments. I think all of them have been answered many times over, and Tist just winds-up dropping the arguments, posts some lame, trivial, ridiculous response, then cuts and pastes in order to answer yet another argument that he has attempted to trivialize. In fact, I'm surprised he's still posting considering that he has had no response to my last 4 arguments; the main one of which uses his own concessions to disprove his idea.

Yet still, he insists on strawmaning these significant moral concepts.

I couple years ago, I remember having this argument with jdrw and Reformed Nihlist concerning faith and reason with my advocacy in the necessity of faith to justify objective moral principles. While I would still hold this position, I need to argue against it on this thread, because Tist is presenting his idea as if it were rational, which it is not. Both Tist and Johannes seem to use ideas like the holocaust was wrong to justify that objective morality exists, but neither seems to understand that the holocaust was undertaken via a stance that advocated objective morality. Hitler believed in objective morality and committed what these two consider obviously immoral. If this one fact does not disprove their justification for objective morality, I do not know what does.

I'm especially surprised that someone using the name Johannes de Silentio would have so little understanding of Kierkegaard as to try to characterize morality as objective, especially considering that the bulk of Kierkegaard's arguments concerning god is that it is a fallacy to try and envision God objectively. Kierkegaard thinks it is impossible for man to know things objectively, and leaves only the alternative of embracing the subjectivity of the matter.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 04/27/08 - 05:28 PM:
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#702
Buddahchuck wrote:
In fact, I'm surprised he's still posting considering that he has had no response to my last 4 arguments; the main one of which uses his own concessions to disprove his idea.


Please see post #700. Which arguments did I not address that you would like me to address?


Yet still, he insists on strawmaning these significant moral concepts.


Please give me one specific example of a straw man I have made of a moral concept (and a specific quote to adduce this).


Both Tist and Johannes seem to use ideas like the holocaust was wrong to justify that objective morality exists, but neither seems to understand that the holocaust was undertaken via a stance that advocated objective morality. Hitler believed in objective morality and committed what these two consider obviously immoral. If this one fact does not disprove their justification for objective morality, I do not know what does.


Then I suspect you don't know what does. Seriously, how does that disprove my justification for objective morality? Is it because we find an ethical objectivist who got it wrong? This doesn't disprove ethical objectivism, any more than the flat-earth society (which advocates objective truth) disproves the existence of objective truth. Is it because someone believes a claimed absurdity is perfectly reasonable? If that's the case, and someone does a reductio ad absurdum on a theory proving that it implies a flat-earth, is the reductio ad absurdum invalid because flat-earthers exist?

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Posted 04/27/08 - 06:01 PM:
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#703
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Really the only way to avoid apparent moral absurdities is to posit ethical objectivism. Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what one's culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says an individual trying to exterminate the Jews is morally right if that's what the individual believes. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.


Is this right? The Holocaust is wrong because to think otherwise would be absurd?


Well, not exactly. I don't think one can use "absurd" as a criterion for what is morally wrong. There are lots of absurd things that aren't morally wrong. Nonetheless, "there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" does seem to be an absurdity. My purpose was to use it for my reductio ad absurdum argument against the other meta-ethical systems (to justify my position that those other meta-ethial systems are irrational). If "there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is absurd, then ethical noncognitivism is not rational.

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Buddahchuck
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Posted 04/27/08 - 08:23 PM:
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#704
Tisthammerw wrote:

Please see post #700. Which arguments did I not address that you would like me to address?


1. Overlap: Posted 04/27/08 - 05:13 PM
Posted 04/27/08 - 04:40 PM

2.
Buddahchuck wrote:

And yet you acknowledge the distinction that "I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful)." So where does morality fall? Is morality based on axioms of logic, or is it based on God? You seem to see morality as clearly as a law of noncontradiction; then why is there so much philosophical debate over morality? Where's the controversy if morality is as clear as all that?


IOW: Morality being based in logic does not jive with your conception of Morality being based in objective principles put forth by god.

3.
buddahchuck wrote:
so the basis of mathematics is objective rationality? Well if mathematics and morality are so similar, then the basis of morality must be objective rationality. But I thought that God was the basis of morality. Is God the basis of objective rationality? Is god the basis of Mathematics? And what laws, like the law of noncontradiction, do you "intuitively perceive" that tell you a) God exists b) morality is objective c)God is the basis of morality? How do such intuitive perceptions NOT conflict with rationality? You are indeed assuming a lot to get to these conclusions in the face of many people's contrary "intuitive perceptions" and have you never thought, in all these conflicts you are having over these issues that you consider "intuitively" obvious, that you are really just spinning unsubstantial, unempirical rhetoric that only continues to be disproven as the argument wears on?


a) Morality cannot be simultaneously based on objective rationality and have an independent truth value derived from some vision of God.

b) Rational ideas concerning quality are not known intuitively (distinction between qualitative justification and quantitative justification)

c) Diversity of views of objectivity, in this thread, are indicative of an impossibility of consistent objective criteria.

4.
Buddahchuck wrote:

And yet we would still have no way of knowing a) if those perceptions are true (perceptions often deceive, remember) or b) if those perceptions are objective. You don't seem to have a proper understanding of what entails a "rational" discussion if you think that all views are clearly rational or not. The philosophical tradition is not steeped in the obtaining of "objective truths" but rather humanity's incessant inability to find truths that are objective. Socrates knew nothing save that he didn't know; the skeptics' idea of acatalepsia carried them through life. Plotinus described ideas of "objective rationality" as being Perhaps the furthest from truth one could be. It bears no resemblance to any conception of rationality of Modern philosophers who believed in a dialectic or an interpersonal relationship with rationality, whereby one could not come to conclusions unless his idea had been shared and put to the subjective grinding stone of his peers. And if these objective truths that are known are in fact true, then they are only coincidentally true, for you only propose the idea of epistemic possibility concerning morality, and do not offer any sound epistemic criteria yourself. Are you really expectant of persuading members of this forum, who hold high their ability to analyze, criticize and formulate arguments, solely by saying that you believe it is so?


a) Intuitive perceptions are not objective.

b) Intuitive perceptions do not consistently meet epistemic criteria

c) "Objective rationality" defies the philosophical tradition.

d) The truths you point to are not "objectively true", they are coincidentally true.


This argument is a little awkward. For one thing, (4) does not follow from (2) and (3). One reason is that some ethical objectivists are atheists, so (2) has little meaning for them, and the mere fact that we cannot know of something's existence certainly doesn't imply that it doesn't exist.


1. You have put yourself in the position of claiming that atheists cannot be ethical objectivists because even they believe in God somehow.

2. You are right, this argument only indicts your reasoning that "if objective morality exists, then it is evidence of the existence of God"

3. If objective morality exists in a manner consistent with the idea of God, it would need to be clearly communicated to us, and not wrapped in some vague puzzle of ambiguous truth. It is not as if there is some marker in us that says "This idea is objectively true!" The whole existence of moral controversy where moral ideas are in conflict with no clear answer is indicative of a decisively unclear human moral aptitude. So while (2-from referred argument) may not be consistent with ethical objectivism in relation to an atheist; it certainly indicts your "all roads lead to God" ethical objectivism.


Then how can you claim that they do not exist if you don't even know what they are? Isn't it like saying "that belief is wrong" without knowing what the belief is? And how can you say "we cannot know whether objective moral values exist" if you do not even know that objective moral values are? Isn't that like saying "we cannot know whether belief X is true" while not even knowing what belief X is?


This is clearly not the case.

1) If it is impossible to know what objective morality is then your conception of objective morality is certainly skewed too. And seeing as how you have not actually offered a viable way in which morality can be objective (as opposed to just universal and subjective), then your argument is completely flawed because of this.

2) The argument is more like saying that "we cannot be certain of belief X because belief X is linguistically inconsistent" in much the same way one would argue against a person who believed that numbers are qualitative, or that cars are people.


If you think intuitiveness cannot even in principle give us knowledge (i.e. properly justified true belief) of the existence of objective truths, how is it that can know other objective truths, like those in logic and mathematics? Aren't the basic principles of logic intuitively perceived?


1. As jdrw said, through meeting reliable epistemic criteria. Even then, we do not know them objectively

2. No, mathematics and Logic are not intuitively perceived. They are a) constructs of language (meaning if we get the language wrong, then we get the mathematical and logical axioms wrong as well) b) established "proofs" after undergoing thousands of inductive tests to see if they are consistent with reality and c) at times counterintuitive, a word which must have been omitted from your vocabulary since you very nearly deny the possibility of something actually being true while going against intuitive perceptions.

3. The argument against intuitive perceptions is that they cannot be shown to be rational in the same way as mathematical proofs. Even if we were to accept that such truths were objective, you would still need to show that the same is true in cases of Morality, especially when one argues that moral statements have no truth value.

4. There is a way to falsify mathematical and logical principles if they are not true. Such does not exist in terms of morality.


He would if he lives in a culture that says the Holocaust was morally right. Similarly, if he lives in a culture that says Antisemitism is morally right, the cultural relativist is required (if he is to be consistent) to embrace this culture's morals.


