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Moral Argument for God

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Moral Argument for God
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/01/08 - 12:22 PM:
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#526
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
Though Craig did not -- in this instance -- say anything about the heart of God, I'm sure you can see the similarity in your views.


I had already noted I was aware we shared the same view here, it's just that when you said, "This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig" I was under the impression you were accusing me of quoting him.




Then please give me even one plausible alternative.


Assuming that you are not equivocating on the word "plausible," then the options I already gave (reason, necessary truth) are certainly plausible -- so much so that they form the basis of the two major extant moral theories. And the fact remains that you have not yet properly disposed of them, you have merely asserted that they are insufficient (contrary to the historical Zeitgeist of all Western philosophy).


I questioned their sufficiency in regards to answering the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" but I'm not sure I categorically tossed them out (though I do strongly suspect they are in fact insufficient in this regard).



(Note: I did not actually claim that the brute fact position is committed to "nothing," I just said this option would not work.)


I didn't say you did. I said that "the 'brute fact' position is not committed to either 'nothing' or 'the universe' as options." That is, I called the dilemma (N v U) false: there are other options that are, at least initially, in the realm of logically possibility.


It is logically possible for the universe to be five minutes old, but it's not necessarily plausible. I'm looking for viable, plausible alternatives. (If an alternative just doesn't work, I don't see it as plausible.)




You mention (later on) "necessary truth" by Mill but this strikes me as a bit vague. What exactly does he mean by this? How does this answer the following question of who or what says how we ought to behave? (Call me ignorant, but when I think of Mill and ethics I think of utilitarianism.)


You should think of utilitarianism. But while Bentham could perhaps be interpreted as a moral anti-realist, Mill believed happiness to be an objective good and the principle of utility to be a necessary truth (see his comments on Kant, for example, and how he takes his theory to be an advancement of Kantian principles).


Great, but notice you didn't answer the question I put forward. The inability to adequately answer the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" would constitute a fatal problem for any alternatives, including these ones.




...even if we accept the most atheistic form of pantheism, this God would by necessity possess several interesting characteristics.


I do not think this is true. Spinoza's pantheism, for instance, simply asserts that the totality of nature/the universe -- whatever it is -- just is God.


You ignored my arguments for why the interesting characteristics would logically follow from a pantheistic God being the basis of objective morality. Recall that my definition of pantheism was pretty much as broad as what you defined here, i.e. equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. And from this (in addition to a pantheistic God being the basis of morality) I was able to derive those "interesting characteristics." Attacking the claim is fine, but it's probably more constructive to attack the evidential argument supporting that claim.




On your second point, I was not begging the question you mentioned (at least not in the section you quoted me).

Well, let's look at the relevant statements again:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

Tishammerw wrote:

The universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism.

[...] you are begging the question by importing your assumption that the only kind of moral authority there could be is some sort of God.


As presented, you seem to be jumping from "there is some source of moral authority in the universe" to "that source is God (even if just a pantheistic God)." But this is what you are trying to prove; therefore, using it in the middle of the argument is begging the question.


Please remember the definitions being used here; the general definition of God is "the supreme metaphysical reality." Such a definition is admittedly broad, but it allows doctrines like pantheism to be possible. Pantheism equates universe/reality/existence with God (the supreme metaphysical reality) even though pantheism does not necessarily contain the traditional attributes of God (like omnipotence and consciousness). Hence, the universe (or reality, or existence) as the supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong would constitute some form of pantheism. Given the definitions of the terms involved, it’s not clear why this conclusion is question begging. It seems to logically follow.




But now you are equivocating: "some type of God" is not identical with "some type of supreme metaphysical reality."

Actually, yes it is. I very specifically said that a more general definition of God is "the ultimate and supreme metaphysical reality."

But that stipulation (not definition) has been questioned by me.


I very specifically said that it was a definition, i.e. this is what I mean by the term "God." I borrowed it (more or less) from the dictionary: "the supreme or ultimate reality." It goes on for two more specific definitions, but this broad one is what we should focus on here because it allows for the doctrine of pantheism. Remember, a pantheistic God does not necessarily have attributes like omnipotence and consciousness. So how would you define God?




Please elucidate if these are viable alternatives. How does reason say how we ought to behave? Is there some logical or mathematical proof from which we can derive moral principles like "thou shalt not kill"?


See: Kant, the categorical imperative. He argued that there was indeed a logical proof of "thou shalt not kill." As for Mill, you can see my Advocatus Diaboli thread from last year for a simplified version of a Millian argument. His Utilitarianism is still the best source, of course; or you can look at modern utilitarians for more (metaethics was not quite so developed of an enterprise in the days of Kant and Mill).


Unfortunately you kind of avoided my questions. Yes, I'm sure you have lots of things to say about what utilitarianism is and what Kantian ethics is. But perhaps it would be simpler and more constructive to simply give me a straight answer here? Nothing personal, but I've been led on wild goose chases before, and I perused the Advocatus Diaboli thread and didn't see an answer to my question. Additionally, if Kant did indeed argue that there was indeed a logical proof of "thou shalt not kill" as you claim, I don't suppose you would mind showing me this logical proof?

Kant might have put forth an imperative like, “only act according to principles that you rationally wish everyone would follow.” We can perhaps use reason to derive prohibitions against stealing and murder based on this imperative, but who or what says we ought to follow this imperative? This is something that reason alone cannot justify. I do not believe there is any logical proof we can appeal to that would actually work. It seems that reason can never get beyond hypothetical imperatives (“If the goal is to get A, then do B”). For instance, you could reasonably say that we ought to follow the Kantian imperative if we ought to make the world a jolly place, but then we’d have to answer the question of who or what says we ought to pursue the goal of a jolly planet. The Kantian imperative—at least by itself—simply does not work here.



You are again equivocating on "plausible" versus "viable."


If I see that an alternative doesn't work, it won't seem worthy of belief. Hence, if it's known not to be viable it's not plausible. But perhaps we're using different definitions?



Even you do not think that the brute fact position is a viable atheistic alternative -- otherwise your conclusion would not follow and the argument would fail.


Well, I suppose you could argue it is not a viable atheistic alternative if it leads to a pantheistic God, but why would the argument fail if the pantheistic God was an alternative that worked in some general sense? Remember, I said that objective moral values constitute evidence for the existence of God. The brute fact position technically works and is (to at least some degree) plausible, it's just that it seems to lead to a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral--which is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality would still provide strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).





Remember, you are not defending the thesis of supernaturalism, but rather a species of it -- the moral argument for the existence of God. So here is my challenge to you: name one non-subjective, morally relevant thing that God can do that cannot be handled by a sufficiently constructed concept of karma.

God can provide the metaphysical basis of objective moral values; God (by nature of what he is) answers the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" Karma does not do this, or at least not in the normal sense of the term.


rolling eyes

First of all, you have not substantively answered my question; rather, you have just asserted your position once again. How does God answer the question in a non-subjective way?


Okay, so apparently you were not just asking what morally relevant thing God can do that karma cannot. I'm guessing then you were primarily wondering how God can be the basis of moral values such that moral values would be objective. In hindsight perhaps it wasn't clear how my answer fit the "non-subjective" part, and the answer to this sort of thing might depend on how you define moral objectivism, but the definition I'll use is "the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion." It is my position that the metaphysical basis of moral objectivism is the heart of God, and the heart of God is not human opinion.



You might as well be asking me "if a square circle exists, and God did not create it, then who did?" The basis of my moral nihilism is that I do not believe anything could justify objective morality.


Are you saying that the existence of objective moral values is logically impossible?







The above is a response to the specific points made in your last post, but I suggest we start over.


The above is my response to the specific points made in your last post, but if you wish to start over I have no objections.



We both believe that naturalists cannot explain objective morality.


I suppose that would depend on whether you would consider my aforementioned pantheistic God (one that has supreme authority over moral right and wrong etc.) to fit in with the naturalistic worldview.



What we disagree over is whether or not theism provides a sound basis for objective morality. You believe it does and I believe it does not. It is important to note that if I am correct, the moral argument fails -- regardless of whether or not atheists can do any better.


I hesitate to agree because God being the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values might be relevant to the claim "If objective moral values exist, they are evidence for the existence of God." Being the inference to the best explanation would conceivably make that claim true. However, we do seem to disagree whether theism can provide a sound basis for objective morality. So perhaps we should focus on that claim instead.



We must also figure out what your talk about God's nature and morality flowing from the heart of God amounts to. It can't be that there is some moral truth separate from God, because that could exist without him and thus would be available to atheists. It cannot issue from God, either, since that would make it arbitrary in the metaethical sense.


