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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/20/08 - 07:24 PM:
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#576
jdrw wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Close, but my argument is more general than that (that if objective morality exists, then it constitutes evidence for the existence of God). More specifically:

  1. If the only plausible explanations for objective morality posit the existence of a metaphysical entity with God-like attributes (as being transcendent, omnipresent, eternal etc.) then objective morality constitutes evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists).
  2. The only plausible explanations do indeed posit an entity with such characteristics (as pantheism).
  3. Therefore: objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (if they exist).



Exactly what are your criteria for “plausibility” here?

Why wouldn’t a claim that Objective Morality obtains in roughly the same sense that the laws of physics obtain be a “plausible explanation”? If Objective Morality exists, then in whatever sense you allow that Objective Morality exists, that sense can be said to simply be the way things are, just as the patterns that we experience as the laws of physics are the way things are.


This is what might be called the "brute fact" explanation. The brute fact explanation, I think, is the most (and only) plausible alternative for the atheist who wishes to accept the existence of objective moral values. Except how does this explanation answer the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"

Note that the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.” With this in mind, how does the brute fact position answer this questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?”

One possible answer to both questions is “nothing,” but this encounters problems when taken literally. If there is nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying “there are no rules of behavior.” If the truth of a given claim has literally no basis (in anything), then this would include the claim having no basis in reality. If there is literally no basis for two plus two equaling four, then not even logic and mathematics say that the sum of two and two yield four. So this interpretation of a “brute fact” does not quite work.

Another possible interpretation of the brute fact position is that the answers to the questions “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is reality. All facts are based in reality, since being factually real is what it means for something to be based in reality. Similarly, by definition anything that exists is based in existence, and anything based in existence exists. On this view then, a brute fact has its foundation in reality and existence, but nothing else.

If we apply the latter interpretation of the brute fact, then morality being a brute fact would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.

Implications of objective morality being a brute fact

Yet in the case of morality we have a rather unusual situation if this view is correct. Unlike most objective facts, morality is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Morality says how people ought to behave and makes statements that command people’s behavior, e.g. saying that people should not steal. An unusual upshot for the veracity of ought-statements is that it introduces the notion of authority (the power to put forth obligatory statements of what to do). It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality are more authoritative than any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. According to the brute fact position in question then, the universe/reality/existence (the basis of objective morality) not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. Pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. Unfortunately, some of the more traditional aspects of God—like omnipotence, supernatural powers and even consciousness—are not necessarily associated with pantheism (naturalistic pantheism fits into this category) thus requiring a broader definition of God. A definition that fits both the pantheistic and traditional monotheistic God is "the supreme or ultimate metaphysical reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." The God of pantheism is a metaphysical entity greater than ourselves; one that ought to be revered or perhaps even worshiped. God is certainly the supreme metaphysical reality in traditional monotheism, and people are obligated to revere and obey Him. The God of naturalistic pantheism is the most difficult to describe and identify (lacking consciousness and the supernatural), yet the universe wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it would seem to fit the bill, if anything does. Such a pantheistic God would at least be of the naturalistic if not sentient variety.

A pantheistic God as the answer to “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” may seem like a relatively harmless implication. After all, even if the universe/reality/existence wielding supreme moral authority and obligating human obedience etc. is technically pantheism, one could argue that such semantics do not prove anything because pantheism is potentially very different from traditional monotheism. But even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.

This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this ultimate reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent upon anything in the physical world. Suppose for instance some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn’t a corporeal world? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal.

Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.). Objective moral values provide evidence for the existence of God by to the very least forcing us into theism’s vicinity, at least if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with God-like attributes. Even if we don’t want to call the only plausible alternative to theism (i.e. the brute fact position, which ends up being “the the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave”) pantheism, the key idea resulting from the alternative—that there is something transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it—nonetheless treads suspiciously close to theism.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Makarismos
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Posted 03/21/08 - 02:14 AM:
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#577
Tisthammerw wrote:

But as I suggested earlier, we might have to agree to disagree on that.

Yeah, your correct about agreeing to disagree. I think that the idea of objective morality is "just plain nuts" myself.

jdrw had a good point though - even if we assume objective morality for the purposes of argument, It seems that this hypothetical creation might resemble the laws of physics: and no one has ever convincingly claimed that we must assume the presence of god/gods/supernatural entities in order to accept that the laws of physics hold - we instead conduct experiments, believe what we find to be the case.

In morality empirical investigation is not possible in the same way as in the sciences - however we might conduct surveys to discover the general feeling on moral subjects. In this way a consensus could be found against which we could certainly frame moral absolutes for a certain society at a certain time.

The trouble with you position for me, is that is seems to suppose that morals are something entierly different from what I suppose them to be.

Your objective morals:-
May exist separately from human kind.
Obligate Human kind in the same way as Laws would (i.e. laws agreed by human kind within civil society).
Are discoverable (? I don’t know how though?)
Do not alter over time
Are laid down by some entity which might equate to god/gods.

My culturally specific morals are:-
Part of human civil society.
Obligate Human kind within a particular society in a similar way to Laws
Are discoverable by enquiry.
May change over time (though this is likely to be a very slow process)
Are laid down through individual’s interactions and moral feelings.

Now if Culturally Soporific Morality is a more accurate reflection of how morality in human kind works, then your argument may be fatally flawed, doomed to exist only as a logical hypothetical of no real weight at all. This may seem off topic to someone who wants to ask "If OM...", however it really is something you might want to consider.

The key objection against Objective morality seems to be the question of how we might find it. I would like a hint as to how we might discover objective morality, then I might find the whole debate rather more realistic. We might conduct empirical investigations to find how human kind "ought" to act, but it seems that it is very difficult to find what we ought to do from nature. Animals kill each other - but they are not humans. Humans kill each other - yet we assume they "should not". How can we know they should not? If OM does exist, how can we tell it does not require us to kill our neigh bough? I am not idly debating you here, but asking real question that your argument throws up.

You have often said in this thread that the "brute Fact" position is the only alternative that the atheist can come up with to support the existence of objective morality separately from the existence of a god/gods (and I believe you mean this logically, as in it is the only possible position). you then go on to say that this position is less convincing than the assumption of a divine lawgiver - god/spirit/the universe itself. Why is the assumption of some higher power more convincing than the "brute fact" position? This question is key, as I feel it may seem convincing to you because you already assume such a higher power.

It may also be that the "brute fact" position is not the only option. Morals are either supported by some "brute face", or else by an infinite regress. Neither is logically any better than the other - and though I prefer the brute face for its simplicity, I have no reason to discount the infinite regress. Second, If we replace the "brute face" with our own moral feeling (and here, again, I follow Hume) then we have a "brute fact" which is specific to what we believe, in our heart of hearts, is the correct and right action to carry out. It will never be entirely at odds with what we believe to be right.

Finally, I have a tricky possibility for you: If morals are objective, and absolute, and separate from mankind, it could be the case that the holocaust was a just thing to have occurred. Please, if you know how to show that this was wrong objectively , please, explain how you know, and how your knowledge is more certain than my culturally specific morality.
TMB
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Posted 03/21/08 - 04:34 AM:
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#578
Makarismos, one of the points riased by Tist was this,

But if it will help, my brief case for objective morality is a reductio ad absurdum (though we might disagree whether the following consequences really are absurd). Basically, the alternatives to ethical objectivism either don't work or are just plain nuts. Cultural relativism says that being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes. Ethical subjectivism says trying to exterminate the Jews is morally right if that's what the individual believes. Ethical noncognitivism says there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust. None of these alternatives seem even remotely plausible. But as I suggested earlier, we might have to agree to disagree on that.


Your response was that perhaps this was such a point where agree to disagree is required. Yet the issue with this is projecting a number of ethical schools and demolishing them, not with much actual content, but disdain. Set aside these systems and look at what we observe, not what schools of ethical theory exist, but how cultures manage such events. We are well aware that cultures have existed in the past who were cannibalistic, sacrificed humans to gods, waged war, raped women, killed the enemy soldiers, their children and family, and you can be sure, did not judge their actions to be something regrettable, or going aganst some objective or even subjective morality. They did what served their group, their clan, their family, the individual.