Seriously? I am American. I have grown up in a culture that believes that genocide of anyone is wrong. The cultural relativists says that such a belief is the product of the culture I live in. If someone lives in a culture that believes the Holocaust was morally right, then that person would NOT say that the holocaust was wrong, rather he would accept the beliefs of his culture. The cultural relativist believes that moral values are a product of one's culture. Now while I am not a cultural relativist, I am not going to pidgeon-hole his argument by constructing a claim that demands that he is inconsistent. I am not going to say the cultural relativist a) must accept everyone else's view of morality as true or b) must deny his own view of morality in lieu of the culture he lives in. Such is to completely obscure the cultural relativist position.


I agree, but you have to keep in mind that "There is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" is something that many (if indeed not most) people find just plain unacceptable. Hence my use of it.


But certainly you understand the distinction between an argument that is completely absurd and that you don't agree with. Right now, we are outside a cultural context in which "nothing is morally wrong with the holocaust" would be a viable argument. But if we were in that context, a context vested in the idea that Judaism is objectively wrong and corrupting in a way that degrades society's moral outlook, then "nothing is morally wrong with the holocaust" would be a more viable and "objectively obvious" statement. The way you present your argument of intuitive perceptions, however, is elitist. If someone disagrees with your intuitive perceptions, then it is he who is wrong, not yourself. And this is perhaps the case with most murderers who think that it is society who is wrong for putting them in jail rather than himself who is wrong for killing someone.

Because you are arguing that knowledge of objective moral truths come from intutive perception, it must be a necessary truth that EVERY human has the same intuitive perceptions, but this is CLEARLY not the case. Some humans "intuitively perceive" that they must do what is best for themselves (hedonism), others for the group (utilitarianism), others for their own culture (cultural relativism), others for the belief in some authority (authoritarian moralism). Yet while all of these are morality and "intuitively perceived", none of them are consistent enough so that a philosopher can come-along and say that from the empirical fact that all of these people have differing views of morality and will choose different answers to moral questions, the conclusion that "morality is objective" is a sound conclusion.

So then you want to put-in the answer that not everyone will actually do what is moral, even though they know in their deepest of hearts what actually is moral. But the argument against this is that it is the very deepest of hearts that is varying between all these people with different moral views.

One of the arguments I have accused you of and was hinting at in the argument to which this was referring is that you are rationalizing morality. You are coming from this stance that "the holocaust is wrong" and then inventing justification for that. Now on any other forum people might agree with your justification simply because they agree that "the holocaust is wrong", but I would like to think that on a philosophy forum, people can see the problem with this sort of reasoning. You would not like it if I said that because Christianity is accurate and the Jews killed the son of Christ, then killing Jewish people has no moral demerits. Instead it is like cutting down a tree that is in the way of your future home. And if you disagreed with me, I could merely say, but they killed Christ, they're all damned. Maybe the better argument is to say "there is nothing morally wrong with putting thousands of dogs to sleep every day." Yet I doubt that you would be the one willing to go and kill these dogs. I bet you eat meat, but I am also betting that you would be reluctant to use the pipe to kill the pig right in front of you. I bet you drink milk, but I am also willing to bet that you would be unwilling to thear the bleating calf from the cow-mother and throw it into the grinder. I bet you use glue, but that you would feel that it was wrong to pop the bones out of eerily hanging animal to process glue. So while you may actually feel these things as "intuitively wrong", you still distance yourself from them so as to avoid that feeling allowing you to believe that it is objectively true that it is okay to consume animal products, or control pet populations, or cut-down rainforests. But you do this in such a way so that your beliefs become rationalized, justifying only what you want to.


Please give me one specific example of a straw man I have made of a moral concept (and a specific quote to adduce this).


3 you repeat consistently:


Basically, the alternatives to ethical objectivism either don't work or are just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to kill Jews is morally right if that's what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.


while ignoring the answer:
I wrote:

the cultural relativist would still say that the holocaust is wrong based on his own cultural beliefs; he's not required to embrace another's cultural morals. Ethical subjectivism, if you actually gave it credence, is more like what you are advocating where "intuitive perceptions" inform morality; so if someone's "intuitive perceptions" told them killing jews was morally right, then it would be....and you are yet to elucidate the differences. jd has done a fairly good job of explaining "Ethical noncognitivism" which you just don't seem to get (God is an unnecessary addition on your part to Ethical Noncognitivism). A true reductio ad absurdum is when the reasoning used to justify one thing, justifies another thing that is just plain unacceptable. For example, universe/reality/existence is a pink elephant, therefore if objective morality exists, it is proof of the existence of pink elephants is the reductio of your position trivially redefining God to allow one obscure idea to prove another.


Tist wrote:

Then I suspect you don't know what does. Seriously, how does that disprove my justification for objective morality? Is it because we find an ethical objectivist who got it wrong? This doesn't disprove ethical objectivism, any more than the flat-earth society (which advocates objective truth) disproves the existence of objective truth. Is it because someone believes a claimed absurdity is perfectly reasonable? If that's the case, and someone does a reductio ad absurdum on a theory proving that it implies a flat-earth, is the reductio ad absurdum invalid because flat-earthers exist?


What it demonstrates is a) Ethical Objectivism empricially justifies heinous acts b) Comes in so many different forms that it can never truly be objective. The major difference between this example and that of the flat-earth society is that the flat-earth society has never tried to exterminate millions of people based the belief that the world is flat. However, just about every atrocity committed by man has been committed under the guise of ethical objectivism, on side believing that their morality was true, objective and right. It is not a single case that proves my point, it is the history of thousands of years of people justifying their actions through "intuitively perceived" objective moral codes. I am not saying that every ethical objectivist gets it wrong, but I am saying that when something goes wrong, it is ethical objectivism that is to blame.
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Posted 04/28/08 - 12:29 PM:
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#705
Tisthammerw wrote:
jdrw wrote:

I think that Mackie’s “queerness” for instance is a way of saying he doesn’t understand what objective moral values are or possibly would be like


Really? I've always instead interpreted Mackie's queerness argument as saying that objective moral values are queer things. Mackie seems to at least implicitly understand what the phrase "objective morality" means, else he couldn't say it was false, strange, unsupported, or anything of the sort.

I think he clearly makes the point that whatever sort of thingy it is that objective morality is supposed to refer to is something that’s utterly unlike anything else in the entire universe. And I, for one, claim that if something is entirely unlike anything else in the universe, then we don’t understand what it is like. And if we dpn’t understand what something is like we cannot actually conceive of it, we can just say words empty of actual meaning.

Additionally, the properties that are ascribed to objective morality are not possibly actually experienced by humans as properties of objective morality (transcendence, absoluteness, universal bindingness, etc.) so apparently those who insist that these really are properties of objective morality must’ve just pulled then out of thin air and stuck them onto their notions about objective morality. Objective Morality is an entirely speculative notion. I have asked you repeatedly to explain what possible experiences we could have that would allow us to determine even just the difference between the existence and the non-existence of Objective Morality.

I ask again: If we don't even understand how to tell the difference between the existence and the non-existence of something, then what do we think we even mean when we say it exists?



Come to think of it, that raises an interesting point. "Here's my theory--" "I don't know what it is but I believe it's wrong." How can one think it is wrong without even knowing what it is? You have claimed not to understand what objective morality means, but then how can you criticize a belief when you don't even know what that belief is? And what don't you understand? The word "morality" (i.e. a system of principles and statements of how we should and should not behave that are right/true/correct)? Or just the phrase "objective morality" (the belief that the truth of such statements is independent of what humans think, feel, or believe)? If it's "morality" then how can you be a noncognitivist, since the definition of noncognitivism is the denial of morality? How can you deny X if you don't know what X is?


But I have not claimed that your theory that objective morality exists is “wrong”—I have claimed that it doesn’t make any sense, that’s its unintelligible, that it’s vacuous, that it’s metaphysical hand waving and fog, that it’s empty of cognitive content—(and therefore cannot meaningfully be used in a rational argument as evidence for the existence of God.)

I also have claimed that what people call morality can be construed as norms, as value judgments--without any mysterious metaphysical baggage.



But for this to work, you have to have some basis for thinking that sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable (e.g. that a person really is telling you that this medicine is the product of rigorously reasoned conclusions; that the medicine is actually working) and after the events you must have some basis for thinking that memory is at least sometimes reliable (e.g. that someone did indeed tell you the medicine was the product of rigorously reasoned research, that the medicine in fact worked). The basis for accepting these basic beliefs is intuitiveness; you rely on the intuition (as I broadly defined it earlier) that sensory perceptions and memory are at least sometimes reliable.

Moreover, you also have to assume that these sensory perceptions and memories constitute rational grounds for accepting rationality--which also means you are presupposing rationality.


Recall that I do not deny the value of intuition, rather, I say that intuition about claims regarding objective reality, without other epistemic criteria, are not very reliable. Recall more to the point that I explained that a theory such as yours about the existence of Objective Morality is not an intuition, rather, it is one of several rival highly complex cognitive constructions that allegedly explain some human experiences. To claim that it’s true because you just know intuitively that it’s true, or that it’s true because your intuition tells you it’s a “basic belief” that’s exempt from epistemic criteria … is just not intellectually compelling, because we well know that such intuitions very often deliver very unreliable conclusions.