But why think it would make it arbitrary? Perhaps because human persons sometimes make arbitrary decisions, and thus we can conceive a deity doing so as well. However, it is also easy to conceive humans (and deities) making non-arbitrary decisions of what ought to be. And even if we disregard that fact, it is possible (maybe even probable) that if God exists he is not as anthropomorphic as this argument apparently presupposes.

The “arbitrary” objection seems to be missing a premise, at least in some of its more simplistic formulations. Consider this argument against the argument from morality (this sort of argument convinced me for a number of years):


  1. If God commanded rape, then rape would be ethical
  2. Rape is not ethical.
  3. Therefore: God is not the basis for ethics.


At first blush it might look deductively valid (i.e. that the conclusion is true if the premises are true), unless perhaps we look at this:


  1. If rape was a virtue, then rape would be ethical
  2. Rape is not ethical.
  3. Therefore: virtues are not the basis of ethics.


Even if virtue ethics is mistaken, the conclusion does not logically follow. Still, we could fix this by bringing out what seems to be the hidden premise: that it is possible for God to command rape.


  1. If God were the basis of ethics, it is possible for God to command rape and thus it would be possible for rape to be ethical.
  2. Raping people cannot possibly be ethical
  3. Therefore: God is not the basis for morality.


This argument is deductively valid (i.e. the conclusion logically follows from the premises) but notice we could apply the same sort of reasoning to virtue ethics as well.


  1. If virtues were a basis of ethics, it is possible for raping people to be a virtue and thus it would be possible for rape to be ethical.
  2. Raping people cannot possibly be ethical.
  3. Therefore virtues cannot be a basis of morality.


Even if virtue ethics is mistaken, the above argument seems unsound. The problem with this sort of argument is trying to justify the veracity of both premises. Both the virtue ethicist and the theist could argue that premise #2 seems to preclude premise #1. Suppose that premise #2 is true and rape cannot be ethical. Then why on Earth should one accept that if God were the basis of ethics he could command rape, especially if God is not necessarily as anthropomorphic as this argument seems to assume? If the second premise were true, wouldn’t this imply that both God and virtues cannot command rape?


Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:24 AM
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Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/01/08 - 12:45 PM:
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#527
Buddahchuck wrote:
One of my objections with Tist's argument in this thread was his ascribing of authority with no justification for where that authority originates.


Asking where the authority originates is a fair question. I claim the basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God. What makes that authority legitimate (i.e. that we ought to obey it) is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality. Additionally, it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority as to why we should obey. If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition. It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts (facts without further explanation).
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Buddahchuck
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Posted 03/01/08 - 06:42 PM:
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#528
mariner wrote:

He suggests two possible answers, faith and reason. I don't think any of them fits the bill (which comes from me looking "at the other end" of morality, namely, the choosing individual).


I kind of wonder what "the bill" is that needs to be fit.


It is quite clear that the basis of morality is the will. Beings without wills (e.g. machines, tsunamis) can't be moral or immoral. It is only when there is a will that there is morality.


Excellent point. Will is a very clear and descriptive basis of morality, but I'm not sure that it is exclusively the basis of morality. One can easily imagine the permutations of will and reason or will and faith. In fact, it cannot be will alone that is the basis for morality, for history is riddled with attempts to justify will and the expectation that such justification is necessary. I do think that if we are to have a morality, we would need some standard that is fair to society, and I am not sure that will provides such a standard aside from the base that is society's will that would determine the authority. So I find it a bit confusing to use something of the nature of will to be the basis of morality as it seems to want some further justification that is either rational or irrational. So while will may be a pre-requisite for moral issues, it is not necessarily a basis for morality.


"I want food" is neither rational nor faith-based (nor opposed to either faith or reason). It is a given, a datum. And we must beware of looking at this kind of datum as if it were somehow universal. Sometimes,I don't want food.



Exactly. I may want ice cream and this desire could be said to have neither a right or wrong, but nonetheless my will is acting. At the point that will can be amoral, it cannot be a basis of morality.

Mariner wrote:

The deontological dream (I'd say it is a nightmare) forgets this, as do many other metaethical theories. By reducing morality to a small list of archetypal scenarios, we simplify too much, and lose sight of what is going on in reality. Simplification is a great means of achieving clarity, but as someone said (perhaps Einstein), our models should be as simple as possible, but not more than that. Since this discussion has been greatly lopsided towards the objective half of morality, I'll stop here, with this reminder that you can't forget the will of the subject. It is the true master of the situation, more than any other concept or being (including God).


I very much like your point. Reducing ethical problems to anectdotal questions seems to trivialize the moral issue, and I also like the idea that the distinction between objective and subjective morality is a common falsehood due to their being inextricably linked (through the will it could be said). But the will gets confused and looks for answers, and it is then left upon the will to determine the rightness or wrongness in a situation, confusion or no. And in such cases, where the will is confused, what happens to morality. Does it too become blurred?

*****

On a side note concerning karma. I'm not sure that karma is a law giver, karma literally is the balance of the cosmos, so I'm not sure the terms subjective and objective apply to karma considering that such entails both subjects and objects.

But if what Mariner said is not completely accurate, I can still embrace it as it constitutes what I would consider "some exciting concept of internal morality that plays on the existential nature of a human considering morality."

Tist wrote:

Asking where the authority originates is a fair question. I claim the basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God.


Just the heart of God? Which part of the "supreme metaphysical reality" constitutes the heart? Is it merely the center of the universe? The part that makes the universe thrive? If morality comes from the heart of God, what comes from the brain of God?


What makes that authority legitimate (i.e. that we ought to obey it) is that God, by definition, is the supreme metaphysical reality.


Dictionary wrote:


Authority:
1. The power to enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine, or judge.
2. One that is invested with this power, especially a government or body of government officials: land titles issued by the civil authority.


So "the supreme metaphysical reality" has the power to "enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine or judge" moral issues? From this it sounds like you do subscribe to the idea of God as a Lawgiver. Still, I do not see how "God" being the "supreme metaphysical reality" would translate into authority without being exactly like PMB said, a sufficient construction of kharma. Is that what you are getting at? If we drop the idea of God, are you saying that moral law comes directly from reality, and we ought to obey it because it is reality?


Additionally, it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority as to why we should obey.


Except of course a higher conception of God as being the creator of this "metaphysical reality". Or of a God that actually does more than prescribes morality but threatens everlasting pain or an eternity of pleasure.


If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.


Who's definition is this? PMB noted this before, but we could label the "supreme metaphysical reality" as just about anything and call it the basis of morality, but there's no particular reason to do this. "You can call a tail a leg, but that don't make it a leg". Why not say that pink elephants are the supreme metaphysical reality, and thus if objective morality exists, pink elephants exist, and pink elephants are the ultimate authority because they are "the supreme metaphysical reality". And If you ask why Pink Elephants are the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that Pink Elephants are the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.

The traditional definition of god is:
Dictionary wrote:

A- 1. A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.
2. The force, effect, or a manifestation or aspect of this being.

B- A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or reality.
C- An image of a supernatural being; an idol.
D- One that is worshiped, idealized, or followed: Money was their god.



It seems at that point you'd get to brute facts (facts without further explanation).


But I still have no concept of authority coming from the universe. Your best explanation only tells me that the universe prescribes certain actions, not that it enforces those prescriptions.

I even tried telling you that if we are to actually look at the universe as a lawgiver, then it seems to reward vicious acts as generally the most successful things in existence are the most ruthless (e.g. animal packs, plants, bacteria, Political leaders, Religious leaders, Warriors etc.). Your only answer has been that just because things ought to do something doesn't mean that they necessarily will. Not only does this not answer my objection, it trivializes the point being made because clearly it is not the case that "at that point you'd get to brute facts." As the "brute facts" are clearly that the universe prefers vicious acts to more meager ones.

This is related to the authority debate because what gives something moral authority is, as Mariner pointed-out, an individual's will. Without in some way affecting the individual's will, the purveyor of morality has no authority. So when I ask where the authority of God originates, saying that it originates because god is "the supreme metaphysical reality" is not an answer, for in spite of its being the metaphysical reality, it has no certain influence on the will of moral actors.

Now I certainly don't want to respond to things line by line....but when I say one highly controversial claim made after the other, with no justification, proper analysis demands that it be broken down this way.




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Posted 03/01/08 - 07:17 PM:
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#529
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
But that's not the point. The question is whether or not the moral laws we have can be objectively valid without God, not whether or not we can have them without religion (and remember, it would be a mistake to think that the existence of God entails the existence of a religion, commonly understood).