Returning to the holocaust issue, this one almost becomes a defining fallacy in its own impact upon modern society. Despite the fact that this event has people who deny it, and even applaud it, it has become burnt into the modern civilised conscience. It illustrates just how effective our mechanism of relative morality is. Its so good that we operate as if it is an absolute or objective set of morals, and the use of Tists argument works wel here. Just imgaine someone standing up and saying that there is nothing morally wrong (assuming OM) with the Holocaust. The pressure to conform to our social values ensures we will be almost unanimous in denouncing this as wrong from every perspective. This is now a self evident truth, that the Holocaust was wrong, and beware any who would argue otherwise. Tist has used this to his advantage in the argument (and might actually believe it as well). Yet, its still possible that we do consider the Holocaust to be wrong according to a set of optimal and socially acceptable relative morals. Our ability to look back at cannibalism, being remote and emotionalyy detached, allows us to disconnect these from these events and suprisingly not make the connection to current, emotionally invested events.

We are able to look at the supporters of a flat earth in earlier times and wonder at their ignorance. Yet most modern believers in a round earth only do so because this is what they have been taught to believe. Most people could not argue all the logic and evidence for it to be so. Evolution (for those who believe in it) is another good example where most believers actually know almost nothing accurate about how it works, its all based upon believing what our society teaches us.

Tist is a passionate supporter of both a God, and OM, not because he can support it with logic and evidence, but because it maps to his social profile. Our sense that we are truth seekers, philosophers has such a noble ring, is another carefully crafted social illusion. It makes us feel pious. We are empowered, free willed and autonomous individuals and we stand for principles of justice and integrity. But we are just playing games, social puppets is all we are.

Myself, excepted of course.
Makarismos
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Posted 03/21/08 - 05:26 AM:
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#579
TMB wrote:

...Your response was that perhaps this was such a point where agree to disagree is required. ...
...Returning to the holocaust issue,... Just imagine someone standing up and saying that there is nothing morally wrong (assuming OM) with the Holocaust. ...

Cheers TMB
My response was a bit more in depth than that. I argued - am arguing - as follows:-

1) Objective morality (OM) exists (this is assumed given the context in which we discuss).
2) We cannot know what OM is from observing nature.
3) OM cannot be gained through study of mankind.
4) (2+3) We cannot know what OM is.
3) (1+4) OM may not correspond to our own Moral code.
4) We believe the holocaust to be wrong morally.
5) (3+4) It is a possibility that the holocaust was justified by OM, that our moral codes are entirely wrong.

In other words, If objective morality exists, then It is possible that the holocaust was a good and lordly thing to have occurred. I would say that the holocaust was a horrible evil which mankind visited upon itself – furthermore, I am able to justify this using my culturally specific morality. If someone believes in objective morality, they face the problem that it might endorse the Holocaust.

Unless that is, they have some way of finding what their objective morality commands? Any suggestions Tist? Can you deny my fourth premise? Or do you admit that the holocaust may have been a good thing? Or do you reject objective morality? These are your only consistent options.
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Posted 03/21/08 - 09:25 AM:
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#580
Tisthammerw wrote:

This is what might be called the "brute fact" explanation. The brute fact explanation, I think, is the most (and only) plausible alternative for the atheist who wishes to accept the existence of objective moral values. Except how does this explanation answer the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?"

Note that the question “Who or what says how we ought to behave?” is not necessarily looking for a literal mouth and voice (though such a possibility would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.” With this in mind, how does the brute fact position answer this questions like “What is the basis of morality?” and “Who or what says how we ought to behave?”


Let me remind you that I myself do not think that the notion of an Objective Morality is even intelligible let alone demonstrable.

However, if your argument is premised on the actual existence of something that you are willing to acknowledge as Objective Morality, then “what says how we ought to behave” is that Objective Morality that you’ve agreed exists. What you are arguing for now, it seems, is for some additional justification for the moral authority behind that Objective Morality.

It is meaningful to allow that something exists only if there is some sense in which you understand this existence to be the case. Whatever the sense is in which you allow that Objective Morality exists, then that sense is the way that you have agreed that Objective Morality has authority. Objective Morality without moral authority simply is not Objective Morality. To insist that the Objective Morality that you have allowed into existence must get its moral authority from yet something or someone else is to contradict what Objective Morality means.

So, if you allow the existence of Objective Morality, then that very existence is what determines the oughts and ought-nots. To insist that those oughts and ought-nots be justified by reference to something further is to enter a regress. Note that this regress would apply just as logically to your hypothetical supernatural agent being the authority behind Objective Morality. (The Eurythro problem.) If the authority issue can stop with a hypothetical supernatural agent who is alleged to have that authority or who is alleged to be the foundation and source of its own authority, then it can stop with a hypothetical Objective Morality that is alleged to have that authority or that is alleged to be the foundation and source of its own authority. And since there is no empirical observation about the matter, and since all that is required is logical coherence, then the hypothetical authority of Objective Morality need not entail other attributes that render it virtually indistinguishable from the theists' hypothetical supernatural agent.


What the irresistible urge to posit an intentional agent behind oughts and ought-nots reveals is that unless there is some binding force involved, we intuitively realize that all oughts and ought-nots can be ignored with impunity. And this is the observable difference between claims of allegedly Objective Moralities and claims that moralities are socio-cultural constructs. The binding force and enforcement of the latter is an observable fact of life within each socio-cultural context. On the other hand, the enforcement of Objective Moralities is either wholly absent or is alleged to obtain sometime somehow somewhere by somebody in the after-death future.




If there is nothing that says how we ought to behave, then there is also nothing that says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. The problem with “nothing says how we ought to behave” is that it is tantamount to saying “there are no rules of behavior.”


This strikes me as fallacious reasoning.

If you’ve already allowed that Objective Morality exists, then what says how Hitler ought to have behaved is that Objective Morality.

As I understand it, it is a sophomoric non sequitur to insist that noncognitivism entails that “there are no rules for behavior.”

It is an indisputable fact that every society has rules of behavior, ranging from relatively less important rules about the range of appropriate colors women of a certain age should wear, to what are considered to be very important rules about life, death, sex, property, personal injury, and behavior regarding the gods. It is these latter rules that are generally considered to be the “morality” issues. What noncognitivism disputes are claims that these socio-cultural rules are something that transecnd the socio-cultural context in some sense and that they are binding in some sense other than however they are enforced in their own particular socio-cultural context. Noncognitivism disputes claims that calling the rules of our societies “morality” adds something to our understanding of the issue.

On the other hand, one of the many things that Objective Moralists need to show but cannot is how certain behaviors Really Are Moral or Immoral irrespective of what a particular society believes about the matter.


Cheers.
jd
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
TMB
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Posted 03/21/08 - 03:32 PM:
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#581
Hi Mak, you said,

1) Objective morality (OM) exists (this is assumed given the context in which we discuss).
2) We cannot know what OM is from observing nature.
3) OM cannot be gained through study of mankind.
4) (2+3) We cannot know what OM is.
3) (1+4) OM may not correspond to our own Moral code.
4) We believe the holocaust to be wrong morally.
5) (3+4) It is a possibility that the holocaust was justified by OM, that our moral codes are entirely wrong.


I agree with your breakdown that we have no sure way of defining what OM actually is. This is one reason why we have reference to deity to provide this. If we use our own judgement, either we imagine we are somehow objective or absolute (as Tist appears to imagine he is), or we are reduced to subjective positions.

In other words, If objective morality exists, then It is possible that the holocaust was a good and lordly thing to have occurred. I would say that the holocaust was a horrible evil which mankind visited upon itself – furthermore, I am able to justify this using my culturally specific morality. If someone believes in objective morality, they face the problem that it might endorse the Holocaust.


