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Moral Argument for God
Johhanes de Silentio
Student

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Posted 04/20/08 - 02:19 PM:
quote post
#651
TMB,

I apologize for not answering your comments individually, but I think the following point needs to be made, as it will address the root of our problems:

You have a difficulty relying on sentiments to discover moral values. In most areas of philosophy, this is a prudent measure to take; however, in ethics, it seems necessary to rely on them. Why? For what moral principle can we establish solely through reason?

Take the Golden Rule for instance. I think we can both agree that the expression, "Treat others as you would have them treat yourself" is a valid moral statement. But how do we arrive at that conclusion? It is through reason? "Surely," one may say, "for it is in one's best interest to treat another like oneself and it thus is rational to do so." If you then ask this person "What is in one's best interest?", she will reply "safety, comfort, joy, etc. Anyone would agree that these are in one's best interest and also in the best interest of others, for inside each of us is a natural sympathy for one another; thus when one feels good so too does another, and when the one feels sorrowful, the other likewise. And hence, one's best interest is based on the best interest of all." These are not rational claims, however, they are based on sentiments: joy, peace, comfort - these are not determined "good" through reason; no, they are based on sentiments acknowledged universally as good and good for all people.

How then can one judge the goodness of a sentiment based on a rule, when the rule itself is based on the sentiments? The reason, therefore, that something is good is not because it conforms to some "rule of the right" or some moral principle established through logic; it is good because it promotes good sentiments. And sentiments regarded universally as good.

Now there are some exceptions. Some people want to molest children, for example, but are we to suppose that this demonstrates moral relativity? Is it not more likely to think that these criminals and mass murderers are in fact wrong? That even cultures in some of their practices - cannibalism, ethnic cleansing - are wrong? Is that so implausible? Why should we not consider what most people consider right - happiness, friendship, equality, generosity - as in fact right? And what most people consider wrong - egotism, harming the innocent, theft, rape - as in fact wrong? Are we so restricted by logic to refuse this claim that even a 4-year-old would acknowledge as true?

What about drugs and frequent unprotected sex? Surely these promote good sentiments but do you suggest they are right? On the contrary, these are actually not in one's best interest and certainly not in the best interest of others. What eventually happens to drug users and those who engage in such sexual behavior? Depression, paranoia, poverty, disease, etc. What happens to those around them? They are abused, lied to, manipulated, etc. These things therefore promote bad sentiments and are hence wrong.

What then is the role of reason? It is to determine the facts of the situation so that one may have the correct sentiment. For example, when man is killed, we do not immediately feel sympathy for him and hence call his killer wrong. No, we rely on reason to gather all the necessary information in order to make that judgement. Was the killer provoked? Did the victim cause the killer harm in some prior event? Did he threaten the killer in some way? If we answer "no" to these, then we may feel the proper sentiment - in this case sympathy - which then allows us to judge the killer's actions as wrong.

This then is the objective moral principle: an action is right and good if and only if it is useful or agreeable to oneself or to others.


- de Silentio


jdrw
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Posted 04/20/08 - 02:37 PM:
quote post
#652
Tisthammerw wrote:

Bear in mind however the nature of the argument. My central claim recall is “If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God.” This could be translated as “If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God.” How we can possibly detect the existence of objective morality is beside the point.


Tist, I do not understand what it would mean to "recognize the existence of objective moral values. " I do not understand how to "recognize" such a metaphysical thingy nor even how to tell the difference between its existence and its non-existence. Can you tell me how you tell the difference between its existence and its non-existence? I do not understand how to determine whether a given claim really is or really is not an "objective moral value." Can you tell me how you determine whether a given claim really is or really is not an "objective moral value"? Unless you can explain how we can at least tell the difference between its existence and its non-existence, it is meaningless for anyone to "recognize its existence."

If we do not even know how to tell the difference between its existence and its non-existence, we do not understand what it means to say it "exists. " And it therefore is meaningless babble to claim that its existence would be evidence for the existence of God.




Nonetheless, here is my answer if you are curious. I propose that it’s through the same (yet imperfect) way objective rationality reveals itself to us: intuitive perceptions.


"Objective Morality" decidedly is not an "intuitive perception."

Rather, “Objective Morality” is an inference, a theory, a cognitive construction, a proposition … an attempt to understand and explain primary subjective experiences (such as our visceral reactions to and feelings and value judgments about people’s behaviors.)

"Objective Morality" is merely one among several other inferences, throries, cognitive constructions, and propositions attempting to explain such experiences (Subjective Morality, Relativism, Non-cognitivism, Error Theory, etc.) The truth of the theory/explanation known as "Objective Morality" cannot be "intuitively perceived" any more than the truth of any of the other theories can. (Moral Relativists intuitively perceive the truth of Moral Relativism, Non-cognitivists intuitively perceive the truth of Non-cognitivism, etc.)

Theories battle it out by meeting or failing to meet independently applied and intersubjectively evaluated epistemic criteria--not by being intuitively perceived to be true. The experiences--the visceral reactions, feelings, and value judgments about beheviors at issue--are primary and incorrigible, but the explanations for them are just inferences, theories, cognitive constructions whose truth is established according to the epistemic criteria they can meet or fail to meet.


jdrw wrote:

What is the point of arguing that the only plausible Objective Morality is one that is uniquely an aspect of God, so if this aspect unique to God exists, it would count as evidence of the existence of God?


I don't know, but fortunately that is not my actual argument. My argument isn't “if God is the basis of objective morality, then this is evidence for the existence of God.” Rather, my argument goes from objective morality itself (not the premise that it is a unique aspect of God) to God's existence.


But haven’t you argued repeatedly that "objective morality itself" existing as an independent metaphysical entity is implausible because it is circular for it to be its own source of sovereign moral authority? Haven’t you argued that the only plausible way to conceive of objective morality is as an aspect of God, in fact, as "the heart of God"?

If you claim that objective morality itself is an implausible notion, then what sense does it make for you to argue that its existence is evidence for anything? You do not accept the existence of "objective morality itself," you accept the existence of objective morality only as an inherent aspect of God. Therefore, your argument becomes: the existence of an inherent aspect of God is evidence for the existence of God--which absent any actual empirical confirmation is trivially pointless.



jdrw wrote:

And adding God as the referent does not resolve the issue, it merely adds the Eurythro problem step.


Please explain what this problem is and why it is a problem for the argument from morality.


Absent God there is no Eurythro problem.

The Eurythro problem is introduced when God is introduced as essential to the moral calculus: Is behavior X immoral because God has decreed it to be immoral, or does God decree behavior X to be immoral in recognition that it Really is Objectively and inherently Immoral? Is throwing babies up in the air and catching them on bayonets for fun immoral because God says it’s immoral, or does God say it’s immoral in recognition of the Objective Fact that it just REALLY IS immoral?


Is Objective Morality an autonomous, sovereign metaphysical entity or binding force of some kind--or is Morality an aspect of God? If it is not autonomous and sovereign, then "it" doesn’t exist, it’s just another aspect unique to God. And your whole argument comes to this: the existence of an aspect unique to God is evidence of the existence of God.


Cheers.
jd

_____________________
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
TMB
Graduate

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Posted 04/20/08 - 05:05 PM:
quote post
#653
Johhanes, you say,

You have a difficulty relying on sentiments to discover moral values. In most areas of philosophy, this is a prudent measure to take; however, in ethics, it seems necessary to rely on them. Why? For what moral principle can we establish solely through reason?


Actually I do not have problems using intuition and sentiment to establish moral values. Its just that I cannot then consider these moral values to be objective, however I have no issue living by these, or promoting them. My point is that people do use their intuition to establish their moral values. The key question is if these can be considered objective moral values or not. Observation says that they are not. They are inconsistent except as they serve the individual and the group to which they belong. Otherwise they are not objective or universal moral values applicable to all people, all the time.

Take the Golden Rule for instance. I think we can both agree that the expression, "Treat others as you would have them treat yourself" is a valid moral statement.


It is valid within a social context, but it does not operate with competing groups or non social scenarios. Much lip service is also paid to this, but often people do not carry this ideal through, they just state that they do. There are social mechanisms to punish non egalitarian behvior, so people attempt to appear virtuous when they are usually less than virtuous.

But how do we arrive at that conclusion? It is through reason? "Surely," one may say, "for it is in one's best interest to treat another like oneself and it thus is rational to do so."


