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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/25/08 - 07:45 PM:
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#601
jdrw wrote:

It is you who claims that Objective Morality exists. The concept Objective Morality means having moral authority. So if something qualifies as being Objective Morality, then it has moral authority. If it doesn’t have moral authority, then it is not Objective Morality.


Okay, but I have been questioning how is it that objective moral statements like "thou shalt not steal" have supreme authority behind them (i.e. that everyone ought to obey them). "Objective morality" isn't a concrete thing; it's more of an idea: statements and principles of how we ought to behave. The question is, who or what says how we ought to behave? Is it logic (such that the statements can be obtain solely from logic or mathematics)? Is it an Ancient Tablet? What is the metaphysical foundation of this thing called objective morality?



It is meaningless for you to posit that Objective Morality exists as a “given,” and then argue that its claims to moral authority are circular and therefore uncompelling.


I agree, but I never argued against the authority of morality itself, I argued that one proposed answer to the basis of its authority is circular. Remember what I said about objective morality not being a concrete thing, about it simply being "statements and principles of how we ought to behave." It simply doesn't follow from the mere definition of objective morality that the proper answer to "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is morality itself, because that ends up being circular and vacuous (how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave) and provides no real foundation for objective morality (which was precisely what the question was trying to ascertain).


Off-topic: ethical noncognitivism



It's all a matter of taste--like preferring vanilla over chocolate--as mentioned earlier. Of course, a person can strongly dislike genocides, but if the noncognitivist is consistent her dislike would have to be akin to me disliking sauerkraut, and that there really isn't anything wrong about it.


This, too, is sophomoric. A metaphor that has rhetorical effect but which fails to actually capture the issue. It’s not a matter of taste, it’s a matter of value judgments.


But remember that for the noncognitivist these "value judgments" have no objective reference point. They're simply an expression of what the individual likes or doesn't like, i.e. personal tastes (like preferring vanilla over chocolate).

If my understanding is not correct, then what exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?

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Posted 03/25/08 - 07:46 PM:
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#602
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Still, my apologies for confusing you [regarding the suggestion that I quoted William Lane Craig when I didn't].


Apology accepted.



Tisthammerw wrote:

Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

I assumed you were familiar enough with utilitarianism to know the basic outlines of the theory, which is all I would have given you anyway. But since you asked, utilitarians would argue that happiness is necessarily a good, and that wrapped up in the definition of "goodness" is "to be pursued/promoted."


Great, but who or what says we ought to pursue happiness? The core question has not quite been answered yet.

Actually, it was the first thing to be answered: it is (supposedly) a necessary truth. As such it is either "told" to us by pure reason, or it might even be seen as a brute fact (showing yet again the deficiencies in your [N v U] dilemma).


Please keep in mind that it was vastly unclear how "necessary truth" answered the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If reason tells us how we ought to behave, then this would be satisfactory (as long as moral principles could be derived from logic alone, which I do not believe can be done). But regarding the brute fact position, how does this answer the question of who or what says how we ought to behave? One prospect is "nothing" (which I argued doesn't work) another is "reality in some general sense says how we ought to behave" which I've argued leads to pantheism. Do you have another alternative?

Back to my argument (in which I justified the "interesting characteristics" of the pantheistic God that is the basis of morality).




Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent upon anything in the physical world.


This does not necessarily follow. If the pantheism we are considering is indistinguishable from naturalism, and if naturalism is committed to physicalism, then objective morality is somehow tied to the physical world.


Whether or not it follows will depend on the answer to the thought experiment I provided immediately after the sentence you quoted. Suppose some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn’t a corporeal world? If the answer is "no" then the essence of the entity (whether it be a pantheistic God or whatever) that says how we ought to behave must be incorporeal.

(Note that I never said that the pantheistic God has to be naturalistic to be a metaphysical basis for objective morality.)




...a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence...


Do you take this to be a justification? Because it is not.


By definition pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. What more justification do I need?

And now for stuff not dealing with the "interesting characteristics" argument.


You have recently stated that moral authority does not require a literal mouth, yet have maintained that a brute metaphysical truth is implausible (despite the historical attractiveness of such a view).


I do not claim that brute facts are implausible, even when it comes to objective morality.



I just wanted to point out that at this point you have randomly introduced the concept of a pantheistic God without justification.


Let me provide that justification here. I have claimed that the universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. Pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. Unfortunately, some of the more traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence, supernatural powers and even consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism (naturalistic pantheism fits into this category) thus requiring a broader definition of God. A definition that fits both the pantheistic and traditional monotheistic God is "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." The God of pantheism is a metaphysical entity greater than ourselves; one that ought to be revered or perhaps even worshiped. God is certainly the supreme metaphysical reality in traditional monotheism, and people are obligated to revere and obey Him. The God of naturalistic pantheism is the most difficult to describe and identify (lacking consciousness and the supernatural), yet the universe wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it would seem to fit the bill, if anything does. Such a pantheistic God would at least be of the naturalistic if not sentient variety.

Which brings me to this:



You may disagree with this statement, but if the universe having supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong, possessing supreme moral authority over how we ought to behave, if this does not constitute pantheism (at least for naturalistic pantheism), then what does?


Here you seem to be mistakenly assuming that a pantheistic God would have to entail objective morality. It is equally possible that one could hold a version of pantheism that does not involve the universe possessing supreme moral authority (which exposes the above question as merely rhetorical).


(1) I don't actually make the assumption you mentioned (universe being the basis of morality might imply pantheism, but I never claimed the reverse was true); (2) You didn't answer my question. The God of naturalistic pantheism is the most difficult to describe and identify (lacking consciousness and the supernatural), yet if the universe wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it does not fit the bill, then what does? This question is not rhetorical (it seems unclear why it would be rhetorical if a conception of a pantheistic God does not contain objective morality; if anything the opposite seems to follow).

Actually, all our dispute over whether the alternative ("the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave") constitutes pantheism might be quibbling. Even if we don’t want to call the alternative pantheism, the key idea resulting from the alternative—that there is something transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it—nonetheless treads suspiciously close to theism. Perhaps it is best to agree to disagree on the matter of whether the universe possessing such characteristics would constitute pantheism and focus on the attributes my argument has derived.


But the only way to make the jump from "the universe is the supreme authority" to "the universe is, therefore, God" is to assume that the supreme authority must be God. And thus the question is begged. Otherwise, what justifies the "therefore"?


The characteristics the universe/reality/existence would possess if it were the metaphysical basis of objective morality.




I'm not asking you to. I'm asking you to justify your position. If you claim to have knowledge of a logical proof that would refute my position, then with all due respect the burden of proof is on you to provide it, not on me to refute a proof that you haven't even presented.


You misunderstand the situation. For one, I do not "claim to have knowledge of a logical proof that would refute [your] position." What I claim is that Kant attempted a logical proof that has garnered enough allegiance so as to demand an answer (from you). If the proof were successful, it would refute your position. But that's not my purpose in bringing it up (as I do not believe it is successful, either). My point was that you misrepresented the philosophical landscape to make your task easier, which is contrary to any solid philosophical method.


How have I misrepresented the philosophical landscape?

I don't really have time to refute what every philosopher has said about meta-ethics ahead of time, while presenting my argument, and thus did not have the room or time to attack the argument that Kant solved problem ahead of time, while presenting my argument. I used the limited room I had to attack what I believed was the best and most rational alternative to the theistic explanation.

A boxer handles an opponent one at a time; that he does not face a hundred at once is not a character flaw, particularly if he tries to face the most worthy competitors. If you think the Kant argument provides such a competitor, by all means show me the alleged proof.




(Note that I have already addressed Kant’s categorical imperative, and thus this certainly did not seem to be a successful “proof.”)


Would you care to point out where? As you may have noticed, this thread was over 20 pages long when I joined; and you have only directed me to one of your earlier posts, as if it were a full presentation of your argument.


