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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 04/13/08 - 02:05 PM:
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#626
Buddahchuck wrote:


With the exception of God is the "universe/reality/existence" (which was simply the definition of pantheism, not a claim I actually hold on to) I do not hold the views you ascribed to me. I of course claim God is the metaphysical foundation for objective morality, but I did not say that God is objective morality.


Pretty much, this is what you are saying, whether you agree with me or not. It seems your argument is that God cannot exist without objective morality. And the final result of your argument is the claim that objective morality cannot exist without God.


Again, you have misunderstood me. It is true I believe that God cannot exist without objective morality, but my argument is that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God.


Note that I said "....leads one to a conclusion" NOT "....leads to one conclusion".


My apologies, I appear to have misread the statement.




Your argument might be relevant if I were claiming that objective moral values constituted evidence for the existence of God. But I am not arguing that. I am saying if objective moral values existed they would constitute evidence for the existence of God.


And my argument is still relevant because I am saying the objective morality NEEDS to fit a certain epistemic criteria to constitute evidence. Even if objective morality existed, we would need a way to know that it exists in order for it to constitute "evidence". So my argument applies, and as I said before you assertion of conditionals doesn't work against this argument.


So what is your argument exactly? That if objective moral values existed there'd be no way to know they existed and therefore no way they could be used as evidence?

In that case we could modify my core claim slightly, "If objective moral values were known to exist, they would constitute evidence for the existence of God."




(2) What do you mean by "have knowledge of Objective Morality"? Do you mean we have to know that objective morality exists? That we have to know some moral truths? That we have to know all of them?


No, i mean that it needs to be demonstrated that it is possible to know objective morality.


If the answer to all three of my questions above is no, then I don't know what you mean by "know objective morality." What do you mean by this statement?




I propose that it’s through the same (yet imperfect) way objective rationality reveals itself to us: intuitive perceptions.


Objective rationality is an oxymoron to me.


It is? Are not mathematical truths and proofs objectively rational?



And now we can reject ethical objectivism because it is epistemically impossible.


What do you mean by epistemically impossible? Do you mean it is impossible to know it? If so, why is it epistemically impossible? If we reject all intuitive perceptions, then on what grounds are we to believe anything? Including the belief that ethical objectivism is epistemically impossible?

I will concede this much though: if knowledge of objective rationality is impossible (the existence of objective rationality itself, not just some of its truths) then so is knowledge of objective morality (as far as I can tell anyway).

Edited by Tisthammerw on 04/13/08 - 02:09 PM

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Makarismos
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Posted 04/13/08 - 04:12 PM:
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#627
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:
An objective morality must exist. I will argue for this from the impossibility of subjectivism and cultural relativism.

Argument for Subjectivism:
...
3. Therefore, there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply to all people everywhere and at all times.

Problems:

4. If 3, then a person is only do if she breaks her own moral code. Yet if hypocrisy is not one of her moral principles, then she cannot do wrong.

I will take it that you meant that, If 3 is true, then a person is only morally wrong if she broke her own moral code, unless part of her code included the maxim "hypocrisy is ok" (though doubtless it would be phrased differently).

If that was what you meant, then I accept what you say here wink. In her eyes she can do no wrong. In my eyes however, she might well do much which is wrong.

5. If 3, then Adolf Hitler would be morally better than Mother Teresa. For Hitler certainly lives up to his own moral standard; Mother Teresa, on the other hand, admittedly breaks her moral code now and then; therefore, if 3 is true, we must regard Hitler as morally better than Mother Teresa.

You make an error here. Because you are talking about subjectivism you cannot say that "Hitler is better" or that "mother Teresa is worse" without quantifying from whose perspective they are better/worse. In the statement "Hitler is better" you imply that Hitler is objectively better, and yet you assumed a moral objective possibility to postulate this claim. To phrase it correctly you would have to write:-

If 3, then Adolph Hitler would (consider himself to be) morally better then mother Teresa. For Hitler certainly lives up to his own moral standard; mother Teresa, on the other hand, admittedly breaks her moral code now and then. Therefore if 3 is true Hitler (would regard himself) as better than mother Teresa.

You can now see that what Hitler thought of himself is simply what he thought: I might think that Hitler was a bad person regardless of what he thinks. I might even thing that accepting ones own moral flaws is a Nobel and honourable thing in itself, and that this was one thing which made mother Teresa a better person than Hitler. Despite this, I have no access to any kind of objective morality, I am a subjective being. Do you think that Mother Teresa would have considered herself to be worse than Hitler, and do you think that that made her worse?

6. If 3, then one person cannot criticize another for being unfair, for fairness might not be one of the other’s principles.

This is mistaken: One person can criticise another as much as they want - what they cannot do is claim to be objectively correct in their criticism. It is perfectly consistent for me to say that you are wrong to beat your partner, for all I would be doing is expressing my own view of what I believe to be an incorrect action.

Argument for Cultural Relativism
...9. Therefore, there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply to all people everywhere and at all times.

Problems:

10. If 9, then one culture can never object to the morality of another culture, in which case the genocides in Darfur, Rowanda and Germany cannot be considered Evil.

Again you are mistaken. One culture may decide that a different cultures behaviour is intolerable - they may not, however, logically make the claim that another cultures behaviour is objectively incorrect. Further one society may hold up another societies values as proof when discussing their claim - It is not the case that Germans consider genocide to be a moral act, or Rowandans, or the Sudanese for that matter. We may consistently judge others by our own values, and use our knowledge of their values to show them how they ere.

11. If 9, then Hitler, because his culture is behind him, is morally better than Martin Luther King Jr, Ghandi and Jesus, who acted in opposition to their culture’s morality.

12. There are not clear boundaries that distinguish what constitutes a ‘culture.”


You notice how these two points contradict themselves. Martin Luther King was a part of his African American culture, Jesus was a part of his Jewish culture - both had backing from these cultures. Also Hitler’s actions regarding the Jewish people’s extermination were not so widely known to his own countrymen. I would say that 11 is implausible because of these considerations.

On the one hand – from the side of society at large – civil disobidience will be morally wrong so long as the culture agrees with the law in question. On the other hand – to those who belong to the relevant subculture that doesn’t recognize the particular law in question – disobidience will be morally mandated. Why should the Ku Klux Klan follow the laws? In their culture, whites are superior, and therefore, it’s not morally wrong to torture blacks. A person can justify anything as long as he or she joins some sub-culture that supports it.

The following proof can therefore be given for the existence of God:

1. An objective morality exists.
2. The best explanation for this morality is the existence of an intelligent God.
3. Therefore, an intelligent God exists.

I will respond to any objections people have for Premise 2. I think this is where the real question lies.


First, what reasoning do you use to reach 2? Why does positing an intelligent god help to explain Objective Morality?

Second, as I have said to Tist: What if Objective Morality commanded Hitler to kill six million Jews? As you admit, you do not know how to find Objective Morality(OM), you must by necessity admit that you do not know what it commands: Therefore you must admit that is a possibility that OM commanded the holocaust. If it is possible that OM commanded the holocaust, then it is possible that it was justified morally - so long as we accept the possibility of OM without showing how to find it.

I don’t like this possibility, and I therefore reject Objective Morality. For the sake of argument I will still discuss it, but that still leaves you with my first problem wink

Cheers


Edited by Makarismos on 04/13/08 - 05:27 PM
Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/13/08 - 04:43 PM:
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#628
Well, I am glad you thought one of my arguments worked.

You say: "I might think that Hitler was a bad person regardless of what he thinks. I might even thing that accepting ones own moral flaws is a Nobel and honourable thing in itself, and that this was one thing which made mother Teresa a better person than Hitler. Despite this, I have no access to any kind of objective morality, I am a subjective being. Do you think that Mother Teresa would have considered herself to be worse than Hitler, and do you think that that made her worse?"