We seem to agree that objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force, and it is this transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave.

A couple things here: first, it seems that the necessity of such an entity constitutes at least some degree of evidence for the existence of God.

Under theism, God is after all the transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. The sovereign metaphysical entity certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism.

Second, if this sovereign metaphysical entity (I'll call it entity X) is not God then what is it? Simply naming the entity "objective morality" doesn't mean much, because given this peculiar definition of "objective morality" (the transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave) the phrase "objective morality" could simply be God. So what is the identity of this sovereign metaphysical entity if it isn't God?


I’ve said several times that I don’t know the answers to these questions. But that anyone who claims that Objective Morality exists would need to answer them in order for their claim to make sense.

I am guarded about analogies in arguments, but here’s one that I think is apt. To claim as you do that if Objective Morality exists then it is evidence of the existence of God, (because Objective Morality cannot plausibly be conceived to exist independently without some empowering source and anyway amounts to essentially the same thing as the heart of God) … is analogous to claiming that the laws of the physical universe cannot plausibly be conceived of as existing independently without some empowering source behind them, and anyway they amount to essentially the same thing as the creative force of God.

The laws of physics are just “how physical things must behave”—therefore, “how physical things must behave says how physical things must behave” is circular. There must be some empowering source behind how physical things must behave. Who or what says how things must behave? Since the laws of physics existing independently are implausible, the best explanation for how physical things must behave is God. Therefore, the existence of the Objective laws of physics is evidence for the existence of God.



The only plausible alternative I know of for the identity of entity X is that it is the universe/reality/existence. But this gets us to pantheism, as I explained earlier.


How is it that universal physical laws do not logically imply pantheism, but universal moral laws do?



Problem is, "should" and "ought" refer to obligation in those contexts, and obligation in these matters is precisely what noncognitivism expressly denies.

So the noncognitivist shouldn't (no pun intended) use those words to express their beliefs on the Holocaust if they don't want to be misinterpreted as contradicting themselves. They can say "I don't like that the Holocaust happen" but they cannot say "The Holocaust should not have happened" because "should" doesn't exist. I don't like certain vegetables, you might; that's okay because it's a matter of personal taste and neither of us is really right or wrong.


Should and ought also are used simply to express opinion about what the speaker wants—how he wants others to behave or to refrain from behaving with no implied “obigation” for others to comply. This alleged “obligation” thingy is merely the “bindingness” that I’ve referred to before. And you never yet have explained how it works or what it even really means. What exactly is this so-called obligation that somehow originates in Objective Morality and connects with human beings? How does it connect? What is the binding force? In what sense is it obligatory? What are the consequences of not doing what Objective Morality obliges one to do? In what besides our realization that some people want or even demand that we behave in a certain way does this obligation consist? In what besides social and perhaps internalized pressure to comply with prevailing norms and expectations and values does it consist?



Similarly, noncognitivism says genocidal rulers just have different tastes and that’s OK; there’s nothing wrong with it.


I am finding it hard to believe that you continue to say something like this. Are you deliberately trying to misrepresent what non-cognitivists actually are saying. Tist? Is this a deliberately deceptive rhetorical strawman construction?

Do you really not yet understand that what you call moral judgments are what for non-cognitivists call value judgments? Do you really not yet understand that the entire issue of non-cognitivism is rejection of your claim that those value judgments somehow mysteriously receive authority from some allegedly Real, Absolute, Objective, Universally Binding metaphysical thingy off somewhere in the great Somewhere? That the dispute is not about the values themselves?

Non-cognitivism does not say that genocidal rulers just have different tastes and that it’s OK and that there’s nothing wrong with it. Non-cognitivists object to genocide just as Moral Realists do, but they construe their objection as being based on deeply held values, not on hand waving in some metaphysical fog. And they claim that calling it “wrong” adds rhetorical and emotive force, but adds no cognitive content to the issue, adds no additional cognitive understanding of the matter. That’s all non-cognitivists are saying.

Since it is what the entire non-cognitive dispute is about, I can’t imagine why you don’t just explain what cognitive information “wrong” or “immoral” adds to our understanding of the issue.



Care to pick up where we left off? Or do you concede that my analogy is apt and that according to noncognitivism it really is just a matter of personal taste, like favoring vanilla over chocolate?


I find your analogy to be inapt--a glib, misleading rhetorical ploy. Here’s why:

To say that something is “like” something else is to say that they are alike in some--but not all-- aspects. Unless they are the same thing, they also must be unlike in certain aspects. To claim that things are alike, therefore, is to select and emphasize certain aspects that those things allegedly have in common, and is to ignore many other aspects that they do not have in common. An analogy is not apt if the aspects it ignores are central to the issue being discussed. The relative importance of the values on which the judgments are made in these cases is centrally at issue. The values that are at issue in ice cream flavor preference are trivial compared with the values at issue in the condemnation of the Holocaust.

I think that the disnissive expression “just a matter of taste” is one that conveys two ideas about the judgment at issue: (1) it’s not objectively decidable, and (2) it concerns some relatively trivial matter and values.

To characterize non-cognitivists’ vehement condemnation of the Holocaust as being “just a matter of taste, like favoring vanilla over chocolate” is to emphasize the non-cognitivist point of view that judgments about both matters are alike in not being based on objective criteria, but it is to flagrantly misrepresent the importance to the non-cognitivist of the values involved. It has been my claim all along that what Moral Realists call “morality” can be construed simply as value judgtments. So to misrepresent the values invoked in judgment about the Holocaust as of no more importance than the value of one ice cream flavor over another is to create an inapt analogy that ignores the fundamental issue of relative value importance. I have said that morality can be understood as value judgments about human behaviors that are considered to be the very most important—those involving life, death, birth, marriage, property, the gods … .

Just because values are not claimed somehow to be mysteriously empowered by something off in the vast metaphysics fog does not mean that one value judgment is equivalent to every other value judgment any more than you consider one moral infraction to be equivalent to every other moral infraction. Do Moral Realists claim that stealing a pencil is “just like” killing a few million Jews since both are clear violations of transcendent, universally binding, absolute, Objective Morality?


Cheers.
jd



Edited by jdrw on 04/28/08 - 12:40 PM

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Posted 04/28/08 - 12:35 PM:
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#706
Tisthammerw wrote:
Actually, the device transforms humans into disembodied spirits; the thought experiment never claimed that humans had spirits originally.
I don't read it that way given that the thought experiment explicitly says: "stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits" (italics added). The italicized portion strongly implies that "turning" is here supposed to be understood as operating as a matter of course -- that is, that by stripping away the physical one is left with disembodied spirits. While you may not have meant this, it seems to me that one is as likely (if not more likely) to come away with this putative misinterpretation as he is to come away with the interpretation you have now presented.

Tisthammerw wrote:
So far you've avoided answering the question, so I'll ask again.
No, I've answered it several times. You haven't liked my answer, however, so you keep trying to pretend you asked something different.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Suppose some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn't a corporeal world?
Assuming that you actually mean "some strange device transforms all humans from material beings into disembodied spirits and then removes all of the remaining matter in the universe," I would suggest that you are still tangled up in the category mistake I have accused you of, though in a different way. On a physicalist world view, your experiment is flat out impossible. As such, you are begging the question against your opponent.

Tisthammerw wrote:
That the only plausible alternative is something transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it certainly surprised me.
Well, your misleading wording is probably a big part of that, not to mention your continued reliance on a category mistake. But if you consider the more neutral wording that I presented in my last post, I think it would be much less surprising.

Tisthammerw wrote:
We'll have to agree to disagree then. The universe the universe wielding supreme moral authority in telling everyone how they ought to behave (such that everyone ought to obey the universe) seems to be sufficient for at least naturalistic pantheism.
But, as I have taken great pains to note, naturalistic pantheism just is atheism with a highly idiosyncratic (and misleading) terminological bent. Even its adherents recognize this. Spinoza himself makes the point that if we are to insist on retaining the word "God," then the only existing thing that comes even close to answering to a traditional definition is the same thing that we alternatively call Nature -- that is, the universe. It's no coincidence that everyone around him understood "Deus sive Natura" as an endorsement of atheism. Because even if the commonly repeated view that Spinoza is either deifying Nature or naturalizing God is rather crude (he actually sees both "Nature" and "God" as merely names different people have given to the same thing), he was removing from his ontology anything that could yield an appreciable difference from atheism. And like Berkeley with the mechanical philosophy in general, the people around Spinoza saw where such ideas would lead.

Tisthammerw wrote:
But then let's go back to my question earlier: if this is not an appreciable difference, then what is? Particularly for the God of naturalistic pantheism (which lacks consciousness and the supernatural)? I would really like to see an answer to this question.
The fact is, I have answered your question several times. Regardless, I shall answer it again.