For your convenience I can reproduce the quote here. Note: this argument is in rebuttal to a claim (if one were to make it) that the categorical imperative constitutes a logical "proof" for e.g. "thou shalt not kill."

Kant might have put forth an imperative like, “only act according to principles that you rationally wish everyone would follow.” We can perhaps use reason to derive prohibitions against stealing and murder based on this imperative, but who or what says we ought to follow this imperative? This is something that reason alone cannot justify. I do not believe there is any logical proof we can appeal to that would actually work. It seems that reason can never get beyond hypothetical imperatives (“If the goal is to get A, then do B”). For instance, you could reasonably say that we ought to follow the Kantian imperative if we ought to make the world a jolly place, but then we’d have to answer the question of who or what says we ought to pursue the goal of a jolly planet. The Kantian imperative—at least by itself—simply does not work here.




But is that really what I am trying to undermine here? Not really. I am actually trying to argue that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God.


Right, but that can only be achieved by undermining the claims of those naturalistic atheists who believe they can still support objective morality.


I respectfully disagree. My contention is that the only plausible alternative to theism ("the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to be") nonetheless leads to an entity with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it) then objective morality constitutes evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists). Or to put it another way, if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics, then objective morality is evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists). The situation is analogous to a suspect fitting the known aspects of the culprit (blood type, hair color, having a means and motive for the crime etc.) based on the evidence (the blood and hair at the crime scene etc.). Not a hardcore proof, but still circumstantial evidence.




Then perhaps you can offer a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism (the doctrine of equating God with the universe/reality/existence) accurate and meaningful?

Like "life" in biology perhaps there is no perfect definition of "God." But this is the best I can come up with (at least for now).


Here you've been consistently flogging the line "you didn't answer my question" simply because I do not always answer as directly as you like, and now you completely dodge my question altogether? Classic. shaking head

Regardless, I have answered you question in advance: it is likely that there can be no single definition of God, only definitions relative to particular conceptions (i.e. theism, deism, pantheism, panentheism, polytheism).


You didn't answer my question straightforwardly (yes or no) as to whether you could offer a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism (the doctrine of equating God with the universe/reality/existence) accurate and meaningful; but am I correct in interpreting your answer as a "No"? If so, we might have agree to disagree whether it is appropriate to come up with a definition of "God" that fits both traditional theism and pantheism.

I apologize for forgetting to answer the question. You asked:


True or false: if there is no God, there is still an ultimate (and thus "supreme") metaphysical reality.


My answer is this: false (at least within the context of God). A better definition that fits both the pantheistic and traditional monotheistic God is "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." There need not be such a reality if God did not exist.







Something is arbitrary in the relevant [metaethical] sense, then, when the reasons for it are ad hoc or ultimately based on the opinion of some subjective entity.


Then God being the basis of morality is neither of those things (at least in my worldview) because God being the basis of morality goes much deeper than mere opinion, it is an inextricable part of who and what he is.



If God could have made a different decision, then the decision is arbitrary in the relvant sense. But if he could not have made another decision, he is not omnipotent and we must ask ourselves why he couldn't make a different decision.


God can do anything that is logically possible for an entity that is the basis of objective morality. God cannot do evil, but apart from that he has unlimited power to create and manipulate space, time, matter and energy; unlimited power to create spirit entities and realms, etc. This isn't literal omnipotence, but it's awfully close to it.



Obviously, (1) is the relevant issue here. Why is God incapable of making rape ethical?


If rape being unethical is a necessary truth, then the basis of morality (as God) would be incapable of making it ethical. Remember, God is not necessarily anthropomorphic in regards to morality. In my worldview, moral goodness is an inextricable part of who and what God is.

If one were to present the following argument:

  1. If God were the basis of ethics, then he could make rape ethical.
  2. Rape could not be ethical.
  3. Therefore: God is not the basis for ethics.


Why on Earth should we accept premise #1 if premise #2 is true? If rape cannot possibly be ethical, surely it follows that God cannot possibly command rape if He were the basis of ethics? The argument that "If God were the basis of ethics, then he could command rape" does not seem to be well justified.

One could argue that God being incapable of e.g. making rape ethical would imply a standard outside God. But why would God being incapable of making rape ethical imply the existence of a standard outside God? Suppose that rape cannot be ethical and that the basis of morality is X. If X cannot command rape, would it then follow that there is a standard outside of X that is the basis of morality? It seems the answer is no. But then, why is it that God cannot be X? Such an argument might be making some anthropomorphic assumptions about God that aren't necessarily true.

Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 12:15 PM

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Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/25/08 - 07:46 PM:
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#603
Makarismos wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Tisthammerw: Why am I a moral relativist? Because I rely on my intuitive perceptions to know that morality exists?

Makarismos: Yes, that is why.

Tisthammerw: I also rely on my intuitive perceptions to tell me that logic and rationality exist. Does this make logic and rationality relative?

Makarismos: In a way it does. However we all have to agree that they exist in order to argue at all. We can however disagree about morality, and still remain coherent. If we disagree about reason, there can be no further discussion at all.

Perhaps so, but notice that we may have differing views over what beliefs are rational just as some people have differing views over what beliefs are moral. Does this imply that rationality is itself subjective? Suppose we did disagree over whether reason and logic existed. Would this make reason and logic subjective?


But we know what is logical. We know that contradiction is meaningless, we know that aX2 = 2a. Perhaps you have an example of a set of beliefs which are controversial in their rationality?


Theism and atheism is one example, but this is beside the point. My point is that rationality is intuitively perceived by us humans. If something being intuitively perceived makes it subjective, then we'd have to throw out objective rationality as well.



I have shown you why your OM is no better (worse in fact) than CSM, and yet you want it to give absolute answers – they don’t exist.


How have you shown it's better? Isn't the Holocaust being morally correct equally as possible as CSM as it is with objective morality?



Come to think of it, it seems we've gone off topic. What do you think of my actual argument? That if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (post #572)?

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Posted 03/26/08 - 12:51 PM:
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#604
Tisthammerw wrote:

Okay, but I have been questioning how is it that objective moral statements like "thou shalt not steal" have supreme authority behind them (i.e. that everyone ought to obey them).


Tist, I have no idea how it is that allegedly objective moral statements have moral authority. I have said several times that the notion of Objective Morality is unintelligible to me. I don’t know what it means. I don’t understand how it could work. I have been asking from the very first what exactly you understand the binding authority of morality to consist in and in what sense you conceive it as binding.



"Objective morality" isn't a concrete thing; it's more of an idea: statements and principles of how we ought to behave.


But it’s your claim that this Objective Morality idea, these principles, refer to something objective in the world, and that it has moral authority. Your claim has meaning only if you understand: (1) what it is that Objective Morality refers to, (2) in what sense what it refers to is objective, and (3) how what it refers to has moral authority.

If you don’t know what it is that Objective Morality objectively refers to, and you don’t understand what it really means to say that this Objective Morality has genuine moral authority, then you don’t know what your claim even means. It’s just words, empty of reference and meaning.



The question is, who or what says how we ought to behave? Is it logic (such that the statements can be obtain solely from logic or mathematics)? Is it an Ancient Tablet? What is the metaphysical foundation of this thing called objective morality?


I agree that anyone who insists that Objective Morality actually exists needs to explain these questions if their claim is to make the least bit of sense.

My belief is that other people and we ourselves say how we ought to behave. These behavior guidelines are expressed in the particular norms of the social groups into which we’ve been socialized and in which we operate. Certain norms regarding behaviors that are considered most important, (typically involving life, death, birth, sex, injury, property, the gods) are the ones that many people call morality. Thus, I conceive of what people call morality to be a subset of all the norms. Additionally, many of these are codified into law. (Which is why many people believe that law is based on morality.)



jdrw wrote:

It is meaningless for you to posit that Objective Morality exists as a “given,” and then argue that its claims to moral authority are circular and therefore uncompelling.