If I am going to be a consistent subjectivist, then I cannot hold others up to my own moral standards. I cannot say that Hitler is morally evil and Mother Teresa good. Because of my subjectivism, I have to maintain that Hitler is morally better -- yes, morally better to himself -- but that is the only standard there is. We simply cannot give one another moral appraisal.

You say: It is perfectly consistent for me to say that you are wrong to beat your partner, for all I would be doing is expressing my own view of what I believe to be an incorrect action.

I understand what you mean. But I argue that, for a subjectivist to be consistent, she must realize her moral claims have no bearing on another person. In order to judge others according to her moral standards, she would have to believe those standards are objective one, which she cannot do as a subjectivist.

The same can be said about cultures judging one another.

I think you're correct in your argument against 11. Another also made a similair claim: victory you both! Although mind you, the Jewish culture did not support Jesus.

In terms of your first question about the proof, I have no reasoning to support 2. I wanted to open up that discussion, which apparently has been going on for awhile. I need to catch up.

Another says: "That subjectivism and relativism may entail something counterintuitive does not mean they are impossible. Relativity is counterintuitive, and so is traditional Christian theism (at least to me)."

Due to the nature of ethics, we cannot expect a perfect answer; we must use be content with a rough outline of moral principles. We therefore are limited in our ability to use reason to find these principles, which means we must grasp them intuitively; therefore, if the principles we discover are counterintuitive, it stands to reason that they are incorrect.


This philosopher also says: "You have ignored moral nihilism, which is another contender against moral realism."

I did not argue against it because I hold that an argument cannot be made for it. Please show me I'm wrong.


Thanks for the responses

Edited by Johhanes de Silentio on 04/18/08 - 07:28 PM
Makarismos
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Posted 04/13/08 - 05:33 PM:
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#629
Tisthammerw wrote:
What do you mean by epistemically impossible? Do you mean it is impossible to know it? If so, why is it epistemically impossible? If we reject all intuitive perceptions, then on what grounds are we to believe anything? Including the belief that ethical objectivism is epistemically impossible?

Tist, I think you mistake what is at issue.

We do not need to question everything which in intuitively perceived, in order to question Objective Morality.

Objective Morality, if it exists, must by definition be external to us.
Makarismos
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Posted 04/13/08 - 05:37 PM:
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#630
Johhanes de Silentio , in a way you have a point. The ethical relativist/subjectivist cannot claim that an action is objectively wrong. They can claim that they and their culture think it is wrong though. They can even point out that the other person’s moral code, or cultural laws/norms make the action immoral by their own standards. This was my point.

Obviously they do not claim any of this is objective, because they do not believe that such objective morality exists, or that it can be known even if it does exist.
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Posted 04/14/08 - 09:00 AM:
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#631
Tisthammerw wrote:

So your objection is that you don't understand what it means for moral values to be objective? I've tried explaining this to you repeatedly (e.g. post #614). If you still don't understand what the phrase “objective moral values” mean I'm not sure I can help you.


While indeed I have repeatedly admitted that I do not understand what the phrase "objective moral values" means, I do not think the problem is idiosyncratically mine. I think the problem is that the phrase is a language construction that does not actually refer to anything, it’s just words strung together.

If whatever it is that you claim the phrase refers to not only "exists" but exists "objectively" apart from human beings, I wonder why you cannot simply tell us how we can differentiate it out from everything else out there apart from us, why you cannot simply tell us how we could determine what counts for and what counts against it being the case, why you cannot simply tall us what the objective feature of reality is that you identify as "objective moral values."




jdrw wrote:
Do you not see that the referent is the issue in the circularity? Whatever it is that you imagine the metaphor “the heart of God” to refer to is what you are positing as the source of moral authority. This is merely a different hypothetical metaphysical entity than whatever metaphysical entity it is that non-God Objective Morality imagines it is referring to.


Well, I suppose. But “morality says how we ought to behave” is actually just “how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave,” so this particular explanation does not provide any metaphysical entity at all and provides no real foundation for morality.


But your argument grants that Objective Morality really exists, which means that you grant that it is a really existing entity with real moral authority.

Yes, the entity that is by definition the source of morality says how we ought to behave. That’s what it means to be the source of morality. To claim that something exists and is the source of morality is to claim that that something is what says how we ought to behave. Positing some metaphysical something referred to as "Objective Morality" is such a something, and positing some metaphysical something referred to as the "heart of God" is such a something. Calling a hypothetical metaphysical something the "heart of God" instead of just plain Objective Morality doesn’t change the issue of the source of morality being self-referentially "how we ought to behave." In both cases the how-we-ought-to-behave metaphysical thingy is what says how we ought to behave. Whether this hypothetical metaphysical thingy is a depersonalized independently existing thingy or is personalized as an aspect of some hypothetical being is irrelevant to the foundational self-reference.

You seem to believe that a source of morality endorsed by or inherently an aspect of an intentional consciousness is well-founded and plausible, whereas a source of morality that exists in and of itself independently of such an intentional consciousness is an implausible, circular notion. But in both cases the moral buck stops with the proposed metaphysical thingy, and in both cases the moral authority is claimed to reside in that thingy.

The non-God thingy has Mackie’s problem of metaphysical queerness, and the God thingy adds the Eurythro problem. Both have the problem of unintelligible vagueness about what exactly the thingy is and of how exactly and in what sense it exercises its universal bindingness on human beings.)




The heart of God being the source of moral authority does follow from the definition of who and what God is, but how is this circular? We are after all at least referring to a metaphysical entity here, whereas “how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave” does not.


But Objective Morality is proposed by non-God Moral Realists as a really existing metaphysical entity, too. The "heart of God" is your metaphor for the source of authority about how we ought to behave. The "heart of God" says how we ought to behave. The "heart of God" is how we ought to behave. So, how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave.

Again, I note that the difference between Objective Morality as a metaphysical entity in and of itself and "the heart of God" is the intentional consciousness, which seems to make all the difference to you. But both are foundational assertions of authority, and if one is circular, so is the other. The addition of intentional consciousness does not change that.

Additionally, it is downright mind-boggling to me that you characterize whatever it is that you imagine to be referred to by "the heart of God" as "objective."



If God being the source of moral authority does logically following from the definition of who and what God is constitutes circularity, are all mathematical proofs circular? (After all, they all follow from the definitions of the terms involved.)


The circularity of your claim resides in the self-reference of the authority. The heart of God is the true authority behind moral statements because the heart of God is the source of true moral authority.



jdrw wrote:
If Objective Morality exists, then that Objective Morality would include moral authority, otherwise it’s not Objective Morality. Whatever do you mean by allowing that Objective Morality exists unless you mean that it has moral authority? To grant that Objective Morality exists is to grant that it has moral authority.


I agree. The question is, how? What is the transcendent source of authority behind morality's statements? Who or what say show we ought to behave? What is the metaphysical basis of objective morality?


As I have repeatedly said, I do not know the answers to these questions. I do not think there is an intelligible answer to these questions. It seems to me that unless these questions can be answered, the claim of an existing Objective Morality is not only implausible, but senseless. However … the point I have made several times now is that unless you can answer those questions, your own claim that "Objective Morality exists" doesn’t make any sense. What do you understand your own claim that Objective Morality exists to mean if you don’t understand how such a notion could plausibly have moral authority? What do you understand your own claim to mean if you think it is pointlessly circular?



There are a number of prospects (note that the list is not necessarily exhaustive):

1) Nothing says how we ought to behave
2) The universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave
3) Morality says how we ought to behave
4) God (or the heart of God) says how we ought to behave

(1) ends up being tantamount to denying the existence of morality, (2) leads to pantheism, and (3) ends up being circular.

I do not agree that 2 leads to pantheism, and I find 4 to be exactly as self-referencing as 3.