An appreciable difference from atheism consists in anything that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology. Theism, atheism, and the like are, after all, ontological claims. You have objected to the word "cannot," but I believe "cannot" is quite appropriate in this case because the definition issue goes beyond the confines of the narrower argument you are trying to make here. That is, if atheism and pantheism are to be mutually exclusive, one must include something in its ontology that the other simply cannot include. And, of course, if they are not mutually exclusive then you don't really have an argument.

Tisthammerw wrote:
So what's your answer then? That there is none?
There is no ontological difference between atheism and naturalistic pantheism, as I understand them. There is, perhaps, a linguistic difference. But it is the ontological question that is at issue here.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I defined God as "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." This would seem to fit in fine with pantheism, and if the universe obligating ultimate obedience to its supreme moral authority doesn't fit the bill, I can't think of anything that does. So perhaps I should expect your answer to be "there is none."
Again, there seems to be no ontological difference between atheism and ontological pantheism. As such, it is "a difference that makes no difference." Atheists and naturalistic pantheists don't disagree over what exists, just what to call it. Of course, naturalistic pantheists won't agree completely with your definition of God. They do not take it that one is obligated to pay reverence to Nature, only that it is a worthy object of reverent contemplation.

Given this, even if your argument were successful in establishing naturalistic pantheism on the basis of objective morality, it would go no further and would not have really gone anywhere to begin with.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Well, in this context "universe" refers to "physical existence" so that option doesn't really apply.
You are using "universe" as synonymous with the philosophical term "world," then?

Tisthammerw wrote:
Okay, so by "trivial" you mean "Yes it's true, but that doesn't mean much." Apparently you believe the same is true for "morality."
Well, it doesn't mean much in the context of your argument. Arguing that it is somehow striking that objective morality obtains in a universe in which it has been stipulated that objective morality obtains is like arguing that it is striking that I have red hair in a universe that has been stipulated as one in which I have red hair. It's true, but so what?

Tisthammerw wrote:
The wants of an atheist will depend upon the tastes of the atheist, which could quite probably vary.
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Fair enough. That's why I switched to talk about things that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology, as opposed to things he wouldn't "want" to admit.
But then it seems that we're shifting the goal posts a little. I argue that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God, not necessarily an ironclad proof. Saying that I have to provide something from the moral argument from God that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology sounds a lot like I have to show that the existence of objective moral values cannot be consistent with atheism. If this is not what you mean, please elucidate.
Well, you're the one who made the initial objection. Like I said above: the "cannot" language is appropriate insofar as we are discussing whether or not the universe you have stipulated constitutes pantheism. That issue is not confined to your argument, after all. Insofar as your argument rests on the deductive validity of the move from objective morality to naturalistic pantheism, you do require something stronger for that move than you require for the overall argument. So while you do not need anything ironclad for your overall conclusion (which now seems to have devolved into the rather tepid assertion that objective morality is consistent with the existence of God), you do need ironclad arguments for any of the deductive moves made within that argument.

Tisthammerw wrote:
If ethical objectivism implies something transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone (including me) ought to always obey it—I might (as many atheists have done) abandon the idea of ethical objectivism altogether, because I personally would think this sounds too much like God (even if only a pantheistic God).
However, moral objectivism does not imply something in the terms you put it. I have given you a much better way of phrasing what follows from moral objectivism and it is quite clear that atheists need not find anything objectionable therein.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I get "omnipresence" from the universe/reality/existence (I am applying these characteristics to the basis of morality, as what my remarks in context imply).
That's what I thought, but I wanted to be absolutely clear on the issue. Again, however, that the universe is omnipresent is really quite trivial. Moreover, that objective morality obtains in a given universe does not establish that the universe as an entity is what grounds that morality. So deriving the quality from the universe and applying it to the basis of morality is not necessarily a legitimate move.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Second, eternity. Again, you argue for it in terms of the universe but apply the descriptor to morality itself.
No, I apply it to the basis of morality. Again, in context of what you were reading I am applying my little list of characteristics to the basis of morality.
But given the above, this is again a questionable move. You derive "eternity" from the existence of the universe and the assumption that ex nihilo nihil fit. But granting that, you have still to establish that it is the universe that is truly the basis of morality (even if morality could not exist if the universe did not).


Tisthammerw wrote:
That definition of "arbitrary" still seems a bit vague to me...
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Really?
Yes.
I must admit that I am honestly surprised by that. I did not expect an ordinary word like "arbitrary" to be so controversial. Then again, perhaps I should have expected it given the emphasis on linguistic details in contemporary philosophy.

Tisthammerw wrote:
What constitutes an "arbiter"?
Anything with sufficient agency to authoritatively decide a dispute.

Tisthammew wrote:
Particularly if God is not anthropomorphic to the extent that He cannot choose what is right and wrong?
If God isn't anthropomorphic then he isn't an arbiter. I've granted this all along. But I have yet to see a cogent explanation of how a non-anthropomorphic God can be reasonably described as the basis of morality.

Tisthammerw wrote:
In a more important sense it is not independent, because objective morality is grounded in God. Additionally, although I believe it is logically possible for objective morality to exist independently without God (which doesn't mean much, since logically possible isn't necessarily metaphysically possible) I also believe the only plausible alternative is pantheism. If I somehow knew that God did not exist, I do not think I would believe in the existence of objective morality. I personally do not believe objective morality can exist independently without some type of God, but this personal belief of mine does not exist in my argument.
Leaving aside our continuing disagreement over the pantheism issue, I think you are at risk of becoming incoherent here. You have stated that ~O -> ~G, which is the same as G -> O. But you have denied the deductive validity of O -> G. Therefore, you can't believe O <=> G. Insofar as O is a condition of G, then, it must be independent in the relevant sense. Moreover, while the relations between O and G may be logical, O and G are not logical statements; they are ontological (and thus metaphysical) statements. Indeed, we agreed to this much when you conceded my argument against the deductive version of the moral argument.

Tisthammerw wrote:
[A]lthough I think atheists can believe in the existence of objective moral values without believing in God, I believe such a worldview is not very coherent (i.e. it doesn't fit together well, because it suggests an entity with significant God-like characteristics).
But of course, I don't think that belief -- that the existence of objective morality suggests an entity with significant God-like characteristics -- is very coherent (or, if coherent, not correct). wink

Tisthammerw wrote:
There is no contradiction in a worldview that objective morality is grounded in God but God cannot change what is moral. As analogy, the basis of my liver size is me (if physicalism is true, my body is me) but that does not imply I can alter my liver size at will. It is logically possible for the same to be true with God and morality.
That seems to me a rather sweeping generalization. Physicalism may not posit Cartesian souls or anything else immaterial, but it does not follow from that the one is identical with his body. There is a very real debate over whether one is identical with one's body, one's mind/brain, or one's body-mind complex.

Regardless, I am not yet convinced that there is a coherent way in which God can be understood as both the basis of morality and impotent regarding it. The issue seems to again boil down to just what you could possibly mean by morality being grounded in God. Your anatomy analogy doesn't work for me. My liver is the size it is due to the way my genes were expressed in the physical environment and my teetotaling (excessive alcohol consumption can change your liver size). Even if we leave off the potentially confounding factor of my drinking habits, my liver size is determined not by me but by what constitutes me: my genes and their reactions to the environment in which they exist). The analogy seems, then, to be aimed at the idea that objective morality is a constituent, or necessary component, of God (which would be in keeping with your belief that ~O -> ~G). But then morality is not grounded in God, but rather a condition for God. Finally, it is unclear just how far the analogy can really go. My genes are a part of the causal chain that yield "me," but objective morality is not being posited as the creator of God.

One could also come at the problem from a different angle by stipulating that God --if He exists -- is by definition inherently or necessarily good (in a moral sense), and then use this definition to argue that "goodness" is in God. But, of course, that would be to miss the point entirely. The real question is not whether or not "goodness" exists within a God that is thus defined, but what basis we have for such a judgment (and how the basis for that judgment could be a dependent part of, but not created by, God).

What ever way one wishes to come at it, though, I don't think you have yet offered a coherent account of how morality can be said to be grounded in God and objectively binding.

Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:59 AM

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Tisthammerw
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Posted 05/03/08 - 07:54 PM:
quote post
#707
Some of the "arguments" I missed seemed more like questions (questions that did not directly address the matter at hand, so I skipped them for brevity to get to the main points). At the risk of making this post protracted, I'll try to answer each question this time.


Buddahchuck wrote:

And yet you acknowledge the distinction that "I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful)." So where does morality fall? Is morality based on axioms of logic, or is it based on God?


Based in God, but like logic its existence is intuitively perceived. You may think this is not the case in actuality, but the scenario is at least logically possible, and thus it is logically possible for us to know that objective moral values exist.

Buddahchuck: so the basis of mathematics is objective rationality?

No.

Buddahchuck: Is God the basis of objective rationality? Is god the basis of Mathematics?

Possibly, I don't know. In any case it has no bearing on the soundness of my argument.

Buddahchuck: And what laws, like the law of noncontradiction, do you "intuitively perceive" that tell you a) God exists b) morality is objective c)God is the basis of morality?