I agree, but I never argued against the authority of morality itself, I argued that one proposed answer to the basis of its authority is circular. Remember what I said about objective morality not being a concrete thing, about it simply being "statements and principles of how we ought to behave." It simply doesn't follow from the mere definition of objective morality that the proper answer to "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is morality itself, because that ends up being circular and vacuous (how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave) and provides no real foundation for objective morality (which was precisely what the question was trying to ascertain).


Then if you insist that Objective Morality exists, it is incumbent on you to explain in what sense it is objective and in what sense it has moral authority--otherwise your claim is vacuous.

Note also, as I’ve already mentioned, that the circularity problem is merely put off for one step if you posit God as the authority underwriting that morality. (The Eurythro problem.) If you posit God as the authority, the exact same circular reasoning pertains now to God. As I and others in this thread have said, the issue is etiher circular or enters a regress or is stopped at some unprovable allegedly foundational assertion.

In the end, morality either is about will and the ability to enforce that will—or it is about some independently existing force of some kind. If that somebody is God, then either morality is about what God wills—or else God is constrained by some moral force that exists apart from himself. (The Eurythro problem.)

Those who claim that morality is an independently existing force of some kind have all the many problems that those of us who’ve disputed the existence of Objcetive Morality have been addressing in this thread. And which need to be answered if the claim is to have any ability to compel acceptance among rational people.

Those who claim that morality is whatever God wills have endorsed a circular definition of morality. And they still have many unresolved problems, (such as what exactly constitutes the binding force.)



But remember that for the noncognitivist these "value judgments" have no objective reference point. They're simply an expression of what the individual likes or doesn't like, i.e. personal tastes (like preferring vanilla over chocolate).


Well, as I’ve said, moral realists insist til the cows come home that their value judgments are objective (as well as transcendent, universally binding, true, ). But they cannot actually even tell us exactly what they mean by these claims, let alone objectively demonstrate that they’re the case. All they add to the non-cognitivist claims is vacuous rhetoric.



If my understanding is not correct, then what exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?


The phrase “personal taste” has a certain pejorative rhetorical slant that trivializes the value judgments at issue. It misrepresents what can be very deeply held values that people are even willing to put their lives in the line for. A moral nihilist’s value judgments about the Holocaust are misrepresented as being merely a matter of taste analogous to trifling preferences such as vanilla vs. chocolate.

To insist that pretentious metaphysical claims about one’s value judgments obtain, as moral realists do about their own value judgments, does not make those value judgment any more significant than the value judgments of people who don’t make such pretentious claims. Such pretentious metaphysical claims are vacuous--mere self-righteous rhetorical bluster and hand waving in a smoke and mirrors attempt to persuade others that there's some magically superior Deep Truth about their opinions.


Cheers.
jd


Edited by jdrw on 03/26/08 - 12:57 PM

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Posted 03/26/08 - 03:39 PM:
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#605
Tisthammerw wrote:


How have you shown it's better? Isn't the Holocaust being morally correct equally as possible as CSM as it is with objective morality?

It is better, because I can say with certainty that I do not think the holocaust was a morally correct action. I can justify this by saying that my moral feeling is such that it couldn't be anything like morally correct.



You would rather say that your own moral feeling is embedded in the universe itself, and that this is why it is correct.



The first answer seems more honest. Also, you cannot be certain about what is actually endorsed by Objective Morality, as you only have your own intuition to guide you. Therefore OM might be the opposite of what you think.



I have answered already why it is pointless to deny reason in an argument, and I don't think you get it:-

Tisthammerw wrote:

If something being intuitively perceived makes it subjective, then we'd have to throw out objective rationality as well.

If we threw our objective rationality then we would have to stop talking. We can throw out objective morality and still talk, so they are not the same thing at all. Do you understand this at all? If you do understand then you accept objective rationality, but you might also be another Hitler (who I understand, could talk, read, and reason), and yet still understand what I say.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Come to think of it, it seems we've gone off topic. What do you think of my actual argument? That if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (post #572)?

All of my posts on this thread have been responding to your original argument. They all had direct significance to your conclusions. Your just not relay listening to what anyone else is saying, and repeating yourself after they have stopped reading.



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Posted 03/27/08 - 03:24 AM:
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#606
The term 'morality' has two common definitions: "a system of value-judgements on behaviour" and "a system of ought-claims on behaviour". The first definition is used when we say "that action is wrong". The latter definition is used when we say "we ought not perform that action". The two are often used synonymously.

Let us take the first definition, and see where this leads us:

Morality is by definition a system of value-judgements. Value-judgements are by definition dependent on a conscious evaluation. A conscious evaluation is by definition non-objective. Therefore, morality cannot be objective.

Let us take the second definition, and see where this leads us:

Morality is by definition a system of ought-claims. Ought-claims cannot be derived from is-statements. The objective is by definition a category of is-statements. Therefore, morality cannot be objective.

This can even be extended further:

An ought-claim must be objective for it to have authority. Ought-claims cannot be objective (as shown above). Therefore, ought-claims are inherently meaningless.

The second definition of morality is nonsense. There cannot be a valid system of ought-claims.

The first definition of morality leads us to the conclusion that the moral value of an action is not inherent to the action. It is valid only for the individual making the judgement.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Come to think of it, it seems we've gone off topic. What do you think of my actual argument? That if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (post #572)?


Your argument relies on an illogical claim, and therefore is irrelevant.

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Posted 03/28/08 - 06:16 PM:
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#607
Here's another argument:

Tist wrote:

if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God



Dictionary wrote:

A thing or things helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment. evidence can include propositions which are presumed to be true used in support of other propositions that are presumed to be falsifiable.


1) God claims are strictly unfalsifiable in their nature. By opening the door to God via evidence, you allow this claim to be falsifiable within the conception of God presented.

2) Evidence entails a certain amount of knowledge that leads one to a conclusion. If a murder suspect is on trial, the found weapon is considered evidence. The hypothetical existence of a weapon does not constitute evidence.

3) By your own admission, we do not necessarily have knowledge of objective morality:

Tist wrote:

Note that my argument does not at all assume that we know what objective moral values are to get to the conclusion.


Prima facie your claim is untrue. With no knowledge of Objective Morality, no inclination, no necessity, no coherence of this sort of Objective Morality being presented, we cannot consider Objective Morality as evidence of the existence of God, any more than we can consider a non-existent weapon evidence of a murderer killing his victim. Whether you believe so or not, your argument very much relies on the observable existence of Objective Morality in order for it to even be considered. Otherwise, you are very likely to become the Emperor with No Clothes.

_________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________


At least Tist loves the role of foil to reason. Where would philosophy be without sophistry?

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Posted 03/29/08 - 08:52 AM:
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#608
jdrw wrote:

Tist, I have no idea how it is that allegedly objective moral statements have moral authority. I have said several times that the notion of Objective Morality is unintelligible to me. I don’t know what it means. I don’t understand how it could work. I have been asking from the very first what exactly you understand the binding authority of morality to consist in and in what sense you conceive it as binding.

....

t’s your claim that this Objective Morality idea, these principles, refer to something [i]objective in the world, and that it has moral authority. Your claim has meaning only if you understand: (1) what it is that Objective Morality refers to, (2) in what sense what it refers to is objective, and (3) how what it refers to has moral authority.

If you don’t know what it is that Objective Morality objectively refers to, and you don’t understand what it really means to say that this Objective Morality has genuine moral authority, then you don’t know what your claim even means.

....

Then if you insist that Objective Morality exists, it is incumbent on you to explain in what sense it is objective and in what sense it has moral authority--otherwise your claim is vacuous.


Wikipedia does a good job explaining moral objectivism. It says that moral objectivism is "is the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion." Objective morality refers to statements of how we ought to behave that are objectively correct or incorrect. The objective moral statements are authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey them.

I'm not sure how to explain it much better than this.