By the way, the obvious omission is the position that the evolved norms of the group say how we ought to behave.



But objective morality isn't an "entity," morality is statements and principles of how we ought to behave. I find “morality says how we ought to behave” an implausible metaphysical foundation because it is circular (“how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave”) and provides no real foundation.


Huh?

Objective Morality is not an entity, but "the heart of God" is an entity? Objective Morality is merely statements and principles? They do not refer to anything? Those statements do not refer to something that "exists" in some "objective" sense? Then whatever do you mean when you assret that Objective Morality exists?

You have remarked several times about what Objective Morality is not. Now you claim it’s not even an "entity." (I cannot help but think of Mackie’s "queerness.")

I, for one, cannot imagine anything less "objective" han whatever you imagine to be captured by the metaphor "the heart of God."

You’ve claimed that "objective" means independent of human opinion. To insist that something exists in objective reality apart from human beings is meaningful to human beings only if we can interact with it in some way and differentiate it out from all the rest of reality in some way. So how is it that we can realize that we are interacting with this really existing objective morality, and how do we differentiate it out from all the rest of reality in such a way that we know it exists in objective reality rather than being just another speculative metaphysical notion? How exatly do we connect with the true Objective Morality oughts and ought nots and distinguish them from mere human opinions about oughts and ought nots?




But perhaps it's high time for me to offer some additional justification as to why this type of circularity (“morality says how we ought to behave” or in other words “The statements that say how we ought to behave say how we ought to behave”) is so troublesome here.


Why are you characterizing Objective Morality as mere "statements" when it is clear that is it postulated by its supporters as some sort of transcendent metaphysical entity to which moral statements refer?


Your argument, as I understand it, is that an independently existing moral authority just sitting out there in metaphysics-ville is logically circular, and therefore the only plausible source of such authority would be "the heart of God," which is not logically circular because you’ve defined God to be the "ultimate metaphysical reality."

So moral authority proceeding from a metaphysical reality that is defined as the ultimate moral authority sitting there in and of itself is logically circular and therefore implausible, and is trumped by moral authority that proceeds from the "heart" of ultimate metaphysical reality, which is plausible and not logically circular.

It seems to me that your whole argument hangs on intentional consciousness (the "heart.") As you see it, morality without intentional consciousness is an entirely implausible, logically circular notion. So if Morality exists, it muct proceed from an intentional consciousness. And if this Morality is universal and transcendent, then it must procede from a universal and transcendent consciousness—a.k.a. God.


Thus, you have accepted the existence of a universal, transcendent, absolute Morality that exists independently of human opinion, but only one that proceeds from an intentional consciousness, not one that is its own species of metaphysical entity, not one that is understood to be a thing unto itself, not what is meant by "Objective Morality" to Moral Realists who are not also theists.

You have not actually accepted the idea or existence of Objective Morality in any sense other than a morality that proceeds from an intentional consciousness. So when you assert that Objective Morality exists, what you really mean is not that something exists independently as a species of metaphysical entity, a thing unto itself—what you really mean is that something exists that proceeds from a universal transcendent consciousness, and of course this most plausibly means … ta-da! God!

So you’ve been arguing that if a universal, transcendent, absolute Morality exists it can only plausibly be that it proceeds from a universal, transcendent, absolute, intentional consciousness, and therefore counts as evidence of a universal, transcendent, absolute, intentional consciousness.



We could of course say that set S is different because set S by definition has the “correct” statements (if moral values exist); i.e. the moral values of set S actually exist and morality is the one whose statements are based in reality. But if this is the crucially distinguishing feature, then this is just the same thing as saying that the basis for moral values existing is reality/existence itself. “Reality/existence says how we ought to behave.” This is a subtle but important point. It leads to my claim of the only plausible alternative being “the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave” being the only plausible alternative as a metaphysical foundation for objective morality.


Um, yes, this is more or less what I understand non-God Moral Realists to be claiming—there are objective moral facts that are Real aspects of Reality analogous to the speed of light and gravity.

Why are you characterizing Objective Morality as mere "statements" when it is clear that is it postulated by its supporters as some sort of really existing transcendent metaphysical entity to which moral statements refer? They call their hypothetical metaphysical entity "Objective Morality" and you call your hypothetical metaphysical entity "the heart of God."


Cheers.
jd

Edited by jdrw on 04/14/08 - 09:05 AM

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Buddahchuck
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Posted 04/14/08 - 04:08 PM:
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#632

Again, you have misunderstood me. It is true I believe that God cannot exist without objective morality, but my argument is that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God.


I don't think I have misunderstood you. I am very clear that you are trying to prove that "objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God". But this argument doesn't exist in a vacuum. In order for objective moral values to be evidence of God, there are quite a few assumptions that are being made to justify this statement. By attacking these assumptions, I am not misunderstanding your argument; I am elucidating the absurdity of these claims. Objective morality comes from "the heart of God"? As ambiguous a claim as this is, it still reveals your reluctance to distinguish between Objective Morality, Existence, and the heart of God. Seeing as how this is very central to the argument you are presenting, I think it a relevant factor to mention for everyone's benefit, not just yours.


So what is your argument exactly? That if objective moral values existed there'd be no way to know they existed and therefore no way they could be used as evidence?


Not exactly. Objective moral values (existing or no), need to be demonstrated as the type of thing known to be objective by subjective entities like humans. As you have so eloquently pointed out, the main way humans "know" things is through "intuitive perceptions". It is these precise intuitive perceptions that define our humanity as well as our subjectivity. So humans being very subjective entities, capable of knowing only through the vessel of a subject, are incapable of knowing of something so vague as for it to be considered Objective. Even if we all have morality, you have not shown that all this morality is comprehensible as Objective Morality, and because it is impossible for humans, a subjective entity, to know Morality in any way other than a subjective one, we lack the epistemic materials to know Objective Morality in order for it to be evidence of anything.


In that case we could modify my core claim slightly, "If objective moral values were known to exist, they would constitute evidence for the existence of God."


Okay. And then you can accept my claim "If objective moral values were known not to exist, then such knowledge would constitute evidence that God does not exist."

After all, Objective Moral values are the "heart of God" and if God has no "heart", then it is not much of a God.


If the answer to all three of my questions above is no, then I don't know what you mean by "know objective morality." What do you mean by this statement?


....that the morality "known" would need to be "known" as objective.


It is? Are not mathematical truths and proofs objectively rational?


You do like to bring up loaded questions, don't you. The type of "rational" dealt with by things like mathematics and logic are only rational in the sense that they represent valid arguments, not necessarily true arguments. For the argument to be true, it requires soundness, and in that sense, logic is not necessarily rational.

Yet you keep referring to mathematics as if the "truth" found there is the same sort of truth that is applied in logical arguments. Absent a lengthy discussion concerning philosophy of mathematics, nominalism and the distinction between quantity and quality, the rational understanding of qualities is distinct from the rational understanding of qualities, and morality (unless you can somehow persuade the acceptance of the contrary) is very definitely a quality. So anything that might lead us to accept that mathematical rationality is "objective" would be inapplicable in a discussion about morality.

Certainly you aren't claiming that the Objective Morality exists in the same way as the number 1.


What do you mean by epistemically impossible? Do you mean it is impossible to know it? If so, why is it epistemically impossible? If we reject all intuitive perceptions, then on what grounds are we to believe anything? Including the belief that ethical objectivism is epistemically impossible?

I will concede this much though: if knowledge of objective rationality is impossible (the existence of objective rationality itself, not just some of its truths) then so is knowledge of objective morality (as far as I can tell anyway).


Makarismos got to the point: the issue is objectivity. I am more than willing to accept intuitive perceptions, I do every day. But I am very unwilling to accept that those intuitive perceptions are objective. As this is the case, I am even willing to accept that "ethical objectivism is epistemologically impossible" is a subjective claim, as it is based on my "intuitive perceptions".