No one would deny that even atheist moral nihilists can have the structure of moral laws, or other normative institutions. The debate is over what sort of justification those structures and institutions could have.



Moral laws are created subjectively with or without god. The belief that god is an objective entity doesn't mean that god is effectively an objective entity. That belief is biased by a logical fallacy, or multiple logical fallacies, especially of the ignorato elenchi type, thus representing a subjective perception of the world, and the moral laws accompanying it.

The nature of any moral laws will always be subjective, because we create them from subjective point of views.

So we have a choice here: either directly creating functional moral laws according to our needs or wish, or indirectly creating moral laws by inventing a fictional representation of the world in which in which we're told what moral laws we must follow.

The second choice is really unnecessarily complicated, plus it has absolutely no versatility.
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Posted 03/01/08 - 09:24 PM:
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#530
Buddahchuck wrote:

Tist wrote:

Asking where the authority originates is a fair question. I claim the basis of morality's metaphysical authority is the heart of God.

Just the heart of God? Which part of the "supreme metaphysical reality" constitutes the heart? Is it merely the center of the universe? The part that makes the universe thrive? If morality comes from the heart of God, what comes from the brain of God?


You're taking what I said too literally. I meant "heart" in the sense of Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 6b, "the essential or most vital part of something." Moral goodness is simply an inextricable part of who and what God is.




So "the supreme metaphysical reality" has the power to "enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine or judge" moral issues?


The definition of "authority" I am using is “the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed.” (Note that this definition of authority does not necessarily include the power to enforce, punish, or reward violations of such commands; X is only authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey it.) In my worldview, it is the heart of God (i.e. the nature and essence of what he is) where these moral dictates originate.


From this it sounds like you do subscribe to the idea of God as a Lawgiver. Still, I do not see how "God" being the "supreme metaphysical reality" would translate into authority without being exactly like PMB said, a sufficient construction of kharma. Is that what you are getting at?


No.


If we drop the idea of God, are you saying that moral law comes directly from reality, and we ought to obey it because it is reality?


If objective moral values exist without the traditional God, I think a pantheistic God would be the most plausible explanation (i.e. "It is the universe/reality/existence that says how we ought to behave") so in that sense the answer to your question is yes. We should obey the moral dictates that come from reality/existence.




Additionally, it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority as to why we should obey.


Except of course a higher conception of God as being the creator of this "metaphysical reality".


If God is the supreme metaphysical reality it is logically impossible for there to be a higher conception of God.




If you ask why God is the supreme metaphysical reality, the answer is that God is the supreme metaphysical reality by definition.


Who's definition is this?


I kind of ripped it off from Merriam-Webster. It's an admittedly broad definition of God, but this definition allows doctrines like pantheism to be possible (pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence, and a pantheistic God does not necessarily share traditional theistic aspects like omnipotence and consciousness). We have to use a broad definition if we wish to call a pantheistic God a conception of God.

Why not say that pink elephants are the supreme metaphysical reality, and thus if objective morality exists, pink elephants exist, and pink elephants are the ultimate authority because they are "the supreme metaphysical reality".


Because it's a bizarre and confusing term. Instead of the term "pink elephants" referring to elephants that are pink, the term refers to something entirely different ("the supreme metaphysical reality"). The definition of God I used is broad so that it permits the doctrine of pantheism (and I didn't make pantheism up). Remember, a pantheistic God does not necessarily share the traditional aspects of a monotheistic God.



But I still have no concept of authority coming from the universe. Your best explanation only tells me that the universe prescribes certain actions, not that it enforces those prescriptions.


How well my best explanation works will depend on how you define "authority." If you are using it in the sense that it enforces moral law and punishes evildoers then perhaps you're right. But that is not "authority" in the sense that I am using the term. I'm saying the basis of morality must be authoritative in the sense that people really ought to obey it. It is in this sense that I am saying the heart of God has the authority to say how we ought to behave.

Nonetheless, it is still logically possible for a pantheistic God to enforce and bring punishment (e.g. in the afterlife) though I'm guessing that will probably not be plausible to most atheists.
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Posted 03/02/08 - 06:00 PM:
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#531
So not to let this thread turn back into that regressive loop, but I want to respond to this briefly.

Tist, I know in your head this is all very clear, but it is coming-off as quite unwarranted and ambiguous and your recent post illustrates this.

Tist wrote:

You're taking what I said too literally. I meant "heart" in the sense of Merriam-Webster dictionary definition 6b, "the essential or most vital part of something." Moral goodness is simply an inextricable part of who and what God is.


So let's just completely drop the label God, for now, and just substitute "the supreme metaphysical reality" to avoid any confusion. Moral goodness (as opposed to "moral badness" i guess), then, is an inextricable part of who and what reality is? Why? I seem to have a conception of reality functioning without morality at all, and this conception makes far more sense and has more reason than some inexplicable description of 'morality' being the "essential or most vital part" of reality. We have never been given a reason to such a claim, and what makes it even more confusing is that it is being given in conjunction with a contrasting claim: reality is the basis for morality. Perhaps you can explain how we can simultaneously have reality as the basis for morality as well as [/i]morality as the basis of reality[/i] (unless of course they are the same thing, but arguing that reality is morality is very different from what has been said).


The definition of "authority" I am using is “the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed.”


And this is a bad definition of authority that goes contrary to 3000 years of meaning in various languages. "Authority" has always involved more than merely something that ought to be obeyed. In fact, literature is constantly plagued with people that ought to be obeyed but incidentally weren't simply because they lacked authority. Authority is quite clearly something more than "the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed."


In my worldview, it is the heart of God (i.e. the nature and essence of what he is) where these moral dictates originate.


So then "the essential and most vital part" of "the supreme metaphysical reality" is where moral dictates originate? Sorry, but that sounds a bit confusing to me; its a little too ambiguous for my tastes. Not to mention it simply doesn't actually tell me where morality originates.


If objective moral values exist without the traditional God, I think a pantheistic God would be the most plausible explanation (i.e. "It is the universe/reality/existence that says how we ought to behave") so in that sense the answer to your question is yes. We should obey the moral dictates that come from reality/existence.


So you accept that if someone who considers pantheism as merely a means to circumvent first causes and really a perversion the word "god" and all its contextual meanings then, to such a person, your talk of God is really a trick of language, and you are really just saying the universe/reality/existence says how we ought to behave?


If God is the supreme metaphysical reality it is logically impossible for there to be a higher conception of God.


Unless of course you are mistaken and the creator of the supreme metaphysical reality carries more authority than reality itself.


I kind of ripped it off from Merriam-Webster. It's an admittedly broad definition of God, but this definition allows doctrines like pantheism to be possible (pantheism equates God with the universe/reality/existence, and a pantheistic God does not necessarily share traditional theistic aspects like omnipotence and consciousness). We have to use a broad definition if we wish to call a pantheistic God a conception of God.


We don't have use this definition; you do. You are choosing this definition and people are contending with it in saying that "God" is poorly defined as "the supreme metaphysical reality". In response, you need to offer a rational justification for this definition of god aside from the fact that it helps you make your point. Because as you say, without such a definition of God, a pantheistic God is NOT a conception of God.


Because it's a bizarre and confusing term.


Yet it is no more bizarre and confusing than the way you are attempting to define a pantheistic God, and that is the point that I am making.


Instead of the term "pink elephants" referring to elephants that are pink, the term refers to something entirely different ("the supreme metaphysical reality").


And instead of the term "God" referring to the creator of reality, the term refers to something entirely different (reality itself).


The definition of God I used is broad so that it permits the doctrine of pantheism (and I didn't make pantheism up).


And the definition of Pink Elephants I used is so broad that it permits the doctrine of rosa elephantism ( and I didn't make pink elephants up).


Remember, a pantheistic God does not necessarily share the traditional aspects of a monotheistic God.


Remember, a pink elephant does not necessarily share the traditional aspects of a traditional elephant.


How well my best explanation works will depend on how you define "authority." If you are using it in the sense that it enforces moral law and punishes evildoers then perhaps you're right.


Okay, so let's compare the two definitions and pick which one is most applicable to morality, for we are talking about moral authority.

So essentially, what we are looking for when we say authority (as explained above) is more than merely people ought to obey something, for if people ought to obey something, than that is a definition of morality, not authority. Authority would be the reason someone ought to obey something. In this sense, "Authority is that which enforces moral law" (not exactly the words I would use, but they'll work for now) seems a much better definition than "Authority is that which people really ought to obey" for the former provides a reason to adhere to moral doctrine (namely that morality is actually enforced by something) whereas the latter merely leaves it at "people really ought to obey it".