Tisthammerw: Remember what I said about objective morality not being a concrete thing, about it simply being "statements and principles of how we ought to behave." It simply doesn't follow from the mere definition of objective morality that the proper answer to "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is morality itself, because that ends up being circular and vacuous (how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave) and provides no real foundation for objective morality (which was precisely what the question was trying to ascertain).

jdrw: Note also, as I’ve already mentioned, that the circularity problem is merely put off for one step if you posit God as the authority underwriting that morality. (The Eurythro problem.) If you posit God as the authority, the exact same circular reasoning pertains now to God.

How? Morality is how we ought to behave. "Morality says how we ought to behave" as the basis of morality is circular, because all it says "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave"; this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality.

God provides a metaphysical foundation for morality because God is the supreme metaphysical reality. It is logically impossible to appeal to a higher authority than God. How is this circular? It does not answer the question of the foundation of "how we ought to behave" by saying "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." It does something entirely different. If you ask why God is the metaphysical basis of morality, the answer is God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that this simply part of the definition of God. This proposed foundation of "how we ought to behave" just isn't the exact same circular reasoning as saying the answer is "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Whatever its flaws, it at least goes one step beyond this.



In the end, morality either is about will and the ability to enforce that will—or it is about some independently existing force of some kind. If that somebody is God, then either morality is about what God wills—or else God is constrained by some moral force that exists apart from himself. (The Eurythro problem.)


This strikes me as a false dichotomy. Why can't the connection between God and objective morality be more elemental than that? Moral goodness being an inextricable part of who and what he is? Perhaps such that objective moral values might not be able to exist without God but God cannot exist with out objective morality?




If my understanding is not correct, then what exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?


The phrase “personal taste” has a certain pejorative rhetorical slant that trivializes the value judgments at issue. It misrepresents what can be very deeply held values that people are even willing to put their lives in the line for. A moral nihilist’s value judgments about the Holocaust are misrepresented as being merely a matter of taste analogous to trifling preferences such as vanilla vs. chocolate.


But in reality isn't that all it is under ethical noncognitivism--personal tastes, albeit personal tastes that some people feel very strongly about (like someone hating sauerkraut to the nth degree)?

You still did not quite answer the questions you quoted. What exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?

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Posted 03/29/08 - 09:16 AM:
quote post
#609
Makarismos wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

How have you shown it's better? Isn't the Holocaust being morally correct equally as possible as CSM as it is with objective morality?


It is better, because I can say with certainty that I do not think the holocaust was a morally correct action. I can justify this by saying that my moral feeling is such that it couldn't be anything like morally correct.


You can say that you do not believe the Holocaust was a morally correct action, but would that belief be in any coherent way correct?

Cultural relativism says that being violently anti-Semitic is morally correct for that culture if that's what the culture believes. So if you were an individual living in this culture, then your belief would be mistaken (it is morally correct for the culture to be violently anti-Semitic). Ethical subjectivism says killing large quantities of Jews is morally correct for that individual if that's what the individual believes. So if you were an individual who thinks what Hitler did was not morally correct, then you would be mistaken.

You may say that CSM (culturally specific morals) is not cultural relativism. But then if it is not ethical subjectivism either, then what is it?

Previously you said,


My culturally specific morals are:-
Part of human civil society.
Obligate Human kind within a particular society in a similar way to Laws
Are discoverable by enquiry.
May change over time (though this is likely to be a very slow process)
Are laid down through individual’s interactions and moral feelings.


It wasn't clear whether this was cultural relativism or ethical subjectivism, but neither one seem better than objective morality (in regards to making the Holocaust morally okay) since both can make genocides of Jewish people morally correct.

Perhaps you can make your position clearer by answer the following question: one ought to do X if (X is what the individual thinks is morally correct? X is what the culture thinks is morally correct? X is...)?

Or is CSM simply ethical noncognitivism? The doctrine that statements of morality (like "the Holocaust is morally wrong") are simply expressions of personal taste, of what people like or dislike? (Note that this view rejects altogether that moral ought-statements have real truth value; thus denying the existence of morality itself.)



Tisthammerw wrote:

If something being intuitively perceived makes it subjective, then we'd have to throw out objective rationality as well.


If we threw our objective rationality then we would have to stop talking. We can throw out objective morality and still talk, so they are not the same thing at all. Do you understand this at all?


I don't think you quite understand what I've been saying here. I suppose I could have done better explaining myself since "If something being intuitively perceived makes it subjective, then we'd have to throw out objective rationality as well" is an enthymeme.

Perhaps this will make it clearer:

  1. If something is intuitively perceived, then this something is subjective and not objective.
  2. Rationality is intuitively perceived.
  3. Therefore: Rationality is not objective.


I was doing a reductio ad absurdum approach. Rationality might be objective, but in practice we only know of rationality (its existence and which beliefs are rational) from our intuitive perceptions. For instance we intuitively "see" the truth behind the law of noncontradiction.




Come to think of it, it seems we've gone off topic. What do you think of my actual argument? That if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (post #572)?


All of my posts on this thread have been responding to your original argument. They all had direct significance to your conclusions.


It's not clear how. Previously you seem to have argued against objective morality, but even if objective morality is false that has no bearing to my actual claim (that if objective morality exists it is evidence for the existence of God).

Edited by Tisthammerw on 03/29/08 - 11:27 AM

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Posted 03/29/08 - 10:31 AM:
quote post
#610
Yahadreas wrote:

Morality is by definition a system of ought-claims. Ought-claims cannot be derived from is-statements. The objective is by definition a category of is-statements. Therefore, morality cannot be objective.


It's a deductively valid argument, but how do you justify it? For instance, how do we know that ought-claims cannot be derived from is-statements? Because we can't find any way to do it? That would seem like an argument from ignorance, not real evidence. But if that option doesn't work, what does?

A brute fact ethical objectivist might argue that ought-statements are their own brand of "is-statements." As in, "it is the case that you ought not to do this, and this being the case is not dependent on human opinion, belief, or feeling." Trying to argue that this is by definition not objective is difficult if the definition of "objective" being used is "truth being independent of human feelings, opinions, and beliefs." Note that it is in that sense ethical objectivists believe morality to be objective.

(Of course, one might define "objective" in a sense that would preclude ethical objectivism, but this would not make "ethics is objective" a logical contradiction if we use the definition of "objective" that ethical objectivists use.)



Tisthammerw wrote:

Come to think of it, it seems we've gone off topic. What do you think of my actual argument? That if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (post #572)?


Your argument relies on an illogical claim, and therefore is irrelevant.


What illogical claim does it rely upon? It obviously isn't objective morality existing, since my argument does not rely upon that claim. It only says if objective morality exists it is evidence for the existence of God.

Or are you saying that because "objective morality existing" is illogical, that the argument is not "relevant" (whatever that means in this context)? Some say the argument isn't worth talking about, then confuse me by talking about it (with multiple posts here).

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Posted 03/29/08 - 11:19 AM:
quote post
#611
Buddahchuck wrote:


Dictionary wrote:

A thing or things helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment. evidence can include propositions which are presumed to be true used in support of other propositions that are presumed to be falsifiable.


1) God claims are strictly unfalsifiable in their nature. By opening the door to God via evidence, you allow this claim to be falsifiable within the conception of God presented.


But if something is only evidence for a theory if that theory is falsifiable, then God claims would not be the only victims to this definition. It has been known for quite some time know in the philosophy of science that logically consistent scientific theories are not conclusively falsifiable. Part of this is the Duhem-Quine problem; theories do not generate predictions out of a vacuum but rely upon any number of background assumptions (also called auxiliary assumptions). To “disprove” the idea that the earth was moving, some people noted that birds did not get thrown off into the sky whenever they let go of a tree branch. That data is no longer accepted as empirical evidence that the earth is not moving because we have adopted a different background system of physics that allows us to make different predictions.

If evidence for a theory can only exist if a theory is falsifiable, then this would toss out a lot of well-accepted scientific theories.



