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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/08/08 - 06:42 AM:
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#551
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Just to be clear, then: you agree that the deductive version of the moral argument fails and have chosen instead to defend an inductive version in which God results from a "reference to the best explanation." Is this correct?


Depends on what you mean by "deductive version of the moral argument." If you mean this:


  1. If objective moral values exist, then we have a 100% ironclad guarantee that a exists being perfect in power, knowledge, and goodness that created the universe.
  2. Objective moral values exist
  3. Therefore this being (the God of traditional theism) exists.


Then no, I don't believe it succeeds. An "inference to the best explanation" would be more accurate to what I'm arguing. I'm saying that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God (not necessarily an ironclad proof) and this has always been my position in this thread.

Although atheism and objective morality are not logically inconsistent, I question whether a plausible atheistic explanation of objective morality exists such that it would not constitute evidence for the existence of God (the other category of atheistic explanations simply being explanations that are not plausible). For instance, the only plausible alternative I know of (the brute fact position) eventually leads us to a pantheistic God, one with a number of characteristics suspiciously like the God of traditional theism. As an example of the other category, the idea that Mount Rushmore is the correct answer to "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" is not logically impossible (thus refuting the first premise of the above deductive argument), but neither is it plausible.

The idea of karma as the basis for objective moral values is interesting, because it is not the typical conception of karma (as in Buddhism and Hinduism) in that e.g. this is also what has supreme authority in telling us how we ought to behave. It also (1) does not seem like the sort of explanation that an atheist (at least a classical one) would find plausible and (2) seems indicative of a God-like force anyway. The existence of some supernatural force wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone always ought to obey it while also punishing anyone who disobeys would be an affirmation of my position. If I were an atheist I would not consider such a supernatural force authoritatively commanding behavior and reincarnating souls etc. to be a plausible alternative (but perhaps that's just me) particularly because such a "force" suspiciously shares some key characteristics of the traditional God (being supernatural, the basis of morality, infallible and supreme authority in commanding moral behavior, and punishing those who disobey).
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
jdrw
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Posted 03/08/08 - 04:49 PM:
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#552
Tisthammerw wrote:

I agree that atheism and objective morality do not yield a logical contradiction and is in this sense consistent. But I am not contending that atheism and objective morality are inconsistent. I am only saying that objective moral values provide evidence for the existence of God, not a rigorous proof. For that, I do not need to demonstrate that atheism and the existence of objective morality provide a logical contradiction.


But the point is: What value to your claim is evidence that is consistent with your claim and also is consistent with your claim’s contradiction?



Why is this true? I suppose whether it is true will depend on whether the statement "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God" is something worth discussing or if discussing the statement's veracity constitutes "mere trivial logical games." I don't think it is, but perhaps I am biased.


My statement is true because unless objective morality actually is a fact, (rather than a presupposed “given”) then your argument is merely valid, but not sound. And if your argument is not sound, then it doesn’t have much import.



As I have said elsewhere, I'm defining "authority" as "the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed."


Sorry, but that definition is unintelligible to me.




jdrw wrote:

If there are no demonstrable consequences [of non-compliance], then what’s the difference between the existence or non-existence of this whole alleged moral dimension?


The only difference I can think of (at the top of my head) is the veracity of the ought-statements themselves and the existence of some X possessing the authority to command our behavior. (The existence direct intuition many of us have of the existence of objective moral truths might also count as a difference.)


I really can’t make sense of your response here. But “direct intuition” is demonstrably one of the least reliable criteria for determining whether or not claims are true—as I would guess you’d agree regarding the direct intuitions people across the globe have about their particular religious beliefs.


Cheers.
jd
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/09/08 - 08:02 AM:
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#553
jdrw wrote:


I agree that atheism and objective morality do not yield a logical contradiction and is in this sense consistent. But I am not contending that atheism and objective morality are inconsistent. I am only saying that objective moral values provide evidence for the existence of God, not a rigorous proof. For that, I do not need to demonstrate that atheism and the existence of objective morality provide a logical contradiction.


But the point is: What value to your claim is evidence that is consistent with your claim and also is consistent with your claim’s contradiction?


If mere logical consistency were sufficient to discard evidence, then there is no evidence of value for pretty much every scientific theory. The underdetermination of theories guarantees that there will be an infinite number of theories that are logically consistent with any set of data. The catch? Not all theories will fit the data equally "well." For example, the theory that the universe popped into existence five-minutes ago exactly as it then was is 100% logically consistent with the data. Any evidence you might point to indicate an older universe (gray hairs, fossils etc.) was created five minutes ago according to the five-minute hypothesis (perhaps this is implausible, but it is logically possible), and thus the hypothesis is logically consistent with the data. Yet a theory being logically consistent does not mean it is plausible, and it does not imply that gray hairs, memories, and fossils cannot be used as legitimate evidence for an older universe.

Similarly, one could come up with an atheistic basis of morality that is logically consistent but not plausible, or come up with an explanation of morality that is plausible but still constitutes evidence for God (e.g. a basis of morality that still requires some type of God that is omnipresent, incorporeal, eternal, etc.).




Why is this true? I suppose whether it is true will depend on whether the statement "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God" is something worth discussing or if discussing the statement's veracity constitutes "mere trivial logical games." I don't think it is, but perhaps I am biased.


My statement is true because unless objective morality actually is a fact, (rather than a presupposed “given”) then your argument is merely valid, but not sound. And if your argument is not sound, then it doesn’t have much import.


I think you may be misunderstanding what my argument actually is. I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. Even if objective moral values do not exist, the argument can still be sound.




As I have said elsewhere, I'm defining "authority" as "the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed."


Sorry, but that definition is unintelligible to me.


What part of "the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed" is unintelligible to you? If X puts forth a statement of what to do (a command, e.g. "Wash the deck soldier!"), and one is obligated to obey it, then X has "authority," because one ought to obey the command.



I really can’t make sense of your response here. But “direct intuition” is demonstrably one of the least reliable criteria for determining whether or not claims are true—as I would guess you’d agree regarding the direct intuitions people across the globe have about their particular religious beliefs.


Is the reliability of sensory perceptions and memory a religious belief? That our sensory perceptions and our memory is ever reliable is something that is just intuitively recognized; there's no real evidence for it. We have to rely on that sort of intuition to accept our basic beliefs. The perception that logic is reliable is also something that is intuitively recognized. Sure, it's possible that those intuitions could be false, e.g. it is logically possible that everyone thinks 2 + 2 = 5 and be wrong. But they're all we have to go on.

For instance, how do you know your memory is ever reliable? You could say something like "Well, I recall a number of instances where I correctly remembered where I parked my car." But that's using a memory to justify memory--circular reasoning. It’s not real evidence for the claim that “memory is at least sometimes reliable.” The same goes for sensory perceptions. The belief that our sensory perceptions are ever reliable is just something that's intuitively recognized. The ethical objectivist (as William Lane Craig) might argue that we have no more reason to doubt the existence of objective moral values than we do to doubt the existence of objective physical objects.

So, what I was saying is that if objective moral values did not exist, perhaps one would argue that it is more likely our intuitive perceptions would be different (just as they might be different if logic supported X instead of Y). It might not sound like much, but at the end of the day intuitive perceptions are all we have to go on.
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jdrw
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Posted 03/09/08 - 12:53 PM:
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#554
Tisthammerw wrote:

If mere logical consistency were sufficient to discard evidence, then there is no evidence of value for pretty much every scientific theory. The underdetermination of theories guarantees that there will be an infinite number of theories that are logically consistent with any set of data. The catch? Not all theories will fit the data equally "well."


Yes, thanks for your patience. The issue of underdetermination nagged at me when I responded to this point, but I’d confused myself by construing the issue as being about not only rival theories, but about contradictory theories (theism vs. atheism.) And whether the theories at issue are actually contradictory or not now strikes me as irrelevant. I guess the issue simply is about plain old underdetermination.

So you need to show how the evidence fits your theory better than it fits rival theories. You need to show that yours is the inference to the best explanation.



Why is this true? I suppose whether it is true will depend on whether the statement "If objective moral values exist, then they are evidence for the existence of God" is something worth discussing or if discussing the statement's veracity constitutes "mere trivial logical games." I don't think it is, but perhaps I am biased.


I did not mean any offense to you by talking about claims that are merely logically valid but not logically sound as being trivial. My point was simply that unless you can establish the soundness and not just the validity of your premises, then the conclusion that God exists is merely valid in a closed logical game of little import, as distinguished from being a fact of great import about the real world..



I think you may be misunderstanding what my argument actually is. I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. Even if objective moral values do not exist, the argument can still be sound.


How can an argument be sound if one of its premises isn’t true?

And if an argument isn’t sound, then its conclusion, if valid, has no import in the world beyond the little self-contained logic game it is part of.