However, there is a very key point in all this that I believe you NEED to address, and I have a way for you to do it that will be helpful to everyone in this debate. If we "know" Objective Morality through "intuitive perceptions", how do we "know" Subjective Morality? In other words, how do you envision the distinction between "intuitive perceptions" that lead to a subjective conclusion and "intuitive perceptions" that lead to an objective one?

Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/15/08 - 06:33 AM:
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#633
Perhaps there is no absolute difference between objectivity and subjectivity, but rather, the difference is a matter of degree. And we would know an intuition to be closer to the objective standard if it were more in line with some criterion.

What would such criterion be?

Let us assume that all people have some basic desires: for security, health, freedom, etc.; and therefore, a moral system is better than another if it better facilitates the fulfillment of these desires.

Perhaps the following could serve as a criterion

1. to keep society from falling apart
2. to ameliorate human suffering
3. to promote human flourishing
4. to resolve conflicts of interest in just ways
5. to assign moral praise and blame

I realize that some terms, such as "flourishing" and "just" are subjective by nature; however, I hold that ethics is not black-and-white , and thus, this criterion is as good as we can do.

What do you all think?
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Posted 04/15/08 - 01:26 PM:
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#634
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:
Perhaps there is no absolute difference between objectivity and subjectivity, but rather, the difference is a matter of degree. And we would know an intuition to be closer to the objective standard if it were more in line with some criterion.

What would such criterion be?

Let us assume that all people have some basic desires: for security, health, freedom, etc.; and therefore, a moral system is better than another if it better facilitates the fulfillment of these desires.

Perhaps the following could serve as a criterion

1. to keep society from falling apart
2. to ameliorate human suffering
3. to promote human flourishing
4. to resolve conflicts of interest in just ways
5. to assign moral praise and blame

I realize that some terms, such as "flourishing" and "just" are subjective by nature; however, I hold that ethics is not black-and-white , and thus, this criterion is as good as we can do.

What do you all think?


Interesting idea! And you can find it in Kabbalistic books. They recommend next criterion: Some of principles of the Future Society
1. Communism is an ideal, meaning it is moral. The goal “to work according to one’s ability and receive according to one’s needs” testifies to that.

2. Every moral must have a basis that necessitates it; education and public opinion are a very unsound basis, and the proof of that is Hitler.

3. Because any concept of the majority is sure to triumph, it is needless to say that the carrying out of the corrected communism is by the majority of the public. Thus, they must establish the moral level of the majority of the public on a basis that will necessitate and guarantee that the corrected communism will never be corrupted. The preordained ideal in humans is insufficient, as too few posses it, and they are insignificant compared to the majority of the public...
6. It is forbidden to nationalize the property before the public reaches this moral level. The collective will not have fuel for work before there is a reliable moral factor in the public.
7. If one is forbidden to exploit one’s friends, why should a nation be allowed to exploit its fellow nations? Which occupancy justifies one nation enjoying the land more than other nations? Therefore, international communism must be founded.
8. The entire world is one family. The framework of communism according should ultimately encircle the entire world in an equal standard of living to everybody. However, the actual process is a gradual one. Each nation whose majority accepts these basic elements practically, and who have already been brought up to bestow upon their fellow person and will have a sound cause for fuel, may enter the framework of the international communism right away...
10. The laws of the collective, equal for all, religion are as follows:

A. One should work for the well-being of people as much as one can and even more if needed, until there is not a single hungry or thirsty person in the entire world.

B. One may be diligent, but no person shall enjoy the society more than the backward. There will be an equal living standard for all souls.

C. Though there is religion, tokens of due honors should be imparted according to the religion; the greater benefit one contributes to society, the higher decoration one shall receive.

D. Refraining from working diligently to benefit society will induce punishment according to the laws of society.

E. Each and every one is committed to the labor of raising ever higher the living standard of the world society, so all the people in the world will enjoy their lives and will feel more and more happiness.

F. The same applies for spirituality, though not everyone is obligated to engage in spirituality but only special people, depending on the needs.

G. There will be a sort of high-court. Those who will want to dedicate their labor for spiritual life will to be permitted to do so by this court...
11. The world must not be corrected in religious matters before the economic correction is guaranteed for the entire world...

How do you like it?
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Gabriel Pinto
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Posted 04/15/08 - 02:23 PM:
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#635
Benedict wrote:
In my opinion one of the most convincing arguments for God is that of the existence of moral law. When a small child is ditched in line he somehow knows that "that's not fair!" Why is that? The answer is best given in the reality of the absolute moral law. If a common moral law exists then that necessitates a Moral Law Giver,God.
One looks at the Holocaust and concludes that the Germans' actions were "atrocious" and "evil". This might beg the question "Why is killing evil?". The question is best answered by assuming something was able to write this law on our hearts with intentions to leading us to an even greater moral perfection. Once again that something is God.

The Argument is best summed up in the following:
1.There is a universal moral law
2.Such a moral law would imply a Law Giver
3.Thus, God exists as the Law Giver

There is still the question of evil. If there is such a law then why aren't murders and rapists bound by it? The answer is that they are or at least they were. People aren't born killers. People make decisions that lead to habits that lead to lifestyles.
I once saw an interview with Jeffrey Dahmer while he was in prison. The interviewer asked him to describe how he came to do the monstrous things he did. Jeffrey answered by saying that he basically had to battle his conscience to commit that first rape and murder. After that it became less of a moral issue each time he did it. However, after the fact Dahmer went on to say he became aware of the atrocity of his actions through contemplation of his acts well after he committed them. In essence, even if one is able to shrug off his conscience for a few moments it still comes back to haunt him once he's had time to think about it.
On the other end of the spectrum, we see moral law coming to perfection in the lives of saints and the like. They have demonstrated that when we follow our conscience it ultimately leads to the Almighty and then to moral perfection in God. This manifests itself in acts of extreme self-sacrifice and selflessness in order to help others with no ulterior motives whatsoever.


You can't get to the conclusion that killing is wrong by yourself? If a kid grows in the wild all his life, then gets to the civilization, if he kills, he'll react just like an animal. The thing is that you know death, and grow with fear of it, when you kill, you gave death to the other person, and you feel like "Wow, I gave him what I most fear, I bet he feared it too, and wanted to live". I didn't need God to get to this conclusion
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Posted 04/15/08 - 04:55 PM:
quote post
#636
jdrw wrote:

The circularity of your claim resides in the self-reference of the authority. The heart of God is the true authority behind moral statements because the heart of God is the source of true moral authority.


That's not quite my thinking behind it. There is no higher authority than God (by definition of who and what God is). If the statements of objective morality possess supreme authority, it follows (if God exists) that objective morality somehow has its metaphysical basis in God.


By the way, the obvious omission is the position that the evolved norms of the group say how we ought to behave.


How is this an obvious omission to the list of explanations in explaining the existence of objective moral values? If morality is simply the evolved norms of the group say how we ought to behave, wouldn't this be something like cultural relativism instead?


But objective morality isn't an "entity," morality is statements and principles of how we ought to behave. I find “morality says how we ought to behave” an implausible metaphysical foundation because it is circular (“how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave”) and provides no real foundation.


Huh?

Objective Morality is not an entity, but "the heart of God" is an entity? Objective Morality is merely statements and principles? They do not refer to anything? Those statements do not refer to something that "exists" in some "objective" sense? Then whatever do you mean when you assret that Objective Morality exists?


Perhaps it's best to explain the logic of my definition, citing the a reputable dictionary to adduce that my definition is not exactly unorthodox. I mean "morality" in the sense of "a doctrine or system of moral conduct" (using Merriam-Webster's dictionary definition 2a) and I define "moral" using Merriam-Webster's dictionary definition 1a, "of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior."