In socities that strive for and state they are seeking egalitarianims, this is correct. However in the Indian caste based system, your status will dictate that you will not treat others as you treat yourself if they are of different caste. It is certainly reasonable to appear to be equitable in a society that promotes democratic, egalitarian principles. Equally it is rational to ensure that you get what is best for you and your group. In WW2, these principles were not stated thus, and did not apply. In any conflict situation they are also not stated and do not apply. The attempts to impose Geneva convention treatment on prisoners and of limited effectivenesst work and notably do not deny the right to kill enemy soldiers. ie. we do not want them to live as we live. As the enemy we want them to be defeated and ourselves to be triumphant.

If you then ask this person "What is in one's best interest?", she will reply "safety, comfort, joy, etc. Anyone would agree that these are in one's best interest and also in the best interest of others, for inside each of us is a natural sympathy for one another; thus when one feels good so too does another, and when the one feels sorrowful, the other likewise.


This relies to a large degree on the other person being part of ones social grouping. If they are part of our direct family we do more to achieve this, than if they are unrelated. This arises from selfish genetics. If they are part of an opposing social group we might actually promote exactly the opposite, such as in the case of war. Even when they are part of the same social group, we pay more lip service and actual to this social moral code, because we might be socially disadvantaged if we do not. Either way, this is not evidence of objective moral values, as we adjust the exact nature to suit the situation.

And hence, one's best interest is based on the best interest of all." These are not rational claims, however, they are based on sentiments: joy, peace, comfort - these are not determined "good" through reason; no, they are based on sentiments acknowledged universally as good and good for all people.


Once again, these are stated objectives in democratic society. We achieve far less than we state in this case. In non democratic society, even in principle this applies far less (see caste based socities, and those at war with each other). Our moral standards also apply to non humans, and here you see how we are extending this sense of "do unto others" to try and improve conditions for battery chickens, abbatoirs, humane ways to hunt, farm and harvest domestic and wild animals. These values have changed. In my local zoo, all animlas that are fed to other animals must be euthanased before they are fed to another animal, except for the termites that get fed to anteaters. We are not "doing unto the termites", as we are to the mice that are fed to the snakes. We judge their right for equalmmoral behavior to be less. What if snakes only eat live mice? Then we must make moral choices between the animals. on some form of subjective value. Peter Singer considers that we should attach greater value to chmps than to severly retarded human children, based upon their level of consciousness, ability to feel pain, an so on. I am not arguing for or against any of these, just showing how subjective and relative they are, and based upon social dynamics.

How then can one judge the goodness of a sentiment based on a rule, when the rule itself is based on the sentiments? The reason, therefore, that something is good is not because it conforms to some "rule of the right" or some moral principle established through logic; it is good because it promotes good sentiments. And sentiments regarded universally as good.


Not quite universally. As I said, it depends upon our social group and this is changing fast. There is a growing tendency to consider the rights etc of all human beings. Even though this is poorly observed with much lip service there are strong pressures to make this so. Looking back in history it was more acceptable to discriminate against other peoples based upon gender, age, race, sexual orientation, mental capacity, caste status etc. This would make it morally OK to enslave black people but not white people (from a white mans perspective), Morally OK to allow men to vote but not women. Morally OK to send men to war but not women. Morally OK to smack children, and in Roman times for fathers the moral right to take their childrens lives if they chose to. All subjective moral standards. What we are observing is the expansion of moral standards to all humans. We are extending it in part to some animals, some even consider plants to have rights.

Now there are some exceptions. Some people want to molest children, for example, but are we to suppose that this demonstrates moral relativity? Is it not more likely to think that these criminals and mass murderers are in fact wrong? That even cultures in some of their practices - cannibalism, ethnic cleansing - are wrong? Is that so implausible?


By whose standard? Yours or theirs? If there was mass murder when the CroMaganon man wiped out Neanderthal some 30000 years ago, was that wrong? They were after all a different species to us? What about when we murdered the american bison and the dodo bird. While these were not considered good actions but of far less moral value than human genocide, but it shows how we apply subjective morality. Did James Jones commit mass murder or was it suicide in Jamestown when his cult was seeking to achieve a higher plane through death? Is it universally wrong if a Muslim seeks eternal life by killing infidels? All these things depend upon your cultural viewpoint and not some universal standard.

Why should we not consider what most people consider right - happiness, friendship, equality, generosity - as in fact right? And what most people consider wrong - egotism, harming the innocent, theft, rape - as in fact wrong? Are we so restricted by logic to refuse this claim that even a 4-year-old would acknowledge as true?


There is certainly logic at work here, but it is bio-logic, not intellectual logic. As we strive to control outcomes for ourselves and our group, we modify these standards as our group changes. If you have experience of 4-year olds, then you must know that when it comes to designing the rules for the games they play, they adjust the rules to suit themselves, not some egalitarian model. We gradually train them to display (if not act upon) social standards. I see young hooligans driving their cars at speed down my road; endangering all in the road, spraying graffitti; keeping me awake at all hours of the morning; breaking into houses to support drug habits. Are they knowingly doing wrong, or just doing what serves their self interest, and justifyin the moral position when required?

What about drugs and frequent unprotected sex? Surely these promote good sentiments but do you suggest they are right? On the contrary, these are actually not in one's best interest and certainly not in the best interest of others. What eventually happens to drug users and those who engage in such sexual behavior? Depression, paranoia, poverty, disease, etc. What happens to those around them? They are abused, lied to, manipulated, etc. These things therefore promote bad sentiments and are hence wrong.


If you want to call these wrong or right, you certainly will, just as we all do, and you will do it in a subjective way. Fro some drugs are wrong even if they harm no others or are used to suppress pain. For others they are OK under any circumstances. Drug use in sport is considered wrong by the ruling bodies, but not by the athletes doing all they can to win. And just what drugs are 'wrong'? Caffeine, Gurana, blood replacement? The wrong drugs are just those they can get an idea if they affect performance and can be detected. When we seek to win, alls fair in love and war.

What then is the role of reason? It is to determine the facts of the situation so that one may have the correct sentiment. For example, when man is killed, we do not immediately feel sympathy for him and hence call his killer wrong. No, we rely on reason to gather all the necessary information in order to make that judgement. Was the killer provoked? Did the victim cause the killer harm in some prior event? Did he threaten the killer in some way? If we answer "no" to these, then we may feel the proper sentiment - in this case sympathy - which then allows us to judge the killer's actions as wrong.


This depends upon when and where. In some countries they still execute many capital offenders, while in others they do not. Surely in objective morality, a murder of a ceratin degree is murder is the same whether its comitted in New York or Shanghai? Apparently not. Surely cold blooded murder in 2000 BC is as wrong as it is in 2000AD? It seems not, people can be lawfully processed for stealing bread and shipped to penal colonies, people were hung drawn and quartered, or burnt at the stake for various crimes. And these were done by the lawful and socialy approved institutions of the day. Why should these change if we are using objective moral standards? You are proposing a western centric view of 2008, and suggesting this is the objective moral view we should al hold. I suggest you are doing this because it is the view that you hold. You express it objective because we have always done this, and it makes sense to do so. What is the value of having a standard they we state could change tomorrow, or once we cross the state border, acknowledging it is an arbitrary standard? It has limited value in this form, so we must argue that it is objective. We have evolved to do this.

This then is the objective moral principle: an action is right and good if and only if it is useful or agreeable to oneself or to others.


The dilemna is getting the Muslims and the Christians to agree on the moral basis of strapping and detonating explosives in civilian contexts, and the Muslim perpertrator seeing it as morally right, the Christian as wrong. There is still limited concensus on what is right and wrong. You see this for yourself, but then offer that when it differs from your view, then they are still objectively wrong. You have madea logical slip with your last comment because this introduces another crteion to assess right and good. It fails logically, and when it does, you will revert to the comment about murderers and child molesters having warped perceptions of morality. Thats the exact point. If they do not meet our standards they must be warped, otherwise we face the thought that our own standards might not be objectively right, and might just exists to promote our self interest. Even our tendency to avoid this evidence is something we have evolved to.


Edited by TMB on 04/20/08 - 05:16 PM
Tisthammerw
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Posted 04/20/08 - 07:08 PM:
quote post
#654
jdrw wrote:

Tist, I do not understand what it would mean to "recognize the existence of objective moral values. "


I mean be aware that objective moral values exist. That is what I meant by If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God.”


The truth of the theory/explanation known as "Objective Morality" cannot be "intuitively perceived" any more than the truth of any of the other theories can.


What about the law of noncontradiction? Is that not intuitively perceived?