If you're referring to laws of logic, I don't know of any for (a) and (b). Depending on how you define God, you could argue that God is the basis of morality by definition (but that definition of God would have to be a loose one). Logically, morality does seem to imply the existence of some sovereign metaphysical entity that says how we ought to behave with supreme authority.

Buddahchuck: How do such intuitive perceptions NOT conflict with rationality?

By there existing no good principle of rationality to conflict with them. Or is there a particular principle you had in mind?

Buddahchuck: You are indeed assuming a lot to get to these conclusions in the face of many people's contrary "intuitive perceptions" and have you never thought, in all these conflicts you are having over these issues that you consider "intuitively" obvious, that you are really just spinning unsubstantial, unempirical rhetoric that only continues to be disproven as the argument wears on?

No, since I haven't seen any such disproof. And what was "the lot" I was assuming?



a) Morality cannot be simultaneously based on objective rationality and have an independent truth value derived from some vision of God.

b) Rational ideas concerning quality are not known intuitively (distinction between qualitative justification and quantitative justification)

c) Diversity of views of objectivity, in this thread, are indicative of an impossibility of consistent objective criteria.


(a) is maybe true, maybe not, depending on how you define rationality and what basis rationality is. (b) what about the law of noncontradiction? What about the truth that something cannot simultaneously be and not be of a specified kind/quality? What about the rationality of scientific theories, of which there is no known way to ascribe a quantitative value to its probability?

And if these are all "quantitative" instead of "qualitative" how do you define those terms?

(c) seems non sequitur. Diversity of views does not imply that there is no objective truth.



a) Intuitive perceptions are not objective.

b) Intuitive perceptions do not consistently meet epistemic criteria


I never said intuitive perceptions are themselves objective, only that some of them can perceive objective truths, as in logic and mathematics. Not all intuitions meet epistemic criteria, but intuition (as I broadly defined) comes in many different types, including the kind in which we intuitively "see" basic axioms of logic. It is logically possible to intuitively perceive that morality is objective. If you think it isn't, please provide derive logical contradiction from it.



c) "Objective rationality" defies the philosophical tradition.


If anything, denying objective rationality defies philosophical tradition (you did not cite your sources, so I am uncertain how true your attributions to those philosophers are). What about mathematical proofs? Are not these truths objective?



d) The truths you point to are not "objectively true", they are coincidentally true.


How do you define "coincidentally true"?


1. You have put yourself in the position of claiming that atheists cannot be ethical objectivists because even they believe in God somehow.


I have neither said nor implied any such thing.

3. If objective morality exists in a manner consistent with the idea of God, it would need to be clearly communicated to us, and not wrapped in some vague puzzle of ambiguous truth.


Yes, I can see how one could argue that. Again, the lack of perfect knowledge of moral goodness is only one of many evils in the world. You could argue that if God was the basis of objective moral values, not only would He disallow incorrect moral knowledge (which admittedly is an evil that perhaps self-deception can only partially explain) but He would disallow all other evils as well. The crucial premise, "There are no satisfactory reasons why God allows the evil we see" is a premise may seem intuitively obvious to you, but what is your justification for this assertion? To me, a premise like "There are no satisfactory reasons why God would allow the evil we see" seems unprovable. Arguments from ignorance ("we don't know why") don't quite work for instance, because a comprehended God is not God and so it isn't necessarily the case that we would know why.



Then how can you claim that they do not exist if you don't even know what they are? Isn't it like saying "that belief is wrong" without knowing what the belief is? And how can you say "we cannot know whether objective moral values exist" if you do not even know that objective moral values are? Isn't that like saying "we cannot know whether belief X is true" while not even knowing what belief X is?


This is clearly not the case.

1) If it is impossible to know what objective morality is then your conception of objective morality is certainly skewed too. And seeing as how you have not actually offered a viable way in which morality can be objective (as opposed to just universal and subjective), then your argument is completely flawed because of this.


You haven't proven that it is impossible to know what the phrase "objective morality" is.


2) The argument is more like saying that "we cannot be certain of belief X because belief X is linguistically inconsistent" in much the same way one would argue against a person who believed that numbers are qualitative, or that cars are people.


How do you know X is linguistically inconsistent if you don't even know what it is?



If you think intuitiveness cannot even in principle give us knowledge (i.e. properly justified true belief) of the existence of objective truths, how is it that can know other objective truths, like those in logic and mathematics? Aren't the basic principles of logic intuitively perceived?


1. As jdrw said, through meeting reliable epistemic criteria. Even then, we do not know them objectively

2. No, mathematics and Logic are not intuitively perceived. They are a) constructs of language (meaning if we get the language wrong, then we get the mathematical and logical axioms wrong as well) b) established "proofs" after undergoing thousands of inductive tests to see if they are consistent with reality and c) at times counterintuitive, a word which must have been omitted from your vocabulary since you very nearly deny the possibility of something actually being true while going against intuitive perceptions.


Remember how broadly I defined intuition: "immediate/direct apprehension or cognition (of a belief)." On this definition there are various levels and types of intuition in how we accept our (basic) beliefs, some more rational to accept than others (e.g. our intuitive perception on the existence of logic at the top, the intuition on our reliability of sensory perceptions somewhat below). In practice, we only accept "counterintuitive" thins as true only by appealing to some higher level intuition, e.g. the intuition on the reliability of our sensory perceptions when appealing to empirical data to support some strange notions of quantum mechanics.

Mathematics and logic are indeed constructs of language and definitions, but the logical consequences of those definitions can be known a priori and in at least some cases cannot be known any other way. For instance, it is impossible to empirically verify that there are an infinite number of prime numbers; induction (of the empirical sort, not the mathematical proof by induction) can only get you so far. The truth of the mathematical proof is intuitively perceived; it cannot be proven any other way. We intuitively perceive certain mathematical and logical truths, and if we did not we could not have formed a mathematical proof proving that there are indeed an infinite number of prime numbers. We can also know that this truth is objective.

Mathematical proofs rely on certain rules of logic that are intuitively perceived. How else could we accept mathematical proofs? You could appeal to "epistemic criteria" in accepting these rules but I don't think you could appeal to any acceptable epistemic criterion in the case of mathematics and logic that wasn't intuitively perceived.


Because you are arguing that knowledge of objective moral truths come from intutive perception, it must be a necessary truth that EVERY human has the same intuitive perceptions, but this is CLEARLY not the case.


But why must be the case? Suppose some fellow thinks the law of noncontradiction is false. Does it mean that our own intuitive perception of it also false or that it is not an objective truth or anything of the sort? It simply does not logically follow that simply because a truth is intuitively perceived by some people it must therefore be perceived by all.



Please give me one specific example of a straw man I have made of a moral concept (and a specific quote to adduce this).


3 you repeat consistently:


Basically, the alternatives to ethical objectivism either don't work or are just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to kill Jews is morally right if that's what you believe. Ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible.



These are not straw man. These are actual implications of those meta-ethical belief systems. Imagine culture X believed that being violently anti-Semitic was morally right. You said, "the cultural relativist would still say that the holocaust is wrong based on his own cultural beliefs; he's not required to embrace another's cultural morals." But in an important way he is: if the culture relativist is consistent, he must agree that being violently anti-Semitic was morally right for culture X (even if it is not right for his own culture). Cultural relativism says what the culture believes is morally right actually makes it morally right for that culture. According to cultural relativism, the people in culture X were morally right in being violently anti-Semitic.

Ethical subjectivism, if you actually gave it credence, is more like what you are advocating where "intuitive perceptions" inform morality; so if someone's "intuitive perceptions" told them killing jews was morally right, then it would be....and you are yet to elucidate the differences.


Because sometimes our intuitive perceptions are wrong (though e.g. self-deception), and the difference between ethical objectivism and ethical subjectivism is that the former postulates a reality outside of humans that says what is right and wrong. We are aware of logical and mathematical truths ultimately through intuitive perception, but that doesn't mean there isn't reality beyond our perceptions; e.g. if everyone thought 2 + 2 = 5, 2 + 2 = 4 would still be correct.


What it demonstrates is a) Ethical Objectivism empricially justifies heinous acts b) Comes in so many different forms that it can never truly be objective.


It doesn't logically follow that different beliefs mean that the truth is not objective. The existence of the flat-earth society would seem to demonstrate this.

The major difference between this example and that of the flat-earth society is that the flat-earth society has never tried to exterminate millions of people based the belief that the world is flat.


I'm afraid I don't understand why this is a relevant difference, much less a major one. If the flat-earth society did try to exterminate millions of people based the belief that the world is flat, would this imply that the shape of the Earth is not an objective truth?

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Tisthammerw
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Posted 05/03/08 - 08:02 PM:
quote post
#708
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Actually, the device transforms humans into disembodied spirits; the thought experiment never claimed that humans had spirits originally.

I don't read it that way given that the thought experiment explicitly says: "stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits" (italics added).


I can use italics too: "stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits" (italics added).

So far you've avoided answering my question, so I'll ask it again (slightly reworded). Suppose some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and transforming all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn't a corporeal world?

Tisthammerw wrote:

So far you've avoided answering the question, so I'll ask again.