What I mean by "objective morality exists" is that there exists a doctrine of principles regarding how we ought to behave that is objectively right/true/correct.

As far as the basis of these principles goes, this is precisely the question at hand. What is the foundation for these statements and principles? Who or what says how we ought to behave?


Why are you characterizing Objective Morality as mere "statements" when it is clear that is it postulated by its supporters as some sort of transcendent metaphysical entity to which moral statements refer?


Oh? And what entity is this? I've been an ethical objectivist for quite some time without believing this (even when I disbelieved that God was the basis of objective morality). It is not at all clear to me that what you say is true. To see why, let's step outside whatever definition you are using for the moment and use my definition of "objective morality." Who or what says how we ought to behave? What is this transcendent metaphysical entity exactly (let's call it entity X) that says how we ought to behave? Is it completely unidentified? Or can the meaning of your definition of objective morality provide a clear and coherent answer to this question?

Probably the best way to answer this when defining objective morality is to just not comment on the answer. That is, it's better (when constructing a definition of objective morality) to mention that these statements and principles exist but not identify the entity that says them.


We could of course say that set S is different because set S by definition has the “correct” statements (if moral values exist); i.e. the moral values of set S actually exist and morality is the one whose statements are based in reality. But if this is the crucially distinguishing feature, then this is just the same thing as saying that the basis for moral values existing is reality/existence itself. “Reality/existence says how we ought to behave.” This is a subtle but important point. It leads to my claim of the only plausible alternative being “the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave” being the only plausible alternative as a metaphysical foundation for objective morality.


Um, yes, this is more or less what I understand non-God Moral Realists to be claiming—there are objective moral facts that are Real aspects of Reality analogous to the speed of light and gravity.


Can we agree then that the correct interpretation of the brute fact position is "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" and not "morality says how we ought to behave?"

Note that the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.” With this in mind, how does the brute fact position answer questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?”

I think the best interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being factually real is what it means for something to be based in reality. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view then, a brute fact has its foundation in reality and existence, but nothing else.

Do you agree with this interpretation?


Edited by Tisthammerw on 04/16/08 - 07:20 PM

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Posted 04/15/08 - 07:59 PM:
quote post
#637
Buddahchuck wrote:

Objective moral values (existing or no), need to be demonstrated as the type of thing known to be objective by subjective entities like humans.


Raising this point kind of misinterprets and misses the point of my claim "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God." This could be translated as "If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God."



And then you can accept my claim "If objective moral values were known not to exist, then such knowledge would constitute evidence that God does not exist."


Yes.



It is? Are not mathematical truths and proofs objectively rational?


You do like to bring up loaded questions, don't you. The type of "rational" dealt with by things like mathematics and logic are only rational in the sense that they represent valid arguments, not necessarily true arguments. For the argument to be true, it requires soundness, and in that sense, logic is not necessarily rational.

Yet you keep referring to mathematics as if the "truth" found there is the same sort of truth that is applied in logical arguments. Absent a lengthy discussion concerning philosophy of mathematics, nominalism and the distinction between quantity and quality, the rational understanding of qualities is distinct from the rational understanding of qualities, and morality (unless you can somehow persuade the acceptance of the contrary) is very definitely a quality. So anything that might lead us to accept that mathematical rationality is "objective" would be inapplicable in a discussion about morality.


Why? We only know that mathematical proofs are objectively true because of our intuitive perceptions (we intuitively “see” the truth of certain logical axioms, as the law of noncontradiction). But if intuitive perceptions cannot be sufficient grounds for accepting something as objectively true, then we'd have to dismiss our belief in the objective rationality of mathematics. This was where I was going. I was challenging the argument that perceiving something intuitively meant one cannot know it to be objectively true. You said, "I am more than willing to accept intuitive perceptions, I do every day. But I am very unwilling to accept that those intuitive perceptions are objective." The perceptions themselves may not be objective, but I think they can in at least some circumstances inform us of some objective truths, including objective morality.



If we "know" Objective Morality through "intuitive perceptions", how do we "know" Subjective Morality?


Intuitive perceptions. It is impossible for us humans to distinguish objectively true statements from subjectively true ones without using intuitive perceptions. There have to be some things we intuitively "see" as true (as the law of noncontradiction) before we get anywhere with our reasoning; the basis of our thinking has to start somewhere (hence the need for intuitive perceptions perceiving those basic truths).

I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful).

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Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/18/08 - 09:23 AM:
quote post
#638
You say: I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful).

What is the source of this intuitive faculty?

jdrw
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Posted 04/18/08 - 05:19 PM:
quote post
#639
Tisthammerw wrote:

How is this an obvious omission to the list of explanations in explaining the existence of objective moral values? If morality is simply the evolved norms of the group say how we ought to behave, wouldn't this be something like cultural relativism instead?


No offense intended. I wasn’t faulting you. Indeed you are right that the issue really was moral claims that are alleged to be transcendent and objective. I was just noting my own favorite understanding of “who or what says how we ought to behave”--namely, the group of people in which we operate.



What I mean by "objective morality exists" is that there exists a doctrine of principles regarding how we ought to behave that is objectively right/true/correct.


I surely understand that morality means “ a doctrine of principles regarding how we ought to behave.” But what I’ve asked you to explain several times is what “objectively” means in the sense you are using it. To say that objective morality means objectively right/true/correct does not tell me what you really mean by objective.

I do not understand what you think it means for a doctrine of moral principles to be “objectively right/true/correct.” I cannot understand this until you explain how it is possible to determine whether or not a given moral statement really is objectively right/true/correct. And I do not understand in what sense you mean that these moral principles “exist.” You have said that they are “principles” which are objective. I do not understand what an objective principle would be.

To me, the meaning of “objective” includes independent corroboration according to specified epistemic criteria. What are the epistemic criteria by which we can independently determine whether or not given moral statements are or are not in accord with “objective morality”?



jdrw wrote:

Why are you characterizing Objective Morality as mere "statements" when it is clear that is it postulated by its supporters as some sort of transcendent metaphysical entity to which moral statements refer?


Oh? And what entity is this? I've been an ethical objectivist for quite some time without believing this (even when I disbelieved that God was the basis of objective morality). It is not at all clear to me that what you say is true. To see why, let's step outside whatever definition you are using for the moment and use my definition of "objective morality." Who or what says how we ought to behave? What is this transcendent metaphysical entity exactly (let's call it entity X) that says how we ought to behave? Is it completely unidentified? Or can the meaning of your definition of objective morality provide a clear and coherent answer to this question?


As I have said many times in this thread, I think the notion of Objective Morality is unintelligible. And it is unintelligible largely because the questions you are asking cannot be intelligibly answered.

As I understand the non-God Moral Realist position, Objective Morality IS the basis itself, there is no further reference to something that provides the moral authority. The moral buck stops with Objective Morality. Objective Morality IS the metaphysical entity itself--it IS the final, absolute, transcendent, universally binding source of moral authority.

If you dispute this, then you dispute that Objective Morality exists--except as an aspect unique to God.

But if you dispute that Objective Morality exists--except as an aspect unique to God--then all your entire argument demonstrates is that if something defined to be unique to God exists, then it would count as evidence for the existence of God. Which, unless you also can demonstrate the actual existence of that something, strikes me as mind-numbingly pointless.

If you define the existence of something as unique to God, then to offer this something as evidence for the existence of God is meaningful only if you can actually demonstrate its actual existence. (The existence of fairy dust would count as evidence of the existence of fairies, and the existence of metal alloys at Area 51 unique to aliens would count as evidence for the existence of aliens.)



Can we agree then that the correct interpretation of the brute fact position is "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" and not "morality says how we ought to behave?"

Note that the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.” With this in mind, how does the brute fact position answer questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?”