Borrowing a little from Merriam-Webster, intuition could roughly be defined as "immediate/direct apprehension or cognition (of a belief)." On this definition there are various levels of intuition in how we accept our (basic) beliefs, some more rational to accept than others. At the highest level is when we intuitively "see" basic logical principles like the law of noncontradiction. From there we can construct real ironclad proofs as in mathematics. Lower down the scale is the intuition that our memory and sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. On a lower level we get testimony (of other people) and our intuitive perception of rationality when judging between empirically identical theories.

For many people, the existence of objective morality is more or less self-evident (intuitively perceived, as in "I just know"), perhaps somewhere between the level of logic and the general reliability of sensory perceptions.


Theories battle it out by meeting or failing to meet independently applied and intersubjectively evaluated epistemic criteria--not by being intuitively perceived to be true.


Problem is, how do you know which criteria to judge a theory by? The only way you can do it is by intuitively perceiving some criteria as rational earmarks of truth. Consider for example the theory that the universe was created just as it was five minutes ago, complete with gray hairs, fossils, false memories, etc. This theory is empirically identical with the theory of a much older universe (say, ten to twenty billion years old). Anything you point to--video tapes, memories, books--is perfectly consistent with the five minute hypothesis which says all those things were created as they were five minutes ago. We can reject the five minute hypothesis by appealing to the principle of credulity: that we should accept what our perceptions tell us as true unless we have good reason to believe otherwise. This rationality of this principle (and other basic principles used as epistemic criteria) is just something that is intuitively perceived to be reasonable. Sooner or later we have to come down to basic beliefs, and our basic beliefs are justified in some way or another on intuitiveness.



But haven’t you argued repeatedly that "objective morality itself" existing as an independent metaphysical entity is implausible because it is circular for it to be its own source of sovereign moral authority? Haven’t you argued that the only plausible way to conceive of objective morality is as an aspect of God, in fact, as "the heart of God"?

If you claim that objective morality itself is an implausible notion, then what sense does it make for you to argue that its existence is evidence for anything?


Please remember the definition of objective morality I am using: "statements and principles of how we ought to behave that are objectively right/true/correct." I do not claim objective morality is itself an implausible notion. I did claim that saying "the basis of morality is morality" is implausible, but that is a different statement than "objective morality exists." The latter claim acknowledges the existence of the principles of how we ought to behave, but does not comment on the metaphysical foundation of those principles. This is what I've chosen as my starting point: that we accept the existence of objective morality itself. "Objective morality exists" leaves open the question of who or what says how we ought to behave, and only says there are objectively true statements on how we ought to behave. In contrast, "the basis of morality is morality" does attempt to answer the question of the metaphysical foundation of morality, and that attempt doesn’t work as I have explained earlier.



The Eurythro problem is introduced when God is introduced as essential to the moral calculus: Is behavior X immoral because God has decreed it to be immoral, or does God decree behavior X to be immoral in recognition that it Really is Objectively and inherently Immoral? Is throwing babies up in the air and catching them on bayonets for fun immoral because God says it’s immoral, or does God say it’s immoral in recognition of the Objective Fact that it just REALLY IS immoral?


Is Objective Morality an autonomous, sovereign metaphysical entity or binding force of some kind--or is Morality an aspect of God?


I would say that these are false dichotomies (at least, some of them are). I don't think objective morality has its basis in God's commands per se. Rather, I think the connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do are morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature of who and what he is, to the extent that God cannot exist without objective morality. (Hence one could say that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God; the heart of God says how we ought to behave, because the connection between God and moral goodness is that elemental.)

If your definition of Objective Morality is "a sovereign metaphysical entity or binding force of some kind that has the supreme authority to say how we ought to behave" without any further specifications as to what this entity is, why can't this entity be God? At first blush he seems to be the most obvious candidate. God after all is the sovereign metaphysical entity (if he exists) so it makes sense that if objective morality has supreme authority behind its statements that it is in some way grounded in the heart of God.

Note however that it is logically possible for objective morality not to be grounded in the God of the Abrahamic faiths, but in such circumstances I think it still requires some type of God, some type of supreme metaphysical reality, even if it's only pantheism (i.e. "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave"). IIRC however, we disagreed whether the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" constitutes pantheism, but please note I acknowledged that as a plausible, viable alternative (it is the alternative I would accept if I were an atheist and an ethical objectivist, though perhaps that might actually make me a pantheist...).

_____________________
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Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/21/08 - 07:13 AM:
quote post
#655
TMB,

TMB wrote:
I do not have problems using intuition and sentiment to establish moral values. Its just that I cannot then consider these moral values to be objective, however I have no issue living by these, or promoting them. My point is that people do use their intuition to establish their moral values. The key question is if these can be considered objective moral values or not. Observation says that they are not. They are inconsistent except as they serve the individual and the group to which they belong. Otherwise they are not objective or universal moral values applicable to all people, all the time.


They are objective in the following way. Unless a person is brought up under unusual circumstances or has some sort of psychological problem, that person feels sympathy for others. In this way, feeling sympathetic is universal and can hence be an objective standard. In order to reach this state of sympathy, one must use reason in order to clear oneself of biases and come to one's "universally human" self. Once in this self, one can have the proper sentiments towards others and thus make moral judgments.

It is valid within a social context, but it does not operate with competing groups or non social scenarios.


The Golden Rule is just an example of one morally valid statement. You're right, there needs to be more in order to develop an entire system of morality.

Much lip service is also paid to this, but often people do not carry this ideal through, they just state that they do. There are social mechanisms to punish non egalitarian behvior, so people attempt to appear virtuous when they are usually less than virtuous.


That may be the case, but it does not prove that the statement itself is incorrect; it simply shows that the people act immorally.

In socities that strive for and state they are seeking egalitarianims, this is correct. However in the Indian caste based system, your status will dictate that you will not treat others as you treat yourself if they are of different caste. It is certainly reasonable to appear to be equitable in a society that promotes democratic, egalitarian principles. Equally it is rational to ensure that you get what is best for you and your group.


In order to judge moral values in the caste system, for example, one must learn to see past another's status and reach a "universally human" point of view. Once that person does this and realizes the pain of those in lower classes, she will see that the caste system itself is immoral.

In WW2, these principles were not stated thus, and did not apply. In any conflict situation they are also not stated and do not apply. The attempts to impose Geneva convention treatment on prisoners and of limited effectivenesst work and notably do not deny the right to kill enemy soldiers. ie. we do not want them to live as we live. As the enemy we want them to be defeated and ourselves to be triumphant.


War is right if the cause promotes what is good for humanity as a whole; therefore, acts of violence against an enemy that promotes the opposite are right acts. Furthermore, in "states of nature," such as war, morality does not have the weight that it has in normal social settings. That does not mean objective rules do not apply; it just means in certain circumstances they do not have the bearing on one's actions. But there is still morality in war: avoid killing the innocent, avoid torture, respect the enemy's call for surrender - these are done out of sympathy. Now perhaps armies have not always followed this code, but that is not reason to believe the code does not exist; it simply shows that they acted morally wrong.

This relies to a large degree on the other person being part of ones social grouping. If they are part of our direct family we do more to achieve this, than if they are unrelated. This arises from selfish genetics. If they are part of an opposing social group we might actually promote exactly the opposite, such as in the case of war.


Perhaps we do, but that does not make it morally right!

Even when they are part of the same social group, we pay more lip service and actual to this social moral code, because we might be socially disadvantaged if we do not. Either way, this is not evidence of objective moral values, as we adjust the exact nature to suit the situation.


Why shouldn't we adjust to the situation? Does the exact same situation ever come up twice? No. Does that mean there cannot be objective principles that apply to many situations in different ways? No.

Once again, these are stated objectives in democratic society. We achieve far less than we state in this case. In non democratic society, even in principle this applies far less (see caste based socities, and those at war with each other). Our moral standards also apply to non humans, and here you see how we are extending this sense of "do unto others" to try and improve conditions for battery chickens, abbatoirs, humane ways to hunt, farm and harvest domestic and wild animals. These values have changed. In my local zoo, all animlas that are fed to other animals must be euthanased before they are fed to another animal, except for the termites that get fed to anteaters. We are not "doing unto the termites", as we are to the mice that are fed to the snakes. We judge their right for equalmmoral behavior to be less. What if snakes only eat live mice? Then we must make moral choices between the animals. on some form of subjective value. Peter Singer considers that we should attach greater value to chmps than to severly retarded human children, based upon their level of consciousness, ability to feel pain, an so on. I am not arguing for or against any of these, just showing how subjective and relative they are, and based upon social dynamics.