This could be easily amended should you provide a reason why "people really ought to obey" morality based upon "the supreme metaphysical reality". This would give you "authority", and it seems a fair and simple task for you to do it. Clearly there will need to be more justification than "it is the heart of God".


Nonetheless, it is still logically possible for a pantheistic God to enforce and bring punishment (e.g. in the afterlife) though I'm guessing that will probably not be plausible to most atheists


I'm not an atheist, but I have trouble conceiving of an afterlife from a pantheistic God. What would that be?
Some form of post-reality? Aside from having a very General definition of "authority" and "God", you seem to have a pretty general definition of "logical" as well.
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Posted 03/03/08 - 08:19 PM:
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#532
Buddahchuck wrote:
So I can barely communicate how overjoyed I am to see that PMB has joined this thread, adding his precise, direct and very fair analysis of philosophical concepts...
Well, thank you for bringing the thread to my attention. smiling face

I must admit that I've never specifically worked on the moral argument before -- though I have been planning a paper about it -- so my precision may at times be counterbalanced by ignorance. We shall see.

Buddahchuck wrote:
(NB I do sort of assume that PMB is a guy, a fair assumption considering that philosophy is a male-dominated field).
That's a fair assumption, and in this case a correct one. And in the next century, I'll be just another dead, white guy to study. sticking out tongue

Buddahchuck wrote:
In society, there is a clear usefulness for morality, for having a right and wrong; namely, to ensure equal treatment by and for each individual within that society. The extent to which this is useful is up for debate, but the problem presented by this is "Upon what do we base morality?" The two typical choices are 'faith' and 'reason'.
I think it is widely known (among those who understand my moral philosophy at all) that I fully support an instrumentalist approach to morality -- that is, I recognize its usefulness as a tool of social cohesion and a psychological pacifier (that's an intentional double-entendre, by the way). As such, I have no objection to first order morality, per se. I would argue, however, that we must understand "reason" quite widely (and "faith" as well) for the choice you have presented above to be a genuine dilemma. That is, a sentimentalist teleology of morals (à la Hume) involves reason, but only as slave to the passions. Authoritarian doctrines, meanwhile, are only "faith-based" insofar as they are unquestionable (which in some cases will involve a rather pejorative sense of the word "faith"). Moreover, a social contract (for example) may be reached in a teleological fashion only to take on an authoritarian role (although, see Thomas Jefferson for some insights into how this undermines even the original contract). So while the dichotomy presented is interesting, I have my doubts as to its sufficiency.

Buddahchuck wrote:
So saying that morality ought to be based on reason only allows for a poor standard for determining what is right and wrong.
It is also viciously circular. Either morality is justifying itself in this case or reason is.

Buddahchuck wrote:
So I would like to say that I really have no vestment in Authoritarian morals, but the great advantage that authoritarianism provides is that standardization for morals that becomes so useful in society. Otherwise, I have been quite tempted to cheerlead for moral nihilism, or some exciting concept of internal morality that plays on the existential nature of a human considering morality.
Have I ever recommended reading Nietzsche to you? I think you might be intrigued by, if not in complete agreement with, his thoughts on morality as presented in Daybreak (Cambridge edition) or The Gay Science (Walter Kaufmann edition). And, of course, you can't forget Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals (the Kaufmann translations of which can both be found in his Basic Writings of Nietzsche).

Nietzsche, after rejecting objective morality, recommends a highly individualistic take on behavior in which authenticity (to anachronistically borrow a term from later Existentialist thought) is valued over obedience. While many (mistakenly) believe this to result in a kind of "anything goes" mentality, the recommendation comes with a thorough description of human psychology -- the details of which clearly delimit what "counts" as "permissible." (Nietzsche is greatly misunderstood, and so the proper study of him pays great dividends. Here's one fun fact that would blow most notions of Nietzsche straight out of the water: gratuitously causing harm to another is a sign of weakness on Nietzsche's account, as he conceives of power as being most evident in acts of self-constraint. The strong do not need to harm others gratuitously.)

Buddahchuck wrote:
So while I'm not sure that this provides as a "metaphysical mechanism" by which God serves as a basis for morality, but it certainly provides an explanation as to the social necessity for morality. In addition, it provides a means and frame of discussion that allows a topic not entirely unrelated to what we have been discussing thus far. I look forward to a fresh look on this thread.
Again, I have no objections to an instrumentalist approach to morality (though I agree with Nietzsche that the need for such an approach is something to be overcome, though this is not currently feasible for most people). Furthermore, let me be clear: it has never been my intention to suggest that the existence of God could not make any difference to morality, only that it cannot serve a specific role that certain theistic moral realists want it to play.
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus
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Posted 03/03/08 - 08:22 PM:
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#533
Mariner wrote:
As I said many thousands of posts ago, though, such an emphasis on the external aspect of morality is lopsided. Morality can't be divided and analyzed as if its subjective and objective halves were independent of each other.
I think I agree, but it depends on what you mean by "subjective and objective halves." Indeed, this has been a source of confusion for me when trying to understand you basic metaethical position (such as in our thread on Hoppe -- which I promise to get back to someday -- and the thread that lead to that discussion). I can agree that there are objective elements to morality if we understand them to be things such as actions, reactions, and the like. That is, it is objectively true that some people kill other people, that many people dislike such occurrences, and that there is in most nations a system by which people who do such things are judged and sentenced according to a set legal standard. It is subjective that any of these actions or reactions are "right/wrong," "just/unjust," et cetera. You are certainly correct that the whole picture must be taken into account when creating a normative system for behavior, however, and the traditional failure to do so has indeed yielded a lopsided field of inquiry.

Mariner wrote:
I must say (as I've done countless times around PF) that the opposition between reason and faith is plain wrong. Faith isn't "believing in something for no reason". Even the (unjustified) faith that this is the proper definition of faith has a reason wink.
Agreed. Faith in the pejorative sense is not faith in toto. nod

Mariner wrote:
PMB, I'll take a shot at answering your question about karma and God. As I see it, karma is easily acceptable as "the source of objective morality" in Tisthammerw's terms. If someone says, "the phenomenon of morality implies that something like karma must be real", I'd say that the case has been well presented, and that Tisthammerw's position has been vindicated. You see, karma is far more objective than God grin.
Indeed. smiling face

But that is actually a problem for Tisthammerw's position, since the moral argument for God requires that other supernatural entities not be qualified to play the role he wants God to play. Though I would suggest that even karma cannot get us objective morality in the sense sought for by moral realists.

Mariner wrote:
God can forgive sinners; He has a will. Karma can't. If one accepts that karma is "the legislator of the universe", ensuring that transgressions are punished and good acts are rewarded (in some life), then one must ditch atheism. Karma may be impersonal theism, but it is still theism in this sense -- it posits a supernatural, beyond-the-senses reality which controls the accessible-to-senses reality. Once one accepts that, he's no longer an atheist.
I disagree. You seem to be conflating atheism with (metaphysical) naturalism, which would be in error. That is, it makes sense to call Buddhism, Jainism, and Taoism atheistic religions despite the fact that some forms of each (though not all forms, except for the case of Jainism) involve some supernatural elements. Jainism is perhaps the best example here: it is dualistic (in a Cartesian sense) and involves a strong concept of karma, but has no Creator God. The only "gods" are those humans who achieve moksha (liberation). Thus Jains are decidedly atheistic in modern terms, though they are certainly not naturalists in the metaphysical sense.

Mariner wrote:
God has many names, but by accepting that evil will be punished (not "should", or "it would be nice if...") and good will be rewarded, one is clearly talking about the same thing which Tisthammerw is talking about.
I'm not so sure about that. For one thing, there is still a lot to say about what qualifies (or perhaps even quantifies) "evil" before we can even know whether or not it will be "punished." For another, Tisthammerw is explicitly concerned with prescriptivity, which involves talk like "should." Finally, God may have many names, but there is a limit to what the word can be applied to while still creating philosophically interesting differences of opinion. That is, one might use the bare word "God" to mean the same thing I do when I say "stone," but that no more proves theism as it is commonly understood than it would prove atheism to define it as the thesis that there is at least one thing in the universe.
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus
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Posted 03/03/08 - 08:31 PM:
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Tisthammerw wrote:
I had already noted I was aware we shared the same view here, it's just that when you said, "This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig" I was under the impression you were accusing me of quoting him.
You take me too literally. My main point (as made clear by the lines that followed) was that you had not adequately explained what your words amount to -- and you still haven't.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I questioned their sufficiency in regards to answering the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" but I'm not sure I categorically tossed them out (though I do strongly suspect they are in fact insufficient in this regard).
But the problem is that you have casually rejected the two most popular moral theories in existence. While I may agree with you that they are insufficient, real philosophical work needs to be done if you are to demonstrate that (which you must if your argument is to have deductive validity). Now, perhaps it is unfair to ask you to single-handedly destroy two historically compelling theories, but you should at least offer us some considerations in your favor.