2) Evidence entails a certain amount of knowledge that leads one to a conclusion.


This would also toss out a lot of scientific theories (if I am interpreting this correctly). There is something called the underdetermination of theories, where there are always countless theories that are consistent with any set of data. Data underdetermine scientific theories. Yet, even though scientific theories are not falsifiable and data underdetermine them, there exists evidence for many of our scientific theories. Why?

It depends on what definition of "evidence" you use. If you mean "something that leads to only one falsifiable conclusion" then there is essentially no empirical evidence for our theories. If however you define "evidence" as "something that contributes at least some degree of reasonable support for a belief" then our scientific theories certainly do have evidence.

I believe that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if they exist) because the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics. This is analogous to a suspect fitting the known aspects of the culprit (blood type, hair color, having a means and motive for the crime etc.) based on the evidence (the blood and hair at the crime scene etc.). Not a hardcore proof, but still circumstantial evidence.

More specifically, my argument is that the only plausible alternative to theism ("the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to be") nonetheless leads to an entity with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it). Or in a more modus ponens fashion:

  1. If the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it) then objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists).
  2. The only plausible explanations are indeed entities with significant God-like characteristics.
  3. Therefore, if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God.

This is what my argument is. Do you dispute the soundness of the argument? If so, where does the justification for my premises fail? (You can find my justification in post #576, page 24 of this thread at http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/moral-...).



3) By your own admission, we do not necessarily have knowledge of objective morality:


Hm? I don't recall saying that. I do recall saying "that my argument does not at all assume that we know what objective moral values are to get to the conclusion" but there is a difference between what my argument does not assume and what I believe. For instance, my argument does not assume that objective moral values exist, but I believe they do exist. I believe we have knowledge of objective morality (that it exists) it's just that my argument does not make this assumption. My argument says if objective moral values exist, they are evidence for the existence of God.

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Posted 03/30/08 - 09:15 AM:
quote post
#612
Tisthammerw wrote:


jdrw wrote:
Then if you insist that Objective Morality exists, it is incumbent on you to explain in what sense it is objective and in what sense it has moral authority--otherwise your claim is vacuous.


Wikipedia does a good job explaining moral objectivism. It says that moral objectivism is "is the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion."


Wiki does not answer the questions I’ve asked you about your statements:

(1) What is it that the idea “Objective Morality” actually refers to? (I understand that Objective Morality is an idea, but what does this idea refer to?)

(2) In what sense is whatever it is that Objective Morality refers to “objective”?

(3) How does whatever it is that Objective Morality refers to have genuine moral authority?

My point is more than that I do not understand what Objective Morality means. My larger point is that unless you can clearly answer these questions, then you don’t understand what you mean either, and your insistence that “Objective Morality exists” is just words.



Objective morality refers to statements of how we ought to behave that are objectively correct or incorrect. The objective moral statements are authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey them.

I'm not sure how to explain it much better than this.


But what does “objectively correct or incorrect” mean as applied to statements about morality?

How exactly do we determine whether a given statement is objectively correct or incorrect? What are the criteria by which we can objectively make this judgment? If this is not clearly understood, then the distinction is pointless, and your claim that “Objective Morality exists” is pointless.

Since “authoritative” (applied to moral guidelines) means ought to be obeyed, the phrase “authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey them” is entirely uninformative, and circular.

If you say that authoritative means “ought to be obeyed,” then the question simply becomes: “In what sense, then, do you mean that Objective Morality ‘ought to be obeyed’?”

That is, what does “ought to be obeyed” actually mean? What does the “ought” mean, and in what sense do you claim it to be “objective”?

What exactly distinguishes an objective ought from a subjective ought? Or a valid or true ought from an invalid or false ought? If there’s no reliable way to actually tell the difference, even in principle, then the claim of a really existing Objective Morality is vacuous, or at least irrelevant.

You still have not explained what it is about Objective Morality that is “objective.” If Objective Morality says that “Behavior X is Immoral” what is objective about such a statement? How exactly can we distinguish statements of Objective Morality from statements that falsely claim to be Objective Morality? What is the objectively discernible difference between an Objective Morality statement and a statement that is not an Objective Morality statement? If person A claims that behavior X is immoral, and person B says that behavior X is not-immoral, what exactly are the criteria of Objective Morality by which this dispute can be objectively adjudicated? Not to understand the answers to these questions is not to know what the phrase “Objective Morality” means.



jdrw wrote:
Note also, as I’ve already mentioned, that the circularity problem is merely put off for one step if you posit God as the authority underwriting that morality. (The Eurythro problem.) If you posit God as the authority, the exact same circular reasoning pertains now to God.


How? Morality is how we ought to behave. "Morality says how we ought to behave" as the basis of morality is circular, because all it says "How we ought to behave says how we ought to behave"; this is circular and provides no real foundation for morality.


If you claim that Objective Morality just sitting there somewhere independently of anything or anyone else as its own source of moral authority is a circular, self-referencing claim, then how is it not the case that Objective Morality just sitting there in and of God somewhere independently of anything or anyone else as its own source of authority is not also a circular, self-referencing claim?

It seems to me that you well realize that oughts without agents are meaningless, and that positing God as the agent behind the oights solves this aspect of the problem. But it does not solve the problem of the circular self-reference of the authority aspect. (More below.)



God provides a metaphysical foundation for morality because God is the supreme metaphysical reality. It is logically impossible to appeal to a higher authority than God. How is this circular? It does not answer the question of the foundation of "how we ought to behave" by saying "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave."

It does something entirely different. If you ask why God is the metaphysical basis of morality, the answer is God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that this simply part of the definition of God. This proposed foundation of "how we ought to behave" just isn't the exact same circular reasoning as saying the answer is "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Whatever its flaws, it at least goes one step beyond this.


This says: The moral authority behind how we ought to behave is God because by definition God is the moral authority about how we ought to behave.

I don’t find this any less circular than the Objective Morality claim, which says: The moral authority for how we ought to behave is Objective Morality because by definition Objective Morality is the moral authority about how we ought to behave.




This strikes me as a false dichotomy. Why can't the connection between God and objective morality be more elemental than that? Moral goodness being an inextricable part of who and what he is? Perhaps such that objective moral values might not be able to exist without God but God cannot exist with out objective morality?


You can claim that moral goodness is an inextricable part of who and what God is. But then when you refer to this moral goodness in God as the source of moral authority, you are right back to the circularity that you object to in non-God claims about Objective Morality.

If Objective Morality is an inherent aspect of God, then all the circular objections that applied to Objective Morality being its own source apply in the same way to the morality aspect of God. To say the moral authority behind how we ought to behave is God because by definition God is the moral authority about how we ought to behave.



But in reality isn't that all it is under ethical noncognitivism--personal tastes, albeit personal tastes that some people feel very strongly about (like someone hating sauerkraut to the nth degree)?

You still did not quite answer the questions you quoted. What exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?


Value judgments for moral nihilists are the same thing value judgments are for moral realists. In this context, they are principled judgments about people’s behavior. Essentially they are approvals or disapprovals of people’s behavior. The criteria on which these judgments are based typically comprise an elaborate network of social beliefs and practices. What distinguishes them from trivial personal preferences such vanilla vs. chocolate is that they are: (1) principled, (2) widely shared in the society, and (3) concerned with what are considered to be the very most important behaviors (life, death, birth, sex, food, property, the gods … .)

The dispute at hand arises when moral realists insist that certain of their own value judgments are something much more than just their value judgments, something much more than their approvals and disapprovals of people’s behaviors. Moral realists insist that their value judgments are of an entirely different ontological status: they’re Transcendent, Universally Binding, True, Objective. Absolute, sometimes even the Will of God … . Moral realists cannot explain what exactly any of these claims actually mean, nor can they demonstrate that these claims actually obtain, but moral realists are convinced that such empty metaphysical claims make all the difference, presumably because empty metaphysical claims somehow magically transmute value judgments into Deep Truths that are far superior to value judgments that don’t make empty metaphysical claims about themselves.