Slippery slope fallacy! I didn't say anything about animals. That issue is way out of the question right now; there's no way you can bring that argument against me. Again, this is one of those grey areas where morality does not carry the weight that it has in normal social situations.

As I said, it depends upon our social group and this is changing fast. There is a growing tendency to consider the rights etc of all human beings. Even though this is poorly observed with much lip service there are strong pressures to make this so. Looking back in history it was more acceptable to discriminate against other peoples based upon gender, age, race, sexual orientation, mental capacity, caste status etc. This would make it morally OK to enslave black people but not white people (from a white mans perspective), Morally OK to allow men to vote but not women. Morally OK to send men to war but not women. Morally OK to smack children, and in Roman times for fathers the moral right to take their childrens lives if they chose to. All subjective moral standards. What we are observing is the expansion of moral standards to all humans. We are extending it in part to some animals, some even consider plants to have rights.


It was never acceptable. If those people who enslaved others came to their "universally human" selves, they would feel natural sympathy for those they were enslaving, and thus realize that their actions are wrong.

If there was mass murder when the CroMaganon man wiped out Neanderthal some 30000 years ago, was that wrong? They were after all a different species to us? What about when we murdered the american bison and the dodo bird. While these were not considered good actions but of far less moral value than human genocide, but it shows how we apply subjective morality.


These actions are perhaps not right, but again, in a "state of nature" morality does not carry the weight that it has in normal society settings. Just because there are some grey areas that does not mean the objectivity is lost. It simply means that morality is less relevant in some circumstances.

I see young hooligans driving their cars at speed down my road; endangering all in the road, spraying graffitti; keeping me awake at all hours of the morning; breaking into houses to support drug habits. Are they knowingly doing wrong, or just doing what serves their self interest, and justifying the moral position when required?


Again, if these hooligans came to a "universally human" perspective, something attainable for each human being (of course with certain qualifiers that I mentioned earlier), then they would feel sympathy for those they harm by their actions and thus determine those actions wrong. In this case, they are either fault for negligence because they did not reach that perspective or they did reach the perspective and simply ignored it, in which case they are at fault for the actions themselves.

If you want to call these wrong or right, you certainly will, just as we all do, and you will do it in a subjective way. Fro some drugs are wrong even if they harm no others or are used to suppress pain. For others they are OK under any circumstances. Drug use in sport is considered wrong by the ruling bodies, but not by the athletes doing all they can to win. And just what drugs are 'wrong'? Caffeine, Gurana, blood replacement? The wrong drugs are just those they can get an idea if they affect performance and can be detected. When we seek to win, alls fair in love and war.


The more harmful the drug to oneself or to others the more wrong it is to take the drug. Steroids are wrong for athletes because they harm themselves, for they ultimately damage their bodies; they also do harm to others by abusing their trust and by making the game unfair for those who do not take steroids.

This depends upon when and where. In some countries they still execute many capital offenders, while in others they do not. Surely in objective morality, a murder of a ceratin degree is murder is the same whether its comitted in New York or Shanghai? Apparently not. Surely cold blooded murder in 2000 BC is as wrong as it is in 2000AD? It seems not, people can be lawfully processed for stealing bread and shipped to penal colonies, people were hung drawn and quartered, or burnt at the stake for various crimes. And these were done by the lawful and socialy approved institutions of the day.


Simply stating differences in cultures does not prove the existence of different moralities. What if one culture just it has it wrong?

You are proposing a western centric view of 2008, and suggesting this is the objective moral view we should al hold. I suggest you are doing this because it is the view that you hold. You express it objective because we have always done this, and it makes sense to do so. What is the value of having a standard they we state could change tomorrow, or once we cross the state border, acknowledging it is an arbitrary standard? It has limited value in this form, so we must argue that it is objective. We have evolved to do this.


No, when we reach the "universally human" state, we see that some things: freedom, equality, justice etc. - are right. It has nothing to do with my current standing as an American.

The dilemna is getting the Muslims and the Christians to agree on the moral basis of strapping and detonating explosives in civilian contexts, and the Muslim perpertrator seeing it as morally right, the Christian as wrong. There is still limited concensus on what is right and wrong. You see this for yourself, but then offer that when it differs from your view, then they are still objectively wrong. You have madea logical slip with your last comment because this introduces another crteion to assess right and good. It fails logically, and when it does, you will revert to the comment about murderers and child molesters having warped perceptions of morality. Thats the exact point. If they do not meet our standards they must be warped, otherwise we face the thought that our own standards might not be objectively right, and might just exists to promote our self interest. Even our tendency to avoid this evidence is something we have evolved to.


It's morally wrong to commit suicide even for the sake of religious beliefs. Why? Even if they believe it is helpful to themselves to commit these acts, they certainly harms others by doing so. If these people reached a "universally human" consciousness, they would feel sympathy for those they harm and thus determine their actions wrong.

What about their religious beliefs? Point me to the passage in the Qur 'an that advocates suicide bombing. These actions are not performed with an objective conscious.

- de Silentio

Makarismos
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Posted 04/21/08 - 10:32 AM:
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#656
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:

Simply stating differences in cultures does not prove the existence of different moralities. What if one culture just it has it wrong?

I think I have the answer: because the culture that got it wrong might be our own.

Think of it; other cultures sincerely believe that their own moralities are correct. They base this on strong intuitions about what is right and wrong - just as we do. They have arguments for their own moral positions, and reasoning which shows them how they are correct. Yet, their morality is different than ours.

How can we be so arrogant as to assume that they are simply incorrect? If TMB is correct, it is simply because it suits us all to think in this way. Unless there is some way of showing how they are incorrect and one that doesn’t involve claims like “I simply feel that you are incorrect”, then it is possible that OM supports the opposing side. Since we have only our own feelings to go on, and others have equally strong feelings, we must have something more than feelings to claim certainty.

This is the problem faced if one wishes to claim Objective Morality’s existence, and this is why I reject such a system.
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Posted 04/21/08 - 11:27 AM:
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#657
Makarismos wrote:
the culture that got it wrong might be our own.


Yes! That's exactly my point: cultures can be wrong in their moral claims. I never say that our culture has it right. I argue that human sympathy is shared by all people - that it does not simply reflect the views of one culture or another - and that this sympathy provides the foundation for moral claims.

Since we have only our own feelings to go on, and others have equally strong feelings, we must have something more than feelings to claim certainty.


On the surface this seems true. But all people have the ability to reach their "universal human consciousness," which allows them to feel sympathy for one another, thus offering an objective basis for morality.
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Posted 04/21/08 - 11:58 AM:
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Johhanes de Silentio wrote:

On the surface this seems true. But all people have the ability to reach their "universal human consciousness," which allows them to feel sympathy for one another, thus offering an objective basis for morality.

Hitler thought he had access to such an objective moral basis. So did Stalin. It seems you wish to put yourself in bad company? Such reasoning could justify the holocaust.
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Posted 04/21/08 - 12:53 PM:
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#659
Hitler thought he had access to such an objective moral basis. So did Stalin.


If they truly thought so it means they had some mental disorder. If they did not have such a disorder, then it means they did not reach what is universally human in themselves, for if they did, they would have felt sympathy for their victims and hence determined their own actions wrong. An objective moral basis presupposes that all people are equal and because the actions of Hitler and Stalin reveal that these men did not have that in mind, they demonstrate that they men did not reach a universally human consciousness and thus had no access to an objective morality.


Edited by Johhanes de Silentio on 04/21/08 - 12:59 PM
Postmodern Beatnik
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Posted 04/21/08 - 12:59 PM:
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Tishammerw wrote:
Please keep in mind that some philosophers believe that not all necessary truths are such that their denial would violate the law of noncontradiction (for instance, many believe ex nihilo nihil fit to be a necessary truth).
While that may be the case, those defending the necessary truth option would most likely deny such an assertion (and they would be part of the majority in doing so). Remember, I was only giving you an explanation of what our putative necessary truth theorist might argue, not a defense of his conclusions.

Tisthammerw wrote:
That response didn't answer the question. So I'll ask it again.
It did if the requisite reading was done, but very well.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Suppose some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn't a corporeal world?

(Your response was that removing all matter in the universe would mean nothing existed at all, apparently that response forgot that the thought experiment transforms the once purely physical humans into disembodied spirits.)
That stipulation is part of the category mistake I am accusing you of making. Removing all of the matter from the universe only leaves disembodied spirits if the universe is dualistic, which would be an entirely separate conversation. If we are not begging any questions against the naturalist, removing all matter from the universe removes the universe itself leaving absolutely nothing.