Tisthammerw wrote:
It is logically possible for the universe to be five minutes old, but it's not necessarily plausible.
Agreed. Luckily, plausibility does not consist in mere logical possibility. Instead, an option is plausible if, prior to reaching a conclusion (and in some cases, even after), the option looks like it might have a good chance of successfully explaining whatever is being examined. If many people believe that an option has a good chance -- or if many people think an option offers a successful explanation -- it is, necessarily, plausible in a general sense. Any given individual may reject it, or even find it implausible (and it is important to note that this is true even if the option turns out to be correct), and so it may be personally implausible in that instance. But that does not negate the general plausibility the option may retain. Ideally, no possible option would be ignored when examining an issue. But practically speaking, no (generally) plausible option can be ignored -- or even casually waved aside.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I'm looking for viable, plausible alternatives. (If an alternative just doesn't work, I don't see it as plausible.)
You are failing to understand the hierarchy of concepts here, and thus your equivocation. Being false does not mean being implausible -- particularly not prior to any definite conclusions. Phlogiston was once a plausible, though false, theory of heat. It is not plausible any more, and it is certainly not viable given current science. But at the time, it was certainly plausible. Not having given us any real considerations for two generally plausible options you wish to reject, you have not met your burden of proof.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Great, but notice you didn't answer the question I put forward. The inability to adequately answer the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" would constitute a fatal problem for any alternatives, including these ones.
I assumed you were familiar enough with utilitarianism to know the basic outlines of the theory, which is all I would have given you anyway. But since you asked, utilitarians would argue that happiness is necessarily a good, and that wrapped up in the definition of "goodness" is "to be pursued/promoted." It is a necessary -- and objective -- truth, then, that one ought to both pursue and promote happiness. While you may not personally agree, that is a far cry from proving that it is fundamentally inadequate.

Tisthammerw wrote:
You ignored my arguments for why the interesting characteristics would logically follow from a pantheistic God being the basis of objective morality.
No I didn't, you have offered no such arguments. What you have given us is a list of assertions that make sense to you, but apparently no one else. This is a problem, particularly among analytic philosophers. The sooner you realize this, the better.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Recall that my definition of pantheism was pretty much as broad as what you defined here, i.e. equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. And from this (in addition to a pantheistic God being the basis of morality) I was able to derive those "interesting characteristics." Attacking the claim is fine, but it's probably more constructive to attack the evidential argument supporting that claim.
It is more constructive, which is why I did so. Why you chose to ignore it is beyond me, though I would suspect your dogmatic attachment to the moral argument for God is causing you to ignore the requirements of academic skepticism (that is, the philosophical need to detach ourselves from dogma and seek out arguments while taking as little as possible for granted).

In case you have forgotten, I noted that broad definitions of pantheism become indistinguishable from a naturalist perspective. And insofar as it is naturalistic atheists that you are seeking to undermine here, such broadness forfeits the point. Because you have offered assertions in place of arguments, it is perhaps understandable why you think this is attack against the claim itself. But insofar as it undermines what might be charitably seen as your premises, it constitutes an attack on your "evidential argument."

Tisthammerw wrote:
Please remember the definitions being used here; the general definition of God is "the supreme metaphysical reality."
Okay, take three. True or false: if there is no God, there is still an ultimate (and thus "supreme") metaphysical reality. If true, what you have offered is not a definition, but a quality that God is believed to have in theistic universes. If false, it is quite unclear what you mean by "supreme metaphysical reality" and it may be just further word candy -- full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Given the definitions of the terms involved, it’s not clear why this conclusion is question begging. It seems to logically follow.
For one thing, you have ignored which question I was accusing you of begging. That is, what I observed was you using the assumption that only God could justify objective morality as a premise in an argument to demonstrate that only God could justify morality. Second, you have failed to understand how certain forms of pantheism are philosophically uninteresting as alternatives to a naturalistic account of the world. Finally, you have either taken attributions as definitions and committed the errors that follow from such a mistake, or you have defined something into existence by calling a tail a leg. If you don't understand why all of these things are problematic, then you need a serious refresher in philosophical method.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I very specifically said that it was a definition, i.e. this is what I mean by the term "God."
See above for my response to this.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I borrowed it (more or less) from the dictionary: "the supreme or ultimate reality." It goes on for two more specific definitions, but this broad one is what we should focus on here because it allows for the doctrine of pantheism. Remember, a pantheistic God does not necessarily have attributes like omnipotence and consciousness. So how would you define God?
God requires different definitions, depending on whether we are discussing theism, deism, or pantheism. As such, God could be defined as:
  • God (theism) - a supernatural being conceived as the perfect and omnipotent and omniscient originator and ruler of the universe.
  • God (deism) - the first cause of the universe.
  • God (pantheism) - the combined force and laws which are manifested in the existing universe.
The moral argument for God was designed with the theistic concept of God in mind, and for good reason: the deists' God is merely postulated as a means for getting the universe started, while the pantheistic "God" may prove to be indistinguishable from the atheistic "universe" (thus Spinoza's deus sive natura -- God, or nature). Here's another good definition, though, which carries a lot of the important aspects:
  • Any supernatural being worshipped as controlling some part of the world or some aspect of life or who is the personification of a force.
Given the wealth of supernatural concepts in existence, I find personification to be fairly important to any robust definition of God that hopes to stand up to rival definitions. Other definitions always threaten to evaporate into another concept -- supernatural or even natural. Deism, for example, would have nothing to speak in its favor should a replacement first cause be found (or should we discover that we don't actually need a first cause, as Stephen Hawking has suggested). We could just stipulate that whatever that first cause is constitutes God, but the original justification for that label was the belief that the first cause could not be explained in naturalistic terms. Should that prove to be false, deism would lose credibility and cease to be philosophically interesting. Meanwhile, pantheism fails to be philosophically interesting unless it posits that the collection of all existing things not only constitutes a nameable set (such as the way in which the numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 constitute the set of odd, single digit numbers), but manages to give rise to something new (such as the way the collection of neurons that make up our brain give rise to consciousness). If "God" is just a name applicable to some necessarily existing set (i.e. whatever exists, supernatural or not) then it does not provide a genuine alternative to atheism (at least not on the bare conceptual level). Then again, I am aware of several efforts to move away from a robustly anthropomorphic God. It remains to be seen what can be made of such concepts.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Unfortunately you kind of avoided my questions. Yes, I'm sure you have lots of things to say about what utilitarianism is and what Kantian ethics is. But perhaps it would be simpler and more constructive to simply give me a straight answer here?
Not really. I pointed you towards the relevant literature. I cannot, however, be expected to do your research and reading for you. We are, after all, on the opposite side of this issue. wink

Tisthammerw wrote:
I perused the Advocatus Diaboli thread and didn't see an answer to my question.
I've explained it a little further above.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Additionally, if Kant did indeed argue that there was indeed a logical proof of "thou shalt not kill" as you claim, I don't suppose you would mind showing me this logical proof?
Again, I am not here to do your research for you. It is not my fault that you have not done the relevant reading or met your burden of proof. I have pointed these failings out, and it is up to you to fix them.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Kant might have put forth an imperative like, “only act according to principles that you rationally wish everyone would follow.” We can perhaps use reason to derive prohibitions against stealing and murder based on this imperative, but who or what says we ought to follow this imperative? This is something that reason alone cannot justify. I do not believe there is any logical proof we can appeal to that would actually work. It seems that reason can never get beyond hypothetical imperatives (“If the goal is to get A, then do B”). For instance, you could reasonably say that we ought to follow the Kantian imperative if we ought to make the world a jolly place, but then we’d have to answer the question of who or what says we ought to pursue the goal of a jolly planet. The Kantian imperative—at least by itself—simply does not work here.
Finally, you have given us something of a consideration as to why we should not consider one of the alternatives you had previously ignored! But notice that you had to take it seriously -- if only for a moment -- in order to do so. Even a skeptic cannot avoid engaging the issues, you see. I, of course, completely agree with you about the failings of Kantian ethics.

Tisthammerw wrote:
If I see that an alternative doesn't work, it won't seem worthy of belief. Hence, if it's known not to be viable it's not plausible. But perhaps we're using different definitions?
See above.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Well, I suppose you could argue it is not a viable atheistic alternative if it leads to a pantheistic God...
Which was precisely my point, thank you very much.