No, I've answered it several times. You haven't liked my answer, however, so you keep trying to pretend you asked something different


You've responded to the question but you haven't answered it. "Yes" or "No" would be an answer. Saying that the experiment is "impossible" misses the point. Of course it's impossible, but a response like that doesn't answer the question. So please answer it.

Tisthammerw wrote:

But then let's go back to my question earlier: if this is not an appreciable difference, then what is? Particularly for the God of naturalistic pantheism (which lacks consciousness and the supernatural)? I would really like to see an answer to this question.

The fact is, I have answered your question several times.


A response to a question is not the same as an answer. For instance, this response does not quite answer the question:


Regardless, I shall answer it again.

An appreciable difference from atheism consists in anything that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology. Theism, atheism, and the like are, after all, ontological claims. You have objected to the word "cannot," but I believe "cannot" is quite appropriate in this case because the definition issue goes beyond the confines of the narrower argument you are trying to make here. That is, if atheism and pantheism are to be mutually exclusive, one must include something in its ontology that the other simply cannot include. And, of course, if they are not mutually exclusive then you don't really have an argument.


It's all well and good to say "if atheism and pantheism are to be mutually exclusive, one must include something in its ontology that the other simply cannot include" but what might this be? That's kind of what my question was asking, after all. For instance, jdrw and I--despite all our substantial disagreements in the argument from morality--seem to agree that objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. If the universe being this sovereign metaphysical entity that has the authority to say how we ought to behave does not constitute an appreciable difference from atheism, then what (specifically) does? Particularly for the God of naturalistic pantheism (which lacks consciousness and the supernatural)? Can you give a response that gives a specific example for naturalistic pantheism? Apparently your real answer is "there is nothing that can make an appreciable difference."

Your response, "if atheism and pantheism are to be mutually exclusive, one must include something in its ontology that the other simply cannot include" will largely depend on how one defines "God." For instance, a more general definition of God is "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." On this definition, my pantheistic moral objectivism certainly is an appreciable difference, and the universe as some sovereign metaphysical entity wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it would constitute an appreciable difference; which might help to explain why many atheists reject ethical objectivism.

There is no ontological difference between atheism and naturalistic pantheism, as I understand them.


Except perhaps the universe as a sovereign metaphysical entity with supreme moral authority in saying how we ought to behave, but I suppose we'll have to agree to disagree on that one. Like I said, it depends on how you define your terms.


You derive "eternity" from the existence of the universe and the assumption that ex nihilo nihil fit. But granting that, you have still to establish that it is the universe that is truly the basis of morality (even if morality could not exist if the universe did not).


Remember the context of what I said though. All those interesting characteristics I derived for entity X were built on the premise (note: the quotes are actually paraphrases), "Suppose entity X is the basis of objective morality. Then entity X would by necessity have several interesting characteristics..."

I did this because I believed that the universe/reality/existence is the only plausible alternative basis for objective morality (because it follows from the brute fact position).

Do you have another?



Tisthammerw wrote:

Particularly if God is not anthropomorphic to the extent that He cannot choose what is right and wrong?


If God isn't anthropomorphic then he isn't an arbiter. I've granted this all along. But I have yet to see a cogent explanation of how a non-anthropomorphic God can be reasonably described as the basis of morality.


The existence of objective morality requires the existence of a some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. God would fit the profile as such a sovereign metaphysical entity.



Leaving aside our continuing disagreement over the pantheism issue, I think you are at risk of becoming incoherent here. You have stated that ~O -> ~G, which is the same as G -> O. But you have denied the deductive validity of O -> G.


Eh, yes and no. Remember, I said "I personally do not believe objective morality can exist independently without some type of God, but this personal belief of mine does not exist in my argument." It is true my argument does not claim the deductive validity of O -> G, however neither does it deny it either. In that case, trying to argue that O -> G is not deductively certain doesn't have much bearing on my argument per se.


Insofar as O is a condition of G, then, it must be independent in the relevant sense.


What is the "relevant" sense? If you mean that O can exist without G, this is not necessarily true. For instance, inertia is required for mass, but that doesn't mean that mass is independent of inertia. Similarly, simply because moral goodness is a necessary part of God in that God cannot exist without objective morality, it doesn't necessarily imply that objective morality can exist independently without some type of God.



There is no contradiction in a worldview that objective morality is grounded in God but God cannot change what is moral. As analogy, the basis of my liver size is me (if physicalism is true, my body is me) but that does not imply I can alter my liver size at will. It is logically possible for the same to be true with God and morality.


This seems to me a rather sweeping generalization. Physicalism may not posit Cartesian souls or anything else immaterial, but it does not follow from that the one is identical with his body. There is a very real debate over whether one is identical with one's body, one's mind/brain, or one's body-mind complex.


Okay, maybe I should have chosen different words. If physicalism and hard determinism is true, my brain is (at least a part of) me, but that does not imply I have control over it. It is logically possible for the same to be true with God and morality.

I haven't heard a coherent explanation as to why this sort of thing is not possible. Do you have one?


One could also come at the problem from a different angle by stipulating that God --if He exists -- is by definition inherently or necessarily good (in a moral sense), and then use this definition to argue that "goodness" is in God. But, of course, that would be to miss the point entirely. The real question is not whether or not "goodness" exists within a God that is thus defined, but what basis we have for such a judgment (and how the basis for that judgment could be a dependent part of, but not created by, God).


I define morality as "the system of principles and statements describing how one ought to behave." But if morality is objective (i.e. moral statements are true independently of what humans think, feel, and believe) what sovereign metaphysical entity says how we ought to behave? God is by definition "good" but by definition he is also the sovereign metaphysical entity. So it kind of works out. Whether you believe God is actually the basis of objective morality, this scenario is at least logically possible. Again, I haven't seen a coherent explanation as to why objective morality being grounded in God is not possible.

It's one thing to claim that objective morality is not grounded in God, it's another to say that objective morality cannot possibly be grounded in God. I'm not convinced that anyone can provide a coherent explanation for that.


Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:41 AM

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Posted 05/03/08 - 08:21 PM:
quote post
#709
jdrw wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

jdrw wrote:

I think that Mackie’s “queerness” for instance is a way of saying he doesn’t understand what objective moral values are or possibly would be like


Really? I've always instead interpreted Mackie's queerness argument as saying that objective moral values are queer things. Mackie seems to at least implicitly understand what the phrase "objective morality" means, else he couldn't say it was false, strange, unsupported, or anything of the sort.

I think he clearly makes the point that whatever sort of thingy it is that objective morality is supposed to refer to is something that’s utterly unlike anything else in the entire universe.


Well, I agree. But that doesn't imply that he believes he doesn't know what the phrase "objective morality" means.

And I, for one, claim that if something is entirely unlike anything else in the universe, then we don’t understand what it is like. And if we dpn’t [sic] understand what something is like we cannot actually conceive of it, we can just say words empty of actual meaning.


Consciousness is a phenomena unlike anything else in the universe. Yet is it not the case that we know what it is like? And don't we conceive it, even if the phenomena is ineffable?


I have asked you repeatedly to explain what possible experiences we could have that would allow us to determine even just the difference between the existence and the non-existence of Objective Morality.


Whether or not this is actually the case, one logically possible way is through intuitive perception, just as we intuitively perceive basic axioms of logic.


I ask again: If we don't even understand how to tell the difference between the existence and the non-existence of something, then what do we think we even mean when we say it exists?


We mean that it has real being. Think of it this way: we may not have any way (at least currently) to detect the existence of parallel universes. Yet we still understand what we mean when we say they could exist.



But I have not claimed that your theory that objective morality exists is “wrong”—I have claimed that it doesn’t make any sense, that’s its unintelligible, that it’s vacuous, that it’s metaphysical hand waving and fog, that it’s empty of cognitive content—


Okay, so it seems like you came as possibly close as you could to saying it is wrong without actually saying it is wrong. But how can you claim it is empty of cognitive content and all that if you don't even know what the phrase "objective morality" means?


Recall that I do not deny the value of intuition, rather, I say that intuition about claims regarding objective reality, without other epistemic criteria, are not very reliable.


Then let's get back to my question regarding these mysterious epistemic criteria. You've made statements like, "Intuitive notions pop into our heads with great regularity, but their truth must be earned through meeting epistemic criteria." But how do you know which criteria to judge an intuition claim by? Isn't the reason we accept the "epistemic criteria" because we intuitively perceive them to be rational? If not, can you give a specific example?

I should point out that not all intuitions are created equal. Intuition, because of my broad definition, comprises different types and levels. For instance, our intuitive perception of basic logic (from which we use to derive mathematical and logical proofs) is of a higher type than our intuition that sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable.


Recall more to the point that I explained that a theory such as yours about the existence of Objective Morality is not an intuition


I think it is for at least some people, though perhaps it could be justified through reductio ad absurdums as I earlier illustrated.




We seem to agree that objective morality implies the existence of some transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force, and it is this transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave.

A couple things here: first, it seems that the necessity of such an entity constitutes at least some degree of evidence for the existence of God.

Under theism, God is after all the transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. The sovereign metaphysical entity certainly sounds like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism.