Tisthammerw wrote:
My argument is this:

  1. If the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it) then objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists).
  2. The only plausible explanations are indeed entities with significant God-like characteristics.
  3. Therefore, if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God.
Thanks. We've gone through so many versions of the moral argument and so many attempts at justifying it that a clear presentation is useful. However, this confirms my comments (which you did not respond to) regarding the timidity of the claim. You are not defending the deductive version of the moral argument (in which the existence of objective morality entails the existence of God). Nor are you defending the inductive version (in which the existence of objective morality makes the existence of God more plausible than its denial). This "forensic" argument you are defending merely asserts that objective morality is not inconsistent with the existence of God (which no reasonable person denies) and that a universe in which objective morality obtains can be described in similar terms as have been traditionally ascribed to God (a rather unsurprising claim, hardly telling of anything). But more on this below.

Tisthammerw wrote:
The point is that you falsely claimed I had gave no justification for my introduction of a pantheistic God. You may not like that justification, but you gave the impression that I never offered any (which was false).
I strongly recommend that you learn to read in a manner sensitive to context. What I was noting was the way in which you casually slipped in the notion of pantheism in that particular post without arguing for it. It is a sign of the sloppy way in which you have been making your argument, and I made a note of it. Deal.

Tisthammerw wrote:
But then, wouldn't the universe wielding supreme moral authority in telling everyone how they ought to behave (such that everyone ought to obey the universe) yield an appreciable difference from atheism?
Assuming that you are not begging any questions and are using "wielding" and "telling" in non-anthropomorphic ways then the answer is "no, not if the atheist in question is also a moral realist." Such a person believes that there is no God, but that there is still objective morality. You have conceded on several occasions that, for all you've said, this world view remains a possibility. Unless we are assuming O -> G in order to prove O -> G (which you have denied, and which would obviously beg the question), the mere description offered above does not offer an appreciable difference from a world view that is both atheistic and morally realist.

Tisthammerw wrote:
If not, then what does? Particularly for the God [of] naturalistic pantheism (which lacks consciousness and the supernatural)?
To create an appreciable difference, one must show how objective morality entails something that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology. Since you have stipulated that you are not concerned with supernaturalist atheists (e.g. Jainists), you have some leeway to show only how objective morality entails something that a naturalistic atheist cannot admit into his ontology.

The problem with attempting to do this via naturalistic pantheism is that the very idea has been criticized since its inception as nothing more than atheism in disguise -- indeed, "Spinozism" was once considered a synonym for "atheism" -- and for much the same reasons as I have been pressing against the notion's coherence here. It is an embattled concept, and is recognized as wholly secular even by many of its adherents -- who explicitly note that the object of their contemplation is "God" only in a decidedly non-traditional sense -- not to even mention its critics. Naturalistic pantheism stems from a desire to save some of the surface qualities of religious belief, such as reverence and wonder, from both a paler version of atheism (i.e. atheism as it is often perceived by its critics) and an equally mechanical deism. Ultimately, it is an assertion that the universe as a whole is the proper object of reverent contemplation -- a notion embraced by as staunch an atheist as Daniel C. Dennett in his Darwin's Dangerous Idea (though without any of the language of God, which is merely a linguistic device in naturalistic pantheism).

Tisthammerw wrote:
My position (that the universe being the basis of objective morality constitutes pantheism) does not actually assume that God is necessary for morality.
Nor did I say otherwise in the quote you were responding to. What I did say is that, absent this assumption, pantheism as you have described it does not generate an appreciable difference from atheism -- and thus your overall argument fails, even if not by begging the question.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Instead of calling it "the pantheistic God" (since we seem to be in dispute over that term) I'll call the entity X.
Fine. Especially in light of my above comments, this seems like a better way to proceed.

Regarding transcendence:
Tisthammerw wrote:
It's transcendent in that it transcends humanity; the basis of morality must transcend what anything else says, thinks, or believes. Its authority is supremely transcendent. Though granted X may not be transcendent in some other sense of the word.
I'm not sure transcendent is the right word here, given this explanation. Regardless, it is the sense that I was originally addressing that is usually attributed to God. So if God and morality are "transcendent" in different senses of the word, this similarity in language does you no good.

Regarding eternity:
Tisthammerw wrote:
There are essentially two possibilities: either the existence existed forever or it came from nothing. If we assume ex nihilo nihil fit then the universe being eternal would be the logical choice (though to be fair some conceptions of traditional theism use the term "eternal" in a different sense, that of being atemporally timeless).
There is a third option: some scientists believe that universes are born of other universes. Thus our universe is neither eternal nor born of nothing. Regardless, even if were to assume that the universe existed forever, it would again be a superficial similarity.

Regarding incorporeality:
To recap: suppose some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn't a corporeal world?

I think the answer is "No" but if you think the answer is "Yes" we might have to agree to disagree on this point.
See my response above.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
The thought experiment was presented in the context of a pantheism that is indistinguishable from naturalism (or at least as close to it as possible).
Technically it wasn't. It was presented in the context of pantheism but left open (at least initially) the position as to whether the correct form of pantheism was purely physical and naturalistic.
Then it is in danger of begging the question against the naturalistic atheist, or else simply missing the point entirely. You have argued that the existence of objective morality alone (that is, by itself and without help from other metaphysical assumptions) is evidence for the existence of God. You need to show how this follows, then, without relying on premises that the naturalistic atheist would deny.

Regarding omnipresence:
Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
[Omnipresence] is a trivial quality of universes as a class
You bet, but X is still omnipresent (regardless of whether you consider that a significant feature).

I'm assuming by "trivial" you mean "trivially true," but that educated guess could be mistaken. What do you mean by "trivial" in this context? Trivial as in unimportant?
I mean trivially true, but things that are trivially true are limited in how much philosophical work they can do. Returning to your analogy with forensic science, your case for God is looking a little like arresting someone because he -- like the killer -- has five fingers.

Regarding morality:
Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
[Morality], of course, is another trivial characteristic in that the moral argument for God stipulates universes in which objective morality obtains.
Maybe so, but X still has this feature (regardless of whether you consider that a significant feature).
Again, trivial qualities can't do much philosophical work.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Well, I didn't mean "wield" in the sense of enforcing its moral laws, only that it has within its power the authority to say how we ought to behave such that everyone ought to obey it.
Okay. I just don't want you (or anyone) to be mistakenly convinced by anthropomorphic language -- especially when you are the one insisting that God need not be anthropomorphic.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Ultimately, however, the major problem I see is that for even the inductive version of the moral argument to work at all (and inductive arguments can work in degrees), you must demonstrate that a world in which objective morality obtains will have properties that an atheist moral realist does not want in his theory.
The wants of an atheist will depend upon the tastes of the atheist, which could quite probably vary.
Fair enough. That's why I switched to talk about things that an atheist cannot admit into his ontology, as opposed to things he wouldn't "want" to admit.

Tisthammerw wrote:
If I were an atheist and wanted my worldview as coherent as possible, I (personally) would not want in my worldview something transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone (including me) ought to always obey it. Such a thing would sound too much like God (even if only a pantheistic God).
Except, assuming you aren't begging any questions, this can all be reworded without losing an ounce of philosophical content in such a way that would not be offensive at all to atheism. Assuming the atheist in question is a moral realist, he absolutely wants there to be some sort of moral authority that demands certain behaviors in such a way that everyone, including himself, ought to obey it. All moral realists want that. And since it is only the moral standards that you are suggesting are "transcendent," and even then only transcendent of humanity, this "characteristic" follows quite trivially from the very existence of objective morality as part of its definition. That is, they aren't really separable, and treating them as such is unwarranted. Moreover, in reducing your rhetoric, we come across two equivocations in your formulation. First, omnipresence. It is unclear whether you think this comes from. The universe is omnipresent, yes, but not morality. Objective morality always applies, but that is (a) not the same thing as being omnipresent in the sense that the universe (and God) are supposed to be and (b) again an attempt to give undue weight to a characteristic of objective morality itself as if it were separable. Second, eternity. Again, you argue for it in terms of the universe but apply the descriptor to morality itself. For all that, moral standards might always apply (though this is not necessarily the case -- as I mentioned before, there is a very real debate over when moral standards come into existence), but it is yet again unclear that this is not simply a trivial characteristic of objective morality itself. And, of course, incorporeality does not actually obtain as far as I am concerned.