Cheers.
jd


Edited by jdrw on 03/30/08 - 09:21 AM

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Posted 03/31/08 - 12:14 PM:
quote post
#613
Tisthammerw wrote:

… if objective morality exists it is evidence for the existence of God.


It seems that there is special appeal to you about this particular issue. It’s apparent that you take Objective Morality as especially compelling evidence of the existence of God.

But it seems to me that what you are offering us comes down to only this: If you had certain evidence that was consistent with your claims about God, then that evidence would be compelling reason to believe in the existence of such a God. But you don’t actually have the evidence, and you admit that even if you had such evidence it wouldn’t logically entail the existence of such a God anyway.

To argue that the existence of some hypothetical entity (Objective Morality) would count as compelling evidence for the existence of some other hypothetical entity (God) because the existence of the first entity would be consistent with the second hypothesis, while admitting that the existence of the first entity would not logically entail the existence of the second entity anyway--strikes me as mind-boggling inanity.


In order for Objective Morality to be compelling evidence for the existence of God you would have to show:
(1) that Objective Morality actually exists
(2) that there is much more compelling reason to believe that Objective Morality is caused to exist by God than that by any other hypothetical cause.


I, for one, cannot imagine how you possibly can show that either of these is the case. But unless you can show that these are the case, your Objective Morality argument provides neither evidence nor logic in support of the existence of God.


Cheers.
jd

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Posted 04/02/08 - 06:24 PM:
quote post
#614
jdrw wrote:

But what does “objectively correct or incorrect” mean as applied to statements about morality?


It means those statements are right or wrong, independent of human opinions, feelings, and beliefs.



Since “authoritative” (applied to moral guidelines) means ought to be obeyed, the phrase “authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey them” is entirely uninformative, and circular.


The phrase “authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey them” is simply stating what I mean by "authoritative," that's all.



That is, what does “ought to be obeyed” actually mean? What does the “ought” mean, and in what sense do you claim it to be “objective”? What exactly distinguishes an objective ought from a subjective ought?


Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought "used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>"

Objective as in true or false (as in "you ought not to steal" being true or false) independent of human opinions, feelings, or beliefs.

A subjective "ought" would be non-objective (as in relative to an individual).

Whether we can actually determine which objective moral statements are true is actually irrelevant to the argument (i.e. it doesn't depend on assuming we know what these objective moral values are). The thrust of my argument is that if objective moral values exist, the only plausible explanations are entities with God-like attributes. Even if I don't know of any way to discern what objective moral values are, this has no bearing on the reasoning of the argument.

Incidentally, do you have any objections against the reasoning behind my claim that "if objective moral values exist then the only plausible explanation is an entity with significant God-like characteristics"? You can argue that objective moral values do not exist and that we cannot possibly know which moral statements are true all you wish, but none of this addresses the reasoning behind this claim.



If you claim that Objective Morality just sitting there somewhere independently of anything or anyone else as its own source of moral authority is a circular, self-referencing claim, then how is it not the case that Objective Morality just sitting there in and of God somewhere independently of anything or anyone else as its own source of authority is not also a circular, self-referencing claim?


Because "morality is what says how we ought to behave" is simply "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Saying "the heart of God says how we ought to behave" does not contain the circular meaning of "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave."




God provides a metaphysical foundation for morality because God is the supreme metaphysical reality. It is logically impossible to appeal to a higher authority than God. How is this circular? It does not answer the question of the foundation of "how we ought to behave" by saying "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave."

It does something entirely different. If you ask why God is the metaphysical basis of morality, the answer is God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that this simply part of the definition of God. This proposed foundation of "how we ought to behave" just isn't the exact same circular reasoning as saying the answer is "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Whatever its flaws, it at least goes one step beyond this.



This says: The moral authority behind how we ought to behave is God because by definition God is the moral authority about how we ought to behave.


No, that's not quite what it says. I was trying to say that if God exists then as a result of the definition God (or at least the heart of God) would be the authority behind morality, because by definition of what God is there cannot be any higher authority than God. Just because God would constitute the basis of objective morality if he exists does not imply that objective morality necessitates God's existence. It could be that there is some plausible basis of objective morality that does not require God (at last not the God of traditional theism). Nonetheless it is my claim that the only plausible explanations of objective morality (if objective morality exists) are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it).



You can claim that moral goodness is an inextricable part of who and what God is. But then when you refer to this moral goodness in God as the source of moral authority


Eh, not quite. Moral goodness is certainly a part of him, but God being the supreme metaphysical authority in the universe is what provides the basis for objective morality. God and objective morality aren't the same thing, but they do go well together.

The key question is that if objective morality exists, what transcendent source of authority says how we ought to behave? The only plausible explanation I know of besides theism (as in "the heart of God is the transcendent source of authority") is that "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave." This explanation is non-circular (do you disagree)? But if it is non-circular, why isn't God a non-circular basis?




But in reality isn't that all it is under ethical noncognitivism--personal tastes, albeit personal tastes that some people feel very strongly about (like someone hating sauerkraut to the nth degree)?

You still did not quite answer the questions you quoted. What exactly are "value judgments" for the ethical noncognitivist if they are not simply expressions of personal taste? How exactly do you define the term "value judgment" in the context of noncognitivism?


Value judgments for moral nihilists are the same thing value judgments are for moral realists. In this context, they are principled judgments about people’s behavior. Essentially they are approvals or disapprovals of people’s behavior. The criteria on which these judgments are based typically comprise an elaborate network of social beliefs and practices. What distinguishes them from trivial personal preferences such vanilla vs. chocolate is that they are: (1) principled, (2) widely shared in the society, and (3) concerned with what are considered to be the very most important behaviors (life, death, birth, sex, food, property, the gods … .)


(2) and (3) do not seem to be any reason not think of supposedly moral statements as simply expressions of personal taste. Even if most everyone preferred vanilla over chocolate and most everyone thought this preference is very important, the "I like vanilla over chocolate" is nonetheless simply an expression of personal taste; likewise with supposedly moral statements.

(1) (even when combined with 2 and 3) also does not seem to be any reason to discount the personal taste explanation, at least with some definitions of "principled." How do you define "principled"? What makes a statement like "I hate genocide" "principled"? Is it because it goes against a fundamental belief on what the person likes? If so, that doesn't appear to be a good reason not to consider it an expression of personal taste (as a person might have a fundamental belief regarding the preference of vanilla over chocolate). Is it because it goes against a fundamental belief on what the individual thinks is morally right? That doesn't appear to be a good reason either, since under noncognitivism this individual would be simply mistaken (since there is no such thing as moral right and wrong).



To argue that the existence of some hypothetical entity (Objective Morality) would count as compelling evidence for the existence of some other hypothetical entity (God) because the existence of the first entity would be consistent with the second hypothesis, while admitting that the existence of the first entity would not logically entail the existence of the second entity anyway--strikes me as mind-boggling inanity.


I agree. Fortunately what you described is not my actual argument. My actual argument is this:

  1. If the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it) then objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists).
  2. The only plausible explanations are indeed entities with significant God-like characteristics.
  3. Therefore, if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God.

This is what my argument is. Do you dispute the soundness of the argument? If so, where does the justification for my premises fail? (You can find my justification in post #576, page 24 of this thread at http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/moral-...).

Would objective morality strictly entail the existence of God? I don't think so, but to the very least I think it provides significant circumstantial evidence. I don't argue from mere consistency but from the attributes of our suspected basis of objective morality. If for instance the only plausible explanation for the evidence of a crime scene are people fitting characteristics of the suspect (hair color, blood type, type of car he/she drove etc.) this would constitute evidence (however circumstantial) in a court of law regarding the guilt of the accused. Similarly, if the only plausible explanations for the existence of objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics, then objective morality would (if it exists) constitute evidence (however circumstantial) for the existence of God.