Agreed, once again Tist uses this example as a challenge based upon prevailing moral standards because it is unlikely that people will propose that the holocaust was a morally good thing.

Unless that is, they have some way of finding what their objective morality commands? Any suggestions Tist? Can you deny my fourth premise? Or do you admit that the holocaust may have been a good thing? Or do you reject objective morality? These are your only consistent options.


Only by reference to a deity who lays dwon a moral code, such as the commandments, or something from the Koran, Gita etc. Without the assumed moral authority of a deity there is no objective moral compass, just the opinions of groups pursuing selfish agendas.
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Posted 03/21/08 - 05:51 PM:
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#582

The key objection against Objective morality seems to be the question of how we might find it.


Indeed, I have been driving at this from the very first moment I realized that his objective morality is not the same sort of morality called for under a typical Natural pantheistic proposal. Looking back over the responses to my arguments, Tist seems to fall back on one of two arguments: (1) "I am not arguing for objective morality, I am saying if objective morality exists, then it is evidence of the existence of God (2) Existence tells us what is moral and not.

Now the obvious extention of the objection, if we don't know what it is, then it cannot be evidence, seems to be completely misunderstood if not seen as irrelevant.

When I objected that the universe seemingly rewards what I consider immoral behavior (i.e. the most aggressive and willing to commit heinous acts tend to thrive be it a lion, a snake, or a human), I was apparently making the fallacy of division for certainly a part does not represent the whole.

To date I have made many arguments against them, all of them were given an answer barely touching on reason.

Yet as it would be, I yet again play the fool, for I was reading some Kierkegaard, and a thought occurred to me. By attempting to describe a metaphysical reality that contains objective morality, the metaphysical reality becomes more and more subjective. This is quite paraphrased, and I don't intend to offer much of an explanation as I will undoubtably fail to reproduce Kierkegaard's argument. But I thought it was pertinent, as I imagine the Kierkegaard perhaps had more faith in God than most philosophers of from the modern era to now. Well, that's my two cents for now, though I was very tempted to rail the reply to my previous post.
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Posted 03/21/08 - 07:47 PM:
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#583
Makarismos wrote:

jdrw had a good point though - even if we assume objective morality for the purposes of argument, It seems that this hypothetical creation might resemble the laws of physics: and no one has ever convincingly claimed that we must assume the presence of god/gods/supernatural entities in order to accept that the laws of physics hold - we instead conduct experiments, believe what we find to be the case.


Recall that I kind of addressed this idea when I responded to you in post #572 (and addressed what jdrw said in #576). The laws of physics are descriptive, but moral laws are prescriptive. We still come to the key question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If the answer is literally nothing, i.e. if nothing says how we ought to behave, then nothing says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If the answer is the universe/reality/existence, then we get a pantheistic God with a number of interesting attributes (see 572).



You have often said in this thread that the "brute Fact" position is the only alternative that the atheist can come up with to support the existence of objective morality separately from the existence of a god/gods (and I believe you mean this logically, as in it is the only possible position).


Actually I said that this is the only plausible alternative position (assuming the atheist wants to believe in objective morality). The atheist could come up with other alternatives that are logically possible but not plausible; e.g. that some hydrogen atom is what somehow commands our behavior.



you then go on to say that this position is less convincing than the assumption of a divine lawgiver - god/spirit/the universe itself. Why is the assumption of some higher power more convincing than the "brute fact" position?


I didn't actually argue it was. My point is that if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are entities with significant God-like characteristics, then objective morality is evidence for the existence of God (if objective morality exists). The atheist could appeal to the brute fact position, but upon closer examination this position leads to a pantheistic God that is at is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral--which is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. If this is what the brute fact position leads to, then to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.). If the only plausible explanations for objective morality are the God of traditional theism and a pantheistic God possessing the God-like attributes I have mentioned, it seems reasonable to conclude that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (again, if objective moral values exist).



If we replace the "brute face" with our own moral feeling (and here, again, I follow Hume) then we have a "brute fact" which is specific to what we believe, in our heart of hearts, is the correct and right action to carry out. It will never be entirely at odds with what we believe to be right.


Perhaps so, but this sounds more like ethical subjectivism, not ethical objectivism. So this doesn't seem like a valid alternate explanation for the existence of objective moral values.


Off topic: on the existence of objective morality itself


The trouble with you position for me, is that is seems to suppose that morals are something entierly different from what I suppose them to be.

Your objective morals:-
May exist separately from human kind.
Obligate Human kind in the same way as Laws would (i.e. laws agreed by human kind within civil society).
Are discoverable (? I don’t know how though?)
Do not alter over time
Are laid down by some entity which might equate to god/gods.

My culturally specific morals are:-
Part of human civil society.
Obligate Human kind within a particular society in a similar way to Laws
Are discoverable by enquiry.
May change over time (though this is likely to be a very slow process)
Are laid down through individual’s interactions and moral feelings.


Now if Culturally Soporific Morality is a more accurate reflection of how morality in human kind works, then your argument may be fatally flawed, doomed to exist only as a logical hypothetical of no real weight at all. This may seem off topic to someone who wants to ask "If OM...", however it really is something you might want to consider.


It seems as though you might be describing cultural relativism, but is this worldview reasonable? For instance, cultural relativism says that being violently anti-Semitic is morally right if that's what the culture believes.


The key objection against Objective morality seems to be the question of how we might find it. I would like a hint as to how we might discover objective morality, then I might find the whole debate rather more realistic.


Yes, but notice that this is also a problem for the existence of objective rationality. How do we find it? Consider for instance the underdetermination of theories in science: the fact that there are always numerous theories that are logically consistent with any set of data. For example, the five-minute hypothesis says the universe sprang into existence five minutes ago exactly as it then was. Fossils, gray hairs, memories etc. were all created five minutes ago. This theory is empirically identical to the belief that the universe is billions of years old. Anything you point to is perfectly consistent with the five minute hypothesis, because it says it was just created that way as it was five minutes ago. Yet if you wish to claim that the older universe theory is objectively more rational than the five minute hypothesis, what do you do? At the end of the day it might come down to intuitive perceptions. We intuitively perceive some strands of thinking as more rational than others. This might not be perfect or what we might want to hear, but it's really all we have to go on. When reasoning, we might try to start with agreed upon points, for instance the law of noncontradiction (its truth is intuitively perceived, but its truth seems "obvious" to most folks) or Occam's razor, or the principle of credulity (that we should accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise). Likewise we could theoretically do the same with morality, e.g. Kant's categorical imperative (that we should only accept behavioral rules that we rationally wish to be applied to everyone, hence prohibitions against murder and stealing).



Finally, I have a tricky possibility for you: If morals are objective, and absolute, and separate from mankind, it could be the case that the holocaust was a just thing to have occurred. Please, if you know how to show that this was wrong objectively , please, explain how you know, and how your knowledge is more certain than my culturally specific morality.


Well, let me put it this way. How do you know that the five-minute hypothesis is less rational than the universe being much older? You cannot appeal to empirical data, because the five-minute hypothesis can be modified to be empirically identical to the old-universe theory. All rationality eventually boils down to some irreducible intuitiveness. Recall the principle of credulity: we accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise. My intuitive perceptions tell me that logic is reliable, that I exist, that objective rationality exists, and they also tell me that objective moral principles (like those disagreeing with the Holocaust) exist. I can go one step further and appeal to things like Kant's categorical imperative, but that would only work if your perceptions agree with mine that the categorical imperative is reasonable.

Culturally specific morality seems less certain because some of its implications appear irrational. What if, for instance, you were in culture that accepted the treatment of Jews and/or blacks as second-class citizens?
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Posted 03/21/08 - 08:03 PM:
quote post
#584
jdrw wrote:

However, if your argument is premised on the actual existence of something that you are willing to acknowledge as Objective Morality, then “what says how we ought to behave” is that Objective Morality that you’ve agreed exists.


"Who or what says how we ought to behave?"
"Morality."
"What is morality?"
"How we ought to behave."