An atheist, then, could describe his naturalistic and morally realist world as follows: one in which there are objective standards of behavior that always apply (so long as the universe exists) and that everyone is morally obligated to follow. This contains everything that your description holds (except incorporeality, for the reasons stated); but without the flamboyant language, it is clearly unobjectionable to a naturalistic atheist.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Just because God would have a certain (sub)set of characteristics does not mean that anything with that same (sub)set of characteristics is God -- especially if it has those characteristics trivially.
It depends on what those characteristics are. IMO, the universe possessing the aforementioned characteristics would constitute pantheism, but we seem to disagree on that issue.
We do, but I think the above analysis and reformulation cut strongly in favor of my position.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Perhaps not, but perhaps Aquinas was thinking more along the lines of Occam's razor. Here we have a single entity that explains all these pieces. He might have seen that as the simplest and best explanation.
Perhaps, but I don't really want to get into a discussion about the merits and flaws of Aquinas' reasoning here.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I did not address those two ahead of time, while presenting my argument because I tried to focus my attention on what I believed were the best objections to my argument.
Again, I think you misjudged on that score, but you have answered my requests.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
And you don't think the two most historically important and adhered to moral philosophers are worthy competitors?
Sadly, Kant and Mill are dead and have not posted objections to my argument in this forum.
Red herring. Death does not erase the vast literature written by and about important philosophers, and in that sense they never cease to be current.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Did they post objections to my argument anywhere?
Kant, of course, formulated the deductive version of the moral argument, but he specifically argued that objective morality could exist without God, but was meaningless without Him as a sort of enforcer. Living in a time prior to the internet, Kant did not post his arguments anywhere. But I do not think it unreasonable to expect a decent level of familiarity with offline literature from someone willing to make such bold and sweeping claims -- particularly on a forum that explicitly attempts to maintain higher standards than other online forums. Of course, ignorance is pardonable -- but pardons generally come after an admission of said ignorance.

Tisthammerw wrote:
IIRC Kant tried to say that the categorical imperative was based on reason, but I have already addressed that particular argument.
What I find strange is that you could have easily just pointed me towards -- or re-posted, as you are wont to do -- your critique of Kant's position at the outset. But instead, you acted as if you had never addressed the issue and had no responsibility to do so. The one time your cut-and-paste mentality would have been appropriate, and you missed it.

Tisthammerw wrote:
What objection did Mill produce? Please not that utilitarianism does not in itself present itself as an objection to my claim.
Once again, this is a context violation. My objection was that during your discussion of options for the naturalistic atheist, you ignored the two options that such philosophers typically go for. (This applies in the Kantian case as well -- which is also a context violation -- but I obviously had other things to say about that.) Furthermore, utilitarianism does present itself as an objection of sorts inasmuch as it does not require God in order to give a full explanation of it.



Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Something is arbitrary in the relevant [metaethical] sense, then, when the reasons for it are ad hoc or ultimately based on the opinion of some subjective entity.
That definition of "arbitrary" still seems a bit vague to me, but moving on...
Really? It's not that different from the dictionary definition of "arbitrary" -- just a bit different than the colloquial usage of the word. Something is arbitrary when it ultimately rests of the decision of an arbiter.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
My question is this: according to what standard is God good?
This might be a loaded question, depending on what you mean by this. Thing is, there is no standard outside of God that says he is good (objective morality is grounded in the heart of God) yet no other being can do this because only God is the Supreme Being, the ultimate reality, that which no authority is greater in the universe.
It does not seem like a loaded question to me, but I'll ask it another way: what justifies the use of the word "good" in relation to "God."

Tisthammerw wrote:
The standard is neither of His own creation but neither is the standard independent of Him. Rather, the standard existed as long as He did; the standard was not created any more than God was created. God cannot exist without objective morality being based within him. This prospect does not imply that ethics is "arbitrary" in the sense that such moral truths could have been different from what they were.
So if there is no objective morality, there is no God? Interesting position. Still, you did not argue that objective morality cannot exist without God (and, indeed, you have asserted the opposite several times now), and so it is in that sense independent.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Short answer: I agree. I think atheists can believe in the existence of objective moral values without believing in God.
In which case, I again suggest that the circumstantial argument you are making is ultimately of very little philosophical interest. That God and objective morality could co-exist is not really a controversial assertion, and that is really all your argument can hope to establish. Your use of the word "evidence," then, has been misleading.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik
Now, I have already raised a worry as to the plausibility of any concept of God that does not portray Him as a being of some sort. If that worry is correct, your own worry against these anthropomorphizations is moot.[/quote wrote:
Why? God need not be an anthropomorphic being.
Note the word "if." If that worry were correct, then your own worry would be moot. How is that not clear?

Tisthammerw wrote:
There are certain things that are impossible for God to will and do; methinks even traditional Christianity contains this idea (see Hebrews 6:18).
I agree completely. Ever notice that I never join any of the "can God make a rock he can't lift" threads? That's because the question is ridiculous. Omnipotence is clearly still omnipotence even if it's limited to the logically possible. That said, morality being outside of God's will does make it independent in the relevant sense. Indeed, if he can't will something to be moral, it suggests that there is some standard that it is impossible to break -- a necessary truth, that is. And thus your own argument actually validates the necessary truth hypothesis.

(By the way, God could not be "arbitrary" in the sense that morality could be. I'm not sure why you thought He could be.)

Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 04/28/08 - 10:47 AM

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Makarismos
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Posted 04/21/08 - 03:58 PM:
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#661
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:


If they truly thought so it means they had some mental disorder.

You mean that if someone disagrees with your conception of morality, then they are mentally ill? Why? is it simply because they disagree, or are there other symptoms?

If they did not have such a disorder, then it means they did not reach what is universally human in themselves, for if they did, they would have felt sympathy for their victims and hence determined their own actions wrong.

Would they have? How can we be sure? Does a tiger deny his own universal tigerness by killing? Should a human who has achieved "universal Humanity" (sounds like enlightenment) always act peacefully and sympathetically? I would not claim to know for certain - I hope you are right, but proof is entirely lacking.

Did you ever hear why it was that Machiavelli despised an unarmed prophet? It was because they would certainly be killed. Surely much of what human kind has, was achieved by choosing between greater and lesser evils toward the best outcome available..

An objective moral basis presupposes that all people are equal and because the actions of Hitler and Stalin reveal that these men did not have that in mind, they demonstrate that they men did not reach a universally human consciousness and thus had no access to an objective morality.

On what logic can you show that all people are equal? Why only people? or do you simply feel that all people should be equal? If it is simply a feeling you have, how is this objective?
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Posted 04/21/08 - 04:36 PM:
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#662
Johhanes,

I do not think that a blow by blow response will progress our understanding of this topic.

All your responses revert to the view that our behavior 'ought' to be a certain way, and if it is not or has not been in the past, you explain these away without any substantive support. There is nothing inherently logical or evidentiary in your position. It relies upon your perception of knowing what is objectively right or wrong (and also typifies Tists position) and resorting to this view if the data seems to stack against it. It means that you have an a priori view that OM must be so, therefore in argument you will always seek to validate this position.

The other approach is to assume that we do not know for certain that OM (or any other form of morality) is valid, gather the evidence and see where it takes us. Your approach is quite understandable and characterises much of human behavior (and is perhaps even desirable for cohesive social groups), however it plays no useful role in rational discourse.

Can you tell me how I can then justify having such a dialogue with you?
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Posted 04/21/08 - 05:05 PM:
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#663
What data stacks up against it? The fact that cultures have different moral systems? This neither proves nor disproves MR. It is - as you say - merely a piece of data. Yet it is this argument that you keep bring against MO.

The argument is that moral truths are clear and apparent given the right state of mind. That may not be inherently logical, but it is certainly evidentiary; therefore, it can serve as a premise for what we can rationally discuss, namely, whether the existence of MO can serve as a proof for God's existence.
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Posted 04/21/08 - 07:23 PM:
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#664

Buddahchuck wrote:


Objective moral values (existing or no), need to be demonstrated as the type of thing known to be objective by subjective entities like humans.


Raising this point kind of misinterprets and misses the point of my claim "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God." This could be translated as "If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God."


Actually, chief, it doesn't. This argument, actually directly indicts your claim, however you phrase it. But if anything, I will take you redirection as an admission to the idea objective moral values cannot be known by subjective entities like humans. And this is why that is relevant:

1. If objective moral values were known not to exist, then such knowledge would constitute evidence that God does not exist.