Tisthammerw wrote:
...but why would the argument fail if the pantheistic God was an alternative that worked in some general sense?
I didn't say it would. If it works, then obviously the argument doesn't fail.

Tisthammerw wrote:
The brute fact position technically works...
I don't see how. It's just an assertion. Now, we can take it as an assumption and see what follows from there, but that's a different story (one which you go on to follow).

Tisthammerw wrote:
[The brute fact position] seems to lead to a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral--which is treading awfully close to theism.
I don't agree, and this is where I have accused you of illicitly importing an unwarranted assumption: namely, that whatever justifies the brute fact position is necessarily your God. This is to take as an assumption that which you are trying to prove -- which is, of course, to beg the question. If moral truths are truly just brute facts, then that's all there is to say (that's the very definition of "brute," after all). As such, I don't see it leading to theism at all.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey.
I agree that this sounds an awful lot like a person. I disagree that the morality such a God might form the basis of would be objective. Adding moral subjects to a universe does not yield moral objects.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Okay, so apparently you were not just asking what morally relevant thing God can do that karma cannot.
That's exactly what I was asking; however, I was expecting a substantive answer.

Tisthammerw wrote:
I'm guessing then you were primarily wondering how God can be the basis of moral values such that moral values would be objective.
An explanation of that would be necessary to give a substantive answer to my question; so yes, I suppose that's what I was "primarily wondering." Only the most obstinate pedantry could lead one to think the answer you gave before was sufficient.

Tisthammerw wrote:
In hindsight perhaps it wasn't clear how my answer fit the "non-subjective" part, and the answer to this sort of thing might depend on how you define moral objectivism, but the definition I'll use is "the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion." It is my position that the metaphysical basis of moral objectivism is the heart of God, and the heart of God is not human opinion.
The Wikipedia definition is close, but fatally flawed: take out the word "human" and we're getting somewhere (otherwise a chimpanzee's opinion, so long as it was not dependent on any human being, would be sufficient for all the definition tells us).

A more technically precise definition of moral realism can be found in the following excerpt from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Macmillan 2005) :
Moral realism is a metaethical view committed to robust objectivity in ethics. No single description is likely to capture all realist views, but a reasonably accurate rule is to understand moral realism as the conjunction of three theses:

The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as “right” and “wrong”) is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as “honesty is good” and “slavery is unjust”) purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false, and so on).

The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true.

The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of) ordinary non-moral facts and properties.

To deny any one of these three theses is to embrace some form of moral irrealism.
The central aspects of objectivism are found in the metaphysical thesis, though all three theses must be affirmed to be a moral realist (which is often used interchangeably with moral objectivism). I will grant you the semantic thesis (as will anyone other than a non-cognitivist), and I deny the alethic thesis on the basis of my rejection of the metaphysical thesis. And really, the metaphysical thesis is where most of the action is.

But etymology aside, you have still not explained precisely what "the heart of God" amounts to. It remains an empty name as far as I am concerned.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Are you saying that the existence of objective moral values is logically impossible?
Yes.


Tisthammerw wrote:
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:
We both believe that naturalists cannot explain objective morality.
I suppose that would depend on whether you would consider my aforementioned pantheistic God (one that has supreme authority over moral right and wrong etc.) to fit in with the naturalistic worldview.
Naturalism = atheistic. Therefore, if your pantheistic God fits in with naturalism then the moral argument has failed (in that it has not resulted in a demand for anything that cannot be handled by a naturalistic worldview).

Tisthammerw wrote:
I hesitate to agree because God being the best explanation for the existence of objective moral values might be relevant to the claim "If objective moral values exist, they are evidence for the existence of God." Being the inference to the best explanation would conceivably make that claim true.
If God cannot provide a sound basis for objective morality, then it doesn't matter if the moral argument is constructed deductively (à la Kant or Craig) or inductively (as in inference to the best explanation). After all, something cannot be the best explanation for something that it cannot explain at all.

Tisthammerw wrote:
However, we do seem to disagree whether theism can provide a sound basis for objective morality. So perhaps we should focus on that claim instead.
This is the claim I was suggesting we focus on. The previous bit was just a note about why dealing with this issue would be sufficient.

Tisthammerw wrote:
But why think it would make it arbitrary?
Arbitrary in the metaethical sense -- as in the Euthyphro problem. Even if Socrates' hypothetical god follows a partially rational process to reach his decisions, it is still arbitrary in this final sense, even if it is not radically arbitrary (as in, without any reason whatsoever).

Tisthammerw wrote:
...it is possible (maybe even probable) that if God exists he is not as anthropomorphic as this argument apparently presupposes.
Yes, it is quite possible. Many recent responses to people such as Dennett and Dawkins have given up the concept of an anthropomorphic God in favor of a more abstract concept. By your own admission, however, a moral God seems to be an anthropomorphic one.

Tisthammerw wrote:
The “arbitrary” objection seems to be missing a premise, at least in some of its more simplistic formulations. Consider this argument against the argument from morality (this sort of argument convinced me for a number of years):

  1. If God commanded rape, then rape would be ethical
  2. Rape is not ethical.
  3. Therefore: God is not the basis for ethics.

At first blush it might look deductively valid (i.e. that the conclusion is true if the premises are true)...
It shouldn't look valid. As stated, premises (1) and (2) only entail "it is not the case that God commanded rape." The argument should look more like this:
  1. If God were the basis of ethics, then he could make rape ethical.
  2. Rape could not be ethical.
  3. Therefore: God is not the basis for ethics.
This is, of course, virtually the same argument you formulate later on. The problem for the moral argument is to explain (1) how God can be the basis of ethics, yet still be powerless to make rape ethical or eating vegetables unethical, and (2) how such a moral system could be objectively valid.

This problem does not exist for virtue ethics because virtues are not posited to be powerful or causal entities. Thus, "if virtues were the basis of ethics, rape could be a virtue" is not nearly as plausible of a premise. Rather, it just seems impossible for rape to be a virtue.

Tisthammerw wrote:
Both the virtue ethicist and the theist could argue that premise #2 seems to preclude premise #1. Suppose that premise #2 is true and rape cannot be ethical. Then why on Earth should one accept that if God were the basis of ethics he could command rape, especially if God is not necessarily as anthropomorphic as this argument seems to assume?
Again, the problem is that God and virtue do not seem to be analogous concepts. God, particularly a God who is responsible for morality, should be able to dictate what is moral. In such a case, we just have to hope that God is benevolent and thus chooses not to make glass-eating morally obligatory. If He is constrained by something other than his benevolence, however, it seems it would have to be something outside of Him -- and thus logically separable from Him.

(It may be that only a benevolent God could be worthy of the kind of worship that theists take part in, and thus God must be benevolent by virtue of definition. That is, an entity that was the same in all other aspects, but was malevolent or indifferent, might be seen as fulfilling many of the same metaphysical functions of God, but still not qualified to be called God. I'm not sure how attractive such a view should be to theists, given its potential to wreak havoc upon a number of traditional arguments. Regardless, it would obviously not solve the dilemma above.)

The virtues, on the other hand, are posited as just being virtuous. And they have this quality as a consequence of being instrumental to a good life. Virtue ethics, after all, only makes sense on a teleological reading and thus requires some goal (eudaimonia, for example) to be complete. Now perhaps the good life posited by some moral philosophers would necessarily include rape. In such a case, assuming we are not going to reassess our opinions of rape, I don't see why such an odd consequence shouldn't make us take pause and rethink the particular presentation of virtue ethics concerned.

Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 05/14/08 - 11:27 AM
"If there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life." - Albert Camus
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Posted 03/05/08 - 04:32 AM:
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#535
Postmodern Beatnik,

Love your work!
Mariner
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Posted 03/05/08 - 07:20 AM:
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#536
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

You seem to be conflating atheism with (metaphysical) naturalism, which would be in error. That is, it makes sense to call Buddhism, Jainism, and Taoism atheistic religions despite the fact that some forms of each (though not all forms, except for the case of Jainism) involve some supernatural elements. Jainism is perhaps the best example here: it is dualistic (in a Cartesian sense) and involves a strong concept of karma, but has no Creator God. The only "gods" are those humans who achieve moksha (liberation). Thus Jains are decidedly atheistic in modern terms, though they are certainly not naturalists in the metaphysical sense.