I think the best interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being factually real is what it means for something to be based in reality. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view then, a brute fact has its foundation in reality and existence, but nothing else.

Do you agree with this interpretation?


As I understand their claims, this is more or less what non-God Moral Realists claim. But recall that I have repeatedly said that this claim is unintelligible to me.


Cheers.
jd





Edited by jdrw on 04/18/08 - 05:38 PM

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Posted 04/18/08 - 05:22 PM:
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#640
Johhanes de Silentio wrote:
You say: I intuitively perceive some statements as objectively true (e.g. the basic axioms of logic) and some as based on my own personal tastes (e.g. sauerkraut tastes awful).

What is the source of this intuitive faculty?


Aye, that's the question isn't it? nod

This will depend on your worldview. Intuitive perceptions are something we are more or less born with. So it could be nature or God or some combination of the two. Human individuals may also play a part in influencing this (I happen to think self-deception is a lot easier than most people think, for instance).

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Posted 04/18/08 - 05:56 PM:
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#641
jdrw wrote:

I surely understand that morality means “ a doctrine of principles regarding how we ought to behave.” But what I’ve asked you to explain several times is what “objectively” means in the sense you are using it. To say that objective morality means objectively right/true/correct does not tell me what you really mean by objective.


I've tried explaining this to you before but we end up getting nowhere. As a recap, by a statement being objectively true I mean the statement is true independently of what humans think, feel, and believe.

You've mentioned epistemic criteria and about identifying objectivity, but I suggest we not continue that discussion because it kind of misses the point of my central claim. My central claim recall is "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God." This could be translated as "If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God."

I'm not sure what to make of the following:

As I understand the non-God Moral Realist position, Objective Morality IS the basis itself, there is no further reference to something that provides the moral authority. The moral buck stops with Objective Morality. Objective Morality IS the metaphysical entity itself--it IS the final, absolute, transcendent, universally binding source of moral authority.


I have already responded to why "the basis of morality is morality" doesn't work, and offered what I believed to be a better one: "the sole basis of moral values existing is reality and existence itself." It is a view that flatly contradicts the one you mentioned above, and yet to this you replied, "As I understand their claims, this is more or less what non-God Moral Realists claim." I'm a bit confused. confused

Anyway...

jrdw: Why are you characterizing Objective Morality as mere "statements" when it is clear that is it postulated by its supporters as some sort of transcendent metaphysical entity to which moral statements refer?

Tisthammerw: Oh? And what entity is this? .... [L]et's step outside whatever definition you are using for the moment and use my definition of "objective morality." [Which is basically the system of statements and principles that say how we ought to behave] Who or what says how we ought to behave? What is this transcendent metaphysical entity exactly (let's call it entity X) that says how we ought to behave? Is it completely unidentified? Or can the meaning of your definition of objective morality provide a clear and coherent answer to this question?

You kind of sidestepped the questions, albeit with some justification (claiming that morality is unintelligible etc) and then responded with "Objective Morality IS the basis itself." If we use my definition of morality, i.e. "statements and principles of how we ought to behave" then this answer just doesn't work as I demonstrated in post #616 (the set S argument). If however your definition of morality is simply "the final, absolute, transcendent, universally binding source of moral authority" that says how we ought to behave, then this entity could be almost anything, including God (as far as this definition knows).

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Posted 04/18/08 - 06:09 PM:
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#642

Johannes you said,

An objective morality must exist. I will argue for this from the impossibility of subjectivism and cultural relativism.
Argument for Subjectivism:
3. Therefore, there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply to all people everywhere and at all times.
Problems:
4. If 3, then a person is only do if she breaks her own moral code. Yet if hypocrisy is not one of her moral principles, then she cannot do wrong.


You are reverting back to assumption of objective morality in order to take this position. It is possible for a person (from their own perception) to never be wrong. We have exmaples where this does happen. While it does not provide evidence that the entire basis of morality is at an individual level, it does show that it does aply at least for some people.

5. If 3, then Adolf Hitler would be morally better than Mother Teresa. For Hitler certainly lives up to his own moral standard; Mother Teresa, on the other hand, admittedly breaks her moral code now and then; therefore, if 3 is true, we must regard Hitler as morally better than Mother Teresa.


We would only take this position if we applied an objective moral standard and this applied to all indivdual percepions. You are also making the judgement that living up to an internal code of morality has some type of moral content. What is the basis for this? Also note that some people might well hold the view that Hitler is better than M Theresa. Once again a display of subjective morality from individuals.

6. If 3, then one person cannot criticize another for being unfair, for fairness might not be one of the other’s principles.


Once again we do criticise others for being unfair, regardless of whether it is one of their principles. Once again you are making an assumption that there is an objective viewpoint to this, that you know what it is, and are then applying it to the above.

Argument for Cultural Relativism

9. Therefore, there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply to all people everywhere and at all times.

Problems:

10. If 9, then one culture can never object to the morality of another culture, in which case the genocides in Darfur, Rowanda and Germany cannot be considered Evil.


Same problem here. We do consider them evil, but probably not all people everywhere all the time. You are making a subjective moral judgement on what people should or should not do, consisdering it to be objective and applying it to the above. This perspective explains why we hold onto the view that OM does exist, despite evidence to the contrary.

11. If 9, then Hitler, because his culture is behind him, is morally better than Martin Luther King Jr, Ghandi and Jesus, who acted in opposition to their culture’s morality.


You are making a subjective judgement that we must morally judge people if they act contrary to the morality of their culture. We also do thia all the time, but not everyone thinks this way either. Once again unless you are the source of OM, then this argument fails.

On the one hand – from the side of society at large – civil disobidience will be morally wrong so long as the culture agrees with the law in question.


On the basis that a country tries to argue that its laws are objectively moral.

On the other hand – to those who belong to the relevant subculture that doesn’t recognize the particular law in question – disobidience will be morally mandated. Why should the Ku Klux Klan follow the laws? In their culture, whites are superior, and therefore, it’s not morally wrong to torture blacks. A person can justify anything as long as he or she joins some sub-culture that supports it.


And this is exactly what we do see. At some point the subculture might get recognition, the law gets change and people than (on the surface at least) agree that they got the original law wrong, but now they have got it objectively right.

The following proof can therefore be given for the existence of God:

1. An objective morality exists.


We think it exists. If we did not, we would be forced to recognise that laws and morals are power based and arbritrary in all other senses. This state of affairs makes us very uncomfortable and can split societies. Its likely that natrual selection has weeded out people who violate social standards. A view of OM is probably an adaptive trait.


2. The best explanation for this morality is the existence of an intelligent God.


Since 1 failed, 2 is no longer relevant.


3. Therefore, an intelligent God exists.


I will respond to any objections people have for Premise 2. I think this is where the real question lies.


You need to go right back to your basic premises to handle any objections. The real question is there, by the time you got to premise 2, the argument was long gone.
Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/18/08 - 07:26 PM:
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#643
Please see post 628.
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Posted 04/19/08 - 02:00 AM:
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#644
Johhanes, you said,

Please see post 628.


Apologies, I overlooked this response. Here are my comment on this.

If I am going to be a consistent subjectivist, then I cannot hold others up to my own moral standards.


Why have you specified consistency? Unless you do not want to discuss the reality of the worlds moral standards, I cannot see why you would use an unrealistic model of consistency. I also do not see why this is limited to the category of subjectivism (cultural relativism). The arguemtn I am debating is the existence of objective reality. How the relative morality exists - in individuals, cultures, a mixture, consistency is secondary to the existence of OM.

I cannot say that Hitler is morally evil and Mother Teresa good.


You sure can, and people do all the time. This does not mean OM exists. It just means people have fluid moral standards designed to support the power base of themselves and their society.