So how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation (and thus no real answer to the question at hand). We're still left with the question of who or what says how we ought to behave. That's why I think something like "reality says how we ought to behave" is a better alternative. All real facts are based in reality anyway, and anything existing is based in existence. Hence, moral truths being based in reality/existence is perhaps the most plausible atheistic route to go if one wants to believe in objective moral values.



As I understand it, it is a sophomoric non sequitur to insist that noncognitivism entails that “there are no rules for behavior.”


Noncognitivism entails that there are no moral rules of behavior, which was the context I was talking about.
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Posted 03/21/08 - 08:30 PM:
quote post
#585
Buddahchuck wrote:

Looking back over the responses to my arguments, Tist seems to fall back on one of two arguments: (1) "I am not arguing for objective morality, I am saying if objective morality exists, then it is evidence of the existence of God (2) Existence tells us what is moral and not.


(2) is false. I don't believe existence tells us what is moral and what is not. I said that the pantheistic alternative suggests “reality/existence says how we ought to behave.” I do not believe that the pantheistic alternative is actually true.



Now the obvious extention of the objection, if we don't know what it is, then it cannot be evidence, seems to be completely misunderstood if not seen as irrelevant.


Why would it follow that if we don't know that the objective moral truths are then the existence of objective moral truths could not be used as evidence? Note that my argument does not at all assume that we know what objective moral values are to get to the conclusion. It just doesn't depend on that premise. That's why it is irrelevant (at least to my argument).



When I objected that the universe seemingly rewards what I consider immoral behavior (i.e. the most aggressive and willing to commit heinous acts tend to thrive be it a lion, a snake, or a human), I was apparently making the fallacy of division for certainly a part does not represent the whole.


Actually, in this particular case I would argue you seem to be making a kind of is-ought fallacy. Just because something happens (e.g. a criminal gets away) does not imply that it ought to happen. In any case its kind of beside the point. I don't believe the basis for objective morality is "the universe." You can argue that the pantheistic explanation is false all you like, but in the end it doesn't matter because the pantheistic explanation is not a position I adhere to.

I could also argue that the universe seems to punish immoral behavior (e.g. many heinous criminals get put behind bars), but please bear in mind I would be playing devil's advocate and that arguing against the pantheistic view does not attack my actual position.

Incidentally, the sort of thing I would say is the fallacy of division would be an argument that says something like "If existence says how we ought to behave, then everything in existence would behave morally." I believe this does not logically follow and makes the fallacy of division. The idea that "reality says what ought to be" does not at all imply that every individual unit will behave morally, and it does not even imply that every individual unit will have the correct idea of what ought to be. Reality says that two plus two equal four, but that does not imply that a component of reality (such as an incorrectly programmed calculator) will not say otherwise.
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Posted 03/22/08 - 07:13 AM:
Subject: checkmate? 		quote post
#586
Hey Tist,
Tisthammerw wrote:

Recall that I kind of addressed this idea when I responded to you in post #572 (and addressed what jdrw said in #576). The laws of physics are descriptive, but moral laws are prescriptive. We still come to the key question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If the answer is literally nothing, i.e. if nothing says how we ought to behave, then nothing says Hitler ought to have behaved differently when he decided to slaughter millions of Jews. If the answer is the universe/reality/existence, then we get a pantheistic God with a number of interesting attributes (see 572).

My point is that unless you can find a way of finding OM, then the holocaust is more of a problem for your OM, than it is for my CSM. Lets examine how you might find your OM, as you seem to think you have already told me.

This is the part of your Post, number #572, which I think you refer to:-
Tisthammerw wrote:

Sure. You have to keep in mind that when I ask the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" I am not necessarily talking about a literal mouth and voice (though that would answer the question) but simply a metaphysical basis. If for instance the foundation of morality were an eternally existing Ancient Tablet inscribed with all moral principles, then the answer to the question is “The Ancient Tablet is what says how we ought to behave.” Or if the basis of morality were mathematics such that all moral principles could be derived from some mathematical proof based solely on mathematical truths, then the answer is “Mathematics says how we ought to behave.”

So if source of the moral code is the universe itself, then the answer to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is "the universe...

This fails to explain how “the universe” ...”says how we ought to behave”. Buddahchuck raises the perfectly valid point; vary many things in nature do not follow anything which corresponds to your Objective Moral code. This means that nature provides no evidence for how humanity should act, nothing more, nothing less. It just doesn’t provide any evidence for your brand of OM, I would say it provides evidence against it. However this lack of evidence is all that is necessary, as we are left with no placer to find your OM in nature. Where else could we look?

So how do you know how OM wants you to act? Is it merely the case that you look to religious writings to find your objective moral codes? If so, then all well and good, but then you are at the mercy of the writers of those codes. You must admit that there is a possibility that the meanings of say, the commandments, have altered through translation, were remembered wrong before being written down. Were written down by someone who simply made them up, or have been interpreted incorrectly ever since? Just a possibility... but this only counts if you do rely on written commands: Do you rely on such? My problem is, if you are simply intuitively sure that such writings are correct, you are relying on your gut moral instinct, and your position is simply Culturally specific Morality (CSM) by another name. Surely this can not be your position, as you seem so against what you refer to as ethical subjectivism

You said you might have given an answer in post #576 to jdrw, I believe this is the relevant passage:-
Tisthammerw wrote:


If we apply the latter interpretation of the brute fact, then morality being a brute fact would say that morality’s foundation is the universe and existence in some general sense as opposed to placing its basis within a person or culture. It is reality that says Hitler should have behaved differently. Reality—unlike fallible humans—cannot be mistaken about what is right, and it is reality in some general sense that says Hitler’s actions are wrong. It’s just that there isn’t any specific component of the universe that says it’s wrong, but rather the universe itself.

...

It is rather hard for me to understand how “the universe itself” ...”says it’s wrong”. Does it speak directly to your mind? Does it write to you? Does it leave stone tablets with commandments written on? I am left with no real answer to the question of how to discover OM.
You go on to say that a brute fact position is the best hope for the atheist wanting to claim the existence of OM, but that if they do so a pantheistic god must necessarily follow (through an argument I’m sure we are all familiar with by now). That god has some interesting characteristics:-
Tisthammerw wrote:

...a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral...

I don’t suppose you have a solution to the problem which plagues Descartes – of interaction? An incorporeal god would be separate from the physical world, and yet would interact with it? This to me seems an impossible thing – unless the physical world could also interact with the incorporeal nature of the “God”? An interesting aside; as a monist I find the idea of the incorporeal slightly hard to fathom.
So far, despite my pains to read the posts you cite, you remain silent on how you would find OM, and this means I can still ask:-
me wrote:

If morals are objective, and absolute, and separate from mankind, it could be the case that the holocaust was a just thing to have occurred. Please, if you know how to show that this was wrong objectively, please, explain how you know, and how your knowledge is more certain than my culturally specific morality.

To which you have tried to respond. You have said that all knowledge is at variance, that we should be sceptical of the very existence of history itself:-
Tisthammerw wrote:

For example, the five-minute hypothesis says the universe sprang into existence five minutes ago exactly as it then was. Fossils, gray hairs, memories etc. were all created five minutes ago. This theory is empirically identical to the belief that the universe is billions of years old. Anything you point to is perfectly consistent with the five minute hypothesis, because it says it was just created that way as it was five minutes ago. Yet if you wish to claim that the older universe theory is objectively more rational than the five minute hypothesis, what do you do? At the end of the day it might come down to intuitive perceptions.

You say that even rationality is uncertain, that we should doubt everything. Now this response is interesting, because it fails you on two counts.

Count 1
If you are correct, and we cannot rely on rationality – all of your arguments are also false. If you are right about rationality being wrong, you are by necessity wrong about all else. If you are wrong in your scepticism, then I may also be right. If I am right you are (in the absence of a better argument from you) wrong. Either way your arguments are incorrect as they stand.*

Count 2
It suggests that your OM is found by intuition, meaning it is identical to my CSM! You say “At the end of the day it might come down to intuitive perceptions”, and If this is so, that exactly how I would suggest that we would find Culturally Specific Morality.