What part of "the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed" is unintelligible to you? If X puts forth a statement of what to do (a command, e.g. "Wash the deck soldier!"), and one is obligated to obey it, then X has "authority," because one ought to obey the command.


Words/concepts such as “ought” (as well as “should” and sometimes “obligated”) are very vague to me. I really don’t understand quite what people think they mean by “ought”, especially when used in some so-called moral sense.

I understand that the soldier ought or is obligated to obey the order of his superior in the sense that obeying the orders of superiors is what he agreed to do in becoming a soldier. He either is living up to his agreement or he is avoiding undesirable consequences of noncompliance. These are the senses of “ought to obey” that make sense to me.

But you seem to have some other sense of “ought” in mind.



So, what I was saying is that if objective moral values did not exist, perhaps one would argue that it is more likely our intuitive perceptions would be different (just as they might be different if logic supported X instead of Y). It might not sound like much, but at the end of the day intuitive perceptions are all we have to go on.


Intuitions (as well as memories) are notoriously unreliable. People have any number of intuitions that are subjectively compelling for them, but which are incmpatible with or even contradictory of the intuitions that other people are convinced are true.

Our intuitions about the so-called morality of various behaviors are an emotional, psychological, and cognitive mix largely determined by our particular social subgroup in its particular context at its particular historical moment. What people construe as so-called “intuitive moral knowledge” can be shown to vary widely and sometimes to directly contradict the “intuitive moral knowledge” of others in other socio-cultural contexts or in other historical periods.


Cheers.
jd
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/09/08 - 02:24 PM:
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#555
jdrw wrote:

So you need to show how the evidence fits your theory better than it fits rival theories. You need to show that yours is the inference to the best explanation.


I suppose I ought to distinguish between what my argument says and what I personally believe. I personally believe that God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values. My argument (all it really says) is that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God.

I argued (as in post #505) that the only plausible atheistic alternative (the brute fact position) eventually points us in the general direction of theism anyway; implying a pantheistic God that is transcendent, omnipresent, incorporeal, eternal etc. If the only plausible alternative nonetheless leads to some type of God with these characteristics, I conclude that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God.

One could still argue from inference to the best explanation here. If I were an atheist and the only plausible "alternative" was some transcendent, eternal, pantheistic God wielding supreme moral authority in telling me what to do, I'm not sure I could stomach it. I'd probably think I was better off denying the existence of objective moral values altogether if I were to remain an atheist.




I think you may be misunderstanding what my argument actually is. I am arguing that if objective moral values exist they are evidence for the existence of God. Even if objective moral values do not exist, the argument can still be sound.


How can an argument be sound if one of its premises isn’t true?


"Objective moral values exist" is not a premise but more like a conditional proof assumption to reach the desired conclusion "If objective moral values exist, they are evidence for the existence of God."




What part of "the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed" is unintelligible to you? If X puts forth a statement of what to do (a command, e.g. "Wash the deck soldier!"), and one is obligated to obey it, then X has "authority," because one ought to obey the command.


Words/concepts such as “ought” (as well as “should” and sometimes “obligated”) are very vague to me. I really don’t understand quite what people think they mean by “ought”, especially when used in some so-called moral sense.


There are only so many synonyms I can appeal to. "Should" basically means "ought" which basically expresses an "obligation." "Obligation" expresses a responsibility or duty, something that one is supposed to do. Beyond this I may not be able to help you understand the terms (should the dictionary fail you).




So, what I was saying is that if objective moral values did not exist, perhaps one would argue that it is more likely our intuitive perceptions would be different (just as they might be different if logic supported X instead of Y). It might not sound like much, but at the end of the day intuitive perceptions are all we have to go on.


Intuitions (as well as memories) are notoriously unreliable.


Then on what grounds are we to believe in anything, including the belief that intuitions are untrustworthy? Remember that logic is itself something that is intuitively perceived. We rely on our basic intuitive perceptions regarding the belief that memory and sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. If all intuitive perception is thrown out the door, we don't have any knowledge at all.

Note that there is a difference between the basic intuitive perceptions ("Logic is reliable; I think therefore I exist" etc.) and causal hunches ("I have a hunch it'll rain tomorrow"). The basics are required for basic beliefs; otherwise we have to throw out all knowledge. We shouldn't be the ranch on some intuitions (like casual hunches) but there are some intuitive perceptions we can take to the bank (like perceiving the logic behind a sound mathematical proof).



Our intuitions about the so-called morality of various behaviors are an emotional, psychological, and cognitive mix largely determined by our particular social subgroup in its particular context at its particular historical moment.


But how do you know this? If it's because you've seen it with your own eyes, how do you know that sensory perceptions are ever reliable? How do you know that memories (as of your sensory perceptions) are ever reliable? If it's based on testimony (as from a book) how do you know that testimony is ever reliable?

Eventually we are going to have to come down to intuitively recognizing certain basic beliefs if we are to have any knowledge at all. There's just no way around this. That may be in part why William Lane Craig argues we have no more reason to doubt the existence of objective moral values than we do the existence of objective physical objects. I'm guessing Craig believes just as I do that the existence of objective moral values is a basic belief, which is based on (you guessed it) intuitive perception.

Of course, we might disagree whether the existence of objective moral values is a basic belief, but that is another matter (than how we come to our basic beliefs).
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Buddahchuck
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Posted 03/09/08 - 02:52 PM:
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#556
Tist wrote:

Philosophy, psychology, and computer science often take ordinary words and adjust their meaning slightly so that the words more accurately convey the meaning. For example, in metaphysics “free will” can take varying definitions depending on whose theory you accept and although the definitions are typically similar to what a layperson may think of free will they are not necessarily identical. Psychology articles can get more dissimilar from the common meaning, and the word “random” in “random access memory” is more dissimilar yet.


Let me be a little more explicit in my criticism of your definitions since it obviously slipped. Of course people vary definitions, but they do so in consideration to the conventions of speech, and when they adopt a definition, they do so with justification. In virtually every treatise on free will, the essayist will begin with his definitions and explanations for adopting a certain interpretation over another. Often, that explanation will consist of how and why we think of something a certain way, and why this fits their definition. This is true in talking about free will, morality, dualism etc. Seldom is it the case that definitions are just thrown out with no more of an explanation other than "it allows my argument to be true".

Tist wrote:

Personal dislike of a definition is actually no reason to object to the conclusion as long as the definitions are used consistently.


I agree whole-heartedly. The problem is that when using uncoventional definitions there needs to be a justification for using such a definition. For example, we cannot merely label "pink elephants" as "the supreme metaphysical reality" without some sort of justification. Granted, it is hard to see what this justification would be in relation to our conception of pink elephants. Additionally, someone can indict this justification by saying that it is unreasonable and giving a counter-justification (or simply justifying their claim).


So saying “I don’t like that definition” is really beside the point. For instance, one might abominate the definitions of “two” and “four” in mathematics, but even if the majority shared this disliked this would not change that under the definitions it logically follows that two plus two equal four


Yes, saying "I don't like that definition" is beside the point, unless someone gives justification for his/her dislike of the definition. In speaking of definitions of "two" and "four", one should note that they have very conventional definitions that are understood. If someone were to change the conventional definition of "two" to be synonomous with "all composite numbers", however, we would have a problem and require justification for such a drastic change of definition.


Similarly, I may use authority to mean “the right to give orders” whereas you may see it as not only the right to give orders but also the power to punish disobedience of such orders.


So I see your confusion. My argument, however, is not that authority requires the ability to "punish disobedience of such orders". Rather, my argument is that authority is MORE than merely the right to give orders. For instance, in classical literature, there is often a sage, and then one who has authority over that sage. In Oedipus Rex, in the conversation between Teiresias and Oedipus, Oedipus is clearly the one with authority, however, Teiresias is the one who "really ought to be obeyed". This scene illustrates the distinction between "authority" and "what really ought to be done". So while this is the premise upon which I reject your definition of authority, you now need to give justification aside from "it allows me to meet certain criteria".


This criticism really doesn’t get us anywhere, because what really matters is if the conclusion logically follows from my definitions.


This response does matter because if someone rejects your definitions, then there is no way your argument can be compelling.


Expressing dislike of the definitions themselves (saying they are unconventional etc.) really won’t accomplish much. Focusing overzealously on the definitions runs the risks of fallacies of equivocation, misconstruals, ignoratio elenchi, non sequiturs.


Actually, a lack of accurately defining one's terms leads to "equivocation, misconstruals, ignoratio elenchi and no sequiturs." You see, each of these fallacies you named is a result of the very action you are committing: basing an argument solely off of re-defining terms, trying to "force" logic, if you will.


That said, claiming that defining “God” as “the supreme metaphysical reality” is equally (or more so) as bizarre as defining the term “pink elephants” as “the supreme metaphysical reality” is not quite cricket. The problem with defining “God” too narrowly is that it makes the definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) meaningless or misleading.