Buddahchuck wrote:

And then you can accept my claim "If objective moral values were known not to exist, then such knowledge would constitute evidence that God does not exist."


Yes.


2. In order for Objective Moral Values to exist in a manner consistent with the idea of God, it would have to be known by humanity with certainty.

3. ...objective moral values cannot be known by subjective entities like humans

4. Objective Moral Values do not exist (from 2 & 3)

5. God does not exist (from 1 & 4)

Wow, an argument that actually proves that God does not exist. You're very keen at argumentation Tist.

Tist wrote:

Why?


Oh, so you don't understand the difference between a quantity and a quality.


We only know that mathematical proofs are objectively true because of our intuitive perceptions (we intuitively “see” the truth of certain logical axioms, as the law of noncontradiction).


And yet you acknowledge the distinction that "I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful)." So where does morality fall? Is morality based on axioms of logic, or is it based on God? You seem to see morality as clearly as a law of noncontradiction; then why is there so much philosophical debate over morality? Where's the controversy if morality is as clear as all that?


But if intuitive perceptions cannot be sufficient grounds for accepting something as objectively true, then we'd have to dismiss our belief in the objective rationality of mathematics.


so the basis of mathematics is objective rationality? Well if mathematics and morality are so similar, then the basis of morality must be objective rationality. But I thought that God was the basis of morality. Is God the basis of objective rationality? Is god the basis of Mathematics? And what laws, like the law of noncontradiction, do you "intuitively perceive" that tell you a) God exists b) morality is objective c)God is the basis of morality? How do such intuitive perceptions NOT conflict with rationality? You are indeed assuming a lot to get to these conclusions in the face of many people's contrary "intuitive perceptions" and have you never thought, in all these conflicts you are having over these issues that you consider "intuitively" obvious, that you are really just spinning unsubstantial, unempirical rhetoric that only continues to be disproven as the argument wears on?


I was challenging the argument that perceiving something intuitively meant one cannot know it to be objectively true. You said, "I am more than willing to accept intuitive perceptions, I do every day. But I am very unwilling to accept that those intuitive perceptions are objective." The perceptions themselves may not be objective, but I think they can in at least some circumstances inform us of some objective truths, including objective morality.


And yet we would still have no way of knowing a) if those perceptions are true (perceptions often deceive, remember) or b) if those perceptions are objective. You don't seem to have a proper understanding of what entails a "rational" discussion if you think that all views are clearly rational or not. The philosophical tradition is not steeped in the obtaining of "objective truths" but rather humanity's incessant inability to find truths that are objective. Socrates knew nothing save that he didn't know; the skeptics' idea of acatalepsia carried them through life. Plotinus described ideas of "objective rationality" as being Perhaps the furthest from truth one could be. It bears no resemblance to any conception of rationality of Modern philosophers who believed in a dialectic or an interpersonal relationship with rationality, whereby one could not come to conclusions unless his idea had been shared and put to the subjective grinding stone of his peers. And if these objective truths that are known are in fact true, then they are only coincidentally true, for you only propose the idea of epistemic possibility concerning morality, and do not offer any sound epistemic criteria yourself. Are you really expectant of persuading members of this forum, who hold high their ability to analyze, criticize and formulate arguments, solely by saying that you believe it is so? If you are looking to create a compelling argument along these lines, perhaps you should try a forum that will give less consideration to your argument.


It is impossible for us humans to distinguish objectively true statements from subjectively true ones without using intuitive perceptions. There have to be some things we intuitively "see" as true (as the law of noncontradiction) before we get anywhere with our reasoning; the basis of our thinking has to start somewhere (hence the need for intuitive perceptions perceiving those basic truths).

I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful).


And yet everyone seems to have different intuitive perceptions on morality. There goes moral objectivity [wave].



jdrw
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Posted 04/22/08 - 02:49 PM:
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#665
Tisthammerw wrote:
]
I mean be aware that objective moral values exist. That is what I meant by If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God.”


To be aware that something exists objectively is to understand some experience that at the very least would allow us to distinguish its objective existence from its imagined existence, or to distinguish its existence from its non-existence. I do not understand what it is about objective moral values that I can experience that would make me aware that they exist in such a way that I could distinguish their existence from their non-existence. What exactly is it that you are aware of that distinguishes the objective existence from their non-existence? What experience makes you aware of their objective existence as distinguished from their imagined existence?

If we don’t even know how to tell the difference between their existing and their not existing, don’t know how to tell the difference between their objective existence and their imagined existence, then we don’t know what “if objective morals exist” even means, and it therefore is senseless to offer their existence as evidence for anything.


jdrw wrote:

The truth of the theory/explanation known as "Objective Morality" cannot be "intuitively perceived" any more than the truth of any of the other theories can.


What about the law of noncontradiction? Is that not intuitively perceived?


Many ideas are intuitive. Some of them prove to be true, or at least reliable, many of them prove to be false and unreliable. Whether an idea about objective reality is the case or not isn’t a function of the intuitive conviction of a proponent of the idea, it’s a function of the epistemic criteria that the idea can be shown to meet.

The problem is not that an idea is arrived at or held intuitively, the problem is that intuition alone is demonstrably not a very reliable epistemic criterion for a claim about objectively existing entities or phenomena. Intuitive notions pop into our heads with great regularity, but their truth must be earned through meeting epistemic criteria. As an explanation of certain experiences, some people have intuitively arrived at Objective Morality. And some have arrived at Subjective Morality, some have arrived at Moral Skepticism, some have arrived at alien abduction, and some have arrived at Big Brother conspiracies. Any number of theories about any number of issues in any number of subjects, as well as everyday engagement with the world, have been arrived at and embraced intuitively. But these ideas establish their truth--or at least their reliability--according to the epistemic criteria that they can meet or fail to meet, not according to how intuitively certain their proponents are about them. Intuitions sometimes are eventually corroborated by application of rigorous epistemic criteria, but intuitions commonly are flat out wrong.



For many people, the existence of objective morality is more or less self-evident (intuitively perceived, as in "I just know"), perhaps somewhere between the level of logic and the general reliability of sensory perceptions.


Yes, and there are tens of millions of people who find any number of preposterous claims to be “self-evident” and which they “just know” to be true. And many of these claims are contrary to claims that other people insist to be “self-evident” and which they “just know” to be true. A person’s certitude of belief without meeting other epistemic criteria is highly unreliable. Most believers in all the world’s theologies, cults, conspiracy theories, political factions, cultural norms … find their beliefs to be “self-evident” and they “just know” them to be true. Therefore, that someone finds a belief to be “self-evident” and that he “just knows” it to be true is entirely uncompelling reason for anyone else to accept that belief. A compelling argument is one which offers reason to believe, and we have found that the most reliable beliefs are those that meet scrupulously applied epistemic criteria, including rigorous rational analysis and empirical corroboration.


jdrw wrote:

Theories battle it out by meeting or failing to meet independently applied and intersubjectively evaluated epistemic criteria--not by being intuitively perceived to be true.


Problem is, how do you know which criteria to judge a theory by? The only way you can do it is by intuitively perceiving some criteria as rational earmarks of truth.


I have asked you what your epistemic criteria were that provide you with reason to accept your claim. You offered “intuitive perception” which I dispute and show to be highly unreliable.

You note that logic and rationality are required. I agree. And I have shown that a claim that something exists objectively but which claim cannot tell us what conceivable experience we can have to distinguish its existence from its non-existence is vacuous and therefore cannot be used in a rational argument.



I would say that these are false dichotomies (at least, some of them are). I don't think objective morality has its basis in God's commands per se. Rather, I think the connection between God and moral goodness is more elemental. It is true that God’s commands of what we ought to do are morally good, but the reason why they are good is because moral goodness is an inextricable part of God’s nature of who and what he is, to the extent that God cannot exist without objective morality. (Hence one could say that objective morality is grounded in the heart of God; the heart of God says how we ought to behave, because the connection between God and moral goodness is that elemental.)


You are willing to accept a metaphysically unique something that you characterize as “the heart of God” as the sovereign foundation and source of Moral Authority, but you are not willing to accept a metaphysically unique something that is itself the sovereign foundation of Moral Authority.

In both cases the sovereign foundational and source is a hypothetical metaphysical something. In both cases how we ought to behave is prescribed by those hypothetical metaphysical somethings. And you insist that the one hypothetical metaphysical something is just “how we ought to behave” and that it’s therefore circular to say that how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave, How is it that when the the “heart of God” says how we ought to behave, that is not likewise circular? How does its alleged inclusion in a larger hypothetical construct absolve it? Anyway, the non-God hypothetical metaphysical something also is construed as integrated into a larger construct—the universe. Absent God, the highest metaphysical entity is whatever it is that the universe is, including an integrated metaphysical something referred to by non-God Moral Realists as Objective Morality.