If your OM is identical to CSM in practice (as you rely on mere intuitions) then all of your criticism of such morality is now directed at yourself! You have defeated your own argument Tist. Well done.


*interestingly, If you use an argument to show that reason itself is flawed, then you have proved your argument wrong in the process. This is why we are stuck with reason; we could only prove it to be incorrect with an irrational argument, and that would simply not be justified rationally.
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Posted 03/22/08 - 07:14 AM:
quote post
#587
Tisthammerw wrote:

"Who or what says how we ought to behave?"
"Morality."
"What is morality?"
"How we ought to behave."

So how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. Although true, this is circular and provides no real foundation (and thus no real answer to the question at hand). We're still left with the question of who or what says how we ought to behave. That's why I think something like "reality says how we ought to behave" is a better alternative. All real facts are based in reality anyway, and anything existing is based in existence. Hence, moral truths being based in reality/existence is perhaps the most plausible atheistic route to go if one wants to believe in objective moral values.


Perhaps this would be a good point to remind you again that I have said that I find the concept Objective Morality to be unintelligible, whereas you are the one who has has allowed that it exists.

As I’ve said, to allow that Objective Morality exists is to allow that it has moral authority. If you do not allow that it has moral authority, then you are not really allowing that it exists. If you cannot fathom in what sense it could intelligibly be the case that Objective Morality has moral authority, then it is not meaningful for you to allow that Objective Morality exists. If you do not comprehend what it is about an Objective Morality other than your own that makes claims really moral or really immoral, then your premise that any other Objective Morality exists is meaningless. If the only sense that you find intelligible is that moral authority comes from a hypothetical supernatural agent behind the Objective Morality, then your argument might better address the unintelligibility of claims of an existing Objective Morality other than supernatural agent-supported ones. (A point of view I'd be sympathetic with, by the way.)

Also, as I understand their position, non-theistic Moral Realists claim that Objective Morality is its own foundation, its own source of authority, sui generis a thing unto itself, just as theists claim this about the hypothetical supernatural agent authorizing their version of Objective Morality. It seems to me that you would need to counter this position in order to demonstrate that your version of Objective Morality is a better explanation. Recall that I’ve argued that it is not logically necessary to tack on the standard attributes of the theistic deity to other Objective Moralities so that they become indistinguishable from the theistic deity. The claim that Objective Morality exists sui generis avoids all logical entailment of the standard theistic deity’s attributes.


jdrw wrote:

As I understand it, it is a sophomoric non sequitur to insist that noncognitivism entails that “there are no rules for behavior.”


Noncognitivism entails that there are no moral rules of behavior, which was the context I was talking about.


But noncognitivists are not claiming that they don’s subscribe to codes of behavior and to values, they’re just claiming that it adds nothing to our understanding of codes of behavior and values to call them “morality.” A noncognitivist can be as committed as a moral realist to battling and condemning nazi behavior. And it is disingenuous rhetorical nonsense to portray non-cognitivists as valueless loose cannons advocating free-for-all wild west anarchism.

The difference regarding the Nazi issue is that the moral realists express their disapproval of Nazi behavior in language full of words like “immoral” and “evil” and “wicked” and even “sinful,” whereas the noncognitivist, who condemns the behavior just as passionately, just doesn’t use those words because he doesn’t think they add a thing to our understanding of the issue beyond their rhetorical effect.

As I understand the moral realistist v. non-cognitivist debate, the central issue is that moral realists claim that certain behavior principles have some kind of transcendent ontological status, which the non-cognitivists dispute as meaningless, even though they may subscribe to and enforce those very same principles. The dispute is not over whether or not the principles should be subscribed to and enforced, the dispute is a philosophical one, over the ontological status of those principles.


Cheers.
jd
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Posted 03/22/08 - 08:59 AM:
quote post
#588
Makarismos wrote:

This fails to explain how “the universe” ...”says how we ought to behave”.


Fine, but beside the point. Why? The point I was making was that the "brute fact position" inevitably leads to something like "the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave," which in turn leads to pantheism. I don't believe this pantheistic position is actually true (so attacking it will be of limited value) it's just noteworthy that the alternative to theism ends up being a pantheistic God with significant God-like attributes. Again, if the only plausible explanations for objective morality are the God of traditional theism and a pantheistic God possessing significant God-like attributes (transcendent, eternal, incorporeal, and omnipresent while wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it), it seems reasonable to conclude that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God (again, if objective moral values exist).



You say that even rationality is uncertain, that we should doubt everything. Now this response is interesting, because it fails you on two counts.

Count 1
If you are correct, and we cannot rely on rationality – all of your arguments are also false.


Ditto. My point wasn't that objective rationality is nonexistent; my point was quite the opposite. Trying to find out what objective morality is might have its difficulties, but so does objective rationality. The five-minute hypothesis is a case in point. How do we know that the older universe theory is more objectively rational? It seems if we are to disregard the basis of our knowing objective morality (intuitive perception), then it seems we must also do the same for objective rationality (intuitive perception). Logic is intuitively perceived, as is rationality. All rationality eventually boils down to some irreducible intuitiveness. Recall the principle of credulity: we accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise. My intuitive perceptions tell me that logic is reliable, that I exist, that objective rationality exists, and they also tell me that objective moral principles (like those disagreeing with the Holocaust) exist. I can go one step further and appeal to things like Kant's categorical imperative (that we should only accept behavioral rules that we rationally wish to be applied to everyone, hence prohibitions against murder and stealing) to justify certain objective moral truths, but that would only work if your perceptions agree with mine that the categorical imperative is reasonable. Ditto with reductio ad absurdums when trying to justify the existence of objective morality (e.g. ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust, which seems unreasonable; but this will only be a convincing argument if you share my perception that it is unreasonable).
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Posted 03/22/08 - 09:49 AM:
quote post
#589
jdrw wrote:

Also, as I understand their position, non-theistic Moral Realists claim that Objective Morality is its own foundation, its own source of authority, sui generis a thing unto itself, just as theists claim this about the hypothetical supernatural agent authorizing their version of Objective Morality. It seems to me that you would need to counter this position in order to demonstrate that your version of Objective Morality is a better explanation.


Sure, but I'll need an answer to this question: how does this position answer the question of Who or what says how we ought to behave?

If the answer is "morality" then we face the same problem of circularity I mentioned earlier. Who or what says how we ought to behave? Morality. What is morality? How we ought to behave. So how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. True, but circular and provides no real foundation (and thus no real answer to the question at hand). We still have the question of who or what says how we ought to behave.

If the answer is “the universe/reality/existence” then we get a pantheistic God, one with a number of attributes suspiciously like the God of traditional theism.



noncognitivists are not claiming that they don’s subscribe to codes of behavior and to values


Great, but they still deny the existence of morality. Noncognitivism says there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust, because morality does not exist. A noncognitivist may not like what Hitler did. But for noncognitivism it is like favoring vanilla over chocolate. It’s just a matter of personal preference and nothing’s really wrong. Not even torture and genocide.

To me, this view seems irrational.



A noncognitivist can be as committed as a moral realist to battling and condemning nazi behavior. And it is disingenuous rhetorical nonsense to portray non-cognitivists as valueless loose cannons advocating free-for-all wild west anarchism.


You're 100% right, but notice how inconsistent this all seems. Noncognitivists claim there really is no such thing as moral right and wrong. It's all a matter of taste--like preferring vanilla over chocolate--as I've said before. I don't like certain vegetables, you might; that's okay because its a matter of personal taste and nothing is really wrong. But then whence all this hubbub over genocides as if they were moral outrages? As C.S. Lewis said, "The Naturalists must not destroy all reverence for my conscience on Monday and expect to find me still venerating it on Tuesday."

Sometimes I think such people deep down know that some things really are wrong but for whatever reason don't want to believe it.