You are right. My error comes from dealing with Christian atheists in the majority of discussions around here. If the expression "Christian atheist" puzzles someone, so be it. Puzzling people is our task, after all cool. Any atheist is always in reaction against some concept of God (as betrayed by the etymology of the word...). Your examples would be in reaction against Hinduism, animism, ancestor worship, etc. This amounts to a side note, though -- your point is certainly correct, naturalism and atheism are not synonyms.

I'm not so sure about that. For one thing, there is still a lot to say about what qualifies (or perhaps even quantifies) "evil" before we can even know whether or not it will be "punished."


Yep, and this takes us very close to subjective-land. Which is, in the last analysis, the best argument for a personal God. If the "ground of morality" is not an agent, who loves good and shuns evil as He/She/It sees it, then all talk of good and evil becomes strained. Karma-defenders have to deal with this problem, and I don't know how they reconcile it.

A moral conflict is a conflict of wills. To posit objective morality without positing a will is positing trees without roots.

For another, Tisthammerw is explicitly concerned with prescriptivity, which involves talk like "should."


We could imagine a moral agent saying that he is opposed to something but unwilling to take action against it. It happens all the time (especially if one is lazy grin). What puts the moral agent* "God" in a different position from this is the fact that everything is sustained into being by his active intervention. (By the way, for those who may be interested, this is not pantheism; it is orthodox theism). God "acts" in the existence of every being; which is what we theists mean when we say that God "allows" being X to exist. So, in a sense, God cannot abstain from having a vote in the morality of any existing thing. He either approves of it, or doesn't approve of it (granting that there are degrees of each). Agreement between the will of X and the will of God, from God's viewpoint, is the only desirable state.

(Which is not an argument that nullifies free will, or God's omnipotence even though there is evil; but this would be a little off-topic here).

*I put this little footnote here as a reminder that using the word "agent" about God is as wrong as calling Him "a subject"; both words are pregnant with misunderstandings, as always is the case when we try to address God with words.

Finally, God may have many names, but there is a limit to what the word can be applied to while still creating philosophically interesting differences of opinion. That is, one might use the bare word "God" to mean the same thing I do when I say "stone," but that no more proves theism as it is commonly understood than it would prove atheism to define it as the thesis that there is at least one thing in the universe.


Sure, but that's not the case. If one does not want to use "God" to refer to "the objective ground of morality", preferring "karma", that's his right, but it won't change the Tisthammerian argument.

Final clarifiers (not necessarily for you PMB; past discussions make me think that you are more aware of my positions than most):

1. I don't think there is an objective ground of morality that is independent from subjective valuations (which is what most people would take from the bare expression "objective ground of morality"). Take away the "independent" part and I'd agree.

2. I don't think that karma and God are equivalent; I'm rather defending the notion that both concepts fit into the Tisthammerian argument.

3. Putting (1) and (2) in conjunction, I think that the shortcoming in the Tisthammerian argument is not that it is wrong; it is rather that it is trivial, and it is trivial because it doesn't address the thorny subjective side of morality. Karma can be shown (I think!) to be wrong if we take into account the role of the subject in morality.

4. Nevertheless, the Tisthammerian argument is important in that it closes off one possible road of "explaining away" morality, namely, the "objective naturalistic" view. (Which is amazingly naive, of course, and something that makes me think of 19th century positivism, social darwinism, and other dated doctrines -- even while it is making a comeback in such misnamed theories such as "evolutionary psychology"). The argument is not enough to prove, or even indicate, God (I suspect this isn't Tist's goal though). A full analysis of the will, explaining why it would be wrong to will holocausts and slaughters, is required. And it is my belief (sustained by arguments which won't fit into this paragraph grin) that this is impossible (else the will wouldn't be free). The "wrongness" of holocausts is not susceptible to analysis. It is a datum, found (and founded!) by my will, and which can be found/ed by other wills... or not.

Morality is not so easy as to fit into any scheme. Luckily. I'd loathe to live in a world with Orcs -- with people who can be proven to be wicked, based on their actions/beliefs.



Edited by Mariner on 03/05/08 - 07:27 AM
"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/05/08 - 07:40 PM:
quote post
#537
Definitions

Philosophy, psychology, and computer science often take ordinary words and adjust their meaning slightly so that the words more accurately convey the meaning. For example, in metaphysics “free will” can take varying definitions depending on whose theory you accept and although the definitions are typically similar to what a layperson may think of free will they are not necessarily identical. Psychology articles can get more dissimilar from the common meaning, and the word “random” in “random access memory” is more dissimilar yet. Personal dislike of a definition is actually no reason to object to the conclusion as long as the definitions are used consistently. So saying “I don’t like that definition” is really beside the point. For instance, one might abominate the definitions of “two” and “four” in mathematics, but even if the majority shared this disliked this would not change that under the definitions it logically follows that two plus two equal four.

Similarly, I may use authority to mean “the right to give orders” whereas you may see it as not only the right to give orders but also the power to punish disobedience of such orders. This criticism really doesn’t get us anywhere, because what really matters is if the conclusion logically follows from my definitions. Expressing dislike of the definitions themselves (saying they are unconventional etc.) really won’t accomplish much. Focusing overzealously on the definitions runs the risks of fallacies of equivocation, misconstruals, ignoratio elenchi, non sequiturs.

That said, claiming that defining “God” as “the supreme metaphysical reality” is equally (or more so) as bizarre as defining the term “pink elephants” as “the supreme metaphysical reality” is not quite cricket. The problem with defining “God” too narrowly is that it makes the definition of pantheism (equating God with the universe/reality/existence) meaningless or misleading. A pantheistic God does not necessarily have the traditional aspects of God like omnipotence and consciousness. Since my argument from morality includes use of the term “pantheism” I have little rational choice but to choose a coherent definition of God that also allows for pantheism to be meaningfully defined. Before you criticize my definition of God again, please answer this question: can you supply a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism accurate and meaningful?

If not, there seems little reason to criticize my definition if there’s no better one available. I understand you may dislike pantheism, but that’s still no reason not to have a meaningful definition of it (particularly when the term is being used for the topic at hand).

http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=authori...

This source includes the “right to give orders” as a match for the definition of authority. My definition (the power to put forth statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed) is extremely similar to this one, if not outright synonymous. Is such a definition really so bizarre?

Most attempts to define “authority” end up being circular. For instance, something like the “power to command” most closely resembles what I mean by “authority,” but the definition of “command” ends up being something like “to direct authoritatively.” Thus, authority is the power to direct authoritatively. This circularity isn’t very helpful. Hence, “the power to put forth for statements of what to do that ought to be obeyed” seems like an adequate non-circular definition of what I mean by “authority.”


Buddahchuck wrote:

So let's just completely drop the label God, for now, and just substitute "the supreme metaphysical reality" to avoid any confusion. Moral goodness (as opposed to "moral badness" i guess), then, is an inextricable part of who and what reality is?


No. Here's an example of a misconstrual and a fallacy of equivocation resulting from a dislike of my definitions. You have changed "supreme metaphysical reality" into "reality" (thus changing the actual meaning of the term as I used it) and asked a question that does not apply to my actual position.

Another example:


Perhaps you can explain how we can simultaneously have reality as the basis for morality as well as [/i]morality as the basis of reality[/i]


I do not adhere to this position at all and find it almost nonsensical, so it makes little sense for me to explain it.


Buddahchuck wrote:


In my worldview, it is the heart of God (i.e. the nature and essence of what he is) where these moral dictates originate.


So then "the essential and most vital part" of "the supreme metaphysical reality" is where moral dictates originate? Sorry, but that sounds a bit confusing to me; its a little too ambiguous for my tastes. Not to mention it simply doesn't actually tell me where morality originates.


I don't know how to make it much clearer to you (that objective morality comes from God himself, as an inextricable part of who and what he is) except perhaps to point out that morality doesn't originate in any physical location.

Tisthammerw: Additionally, it is thus logically impossible to appeal to any higher authority as to why we should obey.

Buddahchuck: Except of course a higher conception of God as being the creator of this "metaphysical reality".

Tisthammerw: If God is the supreme metaphysical reality it is logically impossible for there to be a higher conception of God.

Buddahchuck: Unless of course you are mistaken and the creator of the supreme metaphysical reality carries more authority than reality itself.

I don't think you understand the meaning of what I am trying to convey. It is logically impossible for there to be a higher authority than God. If X is the largest ball, it is logically impossible for there to be a larger ball (for then it would be larger than the most large ball, resulting in a self-contradiction). Similarly if X is the supreme metaphysical reality then there is no higher conception of God than X. If there is some metaphysical reality that is a higher conception of God than X, then X is not the supreme metaphysical reality (and therefore would have been God in the first place).