There, ya go. The definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) is meaningless AND misleading. This point has been argued widely and deeply, and there are few (aside from yourself, apparently) who would think this is not so. Still, we are all open-minded. All we need to accept this definition of pantheism is some sort of justification. Instead, you offer this:


Since my argument from morality includes use of the term “pantheism” I have little rational choice but to choose a coherent definition of God that also allows for pantheism to be meaningfully defined.


This justification is quite clearly a mere rationalization. You have your conclusion and then you define your term in order to support the conclusion. This type of flawed reasoning is what the enlightenment was supposed to bring us away from.


Before you criticize my definition of God again, please answer this question: can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful?


This is the problem. You are demanding the inclusion of pantheism in the definition of God. But where pantheism is more or less an identity between God and Universe/Nature/Reality and therefore must have a certain conception of God, "God" does not need to include pantheism.

Additionally, this question is an attempt to skew definitions. One definition does not exist to make another meaningful and accurate, it should be meaningful and accurate of its own accord. Pantheism is the concept of God and the Universe/Nature/Reality being one. God is the concept of an "omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent" being." The reason Pantheism fits with this is because the pantheist sees the Universe as "omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent."


If not, there seems little reason to criticize my definition if there’s no better one available.


I presume this was wishful thinking.


I understand you may dislike pantheism


I am typically in defense of pantheism. It just so happens that your abuse of it puts me on a side I am not typically in defense of.


but that’s still no reason not to have a meaningful definition of it (particularly when the term is being used for the topic at hand).


The problem isn't the definition of pantheism, it's your definition of "God" as "the supreme metaphysical reality" that is being indicted. Aside from this definition being vague and indecipherable (NB putting three loaded words next to each other does not provide for a clear definition"), it is ultimately meaningless. What is a "supreme reality", and why is such a reality a "metaphysical" reality. Is there any reality that is not metaphysical? Or perhaps you mean supremely metaphysical which still doesn't make sense. What's the distinction between a "supreme metaphysical reality" and just a plain ordinary reality? What sort of metaphysical assumptions are you making when you provide a definition like "supreme metahpysical reality" and why would that definition be exclusive to "god" and not to something like....pink elephants, the human mind, a flying spaghetti monster. Certainly an atheist can believe in a "supreme metaphysical reality" without adhering to the idea of "God", but if we accept your definition, then atheists are simply misguided. I understand you are trying to develop an idea of "God" that would mesh with a concept of pantheism, but rather than defining pantheism as the identity of God being the universe, you are defining God as pantheism, which is entirely unnecessary for the argument you are trying to make.


This source includes the “right to give orders” as a match for the definition of authority. My definition (the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed) is extremely similar to this one, if not outright synonymous. Is such a definition really so bizarre?


Yes, because the question is truly the "potency" of the giving of such orders. To date, you have never explained why such a conception of God constitutes a moral authority. Spinoza explained that in a pantheistic setting, everything that does happen ought to happen. What is your answer to this question? It cannot merely be something that "ought" to be obeyed, for as explained above, there are plenty of arguments that perhaps "ought" to be obeyed yet are not for lack of authority. where's the resolution?


Hence, “the power to put forth for statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed” seems like an adequate non-circular definition of what I mean by “authority.”


It seems quite inadequate to me. If I were you, I would go with Spinoza's resolution, but you have expressed your dislike of that resolution (without justification I might add). By your definition, merely being able to speak would constitute "the power to forth statement of what to do that ought to be obeyed." Yet, it does not fit with your idea of God, for the universe does not exactly "put forth statements". So I could accept your definition, but I'm not sure that you would want me to do that, because then you would NEED to answer how the universe "puts forth statements", a dilemma you tried to dodge earlier.


You have changed "supreme metaphysical reality" into "reality" (thus changing the actual meaning of the term as I used it) and asked a question that does not apply to my actual position.


Well, perhaps you can elucidate the distinction.


I do not adhere to this position at all and find it almost nonsensical, so it makes little sense for me to explain it.


So you do not think that "the Supreme metaphysical reality" is the basis of morality? I thought this was your point. That if there were such a thing as objective morality, it would be based in the "supreme metaphysical reality. You must be objecting to the other claim.

morality is the basis of the "The supreme metaphysical reality". This is the logical principle that follows from your claim that morality originates from the "heart" of God, meaning that morality is the "essential and most vital part" of god. It seems like if the "essential and most vital part" of God is morality, then one could also claim that such is its basis, the crux upon which it hinges. Now you can understand my confusion in what is mutually agreed to be "nonsensical".


I don't know how to make it much clearer to you (that objective morality comes from God himself, as an inextricable part of who and what he is) except perhaps to point out that morality doesn't originate in any physical location.


You don't know how to make your point clearer than morality originates from the essential and most vital part of the supreme metaphysical reality? Why don't you start by explaining what the essential and most vital part of "universe/reality/existence" is. Or does morality not just originate there and they are the same thing? Don't act like your words are so clear and well-defined. Replacing one ambiguous statement with another doesn't aid my understanding. FYI: never did I presume that you meant that morality comes from a physical location, I was only pointing-out that you are not explaining your point clearly enough for it to be intelligible.


I don't think you understand the meaning of what I am trying to convey. It is logically impossible for there to be a higher authority than God. If X is the largest ball, it is logically impossible for there to be a larger ball (for then it would be larger than the most large ball, resulting in a self-contradiction). Similarly if X is the supreme metaphysical reality then there is no higher conception of God than X. If there is some metaphysical reality that is a higher conception of God than X, then X is not the supreme metaphysical reality (and therefore would have been God in the first place).


And I don't think you entirely understand the meaning of what I am trying to convey. When looking to authority, people respect what they consider to be the highest authority. The point I made earlier concerning my idea of morality and its warrants describes how when humanity looks to authority, it will look to the conceptually highest authority. People don't look to individuals for moral authority because they conceive of something greater, the universe. And then people don't look at the universe for authority because there is a conceptually higher authority, the creator of the universe. And then people don't look to the creator of the universe, they look to the creator of the creator ad infinitum. Now even if we accept that the universe actually says what's moral and what's not, there is a conceptually higher being to which authority will be deferred.

Now one thing I would like to point out in the above passage is : If there is some metaphysical reality that is a higher conception of God than X, then X is not the supreme metaphysical reality (and therefore would have been God in the first place).. So if I can merely conceive of something higher than god, then that conception is true? I do not think this is what you meant, but you seem to have lost the distinction between reality and conceived reality.


And again, please do not conflate "God" with "reality," since the two are not necessarily the same thing.


While I trust you will explain this in your response, I do want to offer:

Tisthammerw wrote:

If objective moral values exist without the traditional God, I think a pantheistic God would be the most plausible explanation (i.e. "It is the universe/reality/existence that says how we ought to behave") so in that sense the answer to your question is yes. We should obey the moral dictates that come from reality/existence.


Perhaps you can see my confusion. If a pantheistic god is both the "universe/reality/existence" as well as "the supreme metaphysical reality", I don't really understand where the "conflation" is.


But I have already provided a reason. Based on my definition of authority, the supreme metaphysical reality has "authority" in the sense that people really ought to obey it. God provides a metaphysical basis of objective moral values. Simplifying it a bit more, people really ought to obey the moral statements because those moral statements are correct.


And you don't see this as a circular and unwarranted assumption?


No, afterlife would still be part of reality, albeit not necessarily part of physical reality. It may sound strange, but it is as I said logically possible.


I was actually looking for an explanation, not another assertion. Perhaps you could explain what would constitute an after life in a pantheistic world. I thought this was clear before, but I guess not.
Buddahchuck
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Posted 03/09/08 - 03:16 PM:
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#557
PMB wrote:

I would argue, however, that we must understand "reason" quite widely (and "faith" as well) for the choice you have presented above to be a genuine dilemma. That is, a sentimentalist teleology of morals (à la Hume) involves reason, but only as slave to the passions. Authoritarian doctrines, meanwhile, are only "faith-based" insofar as they are unquestionable (which in some cases will involve a rather pejorative sense of the word "faith"). Moreover, a social contract (for example) may be reached in a teleological fashion only to take on an authoritarian role (although, see Thomas Jefferson for some insights into how this undermines even the original contract). So while the dichotomy presented is interesting, I have my doubts as to its sufficiency.