And at the end of the day, views like "there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" still seem unreasonable (inconsistent behavior of noncognitivists notwithstanding).
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Posted 03/22/08 - 10:47 AM:
quote post
#590
Tisthammerw wrote:

Ditto. My point wasn't that objective rationality is nonexistent; my point was quite the opposite. Trying to find out what objective morality is might have its difficulties, but so does objective rationality. The five-minute hypothesis is a case in point. How do we know that the older universe theory is more objectively rational? It seems if we are to disregard the basis of our knowing objective morality (intuitive perception), then it seems we must also do the same for objective rationality (intuitive perception). Logic is intuitively perceived, as is rationality. All rationality eventually boils down to some irreducible intuitiveness. Recall the principle of credulity: we accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise. My intuitive perceptions tell me that logic is reliable, that I exist, that objective rationality exists, and they also tell me that objective moral principles (like those disagreeing with the Holocaust) exist.

You can do this, but then you are in the same boat as me my friend. Your idea of what constitutes a moral or immoral act is subjective, not objective. You are a moral relativist, same as the rest of them: You just deny it.
Tisthammerw wrote:

I can go one step further and appeal to things like Kant's categorical imperative (that we should only accept behavioural rules that we rationally wish to be applied to everyone, hence prohibitions against murder and stealing) to justify certain objective moral truths, but that would only work if your perceptions agree with mine that the categorical imperative is reasonable.

Yes, exactly. We can only agree on later points if we agree of former points. I happen to agree that the categorical imperative seems reasonable - however if I did not, you would not be able to argue that I should.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Ditto with reductio ad absurdums when trying to justify the existence of objective morality (e.g. ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust, which seems unreasonable; but this will only be a convincing argument if you share my perception that it is unreasonable).

If you have objective evidence that the holocaust was objectively wrong then I will happily support your position; however I believe no such evidence exists. Since there is a possibility that OM could support the holocaust, whereas it is impossible that CSM would (we all agree that the holocaust was wrong after all) you are the one who is in danger of supporting the holocaust.

So long as you have no objective proof regarding the content of OM, it is a worse position than CSM, as it may support the Holocaust.
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Posted 03/22/08 - 11:28 AM:
quote post
#591
Makarismos wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Ditto. My point wasn't that objective rationality is nonexistent; my point was quite the opposite. Trying to find out what objective morality is might have its difficulties, but so does objective rationality. The five-minute hypothesis is a case in point. How do we know that the older universe theory is more objectively rational? It seems if we are to disregard the basis of our knowing objective morality (intuitive perception), then it seems we must also do the same for objective rationality (intuitive perception). Logic is intuitively perceived, as is rationality. All rationality eventually boils down to some irreducible intuitiveness. Recall the principle of credulity: we accept what our perceptions tell us unless we have good reason to believe otherwise. My intuitive perceptions tell me that logic is reliable, that I exist, that objective rationality exists, and they also tell me that objective moral principles (like those disagreeing with the Holocaust) exist.


You can do this, but then you are in the same boat as me my friend. Your idea of what constitutes a moral or immoral act is subjective, not objective. You are a moral relativist, same as the rest of them: You just deny it.


Why am I a moral relativist? Because I rely on my intuitive perceptions to know that morality exists? I also rely on my intuitive perceptions to tell me that logic and rationality exist. Does this make logic and rationality relative? My eyes perceive the world, but it does not follow that there is no objective world out there. Similarly, it's unclear that the method of how I know morality (my intuitive perceptions) makes morality relative, any more than it would make logic and rationality relative.



Since there is a possibility that OM could support the holocaust, whereas it is impossible that CSM would (we all agree that the holocaust was wrong after all) you are the one who is in danger of supporting the holocaust.


Why? Isn't it possible for a culture to condone the Holocaust? There are anti-Semitic people out there who don't think the Holocaust was wrong. What if some selective natural disaster left these people the majority? Would the Holocaust become morally okay then?

And I'm not sure I'm in agreement that it is metaphysically possible for objective morality to support the Holocaust.
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Posted 03/22/08 - 01:02 PM:
quote post
#592
Tisthammerw wrote:

I wrote:

You can do this, but then you are in the same boat as me my friend. Your idea of what constitutes a moral or immoral act is subjective, not objective. You are a moral relativist, same as the rest of them: You just deny it.


Why am I a moral relativist? Because I rely on my intuitive perceptions to know that morality exists?

Yes, that is why.
Tisthammerw wrote:

I also rely on my intuitive perceptions to tell me that logic and rationality exist. Does this make logic and rationality relative?

In a way it does. However we all have to agree that they exist in order to argue at all. We can however disagree about morality, and still remain coherent. If we disagree about reason, there can be no further discussion at all.
Tisthammerw wrote:

My eyes perceive the world, but it does not follow that there is no objective world out there.

No, but we really must agree that there are people we are talking to in order to have a discussion. Otherwise your talking to yourself wink.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Similarly, it's unclear that the method of how I know morality (my intuitive perceptions) makes morality relative, any more than it would make logic and rationality relative.

Of course it does, because we could all each of us intuitively perceive OM to be different. OM, according to you, depends entirely on what we “intuitively perceive” - i.e. OM is entirely dictated by our own intuition.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Why? Isn't it possible for a culture to condone the Holocaust? There are anti-Semitic people out there who don't think the Holocaust was wrong. What if some selective natural disaster left these people the majority? Would the Holocaust become morally okay then?

In this hypothetical post apocalyptic future, the people you mention would consider the holocaust to be morally ok, yes. This would still not make it ok for me though, or for you, or for any of us here today. In this sense CSM is very lasting indeed.
Tisthammerw wrote:

And I'm not sure I'm in agreement that it is metaphysically possible for objective morality to support the Holocaust.

Why not? The point is we have no way of knowing for sure.
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Posted 03/22/08 - 05:51 PM:
quote post
#593
Tisthammerw wrote:

Sure, but I'll need an answer to this question: how does this position answer the question of Who or what says how we ought to behave?


Tisthammerw, twice above I’ve pointed out that if you grant that Objective Morality exists, then you have granted that it is that very Objective Morality which answers the question “what says how we ought to behave?” Sayinjg how we ought to behave is what it means to be Objective Morality. If you grant that Objective Morality exists, then you have granted that Objective Morality says how we ought to behave. If it doesn’t make any sense to you that Objective Morality can say how it is that we ought to behave, then your premise that Objective Morality exists is a meaningless premise.

You keep trying to demand that the Objective Morality that you’ve already granted existence to be required to provide some additional justification for its authority. But Objective Morality IS the authority. To be the moral authority is what it means to be an existing Objective Morality.



Great, but they still deny the existence of morality. Noncognitivism says there is nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust, because morality does not exist. A noncognitivist may not like what Hitler did. But for noncognitivism it is like favoring vanilla over chocolate. It’s just a matter of personal preference and nothing’s really wrong. Not even torture and genocide.

To me, this view seems irrational.


This is a sloppy caricature of non-cognitivism.

You entirely ignore the fact that non-cognitivism is about the ontological status of moral claims, not about whether the actual behavior is acceptable or deplorable to non-cognitivists. I already noted that non-cognitivists can be as passionate in their outrage as moral realists (not to mention equally willing to put their own lives on the line.) The difference is in the language and in the opinions about the ontological status of the relevant values. Non-cognitivists can share virtually all the values of a moral realist without agreeing that those values also are transcendent or universal or morally true.



You're 100% right, but notice how inconsistent this all seems. Noncognitivists claim there really is no such thing as moral right and wrong. It's all a matter of taste--like preferring vanilla over chocolate--as I've said before. I don't like certain vegetables, you might; that's okay because its a matter of personal taste and nothing is really wrong. But then whence all this hubbub over genocides as if they were moral outrages?