To rename the non-God metaphysical something “how we ought to behave” and then create the circular statement “how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave” is a sleight of hand. The point of non-God Moral Realists is that there Really IS some metaphysical something there as the sovereign source of moral authority behind the oughts and ought nots—just as your “heart of God” is represented as some metaphysical something that’s Really there as the moral authority.



If your definition of Objective Morality is "a sovereign metaphysical entity or binding force of some kind that has the supreme authority to say how we ought to behave" without any further specifications as to what this entity is, why can't this entity be God?


My argument is not that it can’t be God, rather my argument disputes your insistence that the only plausible construal is that it is God, and then using that particular construal as evidence of the existence of God.



At first blush he seems to be the most obvious candidate. God after all is the sovereign metaphysical entity (if he exists) so it makes sense that if objective morality has supreme authority behind its statements that it is in some way grounded in the heart of God.


And in a non-God universe, the sovereign metaphysical entity would be whatever it is that’s metaphysically behind the universe. The Objective Morality of Moral Realists is an integral aspect of this sovereign metaphysical entity, just as the “heart of God” is an integral aspect of God.

The metaphysical something called Objective Morality is no more implausible as an integrated aspect of a non-God universe than it is as an integrated aspect of God.


Cheers.
jd

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Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/22/08 - 02:50 PM:
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#666
For the sake of inquiry, let us suppose that an objective morality exists. And let us suppose that human beings have access to it through the sentiments, that is, through feelings of sympathy for one another. For it seems that every human, regardless of time period, birth status or biological differences - all of us have some spark of sympathy for one another. This may be so slight that it almost does not exist, yet in every human being, on some level, it is there.

Imagine a hardened member of the Italian Mofia. Imagine that he kills and steals and feels no remorse for his actions; he is willing to do whatever it takes to achieve his ends and he does not care if he harms others in the process. Now say we sat this man down and had him watch a video of Italy's children suffering, of their women being beaten and their homeland pillaged. Certainly this man would feel sympathy for those individuals and declare these actions wrong. Even the worst of people in society can feel this sympathy for one another.

Now you say this example merely shows cultural relitivism - that he only feels this way because the injustice is being done to his people. This man would not feel for others experiencing the same thing and thus he has no genuine "human sympathy."

But let us keep in mind that he is regarded among the worst of people and so perhaps his state of character only allows for that amount of sympathy. Someone of greater character, Mother Teresa for example, may have the capacity to feel for all people. Although there are differences between these two, the difference is a matter of degree; it is not an absolute difference.

The more one can take on a neutral, objective mindset in life and see humans as equals, the better that person can grasp morality.

Now you ask: "How do we know that is the basis for morality?" The purpose of morality, according to the foregoing theory, is to promote those basic things desired by all: safety, comfort, peace, etc. Now when one allows oneself to enter a state of sympathy for her fellow human, she is more inclined to act in accordance with this purpose; we determine her actions good and right, and the opposite actions their contrary.

It is thus a state of sympathy that gives us knowledge of moral truths.

I agree this is imperfect. But I beg you to be charitable and acknowledge its merits; for the moment, put aside your criticisms. If this is true, if all people, through their sentiments, have access to an objective morality, does it serve as proof for the existence of God?
TMB
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Posted 04/22/08 - 04:21 PM:
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#667
Johhanes, you appear to be avoiding direct questions when it does not suit your position. However let me answer yours and see where it takes us.

You said,

What data stacks up against it? The fact that cultures have different moral systems? This neither proves nor disproves MR. It is - as you say - merely a piece of data. Yet it is this argument that you keep bring against MO.


In terms of how we assess relative morality, the existence of different cultures who all hold up ther own moral values to be objective, is exactly the data that does show that relative morality exists and is what we practice. While this is not evidence that objective morality does NOT exist, it is evidence that relative moral systems DO exist. You ask "merely a piece of data". Data is the basis by which we ascertain reality. I am not suggesting its the perfect way, however we do not even have this data to support objective morality, all you can offer is subjective perspectives. And this is how you have done it.

The argument is that moral truths are clear and apparent given the right state of mind.


This is convenient. Are you suggesting that you have right state of mind to provide us with this moral compass? How is it that there are so many people who argue that they are blessed with this facility. Are these not the false prophets religious scriptures warn us about? I accept that this is how people do judge morality, and noone seems to accept that they have the wrong state of mind to do this. All people propose they have the right (whatever right is) state of mind. This is why relative moral systems exists, because people base it on their intuition.

That may not be inherently logical, but it is certainly evidentiary;


Actually it is logical. It makes perfect logical sense for a person to trust their own perceptions. If you cannot do this, the fallout from cognitive dissonance is unmanageable. And you are saying that it is evidence, so we back with the Hilter paradigm once again. If he saw his principles and actions as morally right, based upon his perceptions, then he has the evidence to support it. Ah, but I forgot, only chosen peoplpe with the 'right' state of mind can make claim to this. 'Hail all' to Johhanes, but not to Hitler, yet Hitler did have many blind followers. Perhaps Mugabe is a better example?

therefore, it can serve as a premise for what we can rationally discuss, namely, whether the existence of MO can serve as a proof for God's existence.


So you have arrived back at this point. After scientific rigour, second to none, tested and repeatable evidence, you present us with this self evident truth. Welcome to the world of, "I know it to be so, therefore it must be so". I hope your followers buy the postcards.

I repeat my question from previous post.





Your approach is quite understandable and characterises much of human behavior (and is perhaps even desirable for cohesive social groups), however it plays no useful role in rational discourse.

Can you tell me how I can then justify having such a dialogue with you?


Your position is faith based, and not one subject to rational discourse. I have no issue with faith based positions, all of my beliefs are grounded this way, and I live my life by them. But here on a philosophy forum, we are trying to establish reality through rational discourse, and that is what we should try and do. Your discussion belongs on a faith based forum where reason is not a requirement
Makarismos
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Posted 04/22/08 - 04:32 PM:
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#668
I first congratulate you for the number (post number #666!) and topic of your last post - absolute poetry! Now as to what was said:-
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:
For the sake of inquiry, let us suppose that an objective morality exists. And let us suppose that human beings have access to it through the sentiments, that is, through feelings of sympathy for one another.

Excellent thought, and a worthy one which I am sure, if it were universal, would lead to the first great and bountiful human empire.

Their are two problems:-

1) It is not a universal sentiment.

2) If it were, It still does not prove the existence of god.

1) follows because of good intentions and deceit. First good intentions: If humans act as humans do, then there will always be the princes. They will see the starving children and say "No more, I shall not tolerate these children to starve!". To prevent this starving they will gather an army, they will fight wars, they will poison and maim and kill, and at the end they will see on the battlefield the tiny forms of starving children, orphaned by their own actions.

Deceit will take care of the rest of these good intentions. For every man who is morally pure, perfect, we must assume (at least today) that many men will be liars and cheats. If an honest, giving, generous man lives his life in a world full of cheats - how long will he last? Given that all his fellows lie and cheat, some will attempt to appear as he is, and dupe him of his money. Some will take his possessions while he is not looking. Some will lie to his wife, and pretend it is they who are honest - and so he will be alone. Others will simply march on his land with clubs, steal, and guns, and forcibly take all that is his. Because he is kind, peaceful, generous, and honest, he will be powerless to defend himself against these cheats.

2) If in the stillness of our hearts we realise that all is love, and all ultimately want the same, what does this prove? Sure it is an optimistic outlook upon life, it is one which is healthy. It would no doubt be a sentiment which would help human kind a great deal: but why is this proof for god?

What do you mean by god? If god is merely the feeling of love toward your fellow man, then perhaps you have proven this much - but generally god means something different than a simple feeling of love. This love is not a mind in any sense, after all, and would not have existed before mankind. This love is not magical, and cannot create life where there is none. This love is good, but it does not seem to be god.

How then, do you get from sympathy amongst humans, to god? If you want to prove anything, you are going to have to put some more work in.

Cheers
Buddahchuck
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Posted 04/22/08 - 04:42 PM:
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#669
Another one?

Johhanes wrote:

For the sake of inquiry


And yet I see no inquiry being undertaken.


let us suppose that an objective mora