I agree that we do need to understand faith and reason quite widely, but the dichotomy is not my own. From St. Augustus to Rand, faith and reason have always been at war. In fact, a good case could and has been made explaining the relationship between the two (On the Geneology of Morals comes to mind, as well as The Brothers Karamov). What I always find interesting is that where one may adhere to reason, it is such adherence that causes distaste toward the conception of faith (defined simply as belief without reason). When one does open the mind and finds that faith and reason do not necessarily have to be at odds, then an interesting perspective can be found. As I stated before, Reformed Nihlist's thread "the Epistemology of Faith and Reason" had a profound influence on me as it lead to my understanding that today's society has a profound faith in reason, and led to my subsequent search for a reason for faith. This was the basis (a word that has been wantonly thrown around in this thread) of the justification for moral authoritarianism I attempted to layout.


It is also viciously circular. Either morality is justifying itself in this case or reason is.


Do you think that perhaps any search for a basis of morality is circular?


Have I ever recommended reading Nietzsche to you? I think you might be intrigued by, if not in complete agreement with, his thoughts on morality as presented in Daybreak (Cambridge edition) or The Gay Science (Walter Kaufmann edition). And, of course, you can't forget Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals (the Kaufmann translations of which can both be found in his Basic Writings of Nietzsche).
[quote]

While I have read On the Genealogy of Morals, I have not read any of his other works. The Genalogy was interesting, yet I always wondered how true the story is. "blonde beasts" and whatnot. I'll certainly check the others out.

[quote]
Again, I have no objections to an instrumentalist approach to morality (though I agree with Nietzsche that the need for such an approach is something to be overcome, though this is not currently feasible for most people). Furthermore, let me be clear: it has never been my intention to suggest that the existence of God could not make any difference to morality, only that it cannot serve a specific role that certain theistic moral realists want it to play.


But from what I took from the Genalogy of morals, God has served that role. It overtook the ideology of "the blonde beasts" reversing the dominant rolls so that the intellectuals (farmers, Jews, the generally weak) through resentiment, guilted the blonde beasts into accepting their own God. Let's not forget to give credit to the same institution we give blame. God did unite an entire continent for a millenia, even if only in name, under one, righteous moral code.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/09/08 - 07:27 PM:
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#558
Buddahchuck wrote:

Often, that explanation will consist of how and why we think of something a certain way, and why this fits their definition. This is true in talking about free will, morality, dualism etc. Seldom is it the case that definitions are just thrown out with no more of an explanation other than "it allows my argument to be true".


Here's my explanation: definitions of "authority" that most closely match what I mean by them often end up being circular (as I noted in my previous post) so I wanted a better, non-circular definition. I had no other word that more closely matched the meaning of what I wanted it to say. So I chose this word because at the time there seemed to be no better way to communicate what I meant.

Also, I cited a source regarding the definition of authority, and I noted that the definition of God had to be suitably broad to allow for pantheism to be defined meaningfully.



I agree whole-heartedly. The problem is that when using uncoventional definitions there needs to be a justification for using such a definition.

...

My argument, however, is not that authority requires the ability to "punish disobedience of such orders". Rather, my argument is that authority is MORE than merely the right to give orders.


I did cite a source to support my position. The "right to give orders" was a match, remember? Given that I was able to cite an independent dictionary source, doesn't this establish that my definition is not unconventional?


The definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) is meaningless AND misleading.


Please explain, because I thought that is exactly what pantheism was. Is there a problem with my definition of pantheism?



but that’s still no reason not to have a meaningful definition of it (particularly when the term is being used for the topic at hand).


The problem isn't the definition of pantheism, it's your definition of "God" as "the supreme metaphysical reality" that is being indicted


Okay, so perhaps you do not have a problem with my definition of pantheism. But then if my definition of God is inadequate, please answer this question: can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful?




Before you criticize my definition of God again, please answer this question: can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful?


This is the problem. You are demanding the inclusion of pantheism in the definition of God. But where pantheism is more or less an identity between God and Universe/Nature/Reality and therefore must have a certain conception of God, "God" does not need to include pantheism.


Since I use the terms "God" and "pantheism" and since I define pantheism as "equating God with the universe/reality/existence" it is only logical that I come up with a definition of God that makes the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful. So its unclear why this is a "problem" and its even more unclear why I ought to define "God" in such a way that could not include pantheism. If I defined "God" otherwise my definition would be misleading or meaningless.

Incidentally, can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful? My definition of God may not be perfect, but I don't know of a better one given the circumstances.



Pantheism is the concept of God and the Universe/Nature/Reality being one. God is the concept of an "omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent" being." The reason Pantheism fits with this is because the pantheist sees the Universe as "omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent."


One problem is that pantheists do not necessarily ascribe their God with these characteristics. Classical pantheism is not the only variety of pantheism. In naturalistic pantheism for instance, the pantheistic God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient--indeed this God does not even possess consciousness. So I do not believe these definitions are adequate.




This criticism really doesn’t get us anywhere, because what really matters is if the conclusion logically follows from my definitions.


This response does matter because if someone rejects your definitions, then there is no way your argument can be compelling.


Disliking the definitions is no reason to reject the conclusion of the argument if it logically follows. Suppose someone defined "pink elephant" as "four" and "basketball" as "two." The statement "basketball plus basketball equals pink elephant" is a logically valid and sound conclusion, regardless of whether we like the definitions. Are you willing to acknowledge that my argument is valid? If not, perhaps it would be better to attack the reasoning of the argument.



If I were you, I would go with Spinoza's resolution, but you have expressed your dislike of that resolution (without justification I might add). By your definition, merely being able to speak would constitute "the power to forth statement of what to do that ought to be obeyed."


(1) I did not reject it without justification. The idea that "everything that happens ought to happen" seems highly fallacious; it does not logically follow that just because something did happen therefore it ought to be that way. (2) My definition does not at all say or imply that merely being able to speak would constitute "the power to forth statement of what to do that ought to be obeyed." You have misconstrued my position if you think otherwise.


Buddahchuck: Perhaps you can explain how we can simultaneously have reality as the basis for morality as well as morality as the basis of reality

Tisthammerw: I do not adhere to this position at all and find it almost nonsensical, so it makes little sense for me to explain it.

Buddahchuck: So you do not think that "the Supreme metaphysical reality" is the basis of morality? I thought this was your point.

Of course that's my point, but you conflated the definition of "the supreme metaphysical reality" with "reality" as I said in my previous post. In pantheism, God is the universe/reality/existence. In traditional theism God is not "reality" in the pantheistic sense. I am not a pantheist. Also, where did you get "morality is the basis of reality"? It bemuses me why you might think I held that position.



You don't know how to make your point clearer than morality originates from the essential and most vital part of the supreme metaphysical reality? Why don't you start by explaining what the essential and most vital part of "universe/reality/existence" is.


When I talked about the metaphysical basis of objective moral values being the heart of God I was talking about traditional theism, not pantheism.


Tisthammerw: Additionally, it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority as to why we should obey.

Buddahchuck: Except of course a higher conception of God as being the creator of this "metaphysical reality".

Tisthammerw: If God is the supreme metaphysical reality it is logically impossible for there to be a higher conception of God.

Buddahchuck: Unless of course you are mistaken and the creator of the supreme metaphysical reality carries more authority than reality itself.

Tisthammerw: I don't think you understand the meaning of what I am trying to convey. It is logically impossible for there to be a higher authority than God.

Buddahchuck: When looking to authority, people respect what they consider to be the highest authority. The point I made earlier concerning my idea of morality and its warrants describes how when humanity looks to authority, it will look to the conceptually highest authority. People don't look to individuals for moral authority because they conceive of something greater, the universe. And then people don't look at the universe for authority because there is a conceptually higher authority, the creator of the universe. And then people don't look to the creator of the universe, they look to the creator of the creator ad infinitum. Now even if we accept that the universe actually says what's moral and what's not, there is a conceptually higher being to which authority will be deferred.

That people may look for a higher authority that does not exist is not relevant to what I've been trying convey (in hindsight I was doing poor job of doing that; for that I apologize). It is logically impossible that there exists a higher "God" than the supreme metaphysical reality (whatever that reality might be) and there is no higher authority than God. Ergo, it is logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority than God (the supreme metaphysical reality). Whether one can conceive of the supreme metaphysical reality having more knowledge, more power etc. is irrelevant.


Buddahchuck: This could be easily amended should you provide a reason why "people really ought to obey" morality based upon "the supreme metaphysical reality".

Tisthammerw: But I have already provided a reason. Based on my definition of authority, the supreme metaphysical reality has "authority" in the sense that people really ought to obey it. God provides a metaphysical basis of objective moral values. Simplifying it a bit more, people really ought to obey the moral statements because those moral statements are correct.

Buddahchuck: And you don't see this as a circular and unwarranted assumption?

"Hairless mean have no hair" is circular, but not unwarranted. If the conclusion logically follows from my definitions, why think it is unwarranted? What assumption exactly do you feel is unwarranted and why do you believe this?