The “hubbub” is over violations of deep values--value outrage instead of moral outrage. They are over deep values about human beings and how it is and is not acceptable to treat them. The difference between the non-cognitivist and the moral realist is that non-cognitivists do not claim that their value preferences are justified or founded in some magical, transcendent realm, nor that they’re somehow mysteriously binding on all other people. But these values can be just as deeply important to the non-cognitivist as the moral realist’s values are to themselves. (Furthermore, they may even be identical values, such as respect for the rights of other people, and the like.)



And at the end of the day, views like "there's nothing morally wrong with the Holocaust" still seem unreasonable (inconsistent behavior of noncognitivists notwithstanding)


To say that “there’s nothing morally worng with the Holocaust” is merely to deny the ontological claims about the behavior of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. It is not to be confused with saying “There’s nothing about the Holocaust that violates any of my most important values.” It is not to be confused with saying “There’s nothing about the Holocaust that I object to in any way.” And it is not to be confused with saying “There’s nothing about the behavior of the perpetrators of the Holocaust that I would judge to be objectionable or punishable in any way.” It is merely to say that calling the behavior of the perpetrators of the Holocause “immoral” or “evil” has rhetorical force, but adds nothing to our actual understanding of what happened.

Moral realists insist that there is an all-important difference between (1) their own unmitigated moral outrage and moral condemnation of the Holocaust, and (2) the non-cognitivist’s unmitigated outrage and condemnation of the Holocaust. But the Moral Realists can neither intelligibly explain, nor empirically demonstrate what this alleged “moral” difference is. Nor can they intelligibly explain nor empirically demonstrate in what sense it is binding on us all.

At the end of the day, what moral realists cannot ever actually demonstrate to anyone is the very essence of their claim--exactly what the distinctly moral aspects involved are (as distinguished from the plain value judgments of the non-cognitivists), nor how exactly these moral aspects are transcendent, nor in what sense they are universally binding on all humans. In short, all the moral realist’s hyperventilating self-righteous rhetoric notwithstanding, the claims are vacuous.


Cheers.
jd
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/23/08 - 06:45 AM:
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#594
Tisthammerw: Why am I a moral relativist? Because I rely on my intuitive perceptions to know that morality exists?

Makarismos: Yes, that is why.

Tisthammerw: I also rely on my intuitive perceptions to tell me that logic and rationality exist. Does this make logic and rationality relative?

Makarismos: In a way it does. However we all have to agree that they exist in order to argue at all. We can however disagree about morality, and still remain coherent. If we disagree about reason, there can be no further discussion at all.

Perhaps so, but notice that we may have differing views over what beliefs are rational just as some people have differing views over what beliefs are moral. Does this imply that rationality is itself subjective? Suppose we did disagree over whether reason and logic existed. Would this make reason and logic subjective?

If knowing something by intuitive perceptions is sufficient for relativism, then logic and rationality is relative as well. If knowing something by intuitive perception is not sufficient for relativism, you'll have a bit more work to do to show that I am a moral relativist.


Makarismos wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Similarly, it's unclear that the method of how I know morality (my intuitive perceptions) makes morality relative, any more than it would make logic and rationality relative.


Of course it does, because we could all each of us intuitively perceive OM to be different. OM, according to you, depends entirely on what we “intuitively perceive” - i.e. OM is entirely dictated by our own intuition.


I do not believe morality is dictated by our own intuition any more than I believe logic is. Yet our only method of knowing logical truths is intuitive perception, likewise with morality (at least some of the basic principles of morality, e.g. Kant's categorical imperative).


Makarismos wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Why? Isn't it possible for a culture to condone the Holocaust? There are anti-Semitic people out there who don't think the Holocaust was wrong. What if some selective natural disaster left these people the majority? Would the Holocaust become morally okay then?


In this hypothetical post apocalyptic future, the people you mention would consider the holocaust to be morally ok, yes. This would still not make it ok for me though, or for you, or for any of us here today. In this sense CSM is very lasting indeed.


But then if the culture says its OK whereas you and I think it is wrong, then who is right? If the culture is right, then CSM's disapproval of the Holocaust is not lasting at all in this scenario. If the prospect of another Holocaust looms over the horizon, is the statement "The Holocaust ought not to happen" true for false?

Note that there are some forms of ethical relativism that are coherent and some that are not. Ethical subjectivism says that there is a real right and wrong, and what that is depends on what the person believes. So if Adolph thinks that killing Jews is morally right, then it is morally right for that person to do it. If Oskar believes killing Jews is morally wrong, then it is wrong for that person to do it. Under ethical subjectivism, Oskar can believe it is wrong for Adolph to kill Jews, but that belief would be mistaken because Adolph thinks otherwise. Whether ethical subjectivism is correct, it at least produces a non-contradictory answer to the question "Should Adolph kill Jews?" In this way ethical subjectivism is a coherent form of ethical relativism. But what is not coherent is the belief (which I'll call pseudo-relativism) that right and wrong do exist, where Adolph thinks its morally right to kill Jews and Oskar thinks it is morally wrong for Adolph to kill Jews and have them both be right. That would be a contradiction. Pseudo-relativism cannot give a coherent answer to question "Should Adolph kill Jews?" It can reiterate the beliefs of people whether Adolph should kill Jews but it cannot answer the question. Pseudo-relativism is not a coherent ethical system.




And I'm not sure I'm in agreement that it is metaphysically possible for objective morality to support the Holocaust.


Why not? The point is we have no way of knowing for sure.


In this case you're talking about epistemic possibility (something is "possible" in the sense that we don't know for certain that it is false). But if that is sufficient for "possibility" than it is also possible for the Holocaust to be morally OK for cultural relativism or any other coherent meta-ethical belief system. Heck, it's also possible for the universe to be five minutes old. If all our intuitive perceptions fit under the category of "no way of knowing for sure" then its even possible for people's intuitive perceptions about logic to be incorrect (e.g. people could think 2 + 2 = 5 is logical, so it's "possible" for our intuitive perceptions to be wrong about 2 + 2 = 4 because we can't know that for sure).
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/23/08 - 07:30 AM:
quote post
#595
jdrw wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

Sure, but I'll need an answer to this question: how does this position answer the question of Who or what says how we ought to behave?


Tisthammerw, twice above I’ve pointed out that if you grant that Objective Morality exists, then you have granted that it is that very Objective Morality which answers the question “what says how we ought to behave?”


But then if the answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is "morality" then you kind of took my quote out of context (almost making it appear as if I had ignored that response), because I immediately rebutted that very position. The full context of the quote:


Sure, but I'll need an answer to this question: how does this position answer the question of Who or what says how we ought to behave?

If the answer is "morality" then we face the same problem of circularity I mentioned earlier. Who or what says how we ought to behave? Morality. What is morality? How we ought to behave. So how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. True, but circular and provides no real foundation (and thus no real answer to the question at hand). We still have the question of who or what says how we ought to behave.


How do you address the rebuttal that the response being "morality" provides no real answer to the question?



This is a sloppy caricature of non-cognitivism.

You entirely ignore the fact that non-cognitivism is about the ontological status of moral claims, not about whether the actual behavior is acceptable or deplorable to non-cognitivists.


Er, no I don't. That's why I very specifically said that it's possible for an ethical noncognitivist to not like what Hitler did. I do however question whether any statements like "We ought to stop the genocides!" are consistent for an ethical noncognitivist to say. Under ethical noncognitivism, there is nothing wrong with genocide any more than there is anything wrong with sauerkraut (I don't like sauerkraut, but that is simply my personal tastes which differ from those of other people).



The “hubbub” is over violations of deep values--value outrage instead of moral outrage. They are over deep values about human beings and how it is and is not acceptable to treat them.


It's not? But ethical noncognitivism says there's nothing wrong with treating them that way. There is no "ought" or "should," no moral right and wrong under ethical noncognitivism. Noncognitivism says that hate isn’t any better than love, and that intolerance isn’t any better than tolerance. It's all a matter of taste--like preferring vanilla over chocolate--as mentioned earlier. Of course, a person can strongly dislike genocides, but if the noncognitivist is consistent her dislike would have to be akin to me disliking sauerkraut, and that there really isn't anything wrong about it. So how could a noncognitivist say we ought stop genocidal campaigns? It’s not as if people shouldn’t commit genocide, if noncognitivism is correct. Noncognitivism says genocidal rulers just have different tastes and that’s OK; there’s nothing wrong with it. Any noncognitivist that would say we ought to put an end to such behavior would be inconsistent.