Second, if this sovereign metaphysical entity (I'll call it entity X) is not God then what is it? Simply naming the entity "objective morality" doesn't mean much, because given this peculiar definition of "objective morality" (the transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave) the phrase "objective morality" could simply be God. So what is the identity of this sovereign metaphysical entity if it isn't God?


I’ve said several times that I don’t know the answers to these questions. But that anyone who claims that Objective Morality exists would need to answer them in order for their claim to make sense.


They seem like important questions to answer if one claims that objective moral values do not constitute evidence for the existence of God (if they were to exist). In any case, we seem to agree that objective morality implies the existence of a transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. Do we agree that the fact that objective morality implies the existence of just such a sovereign metaphysical entity constitutes at least some degree of evidential support for the existence of God? If not why? Again, God is after all the transcendent, universally binding, absolute, real entity or force that tells us how we ought to behave. Doesn't the sovereign metaphysical entity you earlier described sound like some type of God, even if it is not the God of traditional monotheism?


I am guarded about analogies in arguments, but here’s one that I think is apt. To claim as you do that if Objective Morality exists then it is evidence of the existence of God, (because Objective Morality cannot plausibly be conceived to exist independently without some empowering source and anyway amounts to essentially the same thing as the heart of God) … is analogous to claiming that the laws of the physical universe cannot plausibly be conceived of as existing independently without some empowering source behind them, and anyway they amount to essentially the same thing as the creative force of God.


This strikes me as a false analogy. The physical laws are descriptive whereas moral laws are prescriptive. If we want to ask "who or what says the physical laws are true?" the answer would be "the physical universe." Physical reality is the metaphysical basis for these laws. It's a rather different matter when we ask who or what says how we ought to behave, because moral law is prescriptive rather than descriptive.


How is it that universal physical laws do not logically imply pantheism, but universal moral laws do?


Unlike most objective facts, morality is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. This introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do). It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it.

But if we say that the basis of morality (like the basis of physical laws) is the universe/reality/existence, we are now attributing the universe with supreme moral authority in telling us how we ought to behave, such that everyone ought to always obey it. Because of the necessity of authority to have binding moral principles, we seem to be heading into something a lot more mystical than was the case with mere physical laws. With moral law, the universe has become a transcendent, absolute, universally binding, sovereign metaphysical entity that says with supreme moral authority how we ought to behave. At this point we have some form of pantheism.


Should and ought also are used simply to express opinion about what the speaker wants—how he wants others to behave or to refrain from behaving with no implied “obigation” for others to comply.


In the context of morality those terms mean something different, and the casual reader would most likely interpret those terms using their primary definition (as expressing obligation). I would recommend choosing different words to avoid misinterpretation.



Similarly, noncognitivism says genocidal rulers just have different tastes and that’s OK; there’s nothing wrong with it.


I am finding it hard to believe that you continue to say something like this. Are you deliberately trying to misrepresent what non-cognitivists actually are saying. Tist? Is this a deliberately deceptive rhetorical strawman construction?


This is not a straw man. Noncognitivism really does say that there's nothing wrong with genocide, since it says that the concept of right and wrong behavior do not really exist at all and that it is all a matter of taste.



Do you really not yet understand that what you call moral judgments are what for non-cognitivists call value judgments? Do you really not yet understand that the entire issue of non-cognitivism is rejection of your claim that those value judgments somehow mysteriously receive authority from some allegedly Real, Absolute, Objective, Universally Binding metaphysical thingy off somewhere in the great Somewhere?


Yes, but that doesn't change the implications of ethical noncognitivism.



Care to pick up where we left off? Or do you concede that my analogy is apt and that according to noncognitivism it really is just a matter of personal taste, like favoring vanilla over chocolate?


I find your analogy to be inapt--a glib, misleading rhetorical ploy. Here’s why:

To say that something is “like” something else is to say that they are alike in some--but not all-- aspects. Unless they are the same thing, they also must be unlike in certain aspects. To claim that things are alike, therefore, is to select and emphasize certain aspects that those things allegedly have in common, and is to ignore many other aspects that they do not have in common. An analogy is not apt if the aspects it ignores are central to the issue being discussed. The relative importance of the values on which the judgments are made in these cases is centrally at issue. The values that are at issue in ice cream flavor preference are trivial compared with the values at issue in the condemnation of the Holocaust.

I think that the disnissive expression “just a matter of taste” is one that conveys two ideas about the judgment at issue: (1) it’s not objectively decidable, and (2) it concerns some relatively trivial matter and values.

To characterize non-cognitivists’ vehement condemnation of the Holocaust as being “just a matter of taste, like favoring vanilla over chocolate” is to emphasize the non-cognitivist point of view that judgments about both matters are alike in not being based on objective criteria, but it is to flagrantly misrepresent the importance to the non-cognitivist of the values involved.


Keep in mind though that under noncognitivism, a person feeling that a particular disapproval is "important" has no real meaning except for how much that person dislikes something; i.e. personal taste, like someone strongly disliking sauerkraut. One of the reasons why noncognitivism is so implausible to many people is that it renders moral statements meaningless (moral statements do not even have a truth-value according to noncognitivism).

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Posted 05/05/08 - 08:13 PM:
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In this thread, I have seen a numerous amount of misplaced modifiers. Phrases like logically possible, or objective morality are clear indicators of such. Hopefully, this post will elucidate some of these distinctions in an agreeable way that will make clear not only the objections to Tist's argument, but ideas of morality themselves. In addition, an attempt will be made to show that Tist's argument settles on a harm in many philosophical topics.

Epistemology

It seems clear that a basic understanding of this topic is lacking for the argument being presented. "The study of knowledge" is a great way for an Intro to Philosophy class to characterize this topic to those who have no clue concerning it, but seeing as how we are presently discussing a more fundamental way in which we know things, a better description/understanding of epistemology is necessary. The origins of epistemology lay rooted in the concept that there is an actual reality that is separate, but not necessarily distinct, from the world perceived by individual humans. Certainly we have all experienced a point at which our senses deceived us, found what appeared to be a round rock in the distance only to later discover that it is in fact a jagged square; felt a chill in decidedly hot weather; caught a whiff of a non-existent odor. Epistemology seeks to reconcile the reliability of perceptions with what reality actually is. Of course, epistemology can only take us so far, for being humans, we only experience reality through these perceptions which may or may not be distorted. Enter the necessity for a metaphysical outlook, and often epistemology and metaphysics are lumped together in a way that very nearly ignores the distinction, for while we may talk of what we perceive as real, we also found beliefs based on those sometimes distorted perceptions.

However, much of the "knowledge" (justified true belief) that humanity has acquired today is the result of some very critical epistemological assumptions, and the pursuit of every critical analyst of reality is to find material that is knowable. Astrophysicists use theories derived from light models, over and over, in order to obtain repeated facts and study what is out there. Chemists repeat and rethink the same experiment, over and over, in order to legitimate their findings. And due to humanity's tendency to distort the truth in one's own hopes (e.g. cold fusion), a value of objectivity is established. This value of objectivity is proposed in contrast with subjectivity, meaning that while humanity is prone to base its beliefs on subjective facts (i.e. emotions, leanings, desires and consequentialism), there is still a way to obtain facts that are more objective (i.e. rational, indicative, logic-based). Point being that the terms subjective and objective are not descriptions of reality; they are descriptions of the way in which humans know reality (IOW: the justification of a belief is objective or subjective, but the actual existence/truth/reality of a thing is neither objective or subjective, it just is).

The major question in ethical debates is an epistemological one, for we need to know upon what to base what is right and what is wrong. Some take the stance that morality simply does not exist citing the lack of evidence in reality for some right/wrong action (moral nihlism: moral statements have no truth value). Even more people say that humanity knows morality in a way based on feelings, emotions and desires (e.g.Ethical Subjectivism, Cultural Relativism). And then there are more self-righteous people who believe that they know morality through rationality, evidence, and logic (objective morality).

This particular thread concerns specifically objective morality, but objective morality presented in a very peculiar fashion. Objective Morality is perhaps the only socially beneficent form of morality, and I will try to give a short explanation of why. Morality is a way of saying which actions that humanity takes are right (sometimes in the sense of "correct" but most often in a way that means "sanctified") or wrong (in all senses of the word). In philosophy, we like to make the distinction between the morality of doing something trivial (brushing one's teeth) and doing something that affects society. Generally, the trivial issues are even labeled "amoral", but the truth of the matter is that such things are just considered insignificant and not worth the debate of what is right and wrong. There exists a school of thought that every ought statement must end in a conclusion (e.g. "If one wants healthy teeth, he/she ought to brush his/her teeth everyday." or "If a society is to be peaceful and happy, its citizens ought not kill, rape or steal."). In this way, objective morality sets a standard of what is right and wrong for every human. This standard is set by a solitary moral authority whose decree of morality is unquestionable, and such morality is only viable if everyone follows this standard. The moral authority can be anything from a tome, an idol, a dictator or a "God". In this way, the moral standard is only as strong as its moral authority. Unfortunately, humanity has a tendency toward dissent (entropy I like to call it). An idol becomes a mere statue, a tome becomes a work of fiction, a dictator becomes self-serving. "God" is unique in that it is just some generically powerful being, and in that mystery it takes its hold, but this is not to say that any of these moral authorities have a stronger basis in reality, only that they have varying degrees to which they will based in the human mind. This is important to note because while any of these authorities could, in fact, convey the reality of morality; it is the human perception of objectivity that inspires the belief that morality is actually a part of reality.