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Posted 04/11/08 - 07:41 AM:
quote post
#615
Sorry to take so long to get back to this. As you may know, this thread was missing for a while. I lost momentum.


Tisthammerw wrote:

Whether we can actually determine which objective moral statements are true is actually irrelevant to the argument (i.e. it doesn't depend on assuming we know what these objective moral values are). The thrust of my argument is that if objective moral values exist, the only plausible explanations are entities with God-like attributes. Even if I don't know of any way to discern what objective moral values are, this has no bearing on the reasoning of the argument.

Incidentally, do you have any objections against the reasoning behind my claim that "if objective moral values exist then the only plausible explanation is an entity with significant God-like characteristics"? You can argue that objective moral values do not exist and that we cannot possibly know which moral statements are true all you wish, but none of this addresses the reasoning behind this claim.


Yes, my objection is and has been that unless you can explain what you mean by the proposition “objective moral values exist,” including how we could possibly recognize them and distinguish them from subjective notions floating around in our heads, and distinguish them from other kinds of objectively existing entities, then the claim that "objective moral values exist" doesn’t even make sense. If you are excusing yourself from demonstrating their actual existence, then you at least have to define and explain them in such a way that we would know what it is that the words "objective moral values" refer to so that we can form an intelligible concept.

To say that something exists independently of human beings is meaningful to human beings only if there is some way for us to interact with it, some way to distinguish it from all other interactions, including from our subjective notions, some way to distinguish it from everything else. To understand what a proposition about the world means is to understand some possible experience(s) we could have that would count for or against that proposition being the case. If we don’t understand what possible experience could count for or against a proposition about the world, then we do not understand what that proposition means. If we do not understand what a proposition means, then its use in an argument delivers only pointless incoherence.



Because "morality is what says how we ought to behave" is simply "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Saying "the heart of God says how we ought to behave" does not contain the circular meaning of "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave."


Do you not see that the referent is the issue in the circularity? Whatever it is that you imagine the metaphor “the heart of God” to refer to is what you are positing as the source of moral authority. This is merely a different hypothetical metaphysical entity than whatever metaphysical entity it is that non-God Objective Morality imagines it is refering to. In either case the source of moral authority is either asserted or defined to be the foundation, and it’s only justification for its claim to moral authority is itself.



It does something entirely different. If you ask why God is the metaphysical basis of morality, the answer is God is by definition the supreme metaphysical reality. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that this simply part of the definition of God. This proposed foundation of "how we ought to behave" just isn't the exact same circular reasoning as saying the answer is "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Whatever its flaws, it at least goes one step beyond this.


An expression such as “the heart of God says …” is a metaphorical construction whose referent is no more (or less?) “objective” than the expression “the source of morality is morality itself.” They both are metaphysical notions. By what criterion are you claiming that your metaphysical claim is “more plausible” than the non-God Objective Morality metaphysical claim?



jdrw wrote:

This says: The moral authority behind how we ought to behave is God because by definition God is the moral authority about how we ought to behave.


No, that's not quite what it says. I was trying to say that if God exists then as a result of the definition God (or at least the heart of God) would be the authority behind morality, because by definition of what God is there cannot be any higher authority than God. Just because God would constitute the basis of objective morality if he exists does not imply that objective morality necessitates God's existence. It could be that there is some plausible basis of objective morality that does not require God (at last not the God of traditional theism). Nonetheless it is my claim that the only plausible explanations of objective morality (if objective morality exists) are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it).


But as long as there are no annoying empirical restrictions anyway, whatever metaphysical notions you can postulate about moraity being an aspect of God in and of himself, can be postulated to exist independently as Objective Morality in and of itself.

Thus, those who posutlate the existence of Objective Morality can claim that by definition there cannot be any higher moral authority than Objective Morality itself. If you can define an aspect of your hypothetical metaphysical entity (God) to be the highest moral authority, then they can define their own metaphysical entity (Objective Morality) to be the highest moral authority.

Your assertion that God is the moral authority comes down to your defining him to be the moral authority, and proponents of non-God Objective Morality do the same for their hypothesis.



The key question is that if objective morality exists, what transcendent source of authority says how we ought to behave? The only plausible explanation I know of besides theism (as in "the heart of God is the transcendent source of authority") is that "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave." This explanation is non-circular (do you disagree)? But if it is non-circular, why isn't God a non-circular basis?


Tist, we’ve been here before.

If Objective Morality exists, then that Objective Morality would include moral authority, otherwise it’s not Objective Morality. Whatever do you mean by allowing that Objective Morality exists unless you mean that it has moral authority? To grant that Objective Morality exists is to grant that it has moral authority.

The issue for you seems to be that you cannot conceive of any kind of independently existing moral authority—unless it is an aspect of God (whom you conceive of as independently existing.) If it cannot plausibly exist in and of itself, then the notion of Objective Morality is unintelligible and pointless. And we can skip all talk about Ojective Morality and just talk about God. If there is no plausible Objective Morality apart from God, then Morality has existence and is intelligible only as an aspect of your conception of God, and it is senseless to talk of Objective Morality except as a defined aspect of God.




jdrw wrote:

To argue that the existence of some hypothetical entity (Objective Morality) would count as compelling evidence for the existence of some other hypothetical entity (God) because the existence of the first entity would be consistent with the second hypothesis, while admitting that the existence of the first entity would not logically entail the existence of the second entity anyway--strikes me as mind-boggling inanity.


I agree. Fortunately what you described is not my actual argument. My actual argument is this:

If the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics (like an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it) then objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists).

The only plausible explanations are indeed entities with significant God-like characteristics.

Therefore, if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God.


So your argument actually is that Objective Morality in order to be a plausible concept must be a defined aspect of God or of some god-like entity.

Your argument seems to hang on what is and what is not “plausible.” You find it implausible that some hypothetical entity called Objective Morality can be defined to exist as some sort of independently existing metaphysical entity with actual moral authoity, but you find it entirely plausible and compelling that Morality can exist as a defined aspect of an entity that is transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it.

And you would have us believe that the “best explanation” for this Objective Morality (if it could be shown to actually exist) would be the transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent entity that you’ve defined it to be an aspect of.



Cheers.
jd

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Posted 04/12/08 - 09:26 AM:
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#616
jdrw wrote:
Sorry to take so long to get back to this. As you may know, this thread was missing for a while. I lost momentum.


It didn't actually go missing, though the last page did get moved for some crazy reason. Nonetheless, I accept your apparent apology, even though I don't think it's really necessary.nod


Tisthammerw: Incidentally, do you have any objections against the reasoning behind my claim that "if objective moral values exist then the only plausible explanation is an entity with significant God-like characteristics"? You can argue that objective moral values do not exist and that we cannot possibly know which moral statements are true all you wish, but none of this addresses the reasoning behind this claim.

jdrw: Yes, my objection is and has been that unless you can explain what you mean by the proposition “objective moral values exist,” including how we could possibly recognize them and distinguish them from subjective notions floating around in our heads, and distinguish them from other kinds of objectively existing entities, then the claim that "objective moral values exist" doesn’t even make sense. If you are excusing yourself from demonstrating their actual existence, then you at least have to define and explain them in such a way that we would know what it is that the words "objective moral values" refer to so that we can form an intelligible concept....If we do not understand what a proposition means, then its use in an argument delivers only pointless incoherence.

So your objection is that you don't understand what it means for moral values to be objective? I've tried explaining this to you repeatedly (e.g. post #614). If you still don't understand what the phrase "objective moral values" mean I'm not sure I can help you.




Because "morality is what says how we ought to behave" is simply "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." Saying "the heart of God says how we ought to behave" does not contain the circular meaning of "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave.