A noncognitivist could shout from the rooftops "I loathe genocide" like I could for "I loathe sauerkraut" but neither of us have any real basis or any real reason for others to share our dislike for those sorts of things (for we ourselves dislike it for no real reason; it just doesn't fit our mental taste-buds). There is no real reason for a genocidal ruler to stop killing people, because it's all a matter of personal taste and nobody's really wrong, right?
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Makarismos
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Posted 03/23/08 - 10:46 AM:
quote post
#596
Tisthammerw wrote:
Tisthammerw: Why am I a moral relativist? Because I rely on my intuitive perceptions to know that morality exists?

Makarismos: Yes, that is why.

Tisthammerw: I also rely on my intuitive perceptions to tell me that logic and rationality exist. Does this make logic and rationality relative?

Makarismos: In a way it does. However we all have to agree that they exist in order to argue at all. We can however disagree about morality, and still remain coherent. If we disagree about reason, there can be no further discussion at all.

Perhaps so, but notice that we may have differing views over what beliefs are rational just as some people have differing views over what beliefs are moral. Does this imply that rationality is itself subjective? Suppose we did disagree over whether reason and logic existed. Would this make reason and logic subjective?

But we know what is logical. We know that contradiction is meaningless, we know that aX2 = 2a. Perhaps you have an example of a set of beliefs which are controversial in their rationality? Even if you do, I rather think that rationality itself is well understood, where as showing that these “irrational beliefs” match with Rational thought is generally the difficult thing. Humans are not the most naturally rational creatures.
Tisthammerw wrote:

If knowing something by intuitive perceptions is sufficient for relativism, then logic and rationality is relative as well.

Not true, if you deny rationality then you also deny all of your arguments. If you want to do this then go ahead – I don’t mind. If not, then you still have morality to discuss, and your brand is decidedly relative.
Tisthammerw wrote:

If knowing something by intuitive perception is not sufficient for relativism, you'll have a bit more work to do to show that I am a moral relativist.

Eh? If knowing something by intuitive perception alone does not count as relativism, then what does? Mr A feels in his heart that murder is wrong, mr B says it is right – how would you decide? Or does it only matter what you think?
Tisthammerw wrote:

I do not believe morality is dictated by our own intuition any more than I believe logic is. Yet our only method of knowing logical truths is intuitive perception, likewise with morality (at least some of the basic principles of morality, e.g. Kant's categorical imperative).

Kant was a fine philosopher, but you can’t be seriously claiming that he has shown us all the undisputed path to moral realisation! His work is heavily criticised, amongst other things he believed we should never act morally because we merely wanted to. He believed that moral commands should be followed through a sense of duty – a mother protecting her child through instinct would be acting immorally, unless she resorted to rationalising her duty to her child first.
Thus morality does not equal logic (unless you have some way of showing how it does?).
Tisthammerw wrote:

But then if the culture says its OK whereas you and I think it is wrong, then who is right? If the culture is right, then CSM's disapproval of the Holocaust is not lasting at all in this scenario. If the prospect of another Holocaust looms over the horizon, is the statement "The Holocaust ought not to happen" true for false?

You want more from morality than can logically be possible – but this is your problem, not a problem for the universe. I can sit here all day and complain that there are too few perfect circles – but this is no criticism against the idea that a perfect circle is a mere imaginary construct. It explains to an extent a natural phenomena, but this does not make it a reality.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Note that there are some forms of ethical relativism that are coherent and some that are not. Ethical subjectivism says that there is a real right and wrong, and what that is depends on what the person believes. So if Adolph thinks that killing Jews is morally right, then it is morally right for that person to do it. If Oskar believes killing Jews is morally wrong, then it is wrong for that person to do it. Under ethical subjectivism, Oskar can believe it is wrong for Adolph to kill Jews, but that belief would be mistaken because Adolph thinks otherwise.

Even on your own description of “ethical subjectivism” this is incorrect. According to what you have written, killing Jews is morally wrong only from Oscars point of view. In other words Oskar’s belief would be correct, for him killing Jews is morally wrong, it is not wrong from Adolph’s perspective however. Besides, who cares – I was talking about your position, which is logically flawed, and you have not remedied that yet. If you merely receive your “Objective” morality from your own intuition, then it is by definition a subjective morality.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Whether ethical subjectivism is correct, it at least produces a non-contradictory answer to the question "Should Adolph kill Jews?" In this way ethical subjectivism is a coherent form of ethical relativism. But what is not coherent is the belief (which I'll call pseudo-relativism) that right and wrong do exist, where Adolph thinks its morally right to kill Jews and Oskar thinks it is morally wrong for Adolph to kill Jews and have them both be right. That would be a contradiction.

If I think the world is round, and you think it’s flat, it doesn’t care. This sort of contradiction is just fine thanks.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Pseudo-relativism cannot give a coherent answer to question "Should Adolph kill Jews?" It can reiterate the beliefs of people whether Adolph should kill Jews but it cannot answer the question. Pseudo-relativism is not a coherent ethical system.

Again, you want more from morality than it can give you. I have shown you why your OM is no better (worse in fact) than CSM, and yet you want it to give absolute answers – they don’t exist. You are chasing the philosopher’s stone. Give it up – or else show how it can be found? If you have an objective method of finding OM, then I’m all ears.
Tisthammerw wrote:

In this case you're talking about epistemic possibility (something is "possible" in the sense that we don't know for certain that it is false). But if that is sufficient for "possibility" than it is also possible for the Holocaust to be morally OK for cultural relativism or any other coherent meta-ethical belief system.

The fact that it is possible is fatal for your arguments. If it is possible that the holocaust is commended by OM, then you (as a follower of OM) might endorse the holocaust. You have no way of showing how this is not the case, and so you simply guess. According to your guess, OM does no such thing, but you can’t show your working can you.
Tisthammerw wrote:

Heck, it's also possible for the universe to be five minutes old. If all our intuitive perceptions fit under the category of "no way of knowing for sure" then its even possible for people's intuitive perceptions about logic to be incorrect (e.g. people could think 2 + 2 = 5 is logical, so it's "possible" for our intuitive perceptions to be wrong about 2 + 2 = 4 because we can't know that for sure).

If logic is wrong, then your arguments are all duff as well as mine. If the universe if five minutes old, then how does that affect my arguments? It doesn’t affect them at all. It is still the case that we have no way of knowing what objective morality is, except for our own moral intuition – and I would say our own moral intuition is sufficient for a moral understanding. You, however, want everything you feel to be eternal and commanding for all of time: something you have yet to argue for successfully.
Please, keep going.
jdrw
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Posted 03/23/08 - 12:33 PM:
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#597
Tisthammerw wrote:

But then if the answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave" is "morality" then you kind of took my quote out of context (almost making it appear as if I had ignored that response), because I immediately rebutted that very position. The full context of the quote:

Sure, but I'll need an answer to this question: how does this position answer the question of Who or what says how we ought to behave?

If the answer is "morality" then we face the same problem of circularity I mentioned earlier. Who or what says how we ought to behave? Morality. What is morality? How we ought to behave. So how we ought to behave says how we ought to behave. True, but circular and provides no real foundation (and thus no real answer to the question at hand). We still have the question of who or what says how we ought to behave.


How do you address the rebuttal that the response being "morality" provides no real answer to the question?


Once again, let me remind you that I do not think that Objective Morality is an intelligible concept. As I’ve said in other threads, and as Buddahchuck (I think it was) has noted in this thread, moralities tend to be circular. And as Makarismos, in particular has noted, explanations about moralities tend to slide into a regress, or else to stop with some allege