The morality being presented by Tist, however, is very distinct from this concept in that he is saying that because morality is part of reality, it is objective, and he takes this to be the definition of what Objective Morality means. While this does bare some similarity to the idea that humans' perceptions of morality as objective makes it objective, it diverges in its attempt to establish a basis, for no longer are the words objective and subjective referring to man's perceptions and where they originate; rather, they are being redefined so that objective means anything that is reality/truth/existence and subjective is anything that comes from the mind.

The point I am making here is that if Morality is based in existence, if it is actually a part of truth independent of human perceptions, then morality is not objective per say, it simply is. The only way the idea of objectivity being a descriptor denoting reality could work, would be to accept Objectivism. Yet objectivism stays clear of having truth values, and in such a philosophy, morality cannot exist, for if nothing is right and wrong, then there is no morality. If we accept Tist's conception of Objective Morality, not only are we muddling epistemology with metaphysics, but with Ontology as well, and I think that it is in the blending of these three subjects that Tist has confused himself, for while being, reality and knowledge are all related, they are also all philosophically distinct.

Logic and Mathematics

Both logic and mathematics are methodologies humans use to understand the world. While we may use these methodologies to gain some sort of understanding, we are not guaranteed that we will be lead to the reality/truth/existence. We use them in hopes to be lead in that direction. Nonetheless, logic and mathematics are ever-changing and linguistically based. When we have a new phenomena that is out of this realm, we are forced to invent new logical and mathematical language to describe such things. That being said, one should note that logic and mathematics exist only in the realm of human thought, and are not necessarily reflective of the true/real/existing world. As in the law of non-contradiction, it is a property of western language that something cannot simultaneously be and not be. However, with any example of the law of non-contradiction, the application of said principle is always based on a solitary perspective (perhaps unanimous, but definitely solitary), and given alternative perspectives, the law of non-contradiction is not applicable. For example, southerners believe that southern hospitality is the best in the world. New Yorkers comes to the south and find southerners to be the rudest people in the world. Due to linguistic barriers, both of these people cannot be correct at the same time, for southerners cannot simultaneously be hospitable and rude. Yet aside from language, this could be a fairly accurate account of the way truth/reality/existence actually is. I could go on and on about the law of non-contradiction and why it cannot fit under the category of "objective rationality" (NB another misplaced modifier, if something is rational, objectivity/subjectivity do not add any meaning to the idea of rationality), but the point to gather here is that it is a complete misunderstanding of the ideas of logic to say that they are true because they are "intuitively perceived". One thing did confuse me in Tist's post however:

Tist wrote:

Remember how broadly I defined intuition: "immediate/direct apprehension or cognition (of a belief)." On this definition there are various levels and types of intuition in how we accept our (basic) beliefs, some more rational to accept than others (e.g. our intuitive perception on the existence of logic at the top, the intuition on our reliability of sensory perceptions somewhat below).


Is this not the problem of a misplaced modifier all over again? If we are going to say that some perceptions are more rational than others, why do we need the modifier "intuitive" on there. Are intuitions and perceptions not consistent of the same faculty (Kant)? It seems to not make much sense to say that some intuitions require more rationality than others when, by definition, intuition is what is had without reason. And yet, there exist things we consider "counterintuitive", and have proven to be counterintuitive through following logic. So did Tist read a paragraph of Heyting or Dummet without grasping the entire argument? This is what intuition tells me. Intuition, even by the proponents of intuitionism, is acknowledged to be based on the initial feelings of humans, a subjective epistemology.

Social Morality and Humanity

Occasionally, moral arguments are based on some end of consequence, for the true value of morality is the creation of a society that is capable of living harmoniously. Murder, rape and theft are wrong because they inspire an untrusting and negative society; murderers, rapists and thieves are seen as detrimental to society for the degradation of the social structure their actions perpetuate. In such an argument, murder, rape and theft are not wrong in and of themselves, but only in their impediment to the advancement of society. And this idea extends beyond murderers, rapists and thieves; it may also extend to those who cause general social dissent, whether they be radicals, revolutionaries or some other social agitator.

It just so happens that humans are very interesting moral beings in that they very much act based on their feelings. If someone tells me to kill an innocent child, I may feel a slight shudder at the idea of committing this act and subsequently refuse to kill the child. Yet not everyone may feel this same shudder when faced with the killing of a child. Some people steal with no remorse, while others see the fulfillment of desire a sufficient reason to commit rape. Point being, that historically, where one human may feel an act as wrong, there most certainly is another who lacks that--moral conviction. Hence the need for a moral standard based outside of human feeling....for human feelings simply are not standard.

But here a problem arises, a conflict with society and humanity. For while it may be beneficial for society to have a moral standard, much of what it means to be human is to follow that internal feeling. Certainly there is no conflict when the internal feeling says "I want ice cream today" and the society has no rules concerning the desiring of ice cream. No, the conflict arises more often in the situation where a human has the internal feeling to know more about a certain topic and the society, in the interest of society, forbids dissemination of information on that topic. Such a society is striving to maintain a certain standard of behavior, and in so doing they are stripping its citizens of their humanity, and that is the conflict of which I speak.

How does this apply to a concept of Objective Morality? As was stated above, objective morality seeks to establish a standard of behavior by which all people should act. And there are many historical examples in which society has dictated that people who do not meet those standards of behavior are to be "dealt with". Hitler viewed himself as a purveyor of "objective morality" and sought to establish a standard by which all his citizens should act. Stalin did the same. The Grand Inquisitor's job was to seek-out those whose "intuitive perceptions" did not fit with the standard of a catholic society. Of course, I am not arguing that these actions were "wrong", for I have no stance on this issue, and I could likewise present cases where establishing such a standard is considered to be more positive. Abraham Lincoln demanded the south meet a certain standard (of being a part of the union); Queen Elizabeth I's memory is in her strength and ability to require of her citizens to meet a certain standard with dire ends should they not; Napoleon's enforcement of a moral code is one of the major reasons he is still respected today (amongst others). Now while none of these do I personally see as being particularly negative, these historical icons all committed acts that "democratic" nations might consider fascist (in the interest of the state), and striving toward enforcing some moral code that is seen as part of reality.

Now while I do not see any of the above acts as being particularly "wrong" with respect to society, I do see it as a major detriment to humanity that these people so eagerly and willfully attempted to divide humans from their internal feelings, a division based on the belief that a solitary belief is accurate/true/part of reality. In other words, the idea that a solitary belief is actually the "truth" as it has been discussed is MORALLY FASCIST.

_________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________

Now for responses to Tist:

Tist wrote:

Based in God, but like logic its existence is intuitively perceived.


But I don't "intuitively perceive" God or morality objectively. Does this make me warped in some way?

I think the logic part was adequately addressed above, but just to reiterate, logic is based on language, and because language is learned, it is not "intuitively perceived".

Tist wrote:

You may think this is not the case in actuality, but the scenario is at least logically possible, and thus it is logically possible for us to know that objective moral values exist.


1. Is there anything that is possible that is not logical? Vice versa?(NB This may be a question, but I would encourage you to think seriously on this issue, as with all questions asked.)

2. While there may be a "true" morality out there, "intuitive perceptions" would not allow us to know such a morality objectively. So, no, it is not possible, at least not logically possible.

Tist wrote:

Buddahchuck: so the basis of mathematics is objective rationality?

No.


So mathematics is not rational?

Tist wrote:

Buddahchuck: Is God the basis of objective rationality? Is god the basis of Mathematics?

Possibly, I don't know. In any case it has no bearing on the soundness of my argument.


Well if God is not the basis of the two things you say we "intuitively perceive" as we do Objective morality, then I see no reason why it is necessary for God to be the basis of Objective Morality. I realize this claim does not make much sense, but that is because it is an attack on your claim. Rationality(which certainly doesn't need the modifier "objective") and mathematics are both epistemological methods, where as morality is not. Therefore you are making a category mistake in applying rules of rationality and mathematics to morality.

Tist wrote:

Buddahchuck: And what laws, like the law of noncontradiction, do you "intuitively perceive" that tell you a) God exists b) morality is objective c)God is the basis of morality?

If you're referring to laws of logic, I don't know of any for (a) and (b). Depending on how you define God, you could argue that God is the basis of morality by definition (but that definition of God would have to be a loose one).


You seem a little shaky on this answer. But considering that you don't seem to have any real "intuitive perceptions" that tell you a or b, I find it odd that you even attempt to answer c:

Tist wrote:

Logically, morality does seem to imply the existence of some sovereign metaphysical entity that says how we ought to behave with supreme authority.


Yet this is not the case as is explained above. Again reiterating, morality does not need "some sovereign metaphysical entity that says how we ought to behave with supreme authority".