Do you not see that the referent is the issue in the circularity? Whatever it is that you imagine the metaphor “the heart of God” to refer to is what you are positing as the source of moral authority. This is merely a different hypothetical metaphysical entity than whatever metaphysical entity it is that non-God Objective Morality imagines it is refering to.


Well, I suppose. But "morality says how we ought to behave" is actually just "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave," so this particular explanation does not provide any metaphysical entity at all and provides no real foundation for morality.



In either case the source of moral authority is either asserted or defined to be the foundation


The heart of God being the source of moral authority does follow from the definition of who and what God is, but how is this circular? We are after all at least referring to a metaphysical entity here, whereas "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave" does not.

If God being the source of moral authority does logically following from the definition of who and what God is constitutes circularity, are all mathematical proofs circular? (After all, they all follow from the definitions of the terms involved.)



If Objective Morality exists, then that Objective Morality would include moral authority, otherwise it’s not Objective Morality. Whatever do you mean by allowing that Objective Morality exists unless you mean that it has moral authority? To grant that Objective Morality exists is to grant that it has moral authority.


I agree. The question is, how? What is the transcendent source of authority behind morality's statements? Who or what say show we ought to behave? What is the metaphysical basis of objective morality? There are a number of prospects (note that the list is not necessarily exhaustive):

  1. Nothing says how we ought to behave
  2. The universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave
  3. Morality says how we ought to behave
  4. God (or the heart of God) says how we ought to behave

(1) ends up being tantamount to denying the existence of morality, (2) leads to pantheism, and (3) ends up being circular.


If it cannot plausibly exist in and of itself, then the notion of Objective Morality is unintelligible and pointless.


Hm? There seem to be a lot of counterexamples for that statement (e.g. me).



So your argument actually is that Objective Morality in order to be a plausible concept must be a defined aspect of God or of some god-like entity.


Correct.


Your argument seems to hang on what is and what is not “plausible.” You find it implausible that some hypothetical entity called Objective Morality can be defined to exist as some sort of independently existing metaphysical entity with actual moral authoity


But objective morality isn't an "entity," morality is statements and principles of how we ought to behave. I find "morality says how we ought to behave" an implausible metaphysical foundation because it is circular ("how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave") and provides no real foundation.


But as long as there are no annoying empirical restrictions anyway, whatever metaphysical notions you can postulate about moraity being an aspect of God in and of himself, can be postulated to exist independently as Objective Morality in and of itself.


How? "Morality says how we ought to behave" is just "how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave." This level of circularity does not exist when we apply a metaphysical basis for morality. Morality is simply statements and principles of how we ought to behave, as I have suggested earlier. "The statements that say how we ought to behave say how we ought to behave" is true but circular and provides no real foundation for the authority of those statements.

But perhaps it's high time for me to offer some additional justification as to why this type of circularity ("morality says how we ought to behave" or in other words "The statements that say how we ought to behave say how we ought to behave") is so troublesome here.

What is morality? Morality is a certain set of values, norms and principles of what people ought and ought not to do. Let morality equal set S, where S is such a collection of all principles and statements of what we ought to do. Anything immoral violates something in set S. An example of a moral value set S might contain is “one should not torture infants for fun.” Let set O be the opposite of all statements in set S (or at least statements that contradict set S). An example of a norm in set O might be “one should torture infants for fun.”

Who or what says we should follow set S over set O? On what basis should we follow a principle of set S over a principle of set O? One could cite the statement of set S; it supports itself. But the antithesis statement of set O supports itself equally as well, and so circular arguments get us nowhere. The same sort of thing applies if were to take the sets as a whole. Set S may support itself (e.g. have a statement saying we should follow all statements in this set), but then so would set O (e.g. have a corresponding statement, saying we should follow all statements in set O).

We could of course say that set S is different because set S by definition has the "correct" statements (if moral values exist); i.e. the moral values of set S actually exist and morality is the one whose statements are based in reality. But if this is the crucially distinguishing feature, then this is just the same thing as saying that the basis for moral values existing is reality/existence itself. "Reality/existence says how we ought to behave." This is a subtle but important point. It leads to my claim of the only plausible alternative being "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave" being the only plausible alternative as a metaphysical foundation for objective morality.

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Posted 04/12/08 - 04:29 PM:
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#617
Tisthammerw wrote:
Please keep in mind that it was vastly unclear how "necessary truth" answered the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If reason tells us how we ought to behave, then this would be satisfactory (as long as moral principles could be derived from logic alone, which I do not believe can be done). But regarding the brute fact position, how does this answer the question of who or what says how we ought to behave?
The necessary truth is argued to be a brute fact, and therefore it is a matter of logic how to behave. So it combines the two positions that you have tried to separate above. Understand that I agree with you that, in the final analysis, Utilitarianism won't work. My point has only been that to not address it is a serious oversight.

Tisthammerw wrote:
One prospect is "nothing" (which I argued doesn't work) another is "reality in some general sense says how we ought to behave" which I've argued leads to pantheism. Do you have another alternative?
The "nothing" answer, of course, cannot work; if nothing grounds morality then it is obviously useless to look for the grounds of morality. However, I have argued at length that the "reality" answer does not, in fact, lead to pantheism. I also don't think that it will lead to objective morality. Keep in mind that it is not my goal to demonstrate how something else grounds objective morality; I do not believe objective morality exists. My goal has been to demonstrate (a) that there are alternatives to God that can do all the same non-subjective things that He can (and thus if those things were enough to ground objective morality -- which they are not -- God would not be necessary for objective morality) and, more recently, (b) that God cannot ground objective morality. Both of these points seriously undermine the moral argument for God, and (b) would eviscerate even the inductive form.

Quite frankly, I've always thought it was rather curious that so many theists focus on objective morality. After all, theists perhaps have one of the strongest claims to a robust -- even if subjective -- morality under an anti-realist framework. They would still have to argue that morality was an invention, but it would be the invention of God. And as far as theists also believe that life, the universe, and everything are inventions of God, it seems like morality would be in pretty good company. But hey, I gave up strategizing for Christianity long ago.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent upon anything in the physical world.
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
This does not necessarily follow. If the pantheism we are considering is indistinguishable from naturalism, and if naturalism is committed to physicalism, then objective morality is somehow tied to the physical world.
Whether or not it follows will depend on the answer to the thought experiment I provided immediately after the sentence you quoted.
Which I gave in the response immediately following the sentence you quoted.

Tisthammerw wrote:
By definition pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. What more justification do I need?
I see you have a problem with context (and focusing on sentences rather than paragraphs). Very well: this goes back to the directional problem that you are having. A pantheistic god may consist in simply the collection of things in the universe, but this does not mean that the collection of things in the universe necessarily add up to a pantheistic God. That is, for the term to mean anything philosophically interesting, it must be distinguishable from competing claims.

Two examples:

(1) Jack is a Petrologian -- a believer in Petrolicus, the stone god. Jill, as an atheist, does not believe in Petrolicus. She believes in stones, but not a god of stones. After much debate, Jack arrives at panpetrologianism: Petrolicus exists as the collection of all stones in the universe. Jill, who is competent in set theory, understands that the collection of stones in the universe constitute a set. And just to make things easier, let's say she's an unrestricted compositionist on the mereological issue (meaning she agrees that this set constitutes, on some level, a real object). Does it follow, then, that she should believe in Petrolicus? Do you now believe in Petrolicus? No! And why? Because there is no appreciable difference between Jill's atheistic set of all stones and Jack's panpetrologian Petrolicus. Jack has simply chosen to name Jill's set "Petrolicus" -- which can only yield confusion (assuming a wide enough familiarity with Petrologianism). If Jack believed that his panpetrolgian Petrolicus had some property that Jill's set of all stones did not, then we would have a philosophically interesting difference (that is, Petrolicus would be the set of all stones, but just being the set of all stones in Jill's sense would not suffice for the existence of Petrolicus). But absent any substantive difference -- the name being a matter of terminology, and one that clarity demands we decide in Jill's favor -- Jack's argument does not am