For the traditional God of theism, I think the reason why God has supreme authority is reasonably clear; its inherent in the definition of who and what God is (at least, the traditional definition of God). What about the God of pantheism? Recall that pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. Naturalistic pantheism is the most difficult to describe and identify, because this pantheistic God is not supernatural and does not possess consciousness. Yet if there is anything that fits the conception of this pantheistic God, the universe wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it would seem to be it. The basis of morality requires (by definition of what morality is) that one ought to honor these moral commands and devote oneself to them. This pantheistic God is the source of morality, and it follows that one ought to show deferential devotion to whatever source of morality authoritatively commands our behavior. So this pantheistic God is at least of the naturalistic if not sentient variety.

In the case of pantheism, I went from "supreme metaphysical authority" to "supreme metaphysical reality" using just this sort of reasoning.


Tisthammerw: Nonetheless, it is still logically possible for a pantheistic God to enforce and bring punishment (e.g. in the afterlife) though I'm guessing that will probably not be plausible to most atheists

Buddahchuck: I'm not an atheist, but I have trouble conceiving of an afterlife from a pantheistic God. What would that be? Some form of post-reality?

Tisthammerw: No, afterlife would still be part of reality, albeit not necessarily part of physical reality. It may sound strange, but it is as I said logically possible.

Buddahchuck: I was actually looking for an explanation, not another assertion.

Please remember what I was claiming. I said it was logically possible for a pantheistic God to bring punishment. As long as my assertion is logically possible, that is all that is required here. An afterlife could be a spiritual place of incorporeal souls. Although of course this wouldn't fit in well with naturalistic pantheism, it is still consistent with pantheism in the general sense (not all pantheistic worldviews reject the supernatural).
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
jdrw
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Posted 03/10/08 - 04:58 PM:
quote post
#559
Tisthammerw wrote:

One could still argue from inference to the best explanation here. If I were an atheist and the only plausible "alternative" was some transcendent, eternal, pantheistic God wielding supreme moral authority in telling me what to do, I'm not sure I could stomach it. I'd probably think I was better off denying the existence of objective moral values altogether if I were to remain an atheist.


In this little tangent you commit the logical fallacy of appeal to motive by constructing a a strawman alleging that atheists would need to commit the fallacy of appeal to consequences.



There are only so many synonyms I can appeal to. "Should" basically means "ought" which basically expresses an "obligation." "Obligation" expresses a responsibility or duty, something that one is supposed to do. Beyond this I may not be able to help you understand the terms (should the dictionary fail you).


Meaning is in people not in words. My interest is in understanding what you think you mean. I well realize that people use these words all the time. I don't understand what people think they mean by them.

When you say that somebody "ought" or "ought not" to do something, what do you mean besides you want them to behave in a particular way? What besides your personal desire do you take to be involved? What exactly are you referring to that’s outside yourself and the other person? What besides pragmatically undesirable consequences does this ought appeal to? In what sense is this "ought" binding on us?



jdrw wrote:

Intuitions (as well as memories) are notoriously unreliable.


Then on what grounds are we to believe in anything, including the belief that intuitions are untrustworthy? Remember that logic is itself something that is intuitively perceived. We rely on our basic intuitive perceptions regarding the belief that memory and sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. If all intuitive perception is thrown out the door, we don't have any knowledge at all.


Our grounds for our beliefs are the epistemic criteria that our beliefs can meet. There are various criteria available. Stringent intersubjectively agreed upon empirical confirmation under clearly specified conditions is one such possible criterion that we use. Rigorous rational coherence with theories that already have met that criteria is another possible criterion. These two are the hallmarks of science. It is entirely possible that personal subjective intuitions can turn out to be reliable, but we have learned that on the whole, claims that cannot meet the rational/empirical criteria are not very likely to prove to be reliable.

The presuppositions and laws of logic are defensible because we have found that they work. Claims that ignore them are highly unreliable, (if intelligible in the first place.) Thus, we use logic not because we’ve attained intuitive knowledge that logic is True, but rather because using logic works to our purposes better than not using it.



Eventually we are going to have to come down to intuitively recognizing certain basic beliefs if we are to have any knowledge at all. There's just no way around this.


What I recognize is that certain presuppositions work and others don’t.

The presuppositions of logic (say the law of noncontradiction) are after the fact descriptions of a way of forming cognitions about the world—a way that works. Furthermore, there are explanations (such as “embodied cognitions”) that account for such abstract rules as logic and math as being entirely human constructs derived from our physical engagement with the world.

I recognize that application of the epistemic criteria of science works very reliably, and claims that do not meet these criteria are not as likely to work.



That may be in part why William Lane Craig argues we have no more reason to doubt the existence of objective moral values than we do the existence of objective physical objects. I'm guessing Craig believes just as I do that the existence of objective moral values is a basic belief, which is based on (you guessed it) intuitive perception.


The reason we have to believe any claim is the epistemic criteria that we judge the claim to have met.

Claims about physical objects are able to be judged by the stringent epistemic criteria of science that I’ve outlined. Claims about “objective moral values” cannot meet these criteria. Thus, the reasons we have to believe claims about physical objects are radically different reasons than those for believing claims about “objective moral values.” What epistemic criteria besides subjective intuition have “objective moral values” met for you?


Cheers.
jd


Edited by jdrw on 03/10/08 - 05:04 PM
OTOH I might be exhaustively wrong about everything I've ever thought--with the possible exception of this sentence.
Buddahchuck
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Posted 03/10/08 - 04:58 PM:
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#560

I had no other word that more closely matched the meaning of what I wanted it to say. So I chose this word because at the time there seemed to be no better way to communicate what I meant.


And now, at this time, do you have a better way to communicate what you mean? It's just that moral authority is a pretty specific thing with specific criteria. The ability to put forth prescriptive statements, while perhaps an aspect of moral authority, does not constitute moral authority in and of itself.


I did cite a source to support my position. The "right to give orders" was a match, remember? Given that I was able to cite an independent dictionary source, doesn't this establish that my definition is not unconventional?


The link you provided referred me here: http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=authori...

The definition that fits "the right to give orders" is this:

"authority, authorization, authorisation, potency, dominance, say-so (the power or right to give orders or make decisions) "he has the authority to issue warrants"; "deputies are given authorization to make arrests"; "a place of potency in the state"".

This definition seems to assert that this authority requires consciousness. While the traditional theistic god has this ability, it is unclear why a pantheistic god would. Considering that we still cannot see how the universe/existence/reality "gives orders or makes decisions", I think the point would need to be elaborated on further in order for your point to be made more clear.

However, there is a better definition (from your link) that fits more of what we mean by "moral authority":
"authority (an expert whose views are taken as definitive) "he is an authority on corporate law"". This feeds into Mariner's post concerning the will being the basis of morality. When an individual chooses to accept a being's moral claims, then that being can then be labeled as an "authority". The reason this definition is better in the context of moral authority is that when we think of moral authoritarianism, we consider the moral authority to be the expert to which we refer in queries regarding morality, and such views are definitive in that they are not questioned.


Okay, so perhaps you do not have a problem with my definition of pantheism. But then if my definition of God is inadequate, please answer this question: can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful?


Can and have.


Since I use the terms "God" and "pantheism" and since I define pantheism as "equating God with the universe/reality/existence" it is only logical that I come up with a definition of God that makes the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful. So its unclear why this is a "problem" and its even more unclear why I ought to define "God" in such a way that could not include pantheism.


You do not see the circularity in defining pantheism as "equating god with the universe/reality/existence" and then defining god as "the supreme metaphysical reality"? Should we try a little substitution?

Using your definitions, the definition of pantheism is:

Equating "the supreme metaphysical reality" with the universe/reality/existence"

I think you need to elucidate the distinction between "the supreme metaphysical reality" and the universe/reality/existence in order to make your definition of pantheism meaningful; something i'm not sure you have done. It would help if you addressed my point from earlier:

I wrote:

What is a "supreme reality", and why is such a reality a "metaphysical" reality. Is there any reality that is not metaphysical? Or perhaps you mean supremely metaphysical which still doesn't make sense. What's the distinction between a "supreme metaphysical reality" and just a plain ordinary reality? What sort of metaphysical assumptions are you making when you provide a definition like "supreme metahpysical reality" and why would that definition be exclusive to "god" and not to something like....pink elephants, the human mind, a flying spaghetti monster. Certainly an atheist can believe in a "supreme metaphysical reality" without adhering to the idea of "God", but if we accept your definition, then atheists are simply misguided.


Tist wrote:

One problem is that pantheists do not necessarily ascribe their God with these characteristics. Classical pantheism is not the only variety of pantheism. In naturalistic pantheism for instance, the pantheistic God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient--indeed this God does not even possess consciousness. So I do not believe these definitions are adequate.


This is your attack on my definition of pantheism (just in case you didn't catch that).