Because of my subjectivism, I have to maintain that Hitler is morally better -- yes, morally better to himself -- but that is the only standard there is


Unles you are limiting yourself to a narrow system of relative morality (which I am not), you can, (and people do) maintain what you please. You might not get away with it, and it might not affect anyone else, and might not further your way in life, but it still happens. You are reverting to theoretical 'oughts' to defend the position of OM.

We simply cannot give one another moral appraisal.


Thats your opinion of what we 'ought' to be doing. This is an example of subjective morality and what you think ought to happen or not. The reality is different. People do morally appraise each other all the time.

But I argue that, for a subjectivist to be consistent, she must realize her moral claims have no bearing on another person. In order to judge others according to her moral standards, she would have to believe those standards are objective one, which she cannot do as a subjectivist.


This raises two points. You are once again specifying consistency at the moral level, when our consistency operates at a self determination level only. As soon as you elevate above this humans are not consistent. The second point is the idea that subjectivists recognise that moral standards can be theoretically relative, but practice them as if they are objective. I suspect this is due to the underlying drive for self determination that means we take the position that in order to further our objectives we must operate as if we are objectively moral.

Did you make the following comment, or paraphrase what someone else said?

Another says: "That subjectivism and relativism may entail something counterintuitive does not mean they are impossible. Relativity is counterintuitive, and so is traditional Christian theism (at least to me)."


Why are subjectivity and relativism counterintuitive? Does this mean that given the position each person holds as having intuitions that they are unable to consider them anything else but objective (despite theoretical discussions that both subjectivity and relativity exist), because they only have their own senses to trust (trust of senses of other people and objects is possible, but is channeled through self senses and so is subject to the same process). It means that the way you see, touch, feel, hear the world must be the way that it is. To acknowledge, in real time, that you are illusory is a paradox. Once illusion is recognised to be an illusion, it no longer operates as if it were reality.

We therefore are limited in our ability to use reason to find these principles, which means we must grasp them intuitively; therefore, if the principles we discover are counterintuitive, it stands to reason that they are incorrect.


I do not understand that we are limited in our use of reason, then use reason as a means to judge that counterintuitive principles must be incorrect. Firstly, I do not see that counter intuitive experience is incorrect, or secondly that reason is unable to establish the principes of something like morality. Intuitively, the earth is flat, however reason allows to set aside this intuition and establish it as a globe. It still possible that we are incorrect (but not may takers for this stance), and it is not a globe, or even flat.
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Posted 04/19/08 - 09:59 AM:
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#645
Tisthammerw wrote:

I've tried explaining this to you before but we end up getting nowhere. As a recap, by a statement being objectively true I mean the statement is true independently of what humans think, feel, and believe.

You've mentioned epistemic criteria and about identifying objectivity, but I suggest we not continue that discussion because it kind of misses the point of my central claim. My central claim recall is "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God." This could be translated as "If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God."


But we cannot intelligibly grant that moral values exist independently of human beings if we do not understand in what possible way we can refer to them in order to determine whether or not a given behavior really is moral, because to exist as real moral values means to be the reference for whether or not a given behavior really is moral.

In order for us to even conceive of the possibility that something exists as objective reality we have to be able to conceive of some way in which we can interact with it, some way that we can experience it at least to the degree that we can tell the difference between its existence and its nonexistence.

What do you take it to mean if someone proposes that something exists objectively but offers no way of determining the difference between its existence and its non-existence? If we don’t understand how to tell whether what we are referring to is really objectively there or not, then what sense does it make to claim that it really objectively exists? And if we cannot discern some difference between its existence and its non-existence, then what difference does its existence or non-existence make to us?

What is the point of arguing that the only plausible Objective Morality is one that is uniquely an aspect of God, so if this aspect unique to God exists, it would count as evidence of the existence of God?

How is your argument any less pointless than arguing that the only plausible Fairy Dust is the kind that is unique to fairies, so if Fairy Dust exists, it would count as evidence for the existence of fairies?



You kind of sidestepped the questions, albeit with some justification (claiming that morality is unintelligible etc) and then responded with "Objective Morality IS the basis itself." If we use my definition of morality, i.e. "statements and principles of how we ought to behave" then this answer just doesn't work as I demonstrated in post #616 (the set S argument). If however your definition of morality is simply "the final, absolute, transcendent, universally binding source of moral authority" that says how we ought to behave, then this entity could be almost anything, including God (as far as this definition knows).


I have repeatedly said that I cannot imagine the answer to those questions, but it is Moral Realists who would need to answer them if their position is to be made intelligible. And because they are not answerable, I find Moral Realism to be an unintelligible notion that refers to an unsupportable and unintelligible metaphysical entity of some kind. And adding God as the referent does not resolve the issue, it merely adds the Eurythro problem step.


Cheers.
jd

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Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/19/08 - 10:38 AM:
Subject: To TMB 		quote post
#646
1. I am a subjectivist.
2. What is wrong for one person is not necessarily what is wrong for another.
3. I believe that action A is wrong for me.
4. Because of 2, however, I must accept that it is not necessarily wrong for Karen.
5. Therefore, if Karen performs A, I have no justification to tell her to stop, for A may not be wrong for Karen.
6. If I feel justified in tell Karen to stop, it reveals I believe 2 is incorrect, for I believe A is wrong not only for me, but that it is also wrong for Karen; because of 2, however, I should not feel justified.
7. Therefore, if I feel justified in telling Karen to stop, then my intuition says subjectivism is false.

Let me make some assumptions and draw a conclusion:

1. You are a subjectivist.
2. What is wrong for you is not necessarily what is wrong for Hitler.
3. You believe that torturing Jews is wrong for you.
4. Because of 2, however, you must accept that it is not necessarily wrong for Hitler.
5. Therefore, if Hitler tortures Jews, you have no justification to tell him to stop, for torturing Jews may not be wrong for Hitler.
6. If you feel justified in telling Hitler to stop, it reveals you believe 2 is incorrect, for you believe torturing Jews is not just wrong for you, but that it is also wrong for Hitler; because you believe 2, however, you should not feel justified.
7. Therefore, if you feel justified in telling Hitler to stop torturing Jews, then your own intuition tells you subjectivism is false.

Why then believe subjectivism is true?




Edited by Johhanes de Silentio on 04/19/08 - 06:01 PM
TMB
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Posted 04/19/08 - 05:56 PM:
quote post
#647
Johhanes,

You have not answered my post directly. INstead you appear to be outlining what it is to be a subjectivist, following through some logic and reaching the conclusion that subjectivism is therefore not true. Am I reading your post correctly?

If so, let me be clear about my position. I am not trying to debate the merits of subjectivism, my interest is the way in which we construct morality in life. The argument on this thread is around the assumption that if OM exists, it is evidence for the existence of God.

From your original post, I can only assume that you think the subjectivist position is invalid (as per the specific assumptions of this position). Given the eway you describe this particular form, you apprea to be correct. However this does not mean that OM is the correct position or that relative morality manifests in another way.

I will take you post and show how I think this process is better described.



1. I am a subjectivist.


I take this to mean that you are defining this a starting position for someone and then following the defined logic for subjectivism.

2. What is wrong for one person is not necessarily what is wrong for another.


Except in the real world, relative morality does not work in this way. A person does not hold their moral views as being right for themselves and another have different (and right for them) moral views. They hold the view that the other person should hold the same views, if their views are different then they are wrong. The other person has the same position. ie. "my moral views are the correct ones, yours are incorrect". Subjectivists might argue the theory of each person views being right for them, by practice does not support this idea.

3. I believe that action A is wrong for me.


Reality says that the view is that it is wrong for me and everyone lese. Even in the case of no or diminished responsibility we do not consider the action to be morally right for the other person, just that the person might not have the capacity to fully take responsibility for taking this action.

4. Because of 2, however, I must accept that it is not necessarily wrong for Karen.
I must? If this is the way a subjectivist assumes people operate, ie. consistently, then I agree this is not reflected in reality. People take the position that protects themselves and their group.