And again, please do not conflate "God" with "reality," since the two are not necessarily the same thing.




This could be easily amended should you provide a reason why "people really ought to obey" morality based upon "the supreme metaphysical reality".


But I have already provided a reason. Based on my definition of authority, the supreme metaphysical reality has "authority" in the sense that people really ought to obey it. God provides a metaphysical basis of objective moral values. Simplifying it a bit more, people really ought to obey the moral statements because those moral statements are correct.




Nonetheless, it is still logically possible for a pantheistic God to enforce and bring punishment (e.g. in the afterlife) though I'm guessing that will probably not be plausible to most atheists


I'm not an atheist, but I have trouble conceiving of an afterlife from a pantheistic God. What would that be?
Some form of post-reality?


No, afterlife would still be part of reality, albeit not necessarily part of physical reality. It may sound strange, but it is as I said logically possible.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.
Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/05/08 - 09:38 PM:
quote post
#538
Postmodern Beatnik wrote:

Tisthammerw wrote:

I had already noted I was aware we shared the same view here, it's just that when you said, "This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig" I was under the impression you were accusing me of quoting him.

You take me too literally.


Or rather, taken too literally. But next time if you do not want to accuse me quoting William Lane Craig, please do not say "This is some fine quoting of William Lane Craig." Such a remark is liable to misinterpretation.




I questioned their sufficiency in regards to answering the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" but I'm not sure I categorically tossed them out (though I do strongly suspect they are in fact insufficient in this regard).


But the problem is that you have casually rejected the two most popular moral theories in existence.


Again, I questioned their sufficiency in regards to answering the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" Which brings me to this:



Great, but notice you didn't answer the question I put forward. The inability to adequately answer the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" would constitute a fatal problem for any alternatives, including these ones.


I assumed you were familiar enough with utilitarianism to know the basic outlines of the theory, which is all I would have given you anyway. But since you asked, utilitarians would argue that happiness is necessarily a good, and that wrapped up in the definition of "goodness" is "to be pursued/promoted."


Great, but who or what says we ought to pursue happiness? The core question has not quite been answered yet.




You ignored my arguments for why the interesting characteristics would logically follow from a pantheistic God being the basis of objective morality.


No I didn't, you have offered no such arguments.


I'll try again.

I'm taking the premise that the basis of morality (as reality) cannot be mistaken about what is morally correct (else it would not be the basis of morality). Note that I'm defining "authority" as "the power to put forth statements of what to do (commands) that ought to be obeyed." It is one thing to merely say what people should do, but the basis of morality must be authoritative in that people really ought to obey it. Suppose for instance a Nazi commands a subordinate to kill Jews. Is it the case that the subordinate ought to obey the Nazi? No, the subordinate ought to obey the dictates of morality instead, because the dictates of objective morality are more authoritative than any human. The basis of morality must transcend the authority of other people’s behavioral commands if its ought-statements are to be objectively truthful. This would include, for instance, transcending the authority of dictators who would order torture and genocide. Otherwise people ought to obey the dictator instead of morality. Thus, the basis of objective morality (which under the pantheistic view in question is the universe/reality/existence) not only says how we ought to behave but also does so with supreme authority (transcending e.g. Hitler’s authority).

This pantheistic God might not contain consciousness but would have to possess supremely transcendent moral authority (transcending all peoples and cultures) while also possessing perfect moral correctness (it cannot be mistaken about what is right). Since a pantheistic God is equated with the universe/reality/existence, this supreme metaphysical reality is omnipresent and eternal. This is perhaps to be expected however, given that objective morality commands our behavior regardless of where we are and when we are. Interestingly, the essence of this pantheistic God must also be incorporeal if objective morality is not dependent upon anything in the physical world. Suppose for instance some strange device gets rid of all matter in the universe, stripping away anything physical and turning all humans into disembodied spirits. Would moral prohibitions against cruelty and violence cease to exist simply because there wasn’t a corporeal world? No, moral values are incorporeal and their underlying basis (the supreme metaphysical reality that says how we ought to behave) must also be incorporeal.

Yet a God that is transcendent, eternal, omnipresent, incorporeal and perfectly moral is treading awfully close to theism. Not to mention a moral God sounds an awful lot like a person—a moral God that says what everyone ought to do, a God that is the basis of morality and a God that everyone ought to obey. So even if it’s not an outright proof, to the very least the existence of objective morality still provides strong evidence for theism (by suggesting the existence of a God that is transcendent, omnipresent, perfectly moral etc.).

Feel free to intellectually assault my reasoning here, but please keep in mind a response like "you offered no argument" does nothing to explain why the reasoning of my argument doesn't work.




Recall that my definition of pantheism was pretty much as broad as what you defined here, i.e. equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence. And from this (in addition to a pantheistic God being the basis of morality) I was able to derive those "interesting characteristics." Attacking the claim is fine, but it's probably more constructive to attack the evidential argument supporting that claim.


It is more constructive, which is why I did so.


As I recall your response was "you have offered no such arguments." Or did you think I was referring to something else here?



In case you have forgotten, I noted that broad definitions of pantheism become indistinguishable from a naturalist perspective. And insofar as it is naturalistic atheists that you are seeking to undermine here, such broadness forfeits the point.


But is that really what I am trying to undermine here? Not really. I am actually trying to argue that objective moral values are evidence for the existence of God. The pantheistic God could be called "naturalistic," but (1) this is still God and (2) this (AFAIK) is the only plausible alternative; (3) this God has a number of interesting characteristics (transcendent, incorporeal, omnipresent etc.) suspiciously like those of traditional theism. It might not be an outright proof, but it still seems like evidence.




Please remember the definitions being used here; the general definition of God is "the supreme metaphysical reality."


Okay, take three. True or false: if there is no God, there is still an ultimate (and thus "supreme") metaphysical reality. If true, what you have offered is not a definition, but a quality that God is believed to have in theistic universes. If false, it is quite unclear what you mean by "supreme metaphysical reality" and it may be just further word candy -- full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.


Then perhaps you can offer a better definition of God that would make the definition of pantheism (the doctrine of equating God with the universe/reality/existence) accurate and meaningful?

Like "life" in biology perhaps there is no perfect definition of "God." But this is the best I can come up with (at least for now).



For one thing, you have ignored which question I was accusing you of begging. That is, what I observed was you using the assumption that only God could justify objective morality as a premise in an argument to demonstrate that only God could justify morality.


But I did not quite make the argument the way you mentioned; the context in which you replied was the universe being the basis of morality. I said that if the universe/reality/existence has supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong then this would constitute a form of pantheism (equating the supreme metaphysical reality with the universe/reality/existence). You may disagree with this statement, but if the universe having supreme metaphysical authority over moral right and wrong, possessing supreme moral authority over how we ought to behave, if this does not constitute pantheism (at least for naturalistic pantheism), then what does?




Are you saying that the existence of objective moral values is logically impossible?


Yes.


Perhaps then you could derive a logical contradiction from the definition of objective morality? I would very much like to see it.




Additionally, if Kant did indeed argue that there was indeed a logical proof of "thou shalt not kill" as you claim, I don't suppose you would mind showing me this logical proof?


Not really. I pointed you towards the relevant literature. I cannot, however, be expected to do your research and reading for you.


I'm not asking you to. I'm asking you to justify your position. If you claim to have knowledge of a logical proof that would refute my position, then with all due respect the burden of proof is on you to provide it, not on me to refute a proof that you haven't even presented. Perhaps you could quote Kant’s proof from this literature you speak of? Or perhaps offer a specific book with a specific page number? Or perhaps an online source with a specific location (as a section number or a subheader)? Otherwise I won't have much of a position to attack.

(Note that I have already addressed Kant’s categorical imperative, and thus this certainly did not seem to be a successful “proof.”)



Finally, you have given us something of a consideration as to why we should not consider one of the alternatives you had previously ignored! But notice that you had to take it seriously -- if only for a moment -- in order to do so. Even a skeptic cannot avoid engaging the issues, you see.


Well, I agree. But I do not think it is quite cricket to present the names of Kant and Mill and present them as alternatives to the question "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" without explaining "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" If you want to present something as a valid alternative answer to this question, I think you need to provide an answer to this question. Otherwise I won't have much of an alternative to address.



I don't agree, and this is where I have accused you of illicitly importing an unwarranted assumption: namely, that whatever justifies the brute fact position is necessarily your God.


But I didn't make this assumption. I did say that the brute fact position for objective morality was based in reality/existence. I had justified this by noting that anything that exists is based in existence, and that any real fact is based in reality. Therefore, it makes to say that a brute fact is ba