One thing that this makes clear is that in spite of you being able to dole-out rhetoric concerning pantheism, you are note exactly familiar with it's primary sources:

Tist's favorite reference, Wiki wrote:

* Naturalistic pantheism, based on the relatively recent views of Baruch Spinoza (who may have been influenced by Biblical pantheism) and John Toland (who coined the term "pantheism"), as well as contemporary influences.


Both Spinoza and Toland define God as an "omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent being".

Classical pantheism entails a more personal relationship with this same sort of God.

I am not sure what you have read to make you think that naturalistic pantheism does not entail an "omniscient and omnipotent" god. And just for the record, neither "omniscient" nor "omnipotent" mean conscious in the sense of the consciousness of a traditional monotheistic God; so, your comment about consciousness is misplaced.


Disliking the definitions is no reason to reject the conclusion of the argument if it logically follows. Suppose someone defined "pink elephant" as "four" and "basketball" as "two." The statement "basketball plus basketball equals pink elephant" is a logically valid and sound conclusion, regardless of whether we like the definitions.


Certainly I have demonstrated that my objections to your definitions constitute far more than a mere "dislike".


If not, perhaps it would be better to attack the reasoning of the argument.


Believe me, I have constantly been scouring the thread for both reasoning and an argument. All you have provided is the self-assuming justification that "if objective morality exists, then it is evidence for the existence of God".


The idea that "everything that happens ought to happen" seems highly fallacious; it does not logically follow that just because something did happen therefore it ought to be that way.


Yet Spinoza does explain how it logically follows from a naturalistic view of pantheism. Perhaps you should read-up to discover what exciting new ideas may unfold.


My definition does not at all say or imply that merely being able to speak would constitute "the power to forth statement of what to do that ought to be obeyed." You have misconstrued my position if you think otherwise.


Perhaps I misunderstood, but misconstrued is not the right word. People with the capacity of utterance have the "power to put forth statements". A theistic God who "talks" to people has the "power to put forth statements". So clearly you must mean something other than the "power to put forth statements" when you define authority. What is it?


Of course that's my point, but you conflated the definition of "the supreme metaphysical reality" with "reality" as I said in my previous post. In pantheism, God is the universe/reality/existence. In traditional theism God is not "reality" in the pantheistic sense. I am not a pantheist.


And I asked you to please explain the difference between "the supreme metaphysical reality" and the universe/existence/reality. Certainly you can understand the necessity to do this, especially if I am indicting your definition of "God". All you have done here is to say a theistic god is not a pantheistic God. This hardly suffices as an explanation of the difference between what you mean by "the supreme metaphysical reality" and universe/existence/reality.


That people may look for a higher authority that does not exist is not relevant to what I've been trying convey (in hindsight I was doing poor job of doing that; for that I apologize). It is logically impossible that there exists a higher "God" than the supreme metaphysical reality (whatever that reality might be) and there is no higher authority than God. Ergo, it is logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority than God (the supreme metaphysical reality). Whether one can conceive of the supreme metaphysical reality having more knowledge, more power etc. is irrelevant.


Why is it irrelevant? Assuming a scenario of pantheism (whichever you prefer), if authority (via the definition I argue for above) is given to the mythical creator of the universe instead of the actual universe/reality/existence, then regardless of what is factually true, it is still logically possible to give authority to something that does not exist, be it a pink elephant or a flying spaghetti monster.


"Hairless mean have no hair" is circular, but not unwarranted.


No, it is a statement that is analytically true. Much like "All bachelors are unmarried" to refer to Kant.


If the conclusion logically follows from my definitions, why think it is unwarranted?


Your definitions are circular. You are trying to equate "the supreme metaphysical reality" with reality with no distinctions being made (or at least doing so and blaming it on pantheism). By defining God as "the supreme metaphysical reality", you are making it seem as if what you are describing is an analytic truth, when, in fact, this is not the case. It is not an analytic truth. This is why PMB said you are "begging the question" that God actually is the "supreme metaphysical truth".


What about the God of pantheism? Recall that pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence. Naturalistic pantheism is the most difficult to describe and identify, because this pantheistic God is not supernatural and does not possess consciousness. Yet if there is anything that fits the conception of this pantheistic God, the universe wielding infallible and supreme moral authority in commanding behavior such that everyone ought to always obey it would seem to be it. The basis of morality requires (by definition of what morality is) that one ought to honor these moral commands and devote oneself to them. This pantheistic God is the source of morality, and it follows that one ought to show deferential devotion to whatever source of morality authoritatively commands our behavior. So this pantheistic God is at least of the naturalistic if not sentient variety.


So you're sure you don't want to accept Spinoza's resolution of morality and moral authority? It really fits with what you're saying. If you don't accept it, you'll have an extremely difficult time making the words in bold anything more than an assertion.


In the case of pantheism, I went from "supreme metaphysical authority" to "supreme metaphysical reality" using just this sort of reasoning.


From authority to reality? Wow! Like I said, i'm still scouring the thread for reasoning.


Please remember what I was claiming. I said it was logically possible for a pantheistic God to bring punishment. As long as my assertion is logically possible, that is all that is required here. An afterlife could be a spiritual place of incorporeal souls. Although of course this wouldn't fit in well with naturalistic pantheism, it is still consistent with pantheism in the general sense (not all pantheistic worldviews reject the supernatural).


And I am still looking for an explanation of what this "afterlife" is. I simply don't have any conception of what it might be. Perhaps your third comment will be substantive.


Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/11/08 - 07:45 PM:
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#561
jdrw wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

One could still argue from inference to the best explanation here. If I were an atheist and the only plausible "alternative" was some transcendent, eternal, pantheistic God wielding supreme moral authority in telling me what to do, I'm not sure I could stomach it. I'd probably think I was better off denying the existence of objective moral values altogether if I were to remain an atheist.


In this little tangent you commit the logical fallacy of appeal to motive by constructing a a strawman alleging that atheists would need to commit the fallacy of appeal to consequences.


I'm not entirely sure where all these fallacies are coming from. If I were an atheist, I would be rather reluctant to accept the transcendent, eternal, pantheistic God explanation because it just wouldn't seem to fit my atheistic worldview very well. Would I be a maverick atheist for thinking this? Would this thinking be a straw man?



When you say that somebody "ought" or "ought not" to do something, what do you mean besides you want them to behave in a particular way? What besides your personal desire do you take to be involved? What exactly are you referring to that’s outside yourself and the other person? What besides pragmatically undesirable consequences does this ought appeal to? In what sense is this "ought" binding on us?


With objective morality, there is some transcending and (at least at first) unidentified reality that says X is what ought to be. This transcending reality might be "logic" or it might be some "eternally existing Ancient Tablet" or it might be "reality/existence" that says what ought to be, but at least when the argument first starts out this metaphysical reality is unidentified.




jdrw wrote:

Intuitions (as well as memories) are notoriously unreliable.


Then on what grounds are we to believe in anything, including the belief that intuitions are untrustworthy? Remember that logic is itself something that is intuitively perceived. We rely on our basic intuitive perceptions regarding the belief that memory and sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. If all intuitive perception is thrown out the door, we don't have any knowledge at all.


Our grounds for our beliefs are the epistemic criteria that our beliefs can meet. There are various criteria available. Stringent intersubjectively agreed upon empirical confirmation under clearly specified conditions is one such possible criterion that we use.


But for something like this to work (e.g. empirical confirmation), you would have to believe that your sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. (You would, for instance, have to believe that other minds besides yourself exist if there is to be some sort of agreement among them.) If this belief regarding sensory perceptions is not known via intuitiveness as I claim, on what grounds do you accept it?

Remember, I'm talking about basic beliefs: as logic, sensory perceptions, and memory (believing that these are at least sometimes reliable). Logic is the perfect example of a rational intuitive perception. We intuitively "see" the truths of the law of noncontradiction even in the absence of empirical confirmation (this is why mathematical proofs work a priori). Other intuitions come closer to "feeling" like the assumed reliability (that these things are at least sometimes reliable) of sensory perceptions, testimony and memory. There really is know way around this (at least, none that I know of).

For example, you might say something like "The presuppositions and laws of logic are defensible because we have found that they work." But how do you know they have worked? Memory perhaps, but this means assuming that memory is at least sometimes reliable, which in turn based on intuitiveness. You may hold science to a high epistemological ideal, but even this requires the empirical, which in turn requires assuming that sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable--at least if we embrace scientific realism. How do you justify these basic beliefs (like the at-least-sometimes-reliable memory and sensory perception) without intuitiveness?



What epistemic criteria besides subjective intuition have “objective moral values” met for you?


What epistemic criteria besides subjective intuition have logic, sensory perceptions, testimony and memory have met for you? You can appeal to the empirical and scientific ideals all you want, but these too must be justified. It will do no good, for instance, to appeal to the scientific empirical unless you also have grounds for thinking your sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. It will do no good to appeal to experience, as in "these principles have worked in the past" unless you also have grounds for believing that memory is at least sometimes reliable. I don't believe a person can do that without ultimately appealing to some sort of intuitiveness.