5. Therefore, if Karen performs A, I have no justification to tell her to stop, for A may not be wrong for Karen.


Certainly wishful thinking that these people can stand away and take idealised positions. Not reflected in reality.


6. If I feel justified in tell Karen to stop, it reveals I believe 2 is incorrect, for I believe A is wrong not only for me, but that it is also wrong for Karen; because of 2, however, I should not feel justified.


Except in reality we impose our subjectiuve moral positions on others, as if it were objective. There might be lip service paid to other moral positions, however when they directly affect us, we revert to practicing as if our position os objectively correct.


7. Therefore, if I feel justified in telling Karen to stop, then my intuition says subjectivism is false.


As a system of relative morality, I agree. However I do not think this is the way our operate our relative morals. ie. its not evidence for OM, just a flawed idea of how RM operates.

Let me make some assumptions and draw a conclusion:


OK

1. You are a subjectivist.


I am not - if this is the way they think, but I will go along for the ride.


2. What is wrong for you is not necessarily what is wrong for Hitler.


Hitler might think this, but from my point of view, he is wrong and when it comes to imposing moral values, I want mine to prevail. Usually our moral standards are designed to protect our interests.
3. You believe that torturing Jews is wrong for you.


OK
4. Because of 2, however, you must accept that it is not necessarily wrong for Hitler.


This issue is not what he percieves to be wrong, it is the impact of his view. If I am a Jew then my existence is threatened by this stance and I will try and undermine it. One way of doing this is to describe as being morally wrong.


5. Therefore, if Hitler tortures Jews, you have justification to tell him to stop, for torturing Jews may not be wrong for Hitler.


I asume you left out the 'NO' before justification. Once again, practically I have no interest in his moral view if it directly impacts me.

6. If you feel justified in telling Hitler to stop, it reveals you believe 2 is incorrect, for you believe torturing Jews is not just wrong for you, but that it is also wrong for Hitler; because you believe 2, however, you should not feel justified.


My moral standards are relative, and ideally others should conform to them, because this protects my interests. If subjectivism holds 6., then this is just wishful thinking.


7. Therefore, if you feel justified in telling Hitler to stop torturing Jews, then your own intuition tells you subjectivism is false.

Why then believe subjectivism is true?


We appear to agree that this flavor of RM is flawed. What does this tell us? That RM is invalid in all systsms? That OM is valid? If this is what you think, you will need to provide a but more substance than this.



Edited by jdrw on 04/19/08 - 06:30 PM. Reason: Restore standard font size
Johhanes de Silentio
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Posted 04/19/08 - 07:43 PM:
quote post
#648
Your points are valid. I can reconstruct the argument if you would you would like or we can just move on in agreement that MR is false. I will assume we can move on.

One of three things must exist: moral nihilism, moral relativism or moral objectivism. We agree that moral relativism is wrong because it is counterintuitive; if MR is counterintuitive, then surely moral nihilism is, for according to it, torturing the Jews is just not wrong at all. We therefore can assume that some MO exists and that intuition is at least a necessary condition, if not also a sufficient one, in discovering what it is.

You're right. It depends on what that MO is that will tell us if it implies the existence of God.

Do you have any ideas?
Tisthammerw
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Posted 04/19/08 - 09:13 PM:
quote post
#649
jdrw wrote:

What do you take it to mean if someone proposes that something exists objectively but offers no way of determining the difference between its existence and its non-existence?


Bear in mind however the nature of the argument. My central claim recall is "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God." This could be translated as "If one recognized the existence of objective moral values, then one could use them as evidence for the existence of God." How we can possibly detect the existence of objective morality is beside the point.

Nonetheless, here is my answer if you are curious. I propose that it’s through the same (yet imperfect) way objective rationality reveals itself to us: intuitive perceptions. You might argue that intuitive perceptions make it subjective, but if that were true then rationality would be subjective as well because we only know what is rational through our intuitive perceptions. We intuitively “see” certain truths (such as the law of noncontradiction), we intuitively perceive certain truths as objective (like the laws of logic), and we intuitively perceive some theories as more rational than others, even among empirically identical theories. There is the notorious problem of the underdetermination of theories, whereby there are invariably countless theories logically consistent with the empirical data. For instance, the theory that the universe was created five minutes ago exactly as it then was (complete with false memories, gray hairs, fossils etc.) is empirically identical with the universe being ten to twenty billion years old. Yet we intuitively perceive the older universe theory being more rational. We could justify our beliefs by appealing to various agreed upon principles (e.g. Occam’s razor, and the principle of credulity [that we should accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise]), but the veracity of those principles are themselves intuitively perceived. Similarly, certain moral truths are intuitively perceived, e.g. one should not kill another human being without good reason.

Whether you think this scenario represents reality, it is at least possible in principle for us to know certain truths of objective morality, just as it is possible in principle for us to have knowledge of objective rationality.



What is the point of arguing that the only plausible Objective Morality is one that is uniquely an aspect of God, so if this aspect unique to God exists, it would count as evidence of the existence of God?


I don't know, but fortunately that is not my actual argument. My argument isn't "if God is the basis of objective morality, then this is evidence for the existence of God." Rather, my argument goes from objective morality itself (not the premise that it is a unique aspect of God) to God's existence. Remember my definition of objective morality: "statements and principles of how we ought to behave that are objectively right/true/correct." The question: who or what says how we ought to behave? This question is not answered in the mere definition of objective morality. I believe that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God (if they exist) for reasons I explained earlier.



How is your argument any less pointless than arguing that the only plausible Fairy Dust is the kind that is unique to fairies, so if Fairy Dust exists, it would count as evidence for the existence of fairies?


Here's one possible application. Frequently in atheist versus theist debates where the theist attempts to use objective moral values as evidence for the existence of God, the atheist seldom takes what I believe to be the correct approach (at least in front of large audiences): to argue against the existence of objective moral values (perhaps because it is a position that most people would not find plausible). The atheist seldom does that and instead tries to argue that objective morality does not constitute evidence for God's existence--when in reality the idea that if objective morality exists then it constitutes evidence for God's existence is something that the atheist should concede.

Another application: it would force atheists who are ethical objectivists to reconsider their worldivew.


And adding God as the referent does not resolve the issue, it merely adds the Eurythro problem step.


Please explain what this problem is and why it is a problem for the argument from morality.

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TMB
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Posted 04/20/08 - 07:27 AM:
quote post
#650
Johhanes, you said,

Your points are valid. I can reconstruct the argument if you would you would like or we can just move on in agreement that MR is false. I will assume we can move on.


My issue with discarding all of MR, is that I do think pieces are valid. When you throw in a comment like the next one, there are so many nuances and details that its likely we will get tangled in semantics.

One of three things must exist: moral nihilism, moral relativism or moral objectivism.


I am not familiar with the details of these systems, aside from unstructured research into things like Wiki. Aside from the basic principle of the existence of objective morality as opposed to relative moral standards, the surrounding details differentiate them from other versions. I suggest that is is therefore easier to look at the basic principles, rather than entire systems.

We agree that moral relativism is wrong because it is counterintuitive;


I agree with the basic principle that MR considers there to be no objective moral standards. Whether the whole proposition is compromised, I cannot say, but I do not have an issue with any counterintuitive.

then surely moral nihilism is, for according to it, torturing the Jews is just not wrong at all.


This looks like you are basing a position on your feeling. That you feel this must have some moral value might just be the sense you have, and not a position based upon logic.

We therefore can assume that some MO exists and that intuition is at least a necessary condition, if not also a sufficient one, in discovering what it is.


I do not see this as a valid proposition or assumption and conclusion you have made.

[/quote]You're right. It depends on what that MO is that will tell us if it implies the existence of God.[/quote}

It looks like you t