To answer your question, I cannot think of any other basis (at least at this point) other than intuitive perception--much like my basis for believing that logic and sensory perceptions are at least sometimes reliable. You may think this is poor grounds, but with all due respect I do not believe you have better grounds for accepting your own basic beliefs.
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/11/08 - 08:52 PM:
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#562
Buddahchuck wrote:

And I asked you to please explain the difference between "the supreme metaphysical reality" and the universe/existence/reality. Certainly you can understand the necessity to do this, especially if I am indicting your definition of "God". All you have done here is to say a theistic god is not a pantheistic God.


I did so to help illustrate the fact that they are not the same thing. Under traditional monotheism, the supreme metaphysical reality is not reality itself (though under pantheism it is). Perhaps a better definition of God is "the supreme or ultimate reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." It's a little better, though perhaps this might not fit with some people's conception of deism. The point is that although this definition allows one to equate God with reality/existence, it does not necessarily imply that. God and reality are not necessarily the same thing.

Perhaps it would also help to know that the word “reality” is being used in different contexts when I define pantheism and God. The word “reality” in my definition for God (“the supreme metaphysical reality”) is referring to Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 2a(1) “a real event, entity, or state of affairs” whereas “reality” in the definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) more closely refers to Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 2a(2) “the totality of real things and events.”

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reality



Why is it irrelevant? Assuming a scenario of pantheism (whichever you prefer), if authority (via the definition I argue for above) is given to the mythical creator of the universe instead of the actual universe/reality/existence, then regardless of what is factually true, it is still logically possible to give authority to something that does not exist, be it a pink elephant or a flying spaghetti monster.


We seem to be in a bit of a tangle of misconstruals here. I'm talking about "logically impossible" within a certain set of conditions. For instance, if X is the largest ball in the set, then it is logically impossible given that X is the largest ball for there to be a larger ball, because the statement "there is a larger ball than the largest ball" is self-contradictory. Similarly, if in a given scenario X is the highest authority, then it is logically possible for there to be a higher authority in this scenario because "there exists a higher authority than the highest authority" is a self-contradictory statement. This is what I have been trying to say. I apologize if I did not make this sufficiently clear.



So you're sure you don't want to accept Spinoza's resolution of morality and moral authority?


If his resolution is "everything that happens, ought to happen" then no.



Why is it irrelevant? Assuming a scenario of pantheism (whichever you prefer), if authority (via the definition I argue for above) is given to the mythical creator of the universe instead of the actual universe/reality/existence, then regardless of what is factually true, it is still logically possible to give authority to something that does not exist, be it a pink elephant or a flying spaghetti monster.


We seem to be in bit of a tangle of misconstruals here. I'm talking about "logically impossible" within a certain set of conditions. For instance, if X is the largest ball in the set, then it is logically impossible given that X is the largest ball for there to be a larger ball, because the statement "there is a larger ball than the largest ball" is self-contradictory. Similarly, if in a given scenario X is the highest authority, then it is logically possible for there to be a higher authority in this scenario because "there exists a higher authority than the highest authority" is a self-contradictory statement. This is what I have been trying to say. I apologize if I did not make this sufficiently clear.

More on definitions

To recap, you criticized my definitions of “God” and “pantheism” as insufficient. I replied that the definitions I brought forth are the best I can come up with that would make the two definitions meaningful (pantheism equating God with the universe/reality/existence). I asked if you could come up with better ones. You defined God as an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient being. I argued that this definition does not fit with more naturalistic forms of pantheism, in which God is not an omnipotent and omniscient being.

You have replied thusly:


Both Spinoza and Toland define God as an "omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent being".


If Spinoza considered his pantheistic God to have such characteristics, I would very much like to see a specific, verifiable source on this.

This is perhaps what I found most confusing:


And just for the record, neither "omniscient" nor "omnipotent" mean conscious in the sense of the consciousness of a traditional monotheistic God; so, your comment about consciousness is misplaced.


I define omniscient as “knowing everything” and consciousness as the “state of being characterized by perception, thought, knowledge, volition, sensation, awareness etc. such that if an entity possesses any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.” If a given entity perceives the truth of statements—or has any perception for that matter—the entity possesses consciousness. Omniscience by definition implies consciousness, unless you have bizarrely different definitions of those terms. The criterion of omnipotence is perhaps stranger yet, because for at least some pantheists the pantheistic God is limited by the laws of nature (a limitation that a monotheistic supernatural God is not bound by).




My definition does not at all say or imply that merely being able to speak would constitute "the power to forth statement of what to do that ought to be obeyed." You have misconstrued my position if you think otherwise.


Perhaps I misunderstood, but misconstrued is not the right word. People with the capacity of utterance have the "power to put forth statements". A theistic God who "talks" to people has the "power to put forth statements". So clearly you must mean something other than the "power to put forth statements" when you define authority. What is it?

First, why on Earth is misconstrued not the right word? When I say misconstrue (see http://www.bartleby.com/61/21/M0332100.html) I mean “To mistake the meaning of; misinterpret.” Or do you believe this definition is unconventional?

Second, the additional requirement of authority (on my definition) as I tried to indicate in the text you quoted me is the “ought-to-be-obeyed” aspect of the person putting for the statement of what to do. God, for instance, is an entity that ought to be obeyed, a critical requirement for the definition of authority I am using.




Please remember what I was claiming. I said it was logically possible for a pantheistic God to bring punishment. As long as my assertion is logically possible, that is all that is required here. An afterlife could be a spiritual place of incorporeal souls. Although of course this wouldn't fit in well with naturalistic pantheism, it is still consistent with pantheism in the general sense (not all pantheistic worldviews reject the supernatural).


And I am still looking for an explanation of what this "afterlife" is. I simply don't have any conception of what it might be. Perhaps your third comment will be substantive.


What part of my description was unclear? After life (and after death) in this logically possible scenario, the soul goes to an incorporeal spiritual place. This is not logically inconsistent with pantheism, even if it is an unusual belief for pantheists to have. If this doesn't answer your question, I'm not sure what you're asking.


Edited by Tisthammerw on 03/12/08 - 05:44 PM. Reason: web links in this forum are apparently buggy; gave up and just did it plain; also added explanation regarding "reality"
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Buddahchuck
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Posted 03/12/08 - 10:13 PM:
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#563
Tist wrote:

I did so to help illustrate the fact that they are not the same thing. Under traditional monotheism, the supreme metaphysical reality is not reality itself (though under pantheism it is). Perhaps a better definition of God is "the supreme or ultimate reality that is in some sense holy, divine, or sacred, such that one is obligated some special reverence, obedience, or devotion to." It's a little better, though perhaps this might not fit with some people's conception of deism.


Definitely a better definition......and I'm sorry to say that I still feel like I'm pulling teeth. But maybe now that you've provided this definition, you can now move on to answer the crux of my query into your definition of God:

I wrote:

What is a "supreme reality", and why is such a reality a "metaphysical" reality. Is there any reality that is not metaphysical? Or perhaps you mean supremely metaphysical which still doesn't make sense. What's the distinction between a "supreme metaphysical reality" and just a plain ordinary reality? What sort of metaphysical assumptions are you making when you provide a definition like "supreme metahpysical reality" and why would that definition be exclusive to "god" and not to something like....pink elephants, the human mind, a flying spaghetti monster. Certainly an atheist can believe in a "supreme metaphysical reality" without adhering to the idea of "God", but if we accept your definition, then atheists are simply misguided.



Perhaps it would also help to know that the word “reality” is being used in different contexts when I define pantheism and God. The word “reality” in my definition for God (“the supreme metaphysical reality”) is referring to Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 2a(1) “a real event, entity, or state of affairs” whereas “reality” in the definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) more closely refers to Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 2a(2) “the totality of real things and events.”


Indeed, this distinction does help. So now we have your definition of pantheism being more like the equating "the [supreme][metaphysical][real entity]" with "the totality of real things and events". Not that it really makes your definition of God any more clear, but certainly we can see the distinction for reality. You are still begging the question, but in a more well-defined way.


Similarly, if in a given scenario X is the highest authority, then it is logically possible for there to be a higher authority in this scenario because "there exists a higher authority than the highest authority" is a self-contradictory statement. This is what I have been trying to say. I apologize if I did not make this sufficiently clear.


Ok, now respond to my argument: it is still possible to give authority to a conceptually higher being. Even if that authority does not actually exist, the argument you claimed logically impossible remains a problem for that conceptual entity which created the meta-reality/God which pantheism describes can still be given authority.


If his resolution is "everything that happens, ought to happen" then no.


Fine. Then you only have left an non-descript, vague, trite, unclear, untelling, unreadable, non-standard, and virtually un-intelligible objective morality. Brilliant argument.


To recap, you criticized my definitions of “God” and “pantheism” as insufficient.


Actually, I only criticized your definition of God. And the argument was more than them merely being "insufficient".

Spinoza Part I-Definitions wrote:

VI. By GOD - I mean absolutely infinite - that is a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.


In this way, Spinoza describes a God with infinite power, infinite consciousness, infinite being etc.


I define omniscient as “knowing everything” and consciousness as the “state of being characterized by perception, thought, knowledge, volition, sensation, awareness etc. such that if an entity possesses any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.” If a given entity perceives the truth of statements—or has any perception for that matter—the entity possesses consciousness. Omniscience by definition implies consciousness, unless you have bizarrely different definitions of those terms. The criterion of omnipotence is perhaps stranger yet, because for at least some pantheists the pantheistic God is limited by the laws of nature (a limitation that a monotheistic supernatural God is not bound by).


I'm sorry, but I don't feel like it is my responsibility to explain all these concepts to you. The best I can do is refer you to Spinoza's ethics and let you figure it out by yourself. Then you will realize why your definitions don't apply and how skewed your version of pantheism is....especially naturalistic naturalism. Please just read it so that we don't have to reply to your complete misunderstanding of what exactly you are saying.

http://books.google.com/books?id=cW6M1A5Q9kUC&pri...

Tist wrote:

First, why on Earth is misconstrued not the right word? When I say misconstrue (see http://www.bartleby.com/61/21/M0332100.html) I mean “To mistake the meaning of; misinterpret.” Or do you believe this definition is unconventional?


I believe this definition is unclear. Certainly we can say miscontrue as in to misinterpret or mistake the meaning of, but those of us who are native english speakers would more likely simply use misinterpret or misunderstand to communicate this idea, whereas to misconstrue means to directly pervert the meaning of words.



God, for instance, is an entity that ought to be obeyed, a critical requirement for the definition of authority I am using.


And here is yet another example of your argument's circularity. God ought to be obeyed. Why? Because he is has authority. Why does he have a authority? Because he is God. But why ought I obey God? Because he has authority. Why does he have authority? Because people ought to obey him. Why? Because he has authority. Why does he have authority? Because he ought to be obeyed.


What part of my description was unclear? After life (and after death) in this logically possible scenario, the soul goes to an incorporeal spiritual place. This is not logically inconsistent with pantheism, even if it is an unusual belief for pantheists to have. If this doesn't answer your question, I'm not sure what you're asking.


So describe this spiritual pantheistic place a little bit. What could it have? Pantheists believe in souls? Why don't you describe this? I've never heard of a pantheism, aside from Classical pantheism that goes along these lines. I'm not really arguing; i'm just curious. It seems like you have some very odd notions of pantheism, its arguments and what it entails, and perhaps if you spoke about these it would be clearer what you mean when you say pantheism. You clearly don't understand Spinoza's conception of pantheism. I really haven't heard you talk about Vishnu, or Tathagata or anything like that. From where does your conception of philosophical pantheism come?

Have you ever ventured to use a philosphical dictionary, rather than the very dated and inaccurate Merriam-Webster? You do realize that this is perhaps the least respected dictionary in existence, right?

Also, you don't really seem to understand many of the arguments that have been made against you, and I worry for you. People have been giving very clear, rational objections to which you only give a rationalized response. In spite of me "sticking with you" for the past few hundred posts, only until this most recent post have I seen you even begin to give more consideration to what others are saying than to your own argument. I think you're probably a pretty smart fella that will have very interesting arguments if you can only focus on understanding the other people and not merely assuming that they just don't understand. A good trick is to give the opposing argument the benefit of the doubt so that you are trying to answer the strongest possible argument against your point. Also try to substantiate your argument using more than identities. Reason and logic are great tools, but they are also very abstract. If you are going to try to prove a mere conditional, then there needs to be more than the idea what you are saying is valid. It needs to be significant....interesting. Saying that atheists are ultimately pantheists, that objective morality (not a very realistic idea as people would generally argue that even if morality comes from the universe it is still subjective, the universe being the subject) leads to God (again neglecting atheists) and then using poorly constructed/defended definitions to defend your contentious self-asserting premise. You can do better. I entered the thread hoping you would give good answers to these problems, for there are good and interesting answers to be had; you simply don't give them. I hope that you can open-up and be a bit more reflective about how this thread has gone, and give the arguments made a bit more consideration. Your goal in such a thread, afterall, should be to offer a compelling argument so that people wind-up agreeing with rather than writing you off as some krakpot. Well, there's my 5 minute rant.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/16/08 - 08:28 AM:
quote post
#564
Buddahchuck wrote:

Definitely a better definition......and I'm sorry to say that I still feel like I'm pulling teeth. But maybe now that you've provided this definition, you can now move on to answer the crux of my query into your definition of God:


I'll deal with the questions that I believe were not answered in the definition I gave. If you want to deal with any more please feel free to bring them up.


  1. Is there any reality that is not metaphysical?
  2. What's the distinction between a "supreme metaphysical reality" and just a plain ordinary reality?


Abstract objects are not composed of spiritual substance nor physical substance, and so are not "metaphysical" realities, at least in that sense (note that materialism believes that only the physical world is real but still allows for the existence of abstract objects like the number six and truths of abstract objects like mathematical proofs). Mathematical truths are realities but not metaphysical entities. I suppose I also added "metaphysical" so as to better clarify the context of "reality" as in "a real event, entity, or state of affairs" as opposed to "the totality of real things and events."



Indeed, this distinction does help. So now we have your definition of pantheism being more like the equating "the [supreme][metaphysical][real entity]" with "the totality of real things and events". Not that it really makes your definition of God any more clear, but certainly we can see the distinction for reality. You are still begging the question, but in a more well-defined way.


Please elaborate. In what well-defined way am I begging the question?



Ok, now respond to my argument: it is still possible to give authority to a conceptually higher being. Even if that authority does not actually exist, the argument you claimed logically impossible remains a problem for that conceptual entity which created the meta-reality/God which pantheism describes can still be given authority.


I'll try explaining my actual position again, using a different approach. Remember, I said "it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority [than God] as to why we should obey." This is because God (as a result of the definition) is the highest authority there is (if He exists); there is no higher authority. Suppose that one person believes God is "the universe." In this case one can conceive of a higher conception of God, but such a higher conception of God would still be God (if that God existed). Thus, this is simply not relevant to my claim that "There is a higher authority than God" is a logically impossible statement. Similarly, given a certain set of finite-sized balls one can conceive of a larger ball; but nonetheless the claim "there is a larger ball than the largest ball" is still a self-contradictory statement (X being the largest ball means there is no larger ball than X; thus there cannot be a larger ball than X if X is the largest ball).




If his resolution is "everything that happens, ought to happen" then no.


Fine. Then you only have left an non-descript, vague, trite, unclear, untelling, unreadable, non-standard, and virtually un-intelligible objective morality.


May I ask why this follows? At least at first blush, the denial of "everything that happens, ought to happen" seems perfectly sensible. For instance, the Holocaust happened. Does it then follow that the genocide ought to have happened? This does not seem plausible.



Spinoza Part I-Definitions wrote:

VI. By GOD - I mean absolutely infinite - that is a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.


In this way, Spinoza describes a God with infinite power, infinite consciousness, infinite being etc.


Let's suppose that your interpretation of Spinoza is correct and he by "God" he is referring to a being that is infinitely powerful and possessing "infinite consciousness" (whatever that means). The problem with defining God so that the entity possesses consciousness is that it is not compatible with those strains of pantheism in which God is not a conscious entity. So I do not believe such a definition is adequate. Which brings me to this...



I define omniscient as “knowing everything” and consciousness as the “state of being characterized by perception, thought, knowledge, volition, sensation, awareness etc. such that if an entity possesses any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.” If a given entity perceives the truth of statements—or has any perception for that matter—the entity possesses consciousness. Omniscience by definition implies consciousness, unless you have bizarrely different definitions of those terms. The criterion of omnipotence is perhaps stranger yet, because for at least some pantheists the pantheistic God is limited by the laws of nature (a limitation that a monotheistic supernatural God is not bound by).


I'm sorry, but I don't feel like it is my responsibility to explain all these concepts to you.


You criticized my definition as inadequate, seemingly thinking it is my responsibility to resolve these apparent inadequacies. Fair enough. One of my responses is that there doesn't seem to be a better definition, and when I point out apparent inadequacies with your own definition, it is not your responsibility to resolve them? It almost seems as though you are applying double standards.

You mentioned Spinoza's book, but his definitions are extremely vague, to say the least. Since it is highly probable that the vast majority of his book does not provide a clear, specific definition of God or address my objections, could yo